

# Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations



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## Restoring and Maintaining Peace

### What We Know So Far

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According to scholars of global conflict, the incidence and magnitude of warfare, especially “societal” warfare—that which is primarily internal to states—climbed more or less steadily from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s, until the end of the Cold War, when it began to decline. The curve continued downward through the end of the 1990s and into the new century, to apparent levels of relative peace not enjoyed by humankind for forty years.<sup>1</sup> A rising proportion of these conflicts ended, however, not in victory for one side but in stalemate or outside intervention.

This book is about the international tools developed, largely since that curve turned downward, to deal with the aftermath of stalemated wars, especially internal/societal wars, the ones that halted with outcomes that were to no one participant’s complete satisfaction or that were stopped by outside military force. It is thus about high-risk environments with imperfect deals (or deals sought after the fact), devastated economies, and governments that, in the past, likely provided little in the way of public services and listened very little to the voices of the governed. It is about international efforts to support (or guide, or control)

the difficult tasks of rebuilding and restructuring both governments and economies, almost always with the stated goal of leaving behind some semblance of functioning and sustainable market democracy. These tasks are usually undertaken with imperfect knowledge, limited resources, and uncertain prospects of success, because not to undertake them would be acquiescing in something worse—the creation of a terrorist haven or a drug transit zone, or the abandonment of the humanitarian and democratic principles that the West has been pressing upon the rest of the world for the past half-century. It is intellectually easy to write off a “failed or failing” state as a bad investment but, like a neglected and decaying neighborhood, dystopias have a way of spreading.<sup>2</sup>

In particular, this book is about the ongoing development of peace support operations (PSOs). These have evolved from largely UN-led military monitoring teams on disputed borders in the Middle East and South Asia, to enterprises that also engage the attention and resources of regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union, of military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and of powerful if temporary “coalitions of the willing.”<sup>3</sup> The book is the third in a sequence of edited volumes growing out of work on peacekeeping and postconflict security undertaken at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Like its predecessors, it uses the method of focused, structured comparison of detailed cases, in the firm belief that broadly valid lessons about the complex problems of restoring peace in war-damaged lands can best be drawn out by using a common analytic structure applied to different sets of experiences.

Each of the six cases in the book briefly describes the geography and contemporary conflict history of the country (or other territory) of interest and then

- describes the process of negotiating the peace accord, if there was one, and summarizes what that accord called for in terms of outside implementation
- assesses support for that accord within the host country, among the country’s immediate neighbors, and among the great powers
- summarizes the peace operation’s mandate, how it may have changed over time, and what such changes meant for the operation and the country

- describes how the operation was funded, planned, and carried out
- assesses how well the operation accomplished its tasks and whether its mandate made sense in the circumstances
- offers broader conclusions about the operation's lessons or implications for efforts to implement peace elsewhere

Following the case studies, the final chapter summarizes lessons from them for future operations and offers some thoughts on how peace support operations, their objectives, and their participants may change over the next few years.

The remainder of this chapter briefly summarizes the history of peace operations through the late 1990s; examines the ongoing debate about how to define exactly what PSOs are and do; positions PSOs in the wider context of conflict and global assistance; reviews studies since the second volume in this series appeared that offer analytical frameworks for peace operations or structured lessons learned; and then provides an introduction to the “third surge” in PSOs that the cases in this volume address. The chapter annex offers details on an element of peace operations that governments always care about, namely, how much they cost and who pays for them.

### **Peacekeeping at the End of the Cold War**

The first book in this sequence examined how UN operations through 1991 were planned and funded and offered twenty structured cases of UN peacekeeping from 1948 through mid-1991.<sup>4</sup> The last four years of that period saw the first surge in demand for peacekeepers, as the Cold War came to an end and external patrons and intervenors withdrew from some long-running struggles. UN observers watched the Soviet army leave Afghanistan and both Cuban and South African forces leave Angola. UN observers also patrolled the 870-mile border between Iran and Iraq at the end of those countries' bloody eight-year war. In 1989, the United Nations returned to complex peace operations—those having civil/political as well as military components—for the first time since leaving the chaotic ex-Belgian Congo in 1964, with a mission to support Namibia's transition to independence. This operation was widely considered successful, despite a somewhat rocky start, as UN officials

monitored and promoted the vote for a constituent assembly and dogged the movements of the colonial government's special police units to reduce their harassment of would-be voters. In Central America, UN peacekeepers provided security for the disarming and disbandment of the Nicaraguan Contras, the insurgent force trained and equipped by the Reagan administration to undermine that country's leftist Sandinista government.

Back in Africa, a UN force prepared to repatriate thousands of refugees from Western Sahara as soon as a referendum determined whether that region would be independent from or merge into Morocco. When neither the government nor its Sahrawi adversaries would risk a vote whose outcome was uncertain, the referendum was postponed and as of this writing still has not been held, despite more than a decade of diplomatic effort. A UN observer mission still watches the sand berm that separates the two sides and runs through 2,000 miles of trackless desert. Finally, the United Nations became deeply involved in attempting to settle the civil war in Angola, a country that had known mostly war both before and after independence from Portugal in 1974. A modest UN observer mission could neither guarantee preelection disarmament of the opposing forces nor adequately monitor the fairness of the fall 1992 national elections, and the loser regrouped his forces and took them back to war. These results in Angola were a harbinger of disasters to come as the United Nations became involved in increasingly unstable conflict situations not only in Africa but also in Europe, where the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was coming apart at the seams.

The second book in this sequence continued the story with the relatively brief but deadly "second surge" of operations in El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, the SFRY (soon to be known as "the former Yugoslavia"), Somalia, and Rwanda from 1993 through 1995.<sup>5</sup> These were generally tougher cases than the earlier ones. The latter four involved either ongoing civil wars or wars that peace accords had interrupted but not solved, whose belligerent parties were committed only tenuously to peace or not committed at all. Although the United Nations had chalked up some successes in these cases by the mid-1990s—in El Salvador and Mozambique, and to some degree in Cambodia—its failures are better remembered. UN peacekeepers could not prevent the

1994 genocide in Rwanda or the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina; could not prevent the resumption of civil war (again) in Angola; and, not two months into their deployment in Somalia, found themselves at war with a powerful Somali faction, which led to intervention by U.S. special operations forces and thence to the firefight in Mogadishu chronicled in *Black Hawk Down*.<sup>6</sup> Frustrated by these failures, UN member states largely turned away from the organization as a manager of major peacekeeping initiatives. Thus, between 1995 and 1999, the United Nations launched just two robust peace operations, in eastern Croatia and in Haiti. Both were relatively short-lived, with the former viewed as a success, the latter ultimately not.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, most troop contributions, especially from developed states, went to operations run by NATO.

### **The Struggle to Define the Enterprise**

“Peacekeeping” was the term coined to describe the tasks of UN-mandated troops deployed after the Suez Crisis of 1956. It gained official status of sorts when the UN General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965, just after UN forces finished their first operation in the former Belgian Congo.<sup>8</sup> It was not defined in any UN document, however, until *An Agenda for Peace* appeared in 1992.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime, scholars put forward their own definitions of UN practice.<sup>10</sup>

### **Evolving Typologies: Practice Meets Theory**

Conceptual discord has grown as PSOs have added dimensions beyond military security. The discord reflects the elusive nature and boundaries of this field and the many disagreements about where to draw those boundaries. The number of moving parts in PSOs, their changeability over time and place, and these operations’ susceptibility to the political whims of many different decision makers mean that analysts of PSOs deal with an open and changing set of variables, actors, and objectives (see table 1.1).

In 1992, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra recognized that peacekeeping was pushing beyond its traditional bounds. Their work on “second-generation multinational operations” incorporated many forms

of military action that went beyond peacekeeping, particularly in the use of force. Their informal scale of operations bears a close family resemblance to what the U.S. military would later incorporate into “peace enforcement” under the rubric of “operations other than war.” When Mackinlay and Chopra used the term “enforcement,” however, they meant it in the original sense of Article 42 of the UN Charter, namely, the collective use of force to resist aggression and thereby maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>11</sup>

William Durch parsed peace operations into four general categories but warned that the amount of force entailed by “humanitarian intervention” in particular can vary a great deal, ranging upward to become peace enforcement for humanitarian purposes. He also observed that the amount or intensity of force needed by an operation can vary significantly over time.<sup>12</sup> Daniel Byman and his coauthors reached a similar conclusion, stressing that military assistance to humanitarian aid providers may involve restoring order first, a potentially “unlimited, open-ended responsibility, which may be difficult to relinquish safely.” Because the operational environment for humanitarian interventions can be so difficult, they argued, forces should both plan and be equipped to enforce their mandate and mission objectives, if necessary.<sup>13</sup>

Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall developed a long taxonomy of “actual and potential” peacekeeping missions that they parsed into four “mission clusters” using quantitative methods. Diehl later summarized these clusters as “monitoring,” “limiting damage,” “restoring civil societies,” and “coercive.” He warned against giving multiple missions to one force, using Somalia as an example of a disastrous admixture of pacification and humanitarian assistance. “Divergent missions,” he argued, “are best handled by different sets of personnel or separate operations.”<sup>14</sup>

Trevor Findlay used a fairly standard mission typology in his work except for the term “expanded peacekeeping,” by which he meant a “multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace process.” A multifunctional operation combines military force with non-military elements and objectives—human rights, elections, support for humanitarian relief—under a single chain of authority.<sup>15</sup> Charlotte Ku and the late Harold Jacobson developed a five-part classification

**Table 1.1. Comparing Researchers' Typologies of Peace Operations**

Mackinlay and Chopra (1992)		Durch (1996)	Byman et al. (2000) (principal tasks)	Diehl (2001) (mission clusters)	Findlay (2002)	Ku and Jacobson (2002)	Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004)
Enforcement			Restoring order		Enforcement	Enforcement	Peace enforcement
Sanctions enforcement	↑	Peace enforcement	Enforcing a peace agreement	Coercive missions	Peace enforcement	Force to ensure compliance with international mandates	Peace support operations
Guarantee of rights of passage		Protecting humanitarian assistance					
Protecting delivery of humanitarian assistance		Humanitarian intervention			Expanded peacekeeping (including humanitarian operations)	Peacekeeping plus state building	Wider peacekeeping
Assisting in the maintenance of law and order		Multi-dimensional peace operations	Restoring civil society				
Supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces			Humanitarian assistance	Limiting damage (humanitarian aid and preventive deployment)			Managing transitions
Preventive peacekeeping							
Traditional peacekeeping		Traditional peacekeeping			Traditional peacekeeping	Traditional peacekeeping	Traditional peacekeeping
Conventional observer missions				Monitoring		Monitoring and observation	

Use of Force (most to least likely, reading down)

Sources: See chapter endnotes 11-17.

scheme in their study of democratic accountability and the use of force.<sup>16</sup> What Durch called multidimensional peace operations, and Diehl called restoring civil society and Findlay called expanded peacekeeping, Ku and Jacobson called “peacekeeping plus state-building.” Their term “force to ensure compliance with international mandates” encompasses all coercive uses of force short of war, while war, in their taxonomy, as in Mackinlay and Chopra’s, is represented by “enforcement.”

Finally, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin offered a mission typology whose first step up from traditional peacekeeping is “managing transitions,” complex but consent-based operations to implement intrastate peace agreements in situations of relative calm. The next step, “wider peacekeeping,” involves situations of relative chaos, with military forces deployed in situations of ongoing violence but still bound by the rules of traditional peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force); indeed, the category conveys a sense of “bridging” missions asked to do too much with too little. In contrast, the authors defined “peace support operations” as enforcing a political agreement, “the substance of which has been *dictated by the interveners* and supports the establishment of liberal democracy” (emphasis added). This definition leans more heavily on the imposition of outcomes than, say, NATO’s definition of the same term. Finally, the authors used the term “peace enforcement” in the same way that Mackinlay and Chopra, Findlay, and Ku and Jacobson used the single word “enforcement.” Their usage comports closely, however, with the most recent evolution of British doctrine.<sup>17</sup>

This debate notwithstanding, a consensus has emerged regarding the need for competent and effective security forces to stabilize the local situation. Peacekeepers provide interim security and stability in a situation that is formally postwar (where there is agreement on peace) but actually still in transition from war to peace; not all factions’ behavior may as yet be compliant with the agreement, and splinter factions may deny its validity. The peacekeepers protect the peacebuilders, who work for institutional, political, and economic changes that will prevent the recurrence of conflict. The August 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (also known as the Brahimi Report) emphasized that without successful peacebuilding, the outside security providers could be stuck in that role indefinitely.<sup>18</sup> The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as

activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into the civilian economy; strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); and improving respect for human rights through monitoring, education, and investigation of past and present abuse; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.<sup>19</sup>


When peacebuilding accomplishes such ends, and promotes within local institutions the capacity to sustain them, the peacekeepers can go home. But if the Brahimi Report's authors hoped to add final definitional clarity to the concept of peacebuilding, their effort failed. Nearly five years later, a study commissioned by the UN Department of Political Affairs concluded that "peacebuilding" continued to lack consensus definition both inside and outside the UN system.<sup>20</sup> Some countries, agencies, and organizations prefer different terms entirely, eschewing "peacemaking," "-keeping," "-building," or "-enforcing" in favor of such terms as "nation building," "state building," "stabilization," "reconstruction," "conflict transition," or "conflict transformation." Indeed, in some leading U.S. government circles at mid-decade, "peace" seemed to have become, somewhat ironically, a fighting word.

### **PSOs and the Larger International Environment**

PSOs can be readily situated within a much larger environment of international relations and programs to prevent and mitigate conflict (long-term, via political, economic, and human development; and short-term, via diplomatic and other interventions intended to keep crises in check, plus efforts to control terrorist organizations and activities). Figure 1.1 locates the components of peace operations within this larger environment.

The horizontal axis is a nominal timeline running from peacetime ("preconflict") through wartime to the difficult period of recovery from war. The vertical axis situates activities according to their level of

Figure 1.1. Peace Operations and the Larger International Environment



focus and effect: on international security (top of the chart), state security (middle), and human/personal security (bottom).

All of the activities on the left-hand side of the chart can be considered conflict preventive in some broad sense, from controlling armaments and the trade in them to building more responsive and democratic government, public order, and the rule of law (“political development”); strengthening economies and promoting equitable growth (“economic development”); and promoting civil society, education, health, and human rights (“human development”).

Peace operations map onto this chart from the center rightward. Some, characterized in figure 1.1 as “humanitarian intervention,”

attempt to suppress conflict (as did NATO in Kosovo, 1999) or provide palliative aid while fighting continues (as did the United Nations in Bosnia, 1992–95). The security elements of peace operations (military forces and police contingents) may take over responsibility from an intervention force and support peacebuilding across a broad spectrum of activities. Elements of PSOs may monitor, advise, restructure, or temporarily replace the local law enforcement sector and/or other sectors of government, depending on the mission mandate.

Many of the boxes within the larger environment of peacebuilding overlap on the chart, and do so even more in reality. Thus, reform of the local security sector (military, police, courts, prisons) may be essential to fighting corruption, and fighting corruption may be essential to effective and lasting reform. Organized crime also feeds corruption, while effective border and export controls can be key tools in fighting such crime, especially those gangs that specialize in regional or even global commodities smuggling and human trafficking.

Some of the elements of peacebuilding that usually lie outside the ambit of PSOs are mapped onto figure 1.1 for illustrative purposes as they may occur contemporaneously. These include attracting outside investment, rebuilding educational and public health systems, and conducting internationally managed campaigns to vaccinate infants and children against infectious diseases. Not indicated on the chart are the many private actors (both commercial contractors and nonprofit organizations) that are almost always simultaneously engaged in parallel with PSOs, sometimes following their own agendas and sometimes executing the policies and programs of national or international aid and development agencies.

### **Framing the Problem, Seeking Success: The Recent Literature**

The realization that restoring durable peace required much more than just ending overt fighting generated a growing literature on complex PSOs. Since contemporary PSOs aspire to be problem-solving ventures, the literature has tended to illuminate and seek solutions to the most recent and vexing problems encountered in the field. Through the mid-1990s, these included the new and sensitive problem of protecting

humanitarian relief, which begged the further question of what, if anything, to do for those who received it. Both fighting (Somalia) and not fighting (Bosnia) on behalf of recipients seemed to produce less than desirable outcomes.

Much discussion and debate also was devoted to the problem of civil-military coordination in complex PSOs; to the problem of tardy deployments of military and police contingents for such operations; to problems of troop and police quality, especially among forces provided to UN operations; and to strategies for dealing with would-be “spoilers” of peace processes.<sup>21</sup> Over time it became clear that any PSO facing possible violent spoiler actions needed to be able to deter or, if necessary, defeat such actions. Indeed, as the veto-wielding Western members of the Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) became more involved in peace operations in the 1990s, they reconceptualized the endeavor as, essentially, very low intensity conflict with a “hearts-and-minds” annex.

French doctrine evolved first, in the mid-1990s, but all three powers now see peacekeeping and peace enforcement as waypoints on a single continuum that runs from non-use to maximum use of force. Although U.S. and British doctrine retain an emphasis on winning hearts and minds, only British doctrine seems to value UN mandates as furthering the international legitimacy of peace operations.<sup>22</sup> These three states, which possess most of the world’s military expeditionary capabilities, heavily influence NATO PSO doctrine. Two are key contributors to European Union (EU) doctrine, and all are likely to have a hand in shaping African Union (AU) doctrine, via their respective bilateral aid programs and through the Global Peace Operations Initiative approved at the 2004 Sea Island Summit of the Group of Eight (G8).

Astute military analysts, meanwhile, recognized that military forces could not avoid at least initial involvement in the politics and public security dilemmas of the places where they deployed, because the military almost always deploys faster than international police or civilian PSO personnel.<sup>23</sup> As interim security forces, however, militaries face a number of choices they would prefer to avoid, such as whether to protect threatened civilians and, if so, under what circumstances; whether to prepare for and engage in riot and crowd control;

and whether to seek out indicted war criminals, fight smugglers, or confront organized crime.

In the rest of this section we focus on works that attempted to shape lessons from “peace implementation” into evaluative or predictive frameworks intended to give guidance to future policymakers contemplating involvement in other peoples’ war zones. We emphasize materials published since the appearance of the previous volume in this series.

### **Searching for the Sources of “Situational Difficulty”**

Civil wars last longer, on average, than wars between states. While acknowledging the contributions of “contested values and identities that underlie many protracted conflicts,” Charles King (1997) argued that the structure of internal conflicts also contributes substantially to their duration.<sup>24</sup> Structural variables include: faction leaders’ personal commitments to the struggle; the difficulty of assessing the true battlefield situation and whether victory really is unattainable; the relatively weak command and control structures of many belligerent groups, which make leaders’ commitments hard to enforce upon the rank and file; fears that compromises made to reach an accord may splinter the group and leave the weaker shards more vulnerable to individual defeat; leaders’ and groups’ reluctance to forgo the economic spoils of war; the desire to avenge the dead and make good other sunk costs of conflict; and the security dilemma, whereby giving up the fight without guarantees that opponents will do likewise exposes the peace-minded to the risk of ambush and encourages hedging behavior.<sup>25</sup>

External powers, King argued, can influence many of these factors in ways that favor an end to fighting, by providing services that the local belligerent parties cannot provide for themselves or that peace requires but that they would not voluntarily seek. The latter “services” include the curtailing of direct outside aid to the belligerents and/or curtailing their ability to sell war-financing commodities (such as gems, precious metals, or drugs) in collusion with neighboring states and smuggling networks. The former sorts of services include breaking the security dilemma by providing credible and reliable information about all sides’ implementation of their commitments under the peace accord; provision of personal security guarantees to specific elites; and provision of impartial security at disarmament and demobilization sites,

where groups are most vulnerable to attack. If equipped and mandated to do so, they may enforce the peace against a party that reneges on its commitments.<sup>26</sup>

Michael Doyle (2001), like King, focused on characteristics of the belligerent parties as key to understanding the dynamics of conflict and its termination. Doyle treated three characteristics—the number of parties, their relative mutual hostility, and their in-group coherence or ability to control their adherents—as the dimensions of five “conflict ecologies” of starkly varying difficulty. The ecology most conducive to peace implementation, Doyle argued, would be one with just a few factions, all of whom were coherent and largely reconciled. The least peace-conducive and most difficult environment would be one with many factions, all mutually hostile, and all incoherent and thus prone to freelance action or to splintering.<sup>27</sup>

Stephen Stedman (1997) emphasized that outsiders may need to enforce peace agreements against the activities of “spoilers” (his coinage), signatories who violate the terms of a peace accord for any of three purposes.<sup>28</sup> A total spoiler sees his struggle as zero-sum and, like Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), may take his forces back to war if he cannot achieve his aims by political means (and still has forces to call upon). A greedy spoiler like Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, will do what he can to maintain his wartime resource flows even after the fighting formally ends, and he may return to violence if it looks as though the flow will be turned off. A limited spoiler like Alphonse Dhlakama, the leader of the so-called Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), may stake out an ostensibly hard-line position but relent in return for the right payoff. Stedman proposed political-operational strategies to deal with each.<sup>29</sup>

A 1997 study by DFI International for the Pentagon’s Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, in which the author participated, adopted Stedman’s terminology and also looked at structural issues and internal conflict. It stressed, however, that “the situations into which peace forces typically are sent are . . . unfinished wars. Militarily exhausted or not, local leaders often are dissatisfied politically. Short of an opposed entry into hostile territory, interventions in civil conflicts can be the most dangerous situations that the military forces

of most countries, let alone their civil servants, will ever encounter.”<sup>30</sup> The study, “Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace,” therefore emphasized the importance of correctly gauging the situational difficulty that a new peace force could expect to encounter.<sup>31</sup>

Of the eight factors the study used to measure situational difficulty, the two most important to sustainable peace appeared to be the willingness of neighboring states to support the peace process, and the willingness of all faction leaders to compromise in the interest of peace, at the risk of losing power. The two variables correlated highly with one another as well as with sustainable peace. This made intuitive sense (shifty neighbors frequently aid and abet the war-sustaining contraband trade of recalcitrant warlords<sup>32</sup>), but would have packed more punch if the study team had been better able to measure faction leaders’ attitudes in the absence of knowing how peace was progressing on the ground and those leaders’ role in it. Intentionally or not, such knowledge may have shaped judgments about leaders’ attitudes and thus promoted a higher than warranted correlation between that variable and the study’s measure of sustainable peace.

The chapter by Downs and Stedman (2002) in the Stanford-International Peace Academy (IPA) study, *Ending Civil Wars*, also assessed factors thought to render peace implementation more difficult: many warring parties; a missing or coerced peace accord; likelihood of spoilers; collapsed state; more than 50,000 soldiers involved in the war; availability of disposable natural resources; presence of hostile neighbors; and secession demands on the part of one or more belligerent parties. The more factors present in a given situation, the authors argued, the more difficult the situation for peace implementation. Analysis indicated that three of the eight variables—spoilers, disposable natural resources, and hostile neighbors—were particularly important in defining situational difficulty. Paralleling the problems encountered by the DFI team, Downs and Stedman acknowledged the difficulty of measuring spoiler likelihood, as opposed to behavior, so as to better predict and plan for trouble.<sup>33</sup>

### **The Correlates of Success**

Effective Transitions measured several dozen variables drawn from practitioner interviews and the relevant literature that were thought

important to a PSO's success. These included variables related to local military forces, public security, governance, the economy, human rights, and freedom of speech, movement, and press. Fifteen of these variables, designed to be measured at the time a PSO ended its mission, correlated well with the study's dependent variable and, of these, five appeared key to an effective transition: demobilizing fighters, cantoning heavy weapons, restarting the economy, working for open and honestly-elected government, and developing a nonpolitical police force.<sup>34</sup> The dependent variable, intended to measure a country's degree of success in transitioning from conflict to sustainable peace, was an average of three measures: residual military conflict, quality of public security, and integrity of the political system. These were to be measured at the end of the first political cycle (that is, the first national election) after the PSO's departure.<sup>35</sup> This composite variable gave Effective Transitions a more sensitive outcome measure than the binary war/no war measure used by many recent quantitative studies of the duration of war and peace.<sup>36</sup> Because the passage of time dilutes the causal impact of any action on subsequent events, the project chose to limit the period for measuring relative success to that one political cycle; beyond that, it is increasingly difficult to sort out the impact of a peace operation from the effects of any number of other variables that continue to operate long after the PSO has shut down.<sup>37</sup>

Downs and Stedman evaluated international support for peace implementation as a key to successful peace implementation, finding great-power interests to be stronger drivers of their engagement than either costs of implementation or estimated risks to their troops (although how these latter variables were scored was not well-defined in text). The cases studied in *Ending Civil Wars* were cross-plotted by mission difficulty and great-power support. Failed cases, those in which peace collapsed either while a PSO was deployed or within two years of its departure, tended to cluster toward the "harder case, less support" quadrant of the plot. Successful cases clustered mostly in the "easier case, more support" corner, while "hard cases with high support" were either partially successful or failed. The authors concluded that, while great-power support for peace implementation might not be enough to guarantee success, its absence in hard cases virtually guaranteed the failure of implementation.<sup>38</sup>

### The Importance of Government Legitimacy, Competence . . . and Democracy?

Better known in the practitioner community than to academic researchers, Max Manwaring and his colleagues at the U.S. Army War College and the National Defense University have been building a body of literature on the requirements of effective peace operations that grows out of their work on limited war, and specifically the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) model, developed for the U.S. Southern Command in the 1980s as a counterinsurgency tool. Possibly due to these origins, this work is cited infrequently in the academic literature. In this review, we focus on summative chapters from two books that follow the Manwaring paradigm, which is, by present standards of public policy and strategy in particular, refreshingly astute, humanistic, and lacking in hubris.

The first of these chapters, written by Manwaring and Kimbra Fishel (1998), argued that postconflict military security and economic development cannot be sustained once peacekeepers depart unless there is left behind in national institutions the basic “political competence” needed to *deliver* continuing security, growth, and other essential public services. They portrayed this requirement in what they acknowledged to be an overly simplified equation: Stability equals Military Security plus Economic Development times Political Competence [ $S = (M + E)PC$ ]. The equation says that low political competence will undermine whatever one tries to build up in security and the economy.<sup>39</sup> Nothing that outsiders build—whether armies, police forces, or structures of investment and taxation—will long survive their departure unless the host government is competent to maintain them. Haiti exemplifies a situation where such competence was lacking. The Congo is a case that risks replicating the Haitian example on a much larger scale unless the government develops serious political competence quickly.

Manwaring and Fishel were inclined to be pessimistic about how much change outsiders can actually induce: “Probably the best an outside power or coalition of powers can do is to help establish a temporary level of security that might allow the carefully guided and monitored development of the ethical and professional political competence

underpinnings necessary for long-term success.”<sup>40</sup> This sentiment is worth keeping in mind when pondering other authors’ requirements for building a complete latticework of modern democratic governance and a well-regulated market economy before the international community lets go of a war-torn state.<sup>41</sup>

In the second chapter of interest, Manwaring and Edwin Corr (2000) placed greater stress on the need for legitimacy, or moral authority, in a host government, both to protect against conflict and to speed postconflict recovery. They observed that insurgencies have been “nourished by the alienation of the governed from the government,” and argued that the Batista and Somoza regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, respectively, collapsed in the face of insurgent pressure in part because their regimes continued to focus, despite budding insurgencies, on their “personal enemies and legitimate internal political opposition.” They did so, moreover, with a “lack of concern for any kind of human rights for detainees—innocent or not. . . . Consequently, the sacrifices necessary to press a fight against insurgents who promised reform were not readily forthcoming from either citizen or soldier. . . .”<sup>42</sup>

The actors of concern to Manwaring and Corr included the host government and its internal foes, the external powers that support the host government, and the external actors (governments or not) that support the host government’s foes. In their conflict model, these players interact in seven distinct but simultaneous and interdependent “wars,” or continuing, organized struggles. Only one of these is a shooting war. The others are a “legitimacy war” to “attack or defend the moral right of the incumbent regime to exist”; a war “to isolate belligerents from their internal and external support”; a war “to stay the course,” or maintain the political, policy, and public backing needed for “consistent and long-term support to a supported host government”; “information and intelligence wars,” which involve intense public diplomacy, on the one hand, and efforts to “locate, isolate, and neutralize” those who “lead, plan, execute, and support a given conflict,” on the other. The final war is for “unity of effort”: overcoming bureaucratic interests, cultural factors, and other obstacles to ensure common focus and the conduct of operations “in a manner acceptable to the populace. And that equates back to legitimacy.”<sup>43</sup>

In the environment of peace operations, the real enemy in the Manwaring-Corr model becomes violence itself, and the objective of struggle, the equivalent of victory, is a sustainable peace.<sup>44</sup> The notion of seven interlocking struggles emphasizes that while robust fighting capability may always be useful, no peace support force (or government), however powerful, can expect to just shoot its way to sustainable peace.

Like Manwaring and Fishel, Elizabeth Cousens (2001) warned that committing to seemingly desirable objectives that prove unreachable can leave both donors and recipients worse off than if they had committed to lesser objectives that were more readily achievable.

Peacebuilding . . . should not be equated to the entire basket of postwar needs. . . . Rather, it should be seen as a strategic focus on conflict resolution and opening political space, to which these other needs may or may not contribute. What are frequently conceived as peacebuilding activities—demobilization, economic reconstruction, refugee repatriation, human rights monitoring, community reconciliation—are not inherently equivalent to peacebuilding unless they design themselves to be.<sup>45</sup>

Cousens argued that in selecting its peacebuilding objectives, the international community should be “ruthlessly modest about its ambitions” and seek only to leave behind a self-enforcing peace with governmental institutions that offer “authoritative and, eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence.” To attempt much more, for example, attempting to inculcate democracy or work out a society’s problems in the realms of justice or equity, would be to invite frustration and failure.<sup>46</sup>

In the introduction to *Ending Civil Wars*, Stephen Stedman argued that the goal of peace implementation should be “the ending of violence and the conclusion of the war on a self-enforcing basis: when the outsiders leave, the former warring parties refrain from returning to war.”<sup>47</sup> These are very similar to the goals for peacekeeping set out by Paul Diehl in his 1993 book.<sup>48</sup> Most analysts agree that peace is prerequisite to all other elements of conflict transformation but by seeking no more than a self-enforcing peace, Stedman and Cousens imply that *reinforcing* a thuggish prewar government may be as good as reforming

or changing it.<sup>49</sup> During the Cold War, autocratic outcomes were routinely hailed (indeed, engineered) as stabilizing but, when they failed, they tended to fail violently.

Jack Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder (2005), drawing on the results of a multi-year, multi-author, government-funded study of state failure and political risk, concluded that stability is “overwhelmingly determined by a country’s patterns of political competition and political authority,” but also that “the key to maintaining stability appears to lie in the development of democratic institutions” that promote fair and open competition, deter factionalism, and constrain the power of the chief executive.<sup>50</sup> A subsequent paper from the same authors and their colleagues on the Political Instability Task Force reaffirmed that, “It is these conditions, not elections as such, and certainly not a mythic and utopian notion of ‘democracy,’ that should guide policymakers seeking greater stability in the world.”<sup>51</sup> Peace and stability, in their view, require more than just efficient or even honest authoritarians, but more than a simple winner-take-all election, as well.

These studies both clarify and re-complicate the peacebuilding problem, which they define as political power and how it is exercised. If, according to one camp, outsiders cannot and should not expect to build a fully-institutionalized democracy but, according to the other, they cannot expect stability to last without it, what is to be done? It may turn out that, while democracy must indeed be built from within, it can be reinforced from without; that training, capacity-building, monitoring, verifying and other characteristically western liberal impulses can be tied to penalties in aid and trade, targeted sanctions, and other tunable gateways to global access, to help ensure that democracy is not hijacked, even if the result is occasionally bruised nationalist feelings. As the Task Force team argues, “The risks of such a slide from full to factionalized democracy are not merely a matter of the loss of some democratic character. Instead, they are more realistically viewed as a massive increase in the risks of political catastrophe, including civil war, genocide, and ethnic slaughter.”<sup>52</sup>

The twin requirements to monitor peace deal signatories’ behavior over some years and to trigger penalties for poor compliance raise the question of who or what should perform these functions. As of late 2005, UN member states were groping toward a mutually acceptable

structure and job description for a new UN Peacebuilding Commission, to be a “subsidiary body” of the Security Council. Early feedback suggested an institution too weak to meet the need for commitment monitoring, let alone consistent implementation or enforcement, but neither could one rule out its potential for growing into these tasks.

### **The Management (and Limitations) of State and Nation Building**

Whatever their ultimate objectives, international efforts to support war-to-peace transitions need to be competently run and effectively funded, with some notion of strategic direction (what to do when, with what priority, linked how to other issues). Jarat Chopra (1998–99) anticipated the legal and political requirements of transitional civil administration (the UN’s term for temporary governance) in several articles and a book published just in time to be tested in the field. (Chopra was one of the earlier members of the civil administration team of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.)<sup>53</sup> The sort of international administration that Chopra had in mind in his writings involved an even more thoroughgoing program of political change than the missions in Timor and Kosovo were geared to produce. For Chopra, the main task of such missions is not state building per se but human security and human development; hence sovereignty loomed not so much as a quality of the state to be restored but as an obstacle to be surmounted en route to rebuilding human dignity.

Chopra delineated three phases of transitional tasks: immediate, medium-term, and long-term. Immediate tasks were about getting set up, imposing order as necessary, disarming factions, clearing landmines, and establishing law enforcement mechanisms. Medium-term tasks included direct public administration, training and structuring of local security forces, rebuilding basic infrastructure, and otherwise facilitating the transition back to local control. Long-term tasks included national reconciliation, “empowering civil society,” and other actions to consolidate peace. Chopra was one of the first authors to advocate a “UN ‘off the shelf’ criminal law and procedure” code as “essential in any peace-maintenance arsenal” to enable it to deal quickly with the most serious of violent criminal offenses. This issue was taken up the following year by the United Nations’ *Brahimi Report*. In late 2001, Chopra,

James McCallum, and Alexander Thier applied Chopra's peace maintenance framework to post-Taliban Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup>

Among the few authors to assign priorities to the major elements of postconflict reconstruction was Graham Day (2001), at the time a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace between postings as a UN civil administrator.<sup>55</sup> In "Policekeeping: Law and Order in Failed and Emerging States," Day agreed with most analysts that intervenors should stop warfighting first, with military commanders leading the international effort and other components supporting. He went on to argue that establishing law and order was the next priority, with the civilian elements of the administering PSO in the lead and the military supporting. Only when a reasonable semblance of governance had been restored, including judicial enforcement of contracts, could one expect to restore the economy and attract outside investment. The economic development phase should be led by the international development banks and funds, with the PSO's civil component "regulating" the effort and other components in support. Finally, with the war stopped, basic government functioning, the economy coming back, and jobs appearing, the international community could and should turn to implementing transitional justice and nurturing civil society (the latter effort led by NGOs). Day did not arrange these priorities linearly but in a kind of overlapping cascade, the next beginning once the preceding one was well under way.<sup>56</sup>

No sectoral specialist wants to be the one whose sector is consigned to the second, third, or fourth tier in the national recovery plan; all will argue that their sector must be active at the earliest possible moment, and they all will have valid arguments to make. But in internal wars, what matters to peace is power on the ground and who holds it. As military stability ebbs and flows, so will government services and any semblance of law enforcement. Local-area markets will function, in turn, based on buyers' and sellers' assessments of their personal security. Day's logic is, in short, basically sound: war can destroy all efforts to rebuild; a semblance of law and order over a fairly wide area is necessary if longer-range markets and trade are to function; and reconciliation is easier if people have work.

Simon Chesterman (2003) took a highly critical look at transitional administration, building on the proceedings of a conference of

practitioners convened by the IPA in October 2002. He focused on oft-repeated mismatches between the stated ends of transitional administration and the means applied to achieve them, which he found to be, in various ways, inconsistent, inadequate, and inappropriate.<sup>57</sup>

Means were *inconsistent* insofar as outsiders talked “local ownership” going into a mission but would not be doing the mission if local capacity were up to the tasks of governing; hence talk of local ownership is, in his view, at best a mollifying smokescreen.

Means were *inadequate* because international resources tended to be supply- rather than demand-driven, reflecting donors’ domestic politics or whatever happened to be popular with donors at the moment, which may not be what the society in question needed most. Funding and other resource shortfalls hampered the fulfillment of ambitious mandates. A paucity of UN police and related rule-of-law personnel, for example, meant that public security needs could be only partially met, leaving wide gaps for criminal elements or local political actors to exploit.

Means were *inappropriate* insofar as interventions created locally unsustainable institutions or imported technologies that could not be maintained once internationals left, due to either lack of skills or lack of funds. Conversely, standards of restored governance and institutional development that met external actors’ needs and interests might fall well short of local parties’ expectations of the government they were to inherit.

International administrators, Chesterman argued, should invite and embrace rather than avoid or dismiss local criticism, and see it as representative of the sort of open political environment that the United Nations hopes to foster in a war-torn state. Similarly, administrators should encourage local consultation but should not pretend that power sharing is happening if it really is not.

The author-editors of *Quest for Viable Peace* (2005) dug deeper into the management of transitional administration but drew their lessons and recommendations primarily from years of personal experience with various aspects of operations in Kosovo.<sup>58</sup> The volume developed a distinctive framework for peacebuilding that focused on requirements for rebuilding local capacity in public security, governance, and economics so that the international community might

withdraw and leave behind a sustainable peace. The volume was co-edited by the author of the Kosovo chapter in this volume; readers can refer to that chapter's conclusions for a set of lessons and recommendations that parallel those in *Quest*.

Until September 11, 2001, the Bush administration ranged from indifferent to hostile toward what Washington tends to call "nation building." After 9/11, the administration reengaged the question through the lens of the "war on terrorism" and Washington became a more receptive market for lessons learned in this field. U.S. troops had been helping keep the peace in Bosnia since 1995 and in Kosovo since 1999 but their post-9/11 engagements placed much greater emphasis on war-fighting and counterinsurgency. In neither Afghanistan nor Iraq was organized resistance to U.S. intervention completely eliminated, however, necessitating simultaneous build-fight strategies. Subsequent lessons learned compendia aimed at U.S. policymakers tended therefore to address situations in which outsiders have responsibilities that are all but overwhelming, requiring power and resources far beyond those called for in even the most vigorous implementation of voluntary peace agreements.

The first post-9/11 report to reach policymakers was "Play to Win: Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction" (2003), co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army. It defined what would become the canonical "pillars" of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) for the Washington community: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation. A companion "task framework" defined the operational elements of each pillar and, like Chopra, described tasks for each of three phases of intervention: the initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. Transformation, for CSIS, meant rebuilding or reforming local and national institutions and sustainability meant national authorities capable of shouldering all responsibility for running the government.<sup>59</sup> A book-length follow-up report, *Winning the Peace* (2004), fleshed out recommendations for the U.S. government initially sketched in "Play to Win".<sup>60</sup>

- Operations need coherent military leadership and good core troops (most easily provided by a single lead nation).

- The international community must have a coherent PCR strategy that addresses problems “holistically,” prioritizes and sequences assistance; timing and phasing of operations must be driven by events and conditions on the ground.
- PCR is a fundamentally political process and intervention therefore must be designed with the interests of all key actors in mind, including the local parties, who must “own” the PCR process and eventually be its prime movers. Outsiders should therefore “avoid undermining” local leaders, institutions, and processes.
- Only a small team of external actors, working in-country, can leverage international resources and create change; resources, power, and authority should devolve to them.
- The international community needs mechanisms for mobilizing resources rapidly, and for maintaining accountability once deployed.

Robert Orr, editor and coauthor of *Winning the Peace*, noted that outsiders’ approaches to rebuilding government may be guided initially by expatriates who have long-standing personal agendas, as will all local actors, and outsiders’ failure to learn and account for those interests “may empower spoilers and disempower legitimate actors.”<sup>61</sup> Advice from the more competent members of the old regime, Orr argued, should not therefore be automatically rejected.

As both U.S. and UN experiences in the field have repeatedly demonstrated, any devolution of authority and resources to the field must be joined at the hip to smart, strict, and well-enforced measures of accountability for both use of funds and personal behavior. And while rapid deployment can be and often is key to postconflict stability, haste opens windows for corruption if most of the necessary supporting contracts are not let well in advance, when competitive vetting can be done in the absence of extreme time pressure.

Where international presence derives from clauses in a peace accord, the templates for postwar leadership, institutions, and processes may already have been drafted by negotiators. The internationals who subsequently deploy will be the implementers, not the engineers or architects, of peace. *Winning the Peace* does not address this scenario, which is the standard one for most UN-led peace operations.

A RAND Corporation study published in 2005 focused on select UN operations. *The UN's Role in Nation-Building, from the Congo to Iraq*, was the second in a two-volume series that used case studies to review and, ultimately, compare the United States and the United Nations as nation builders.<sup>62</sup> Both volumes defined nation building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a transition to democracy.”<sup>63</sup> Cases not built around the use of force were therefore to be excluded. In addition, cases where U.S. troops deployed in any number at any time and any sequence were classified as “U.S. led.”

The lessons learned chapter in *UN's Role* speaks with the voice of experience (perhaps that of lead author, former U.S. ambassador and diplomatic troubleshooter James Dobbins) in an engaging historical narrative. It highlights some of the known problems with UN operations at or before the turn of the century, including lengthy deployment delays, under-resourcing and difficulty managing violent challenges, but also notes some of the UN's achievements. This chapter is more or less divorced from the remaining thematic chapters of the study, however, whose conclusions depend heavily on the study's selection of cases, which is itself problematic.

RAND analyzed nine countries for *UN's Role*: the Congo (for operations 1960–64), Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Croatia (Eastern Slavonia), Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq. Of the nine, UN operations had forceful mandates in just four; in two other cases the United Nations released *local* forces to contest violations of peace accords. These were South African troops in Namibia and Cambodian factions other than the Khmer Rouge, which opted out of the peace process. There were no such episodes in Mozambique, no armed UN troops at all in El Salvador, and while the Security Council may have blessed the presence of coalition forces in Iraq from September 2003 onward, the relative handful of non-Iraqi UN personnel on the ground there were decidedly not using force to promote democracy.

RAND did not include on its UN case list either the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia (1992–95) or the UN's operations in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, or Haiti. Where the selected cases (even Congo) were comparatively successful, these latter cases are generally considered failures (Haiti not so much operationally as strategically). No case chapter in either volume mentions UNPROFOR,

although it was the United Nations' largest operation and one of its most troubling, operationally and ethically. Together with Somalia (treated as a U.S. case), it was pivotal to the decisions of most Western states to forego future UN troop contributions.<sup>64</sup> The UN's major Somalia operation replaced U.S. coalition forces in May 1993 and was specifically mandated to promote a transition to democracy and authorized to use force if necessary. That summer, 110 troops from countries other than the United States lost their lives in combat in an ultimately futile effort to enforce that mandate. Before fighting ended, U.S. forces under U.S. command also suffered 25 dead, a trauma sufficient to help dissuade U.S. political leaders from making any military effort to halt the genocide in Rwanda the following spring.<sup>65</sup> The UN operation in Rwanda at that time, with a mandate and force comparable to the UN operation in Mozambique, dissolved as the genocide mounted. These issues of case selection and assignment in turn skew the conclusions drawn in the volume's final two chapters with regard to U.S. versus UN mission duration, success rate, combat deaths, and so forth.

In suggesting that the United Nations can do nation building as RAND defines it, albeit on a scale smaller than the United States, the RAND studies suggest that the organization can be a reliable junior partner able to hold together failing states that don't quite qualify for extreme political makeovers. This is a dangerous position for the United Nations to be in, not least because the corollary is that UN operations go where great power attention is least focused, yet great power attention has proven to be an essential ingredient for successful peacebuilding. Without that attention, the United Nations' many chaos-straddling missions are condemned at best to stalemate, yet the institution itself, not those who have given it these missions without the requisite political support, will be called to account for the lack of success.

This review has shown that there is considerable disagreement in the literature on peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction, about how much democracy is needed or desirable for sustainable peace and, within that desirable level, about how much can be induced from the outside. There is disagreement regarding how much emphasis to place on economics and whether growth should be nurtured or just allowed to happen; disagreement on how much to press human rights concerns, accountability for wartime behavior, and formal mechanisms

of reconciliation; and disagreement on how much transparency is necessary to promote accountability in postwar government.

There is agreement, however, on the need to get the difficulty of the implementation environment right; agreement that local actors will maneuver for advantage within the peace process after implementation begins; agreement that local actors' access to supporting resources gives them greater incentive and ability to resist and even to bolt the peace process; and agreement that, the longer it takes to get a transition started, the greater the prospect that the process will go awry. Finally, there is agreement that tangible support for implementation on the part of neighboring states and at least one great power is essential if difficult transitions are to have any hope of succeeding. Unfortunately, there is also agreement that, in most instances, great-power attention and money will be difficult to sustain long enough to create sustainable peace.

### **Complex Peace Support Operations in the Twenty-first Century**

Except for the long-running effort in Bosnia, all of the operations detailed in this volume were launched between 1999 and 2001 and constituted the third surge in peace operations since the end of the Cold War. Four of these operations are ongoing as of this writing, so their stories, although updated for the most part to mid-2005, are by definition incomplete.

The third surge seems predictable in hindsight, but in early spring 1999 no one would have guessed that the Security Council would soon give the UN Secretariat another go at managing complex civil-military operations in dangerous and volatile, not-quite-postconflict settings. The growing crisis over Kosovo through most of 1998 and the winter of 1999 drew NATO ever closer to launching air strikes against the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army and its associated paramilitary police. These forces, pursuing the self-styled Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), increasingly visited violence upon Kosovo's largely ethnic Albanian population, whose aspirations for independence the KLA themselves advanced by violent means. When the NATO bombing campaign began in March 1999, betting persons would have wagered that postwar

security and administration tasks would be assigned to Europe's regional institutions. They would have been partly right: NATO got the military tasks, the European Union got the job of rebuilding Kosovo's economy, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe got the job of building democracy. The overall job of civil administration, however—providing police, power, water, and schools—went to the United Nations, whose personnel were roughly as surprised and alarmed as anyone else at their having gotten the job.

The Kosovo bundle-on-the-doorstep was not the United Nations' only new responsibility, however. In May 1999, the organization was invited by the president of Indonesia to manage a plebiscite in East Timor, the former Portuguese colony seized by Indonesia in 1975 and held for twenty-four years without recognition from the United Nations or from any country save Australia. East Timorese voters were expected to favor political independence and, despite months of violent harassment by Indonesian army-sponsored private militias, they did so—only to watch as the militias were unleashed to pillage, burn, and kill. Frantic diplomatic initiatives and serious international arm twisting led the Indonesian government to agree to the rapid dispatch of an Australian-led intervention force, which restored order quickly, but not before most of East Timor had been stripped and burned to the ground. In October 1999, the Security Council created a UN operation to replace the Australian force and, as in the case of Kosovo, gave it governing authority. At about the same time, the council also dispatched a UN force to Sierra Leone to help that beleaguered government implement a peace accord signed, under international pressure, with a rebel group best known for its diamond smuggling and atrocities against civilians.

The DRC was, to a great degree, the mission that the system feared the most, because of its potential to expand. The DRC is huge, the United Nations had been mired there before, and four decades of political decay, economic stagnation, and population growth made it an even more daunting venue in which to keep the peace or even monitor it. The Security Council decided, in February 2000, that the UN military observers already deployed there needed protection, and so voted for a guard force of 5,000 troops. The war in the DRC involved a half-dozen African armies, their local proxies, and assorted militias,

which engaged in a kind of desultory war that did not kill so many soldiers but generated piles of precious gems and metals for officers to cart home. The war also contributed to the deaths of nearly four million ordinary Congolese.<sup>66</sup> Driven from their homes and fields by the many marauding bands, they starved or succumbed to disease in the bush.

As the UN Secretariat struggled to plan, staff, and deploy these new operations in November–December 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released two reports, one on the Srebrenica massacre that had been requested by the General Assembly in November 1998, and the other on the UN role in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, which Annan himself had commissioned in March 1999. Both reports were highly critical of the United Nations, reopening old wounds and creating new doubts about its ability to carry out the missions it had just been given.<sup>67</sup>

It was against this background in March 2000 that Kofi Annan took the initiative to appoint the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, instructing it to “present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting [peace and security] activities.” The panel, chaired by Undersecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, issued its report the following August, in time for submission to the Millennium Summit. The UN Secretariat subsequently engaged member states for three years to implement key elements of the panel’s recommendations. The impacts of that process of change and renewal on the United Nations’ ability to support and conduct peace operations are still being felt at UN headquarters and in the field.<sup>68</sup> Readers should bear in mind, however, that the operations chronicled in the chapters of this volume began before the *Brahimi Report* was commissioned and, in their early years, were themselves elements of the crisis that caused it to be commissioned. Most of these operations benefited from the post-Brahimi reforms, but not until the fourth surge in UN operations, in 2003–4, could the effects of reform on new missions be assessed. Those operations brought UN peacekeepers into Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti, and southern Sudan. Their stories are still unfolding.

## **Annex I: Paying for Peace Operations**

Although peace support operations (PSOs) are cheaper than war, they are still not cheap. Developed states fund about 92 percent of assessed UN peacekeeping costs, pay most of their own real costs of participating in UN operations, and may subsidize other states' participation in non-UN operations. Except for operations led by the United Nations, the costs of PSOs are not easy to calculate, as there is no standardized cost reporting (some states may report the total cost of troops deployed, while others report just the marginal, or added, costs of deploying troops) or central repository of such data. Only the United Nations has a functioning system for reimbursing operational costs based on assessments levied on its member states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has a nominal system of member state taxation to support peace operations but has not managed to collect much toward that end. The lack of effective funding mechanisms led to the transfer of several African operations (including those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burundi) to UN management.

In a major departure, the report of the UN secretary-general's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recommended that UN funding and equipment procurement channels be opened to regionally managed African peace operations on a case-by-case basis, in parallel with other, state-to-state programs to build up the region's peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacity.<sup>69</sup> Not mentioned, but necessary to ensure both transparency in expenditures and the upholding of global human rights standards by regional forces, would be mandatory measures to monitor field performance, for example, by using UN military observers with troop contingents and civilian counterparts in such operations' headquarters. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations might welcome being spared the hassle of mission management, but if UN financial norms and rules applied, UN-funded regional operations would be no less costly than those managed by the United Nations itself. If different, cost-saving norms and rules applied, however, the United Nations would risk charges of discrimination and perhaps racism. Thus, the advantage of the proposal would rest largely in its shifting of the operational management burden to the region, a

burden that the African Union, ECOWAS, and other institutions are several years away from assuming effectively. As they become more capable, however, such a shift might well be in order.

NATO and the European Union cover some “common” costs, such as support for headquarters, infrastructure, identification marking, and medical support for the forces as a whole, “negotiated on an operation-by-operation basis.”<sup>70</sup> Both organizations require their member states to cover their own operational costs (the rather mordant phrase being “costs lie where they fall”). Coalition operations also function on a pay-as-you-go basis unless the lead nation or some generous third party offers to defray a troop contributor’s costs (as the United States did in support of Turkey’s leadership of peacekeepers in Kabul in 2002). For all of these reasons, it is not easy to create global annual spending totals for peace operations. Thus the numbers discussed here should be treated as rough estimates.

### **The Costs of Non-UN Peace Operations**

Non-UN mission costs are the hardest to calculate. Table 1.A.1 presents the results of a late-1999 cost survey, undertaken by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), of countries that were contributing troops to NATO’s Kosovo Force. It also contains CRS data for American operating costs in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, and British costs for Kosovo. When these data are combined with troop deployment numbers drawn from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual *Military Balance*, annual per capita troop costs for each contributor can be estimated. These costs averaged \$128,600 (give or take \$60,000) for members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. DAC membership is used here to define the developed states, that is, states with sufficient economic surplus that they can and do offer development aid to others. As Table 1.A.1 notes, the reported averages exclude the highest- and lowest-cost entries in each category, on the assumption that the extremes reflect less reliable or less consistently reported data.

Costs averaged \$80,000 for non-DAC European troop contributors (give or take \$20,000, again excluding the extremes). Assuming an overall inflation rate of 3 percent per year in Europe, these numbers

**Table 1.A.1. Estimated Annual per-Soldier Costs of Non-UN Peace Operations in the Balkans, in Current Dollars**

Average annual cost per soldier, NATO allies, Kosovo, 1999 <sup>a</sup>	
\$128,600	OECD/DAC <sup>b</sup> members
\$79,300	Non-DAC members
\$111,800	Both
Average annual cost per soldier, United States, 1996–2002	
\$212,800	Bosnia and Kosovo only
\$168,600	Bosnia, Kosovo, and FYROM (Macedonia)
\$51,600	FYROM (Macedonia) only

<sup>a</sup>Averages exclude “outliers,” or the most and least costly entries in each category.

<sup>b</sup>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee.

Sources: Carl Ek, “NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report,” no. RL30398 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2000), 14–15. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002). Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement,” no. IB94040 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 6, 2003), 16. Kenneth Bacon, “DOD Press Briefing, March 16, 1999” (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs). UK Ministry of Defence, “Kosovo: The Financial Management of Military Operations,” report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (London: The Stationery Office, June 2000).

would be closer to \$145,000 and \$89,000 in 2003.<sup>71</sup> (Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures given in this book are in U.S. dollars.)

Reported U.S. operational costs are equally variable, especially if one includes the U.S. contribution to the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia, where reported annual U.S. costs averaged \$50,000 per soldier, in current dollars, from 1996 to 1999. Even if this number reflects prior deductions of the reimbursements the U.S. government would have received from the United Nations for participating in a UN operation, reported U.S. operating costs in Macedonia would still be less than a third of reported U.S. costs for Bosnia and Kosovo, which averaged about \$213,000 from 1996 through 2002, in current dollars (excluding the highest- and lowest-cost mission years).<sup>72</sup>

### The Costs of UN Peace Operations

The United Nations reports publicly on the costs of its PSOs in far greater detail than does any other entity, national or multinational. Since 1973, the organization has paid a fixed rate of reimbursement per soldier, in part to avoid the kind of wildly varying claims for compensation that arose from its 1960–64 operation in the Congo.<sup>73</sup> Not finalized then and still subject to ongoing haggling among the United Nations' member states are the reimbursement rates for wear and tear on vehicles and other "contingent-owned equipment" that troop contributors bring with them to a UN operation. The standard troop reimbursement, initially \$500 to \$650 per month (the latter for specialties such as communications and engineering), was \$1,100 to \$1,400 by 2002. Periodic surveys of UN troop contributors, to determine actual operational costs, have confirmed that UN member states' actual costs vary widely but in many cases exceed reimbursement rates. An early 1989 survey, with responses from eleven of the thirteen states (all but four of them developed states) then contributing troops to UN operations, showed average monthly per capita costs of \$2,300, with a high of \$4,400 and a low of \$280. A late 1996 survey generated responses from twenty-six of forty-three troop contributors (still a broad mix of developed and developing states), showing average monthly costs of \$3,806, with a high of \$10,778 and a low of \$774. A new survey presently languishes in the 259-member working group of member states that ponders reimbursement issues. The group has not been able to reach consensus on changing the reimbursement formula, so the new survey should not be expected to see the light of day until around 2008.<sup>74</sup> Table 1.A.2 shows average per capita UN costs for troops in formed units in two of its peace operations: on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC operation was more expensive because most of its transport was by air.

In 2003, UN and non-UN peacekeeping combined—not including the cost of the occupation and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq—probably totaled between \$9.4 and \$9.6 billion (see table 1.A.3). While a substantial amount of money, this sum is still equivalent to just 1 percent of global military expenditure in 2003.<sup>75</sup>

**Table 1.A.2. UN Troop Costs**

	Ethiopia- Eritrea <sup>a</sup>	Democratic Republic of the Congo <sup>b</sup>
Total UN cost per troop-year for troops in units, 2003–4:	\$38,011	\$50,335
U.S. share of UN peacekeeping costs, 2003–4: 26.9%	\$10,208	\$13,518

*Note:* All UN costs are inclusive of operations, transport, and other support.

<sup>a</sup>Border- and cease-fire-monitoring mission, largely ground-mobile.

<sup>b</sup>Complex operation with enforcement mandate in eastern provinces; large country, poor roads, airborne logistics.

*Sources:* Compiled from United Nations, *Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea for the Period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004—Report of the Secretary-General*, A/59/616, December 16, 2004. United Nations, *Performance Report on the Budget of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004—Report of the Secretary-General*, A/59/657, March 4, 2005. United Nations, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, A/58/157*, July 15, 2003.

### The UN Peacekeeping Scale of Assessments

UN peace operations are funded primarily through the “peacekeeping scale of assessments,” a system first informally adopted in 1973 that puts most of the burden of peacekeeping finance on those states with the greatest ability to pay. It places a special burden on the five permanent members of the Security Council (or P5: China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States), reflecting their special responsibility under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The added burden also reflects the desire of developing countries, who were relieved of an equivalent financial burden, to avoid having to pay for operations whose costs were unpredictable and potentially quite high (in the 1960s, for example, the first Congo operation cost several times more per year than the entire UN regular budget), and which mostly served Western Cold War interests in stability.

The P5 therefore pay roughly a 22 percent higher share of UN peacekeeping costs than they pay in regular UN dues, while developing

**Table 1.A.3. Total Cost of Global Peace Operations, 2003 (excluding Iraq)**

Estimated gross OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members' peacekeeping costs	\$6,600,000,000	at	\$144,700	per troop-year; cost derived from table 1.A.1, inflated to 2003 dollars at 3 percent per year
Less reimbursement for UN operations	\$73,741,200	at	\$23,500	Average UN reimbursement per troop-year, including COE <sup>a</sup> and self-sustainment costs
Net DAC members' peacekeeping costs	\$6,526,258,800		16%	Estimated percentage of DAC members' actual UN operations costs that UN reimburses
Cost of non-UN, non-DAC operations	\$387,864,500	at	\$41,800	per troop-year, assuming that non-UN, non-DAC operational costs are equivalent to UN's
or	\$193,932,250	at	\$20,900	per troop-year, assuming that non-UN, non-DAC operational costs are half of UN's costs
UN peacekeeping budget normed to calendar year 2003 (half of 2002-3 budget plus half of 2003-4 budget)	\$2,671,760,300	of which	91%	contributed by DAC members
Total peacekeeping expenditure, 2003, using higher-cost assumption about non-UN, non-DAC troop contributors	\$9,391,951,350			
Total peacekeeping expenditure, 2003, using lower-cost assumption about non-UN, non-DAC troop contributors	\$9,585,500,000			

<sup>a</sup>COE is contingent-owned equipment, the combat and transport vehicles and other equipment that military contingents bring with them to an operation. Self-sustainment reimburses the cost of fuel and other consumables.

Sources: Table 1.A.1. IISS, *Military Balance, 2003-2004*. United Nations, *Review of Rates of Reimbursement to the Governments of Troop-Contributing Countries, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/774*, April 3, 2003. United Nations, *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003*. United Nations, *Budget for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/705*, February 9, 2004.

states receive a peacekeeping discount. The original peacekeeping scale had just four contributing categories: P5 (Group A); developed states (Group B); developing states (Group C, with an 80 percent dues discount); and least developed states (Group D, discounted 90 percent). Under this arrangement, the P5 and the twenty-six members of Group B funded 98 percent of peacekeeping-related costs from 1973 through 2000. The 157 members of Groups C and D funded 2 percent.

In 2000, however, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke led a successful campaign to formalize the peacekeeping scale (it had, up until then, simply been applied to each new mission budget by custom). Holbrooke not only managed to increase the payments made by wealthier developing states but also won agreement to peg states' membership in an expanded number of payment groups to national per capita income. As states grow richer or poorer, their share of UN peacekeeping will rise or fall. Moreover, Holbrooke managed to get the U.S. contribution to the regular UN budget cut from 25 to 22 percent, and the nominal U.S. share of UN peacekeeping cut from 30–31 percent to about 26.5 percent, a combined savings to U.S. taxpayers, at the 2004 tempo of UN peacekeeping, of roughly \$169 million per year. In turn, the U.S. Congress temporarily lifted a 25 percent ceiling on all U.S. contributions to the United Nations that it had imposed in the mid-1990s (reinstating it in mid-2005). Table 1.A.4 compares the old system with the new one, under which the wealthier among the developing states now pay for almost 5 percent of UN peacekeeping.

The forty-nine members of Group J—the poorest countries in the world—still receive a 90 percent discount on their peacekeeping dues and paid, on average, about \$6,700 apiece toward UN peacekeeping costs in 2003. The eighty-one members of Group I, with an 80 percent discount, paid an average of \$488,000 apiece. Were UN peacekeeping costs apportioned like the regular UN budget, those numbers would have been \$67,000 and \$2.4 million apiece, respectively. Whether such higher payments would be affordable is a matter of legitimate debate, but it is worth noting that in 2003, countries in Group J spent, on average, 12,000 times as much for their national militaries as they dropped in the United Nations' peacekeeping cup, while countries in Group I spent nearly 7,000 times as much.<sup>76</sup> (See table 1.A.5 for the average spending ratios of the other peacekeeping payment groups.) Some

**Table 1.A.4. Old and New Peacekeeping Scales of Assessments**

<i>As of January 1999</i>					<i>As of January 2005</i>				
Old Groups	Payment Relative to Regular Scale	Percentage Group Criteria	Number of Members	Funded by Each Group	New Groups	Payment Relative to Regular Scale	Group Criteria (per capita income)	Number of Members	Percentage Funded by Each Group
A	121.1%	P5 <sup>a</sup>	5	46.89%	A	122.5%	P5	5	45.25%
B	100.0%	Developed	26	51.09%	B	100.0%	Developed	32	50.13%
C	20.0%	Developing	60	2.01%	C	92.5%	N/A	5	0.82%
D	10.0%	Least developed	97	0.02%	D	80.0%	<\$10,188	1	1.51%
E	60.0%	<\$9,169	3	0.01%	E	60.0%	<\$9,169	3	0.01%
F	40.0%	<\$8,150	2	0.29%	F	40.0%	<\$8,150	2	0.29%
G	30.0%	<\$7,131	4	0.34%	G	30.0%	<\$7,131	4	0.34%
H	30.0%	<\$6,112	9	0.28%	H	30.0%	<\$6,112	9	0.28%
I	20.0%	<\$5,094	81	1.38%	I	20.0%	<\$5,094	81	1.38%
J	10.0%	Least developed	49	0.01%	J	10.0%	Least developed	49	0.01%

<sup>a</sup>P5 are China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States.

Sources: United Nations, *Financing of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group*, A/RES/43/232, March 3, 1989. United Nations, *Scale of Assessments for Apportioning the Expenses of the United Nations*, A/RES/52/215, January 20, 1998. United Nations, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/58/157/Add.1, December 17, 2003.

**Table 1.A.5. Dollars of Defense Spending in 2003 per Dollar of UN Peacekeeping Dues in 2004**

	Average	Median	Standard Deviation
P5	\$642	\$423	\$525
Developed States	\$178	\$150	\$110
Groups C through H	\$902	\$832	\$689
Group I	\$6,907	\$3,461	\$8,766
Group J	\$12,365	\$9,580	\$9,358

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance, 2004–2005*. United Nations, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/157/Add.1*, December 17, 2003.

countries with very high ratios of military spending to peacekeeping dues (such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Jordan) are also top troop contributors to UN operations, but many high spenders are not. Moreover, five of the top ten troop contributors in mid-2004 (Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and Uruguay) managed to contribute brigade-sized units to UN operations despite below-average military spending ratios. The UN reimbursements system makes that possible.

## Notes

1. Monty G. Marshall, "Global Trends in Violent Conflict," in *Peace and Conflict 2005*, ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 11.

2. Not everyone buys Robert D. Kaplan's pessimistic assessments, but he does take the time to go out and look. See his *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy* (New York: Vintage, 1997).

3. For an in-depth assessment of what each brings to peace operations and how they support one another, see William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, *Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-first Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

4. William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). The cases in this

volume include two complex operations, the original UN Operation in the Congo (1960–64) and the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (1962–63).

5. William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).

6. Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1999). See also William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-Building' in Somalia," in *UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Durch.

7. The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) supervised the transfer back to Croatia of districts bordering on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia that had been seized and occupied by the Yugoslav army, and then monitored by UN peacekeepers, after Croatia broke away from its parent federation in 1991. An operation with 5,000 well-equipped troops and substantial authority to manage the political transition, UNTAES also benefited from the presence of NATO forces in Bosnia as potential reinforcements. Initiated in January 1996, UNTAES ended in January 1998 roundly viewed as a success. See the information pages on UNTAES maintained by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untaes.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untaes.htm).

Haiti held its first democratic elections in 1990, but its first elected president was ousted by the army in late 1991. Its people then suffered under three years of international sanctions that hurt its ruling elites not much at all. U.S. military intervention in September 1994 was motivated as much by a desire to stop waves of Haitian refugees from flooding U.S. shores as by any interest in restoring Haiti's elected government. Its elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was viewed with a mix of uncertainty and alarm in Washington. American forces shifted from intervention to peacekeeping more or less in mid-deployment when, at the eleventh hour, the military government agreed to resign. A UN peace operation took over from U.S. forces in March 1995, with a U.S. force commander and 2,400 U.S. troops. The full UN force (7,000 strong) was replaced just one year later by a force one-fourth as large, which was replaced in turn after two years by a small contingent of police trainers. None of these missions touched Haiti's political, economic, or judicial structures, and the newly trained police force, standing virtually alone in an otherwise unreformed government, soon sank into the sort of disrepair that characterized the rest of the country. Interest in Haiti had faded by 1998, as outsiders grew frustrated with the country's growing political gridlock. By early 2004, Haiti once again exhibited visible symptoms of state failure, with

militias brandishing arms against an incapacitated government. A coalition intervention force led by the United States deployed there briefly in the spring of 2004, replaced in short order by a Brazilian-led UN operation. For further details, see Chetan Kumar, "Peacebuilding in Haiti," in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). See also Janice Stromsem and Joseph Trincellito, "Building the Haitian National Police," *Haiti Papers*, no. 6 (Washington, DC: Trinity College Haiti Program, 2003); and Robert Maguire, "U.S. Policy toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement?" *Haiti Papers*, no. 8 (Washington, DC: Trinity College Haiti Program, 2003).

8. Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's for the International Peace Academy, 1984), 1.

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

10. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 2–3. See also Rikhye, *Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, 1–2; and Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 1–8, 298.

11. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1992): 116–17. See also United Nations, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 25, 1995, 7–18.

12. William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," in *UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Durch, 3–7.

13. Daniel Byman et al., *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations*, MR-1185-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 39.

14. Paul F. Diehl, "Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping," in *Politics of Global Governance*, ed. Paul F. Diehl, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 217–19.

15. Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–7.

16. Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson, "Broaching the Issues," in *Domestic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law*, ed. Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19–24.

17. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 5–6. For the most recent iteration of

British doctrine for peace support operations, see UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham: UK Ministry of Defence, 2004).

18. United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, paras. 12, 28.

19. *Ibid.*, para. 13.

20. Charles Call, "Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-conflict Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues," a policy review for the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, New York, January 2005, 3–6.

21. The term derives from the piece by Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* (Fall 1997), 5–53.

22. On French doctrine, see Thierry Tardy, "French Policy towards Peace Support Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 1 (Spring 1999); and Joseph P. Gregoire, "The Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine" Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy Series (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002). On U.S. doctrine, see U.S. Army, *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 1994); U.S. Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual FM 3-07 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 2003); and U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept* (draft, September 2004), 3, [www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab\\_joc.doc](http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab_joc.doc). On British doctrine, see Philip Wilkinson, "Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies," in *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); and UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, Joint Warfare Publication [JWP] 3-50, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham, UK: 2004). Of the other two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia has long treated peacekeeping as low-intensity conflict but without the hearts-and-minds annex. See Kevin P. O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia," in *UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Durch (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 412–15. China has not been deeply involved operationally in peacekeeping, although that is beginning to change.

23. Colonel Michael Kelly, "Military Force and Justice," in *From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities to Disrupted States*, ed. William Maley, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), 229–54. See also Michael Dziedzic,

“Introduction,” in *Policing the New World Disorder*, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 6–15.

24. Charles King, *Ending Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper no. 308 (London: International Institute for Security Studies, 1997). Others have addressed civil war duration, especially from the perspective of comparative national statistics (see, for example, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo) 41, no. 3 [May 2004], 253ff). None, in my view, has addressed duration in a fashion as operationally useful to policymakers as King.

25. King, *Ending Civil Wars*, 29–52.

26. *Ibid.*, 55–83.

27. Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001). Doyle uses only one of the four possible combinations with “many” factions, namely, hostile and incoherent.

28. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems.”

29. Dhlakama had little choice but to settle for cash. RENAMO, created by the white minority regime in Rhodesia and sustained after that regime’s demise by apartheid-era South Africa, ravaged Mozambique for fifteen years, only to lose its external support when South Africa abandoned apartheid. On the long-running conflict, see Alex Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). With no substantial internal resources to trade for money or guns, RENAMO lacked the leverage to be a greedy spoiler.

30. See Barry Blechman et al., “Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace, Final Report” (report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources, Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs), Washington, DC: DFI International, September 1997, 10.

31. The DFI study modeled situational difficulty using eight variables, each with content scaled from +5 to –5, or from least to most problematic for peace, as judged by the authors. The first variable measured combatants’ war objectives, ranging from “control of the state” (+5) to “secession from the state” (–5), with power sharing and autonomy goals ranked in between. The second variable measured the motives of the combatants, from political

(seeking a redistribution of power, at +5) to ideological/religious (promoting a new order of power, at -5). The third reflected the amount of damage done to government in the course of the war (from not much, at +5, to complete collapse, at -5). The fourth and fifth reflected the breadth and depth of the peace agreement, respectively. The sixth measured the willingness of local faction leaders to place their hold on power at risk in the course of implementing the peace accord (for example, by gracefully losing an election). The seventh measured whether neighboring states' attitudes toward peace were, on balance, supportive, indifferent, or hostile, while the eighth was a comparably scaled measure of great-power involvement in the peace process. *Ibid.*, 10–13.

32. See, for example, the report of the original panel of experts appointed to investigate the breaking of sanctions against the Angolan rebel group UNITA. It was known as the “Fowler Report,” after Robert Fowler, the Canadian ambassador to the United Nations who chaired the Security Council committee overseeing the panel’s work. United Nations, *Letter Dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/203*, March 10, 2000. There have since been more than thirty reports from comparable investigative panels.

33. George W. Downs and Stephen John Stedman, “Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation,” in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 56.

34. *Ibid.*, 20–28.

35. A politically viable state is a key objective of war-peace transitions. Virtually all of the peace processes studied involved elections. A state that could not sustain itself for even one electoral cycle after a PSO’s departure would be hard to define as viable. In most cases, the electoral cycle was four to six years. The tripartite-variable also credits the survival of a structurally democratic government in the face of resumed warfare and/or disturbance of public order (as in the case of Colombia), while it lowers the score of a country where war is over but elections are stolen.

36. Most of the quantitative studies use survival models with a dependent variable coded 0 or 1, indicating the presence or absence of war for a particular case and time period. See, for example, Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 269–92. For a useful critique of the limits of aggregate data models, see Nicholas Sambanis,

“Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 2 (June 2004), 259–79.

37. Downs and Stedman used an even more constrained timeline for measuring success in peace implementation: If peace lasts for two years after peacekeepers depart, then it should be considered self-enforcing and the mission a success. If peace fails after two years and two months, the mission should still be coded a success. A specific rationale for the two-year timeline was not given, however. “Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation,” in *Ending Civil Wars*, ed. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, 51.

38. *Ibid.*, 43–60.

39. Max Manwaring and Kimbra Fishel, “Lessons that Should Have Been Learned: Toward a Theory of Engagement,” in *The “Savage Wars of Peace”: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations*, ed. John T. Fishel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 207–8.

40. Manwaring and Fishel, “Lessons that Should Have Been Learned,” 209.

41. See, for example, Jack A. Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder, “How to Construct Stable Democracies,” *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004–5): 9–20.

42. Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, “Defense and Offense in Peace and Stability Operations,” in *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*, ed. Max G. Manwaring and Anthony James Joes (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 22, 25.

43. *Ibid.*, 21.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Elizabeth Cousens, “Introduction,” in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 13.

46. *Ibid.*, 4, 15.

47. Stephen John Stedman, “Introduction,” in *Ending Civil Wars*, ed. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, 2.

48. Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 33–39.

49. For comparable warnings about the risks of attempting to instill democracy from abroad, see Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

50. Jack A. Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder, "How to Construct Stable Democracies," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1: 9–20.

51. Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, et al., "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 3, 2005, 31. Online at [globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm](http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm).

52. *Ibid.*, 30.

53. Jarat Chopra, ed., *The Politics of Peace Maintenance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), which originally appeared as a special issue of the journal *Global Governance* (January–March 1998). Chopra et al., "The Politics of Peace Maintenance," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, no. 2 (Autumn 1999); Chopra, *Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority* (New York: Routledge, 1999); and Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," *Survival* 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 27–39.

54. Jarat Chopra, Jim McCallum, and Alexander Thier, "Planning Considerations for International Involvement in Post-Taliban Afghanistan," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 8, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 43–60.

55. Day served with the United Nations in Central America, the Balkans, and Iraq and had just completed a tour with UNTAET as administrator of the Oecusse enclave, an extrusion of East Timor notched into the north-west coast of the island and surrounded, therefore, by Indonesian West Timor. Day went on to be deputy high commissioner in Bosnia, based in Banja Luka. See [www.usip.org/specialists/bios/archives/day\\_graham.html](http://www.usip.org/specialists/bios/archives/day_graham.html).

56. Graham Day, "Policekeeping: Law and Order in Failed and Emerging States" (mimeo), March 29, 2001.

57. Simon Chesterman, "You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building," Project on Transitional Administrations, Final Report (New York: International Peace Academy, 2003).

58. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., *The Quest for a Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005). An excellent compendium on peacebuilding that offers more breadth on nonsecurity issues, but does not provide a consolidated framework of lessons or recommendations, is *From Civil Strife to Civil Society*, ed. Maley, Sampford, and Thakur.

59. "Play to Win: Report of the Bi-partisan Commission on Post-conflict Reconstruction" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] and Association of the U.S. Army, January 2003). For a

comparable but more detailed task framework for the military in postwar Iraq that does a more fine-tuned job of assigning priorities within major substantive categories, see Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, January 29, 2003, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil).

60. Robert C. Orr, "Constructing a Cohesive Strategic International Response," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Orr (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004), 19–36.

61. *Ibid.*, 21.

62. James Dobbins et al., *The U.S. Role in Nation-Building: From the Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004), and Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).

63. Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building*, 2.

64. For a case history see William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Fault-lines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy*, ed. Durch, 194–254.

65. The unusually frank report of the UN commission of inquiry on the summer 1993 war in Somalia is essential reading on this subject. United Nations, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties among Them*, S/1994/653, June 1, 1994.

66. The International Rescue Committee conducted several mortality surveys in the DRC, beginning in late spring 2000. The first found excess mortality of 1.75 million since the start of the regional war in August 1998; the latest, reflecting data collected between January 2003 and April 2004, found 3.8 million excess deaths. See Ken Coghlan et al., *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey* (New York, Kinshasa, and Bukavu: International Rescue Committee, 2004), iii.

67. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, The Fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549, November 15, 1999; and United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/1999/1257, December 16, 1999, [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/reports.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/reports.htm).

68. The full details on the implementation of the Brahimi Report can be found in William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

69. UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (New York: United Nations, 2004), 85–86.

70. See “Funding for Post-conflict Operations: NATO and the EU” (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2004), [www.stimson.org/fopo/Factsheet\\_FundingPostConflictOperations.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/fopo/Factsheet_FundingPostConflictOperations.pdf). See also Michele A. Flournoy et al., “European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategies and Capabilities” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005), 62–63, [www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0510\\_eurodefensereport.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0510_eurodefensereport.pdf).

71. The annual inflation rate for U.S. military outlays averaged 2.6 percent between 1999 and 2004, while the increase in the U.S. consumer price index for the same period averaged 1.9 percent. General rates of inflation in Europe during that period also averaged about 1.9 percent per year, and European armed forces operate at lower economies of scale than U.S. forces, so 3 percent annual inflation in military costs is a reasonable assumption for the militaries of other DAC members. See U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2005* (Washington, DC: Office of the Comptroller, March 2004), table 5-1. For European Union inflation rates, see InfoBASE Europe News Service, “InfoBASE Europe Data Record,” [www.ibeuropa.com/Records/8600/8608.htm](http://www.ibeuropa.com/Records/8600/8608.htm).

72. All of the numbers cover ground operations only. The sources of such great variation in cost are not clear, although U.S. forces in Macedonia were light infantry deployed mostly in static positions, while the other forces were mechanized and used their equipment to patrol their zones of responsibility.

73. William J. Durch, “Paying the Tab: The Financial Crises,” 41–42, and “The UN Operation in the Congo,” 331, in *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Durch.

74. United Nations, *Review of the Rates of Reimbursement to the Governments of Troop-Contributing States, Report of the Secretary-General* (A/45/582, October 10, 1990, 3; A/54/763, February 21, 2000; and A/57/774, April 3, 2003). The 1996 survey was not reported until February 2000.

75. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2004–2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 358.

76. These numbers exclude the two countries in each group with the highest military-spending-to-UN-peacekeeping-spending ratios. For Group J, these are Angola and Myanmar (each roughly \$250,000:\$1); and for Group I, North Korea (roughly \$98,000:\$1) and Armenia (\$72,500:\$1).