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This landmark study offers a rich and detailed portrait of the negotiating practices of American officials. It assesses the multiple influences—cultural, institutional, historical, and political—that shape how American policymakers and diplomats approach negotiations with foreign counterparts and highlights behavioral patterns that transcend the actions of individual negotiators and administrations.
Informed by discussions and interviews with more than fifty seasoned foreign and American negotiators, Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney argue that four distinctive mind-sets have combined to shape U.S. negotiating practice: a businessperson’s pragmatic quest for concrete results, a lawyer’s attention to detail, a superpower’s inclination to dictate terms, and a moralizer’s sense of mission. The authors examine how Americans employ time, language, enticements, and pressure tactics at the negotiating table, and how they use (or neglect) the media, back channel communications, and hospitality outside the formal negotiating arena. They also explore the intense interagency rivalries and congressional second-guessing that limit U.S. negotiators’ freedom to maneuver.
A chapter by the eminent historian Robert Schulzinger charts the evolving relationship between U.S. presidents and their negotiators, and the volume presents a set of eight remarkably candid foreign perspectives on particular aspects of American negotiating behavior. These chapters are written by a distinguished cast of ambassadors and foreign ministers, some from countries allied to the United States, others from rivals or adversaries and all with illuminating stories to tell.
In the concluding chapter, Solomon and Quinney propose a variety of measures to enhance America’s negotiating capacities to deal with the new and emerging challenges to effective diplomacy in the 21st century.
Contributors: Gilles Andreani • Chan Heng Chee • David Hannay • Faruk Logoglu • Lalit Mansingh • Yuri Nazarkin • Robert Schulzinger • Koji Watanabe • John Wood
Statecraft, or the art of conducting a state's affairs with other states, is as old as human civilization. So too is diplomacy, the form statecraft takes in time of peace.
In this comprehensive treatment, distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman describes the fundamental principles of the art of statecraft and the craft of diplomacy. The book draws on the author's years of experience as a practicing diplomat but also his extensive reading of the histories of ancient India, China, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and the Islamic world as well as modern Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Among numerous other subjects, the book addresses the role of intelligence, political actions, cultural influence, economic measures, and military power, as well as diplomatic strategy and tactics, negotiation, and the tasks and skills of diplomacy.
Japanese representatives bring to the negotiating table a distinctive mind-set and behavioral style, one that’s largely free of gamesmanship and histrionics but that’s nonetheless frequently exasperating.
This volume explores four recent U.S.–Japanese negotiations—two over trade, two over security-related issues—looking for patterns in Japan’s approach and behavior. In the first three cases, veteran Japanologist Michael Blaker finds the same fundamental style—coping. “Coping captures the go-with-the-flow essence of the Japanese bargaining approach”: cautious, methodical, low key, resistant, apprehensive, and above all defensive. In the fourth case, Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra recount how the United States and Japan fashioned a new security framework for their relationship in the 1990s. Vogel and Giarra show that close personal relationships, mutual trust, and a common purpose can foster flexible, fast, and fruitful negotiations.
Each case study explains the cultural as well as political, institutional, and personal factors and assesses their influence. A concluding chapter draws out common threads from the four studies, suggests how U.S. negotiators can maximize negotiating efficacy, and points the way toward a new and clearer understanding of Japanese bargaining behavior.
After two decades of hostile confrontation, China and the United States initiated negotiations in the early 1970s to normalize relations. Senior officials of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations had little experience dealing with the Chinese, but they soon learned that their counterparts from the People’s Republic were skilled negotiators.
This study of Chinese negotiating behavior explores the ways senior officials of the PRC—Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and others—managed these high-level political negotiations with their new American “old friends.” It follows the negotiating process step by step, and concludes with guidelines for dealing with Chinese officials.
Originally written for the RAND Corporation, this study was classified because it drew on the official negotiating record. It was subsequently declassified, and RAND published the study in 1995. For this edition, Solomon has added a new introduction, and Chas Freeman has written an interpretive essay describing the ways in which Chinese negotiating behavior has, and has not, changed since the original study. The bibiliography has been updated as well.
After years of relative neglect, culture is finally receiving due recognition as a key factor in the evolution and resolution of conflicts. Unfortunately, however, when theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution speak of “culture,” they often understand and use it in a bewildering and unhelpful variety of ways. With sophistication and lucidity, Culture and Conflict Resolution exposes these shortcomings and proposes an alternative conception in which culture is seen as dynamic and derivative of individual experience. The book explores divergent theories of social conflict and differing strategies that shape the conduct of diplomacy, and examines the role that culture has (and has not) played in conflict resolution. The author is as forceful in critiquing those who would dismiss or diminish culture’s relevance as he is trenchant in advocating conflict resolution approaches that make the most productive use of a coherent concept of culture. In a lively style, Avruch challenges both scholars and practitioners not only to develop a clearer understanding of what culture is, but also to take that understanding and incorporate it into more effective conflict resolution processes.
“Diplomacy is . . .
the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments.”
— Ernest Satow
the art of saying ‘Nice doggie’ till you can find a rock.”
— Wynn Catlin
the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force.”
— Henry A. Kissinger
the continuation of war by other means.”
— Zhou Enlai
the management of the relations between independent
states by the process of negotiation.”
— Harold Nicolson
the police in grand costume.”
With its first edition in 1994, The Diplomat’s Dictionary quickly became a classic reference book, offering professionals and enthusiasts practical information, witty insights, and words of wisdom on the art and practice of diplomacy. The expanded second edition contains 476 new entries, including definitions for selected up-to-date terminology and hundreds of additional quotations from across cultures and centuries. Mediators, foreign policy officials, ambassadors, speechwriters, academics, and legislators alike are guaranteed to be inspired and entertained by this unique collection of definitions and quotations.
Even before it led opposition to the recent war on Iraq, France was considered the most difficult of the United States’ major European allies. Each side tends to irritate the other, not least at the negotiating table, where Americans complain of French pretensions and arrogance, and the French fulminate against U.S. hegemonisme and egoisme. But, whether they like it or not, the two nations are going to have to deal with one another for a long time to come.
Charles Cogan’s timely and insightful study can’t guarantee to make those encounters more fruitful, but it will help France’s negotiating counterparts understand how and why French officials behave as they do. With impressive objectivity and authority, Cogan first explores the cultural and historical factors that have shaped the French approach and then dissects its key elements. Mixing rationalism and nationalism, rhetoric and brio, self-importance and embattled vulnerability, French negotiators often seem more interested in asserting their country’s “universal” mission than in reaching agreement. Three recent case studies illustrate this distinctively French mélange.
Yet agreement is by no means always elusive. Cogan offers practical suggestions for making negotiations more cooperative and productive—although he also emphasizes the long-term damage inflicted by the crisis over Iraq.
Drawing on candid interviews with many of today’s leading players on the French, American, British, and German sides, this engaging volume will inform and stimulate both seasoned practitioners and academics as well as students of France and the negotiating process.
This book is the recipient of the Prix Ernest Lémonon from L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 2006
Drawing on interviews with dozens of European and American negotiators, How Germans Negotiate explores the roots of contemporary German negotiating behavior and identifies the stages through which negotiations typically pass. Using examples drawn from the past 50 years, Smyser illustrates Germany's abiding search for security, stability, and community. Germans are usually willing to make a mutually beneficial deal, but not before they've undertaken exhaustive research, presented a meticulous case, and satisfied their own demands for conceptual consistency.
A separate chapter focuses on business and economic negotiations, which can be very different from diplomatic encounters. Smyser investigates a variety of recent cases, including discussions on global monetary policy and the Daimler-Chrysler talks, and discovers a tension between a traditional "old" style and a more predatory "new" style. The conclusion lays out basic strategies and tactical pointers and explains how to avoid mistakes.
Refreshing and revealing in equal measure, this innovative volume conducts a critical/self--critical exploration of the impact of culture on the ill-fated Oslo peace process. The authors—negotiators and scholars alike—demolish stereotypes as they construct an unusually subtle and sophisticated understanding of how culture influences negotiating styles. Culture, they argue, did not cause the Oslo breakdown—but it did play an influential, intervening role at several levels: coloring the thinking of political leaders, shaping domestic politics on both sides, and affecting each side’s evaluation of the other’s beliefs and intentions.
After an overview by William Quandt of the history of the Oslo process and the impact of international factors such as U.S. mediation, the volume presents a detailed analysis of first Palestinian, and then Israeli negotiating styles between 1993 and 2001. Omar Dajani, a former legal advisor to the Palestinian team, explains how elements of Palestinian identity and national development have hobbled the Palestinians’ ability to negotiate effectively. Aharon Klieman, a distinguished Israeli analyst, traces a long-standing clash between diplomatic and security subcultures within the Israeli political elite and reveals how Israeli identity has helped create a negotiating style that opts for short-term gains while undermining the prospects for a lasting agreement. Drawing on these insights, Tamara Wittes concludes the volume by offering not only a fresh appreciation of culture’s influence on interethnic negotiations but also lessons for future negotiators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Read the review from Foreign Affairs.
Over the past sixty years, Pakistan-U.S. relations have been marked by highs of close cooperation and lows of deep bilateral estrangement. Much of the negotiations story underscores the remarkable resilience, but also the vulnerability and volatility of the relationship. Throughout the Cold War and continuing after 9/11, Pakistan’s location has shaped a relationship of mutual interest and asymmetrical goals. The United States views Pakistan as a strategic partner in achieving global security goals; Pakistan looks to the United States as a counterweight to India and its neighbors.
How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States analyzes the themes, techniques, and styles that have characterized Pakistani negotiations with American civilian and military officials since Pakistan’s independence. Drawing from their vast diplomatic experience, authors Teresita and Howard Schaffer examine how Pakistan’s ideological core, geopolitical position, culture, and military and governmental structures shape negotiations with the United States. The authors address not only the process by which the two governments reach formal agreements, but also the overall conduct of official U.S.-Pakistani dialogue, the informal processes that have shaped their diplomatic relationship, and the periodic involvement of the United States in Pakistani domestic politics. This book offers concrete lessons and advice for U.S. officials on how to negotiate most effectively with Pakistan.
Drawing from their vast diplomatic experience, Teresita and Howard Schaffer, authors of "How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster," discuss how Pakistan's ideological core, geopolitical position, culture, and military and governmental structures shape negotiations with the United States.