

Praise for *Detect, Dismantle, and Disarm*

“The important work of the IAEA in verifying dismantlement and disarmament has attracted surprisingly little attention—until now. In this comprehensive study, Wing and Simpson fill that lacuna by collecting and analyzing a wealth of data about all the relevant cases. Developing machinery capable of effectively verifying the rollback of nuclear weapon programs, especially in a noncooperative setting, is a critical element of creating a rules-based nuclear order able to meet today’s nuclear threat. This useful and interesting volume advances that vital goal.”

—**James Acton**, senior associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

“This volume’s comprehensive case studies provide a unique account of the way in which verification is embedded in messy and ad hoc political processes.”

—**Trevor Findlay**, professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, and fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Detect, Dismantle, and Disarm

IAEA Verification, 1992–2005

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The views expressed in this book are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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Front cover photos, from left to right:

The IAEA has its own experts and facilities, through its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Austria, experienced in sample measurement and analysis, including hundreds of samples from the 1990s Iraq inspections. (Vienna, Austria, August 1, 2000). Photography: Dean Calma. Copyright: IAEA

Rendering harmless the Kalahari test shafts in South Africa. Following South Africa's signature of the NPT in 1991, the IAEA General Conference requested the director general to verify the completeness of the inventory of nuclear installations and material included in South Africa's initial report to the IAEA. A large number of measurements were made of various types of nuclear material. The IAEA concluded that the declared inventory of nuclear installations and material were complete. Copyright: IAEA

Ceremonial signing of the Safeguards Additional Protocol between IAEA's Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, and His Excellency Engineer Matooq Mohamed Matooq, assistant secretary for services of the General People's Committee of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiria. (Vienna, Austria, March 10, 2004). Photography: Dean Calma. Copyright: IAEA

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