Kenneth M. Jensen is currently Executive Director of The American Committees on Foreign Relations. Previously he was the director of special programs at the United States Institute of Peace.
The emergence of a new Russia--a post-communist European state with a vast store of nuclear arms--raises many complex questions. What kind of foreign and defense policies will Russian pursue into the 21st century? What will be the impact of the loss of the former empire? And what are the implications for western policymakers?
This volume attempts to answer those questions by examining Russia's relations with the Near Abroad (the newly independent states on its borders), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and its Pacific neighbors, as well as its peacekeeping role in the former Soviet states. In addition, the book explores the historic patterns of Russian foreign policy (issues of internationalism, accommodation, "Soviet Russia"), the Soviet legacy, institutional mechanisms for policymaking, and the effects of domestic policy.
The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy concludes with a discussion of western perceptions of Russian's evolving national security doctrine and the future of Russian-American strategic relations.
In September 1946, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Nikolai Novikov, sent a 19-page cable to Foreign Minister Molotov describing the likely direction of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period. Recently discovered in the Soviet archives, the Novikov telegram parallels the famous "Long Telegram" of U.S. diplomat George Kennan.
Published here for the first time in English, Novikov's telegram is presented alongside Kennan's cable and a similar telegram by British diplomat Frank Roberts.
Focusing on post-World War II American foreign policy and its intellectual architect, George Kennan, this volume explores the moral dimensions of realpolitik and the ethical dilemmas posed by present-day politics. Is Kennan responsible for persuading the U.S. foreign policy establishment that morality should go by the wayside? Or was Kennan right to regard as "presumptuous" the idea that Americans should tell other societies how to behave? Kennan gives his own influential view in an article reprinted here from Foreign Affairs (1985/96). (Workshop 6)
The clash between concepts of pacifism and perceptions of citizenship has long provoked fierce argument. Sparked by presentations from life-long pacifist Elise Boulding and political scientist Guenter Lewy, the debate in this volume is passionate and profound, ranging across such issues as the political role of pacifists and the character of American pacifism since World War II.
A comprehensive, one-volume exploration of the peace and security field, this volume presents detailed investigations of four major approaches employed in the study of conflict and peacemaking.
While the dramatic events in Europe have considerably eased international tensions, and the United States and the Soviet Union are reducing chemical weapons stockpiles, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 suddenly heightened international concerns about chemical weapons. The imminent danger that chemical and biological weapons might again be employed compels the world to confront this issue candidly.
At a United States Institute of Peace Public Workshop held in January 1989, Peace Fellows Robin Ranger and Raymond Cohen offered a unique – and controversially frank – proposal for controlling the spread and use of chemical weapons: the formation of an International Chemical Weapons Authority (ICWA) that would monitor use and provide aid, humanitarian as well as military, to countries under attack. This volume contains the Ranger-Cohen proposal and responses to it by five expert panelists. The ensuing dialogue dealt with not only the effects of chemical weapons proliferation and use but the strategic incentives that drive nations to use them.
In addition to Ranger and Cohen, participants included Gary Crocker (U.S. Department of State), Douglas Feith (law firm of Feith & Zell), Elisa Harris (Brookings Institute), Itshak Lederman (Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland), and Brad Roberts (Washington Quarterly).
Do the Munich accords of 1938 – the failed attempt of Western democracies to appease Adolf Hitler on the eve of World War I – hold a lesson for the future of NATO? According to a panel of scholars and policy analysts who participated in October 1988 in a Public Workshop at the United States Institute of Peace on “The Meaning of Munich Fifty Years Later,” the answer was an unqualified “yes.” But what lesson to draw, in an era of changing Soviet foreign policy and world power balances, was a matter for sharp disagreement and stimulating debate.
This volume contains papers written expressly for the workshop by Professor David Hendrickson (Colorado College), Mr. Christopher Layne (Blecher and Collins and the Cato Institute), Dr. Keith Payne (National Institute for Public Policy), Professor Earl C. Ravenal (Georgetown University School of Foreign Service), Dr. Robin Ranger (Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace), and Dr. Jed C. Snyder (National Strategy Information Center).