

INTRODUCTION

Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts

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In the early years of the twenty-first century the methods of conflict are more brutal and the methods of conflict resolution more sophisticated than ever before, leaving a tremendous gap between conflict and resolution that remains to be filled. Courage and commitment are needed to use the tools required to meet the challenge of moving people away from their proclivity to violence and nations away from the temptation to war. The purpose of this book is to build an awareness of the tools and techniques available to pursue this goal.

Peacemaking in International Conflict concerns conflict both among and within states and nations and therefore deals with power and interests. It thus encompasses conflicts among people, who act in the name of states and nations, and so touches on basic human interactions and reactions. It bridges and unites these two areas of activity—the interactional and the interpersonal—as it looks for lessons that each has for the other. It recognizes the inevitability of conflict among sovereign and nonsovereign groups speaking in the name of peoples or nations, but it presents ways in which that conflict can be first managed, moving it from violent to political manifestations, and then resolved, transforming it and removing its causes. This book presents the state of the art of the subject in descriptions, generalizations, and concepts, organized according to different methods of international conflict resolution, with the aim of emphasizing their usefulness and limitations.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Conflict in a New World Order

The end of the Cold War was a monumental event, the first global turning point in modern international relations not caused by a major war. However, now we are left without a sense of a dominant structure and system of world order; the post–Cold War era will persist until this uncertainty is resolved (Zartman 2007). Even the negative and destructive globalization inherent in the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, did not introduce any new certainty or revised order, only a mirror reflecting the absence of clear norms and structures.

The Cold War had barely become history when observers noted that its passing had opened an era of vicious “little” conflicts, uncontained by super-power restraints and impervious to regional ministrations. Although regional conflicts and national struggles for power were used by the Cold War protagonists for their own purposes (or to thwart their opponent’s suspected purposes), these conflicts were kept under careful control, lest they turn into tails that wag the dogs of global war, by the Cold War’s system of world order. When these constraints suddenly vanished in the early 1990s, conflicts of many types sprang forth. Many arose over the inheritance of a former communist-supported domestic order—including Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya, Nicaragua, and others.¹

Many regimes were artificially protected and ignored at the same time by the previous global balance. As soon as the balance shifted, some governments set about privatizing power and its profits. When justified rebellion broke out, the rebels imposed their own brand of bad government, eventually perpetuating the cycle of greed and grievance. Such is the recent history of Liberia, Sierra Leone, both Congos, all three Guineas, Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia, Burma, Pakistan, Venezuela, Mexico, and others.²

Elsewhere (and in some of the same cases), conflicts arose from deep-rooted antagonisms that had lain dormant or been held in check by the old balance of power. Such antagonisms rise and fall according to external conditions. When national systems of order break down, people fall back on ethnic or confessional identities that may exclude others with whom they formerly lived in harmony. When economic conditions worsen and the national resource pie shrinks, people (again, often mobilized by a selective sense of identity) fight over the scraps. International pressures for competitive, pluralist political and economic systems may augment the problem, creating a new context of conflict that societies cannot handle productively. These conditions fostered conflict in Algeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia,

Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Albania, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India, Guatemala, Haiti, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia.³ In addition to unsupported authoritarian systems, another inheritance from the Cold War is the sea of arms that has flowed into potential conflict areas. Africa, the former Soviet littoral from Afghanistan to Yugoslavia, Southeast Asia, and Andean and Central America are all awash with arms (Boutwell, Klare, and Reed 1995). In some places, an AK-47 is cheaper than a bucket of grain, and sales of ex-Soviet heavy armaments are a thriving discount business years after the Soviet Union dissolved. Although conflicts are pursued and atrocities are committed using even the most primitive weapons, the widespread availability of modern weaponry has provided the means to make many men and women mass murderers.

The international dimension that ties together these disparate types of internal conflicts is the new terrorism. Scarcely a “war” in any classical sense, and impervious to classical or modern methods of waging war, terrorist conflicts are expressions of desperation and hopelessness, where life is so meaningless that its only use is found in its negation. The source of such conflict is ultimately structural—the impingement of globalization on unwelcoming lives and cultures and unsatisfying spiritual and material conditions at home. But structural causes of conflict are notoriously difficult to work into peacemaking, and conflicts born of desperation are impervious to operational conflict management methods. Conflicts in West and Central Africa, Andean America, and the Middle East are partially rooted in the failure of the promise of contending “isms” of the Cold War, whether communism, native socialism, or capitalism. People who see the control of their individual and collective lives escape from their hands and who are accustomed to searching for solace in isms continue to search. To find comfort, they resort to a millennialist justification of anger and hate against the impingements and impositions of an outside world.

Despite spillover effects and “neighborhood” involvement, the conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s have not been classic interstate conflicts over causes such as boundaries, territory, hostile regimes, or the possession of resources. In the 1990s, only the first Gulf War, between Iraq and Kuwait, involved interstate aggression, making it the last of the Cold War conflicts (see Zartman and Kremenjuk 1995). In the 2000s, the exceptions as of this writing have been the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which began in 2003, and the Israel-Lebanon conflict in 2006. Indeed, neighbors tend to regard conflicts with apprehension, fearing that there, too, but for the grace of God, go they. Conflicts tend to become regionalized, not by unbridled aggression but by “contamination,” where violence

overflows boundaries and neighbors seek allies, as in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast), Central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad), the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan), Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Armenia), Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria), Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kurdistan, Iran, Iraq), Central America (Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador), and the Balkans.⁴

Although interstate conflict has remained at a low level of frequency, the incidence of intrastate wars peaked in the mid-1990s and then settled down to a “standard” level. But that observation hides both the low-level conflicts of contaminated regions and the long-term intractable conflicts in remission (many of the regional conflict areas noted above; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004, 2005). These conflicts underlie internal and interstate political dynamics, dribbling along below the statistically significant level of one thousand, or even twenty-five, battle-related deaths per year (Wallensteen 2007, 22–27) but ready to flare into incomprehensible outbursts.

The limits of the new situation are being tested everywhere. How much unrestrained conflict and brutality will the international community allow? How much interference in domestic security policies—nuclear, conventional, or counterinsurgent—will the international community permit? How immutable are the existing states and their boundaries? How widespread is the right of self-determination, and who may claim it? How long may a rapacious ruler take his turn at the trough to enrich himself before someone replaces him, and will the replacement be domestically, regionally, or internationally accepted or imposed? Until new and effective systems of world and domestic order are recognized, and until restive populations and ambitious actors have learned the new rules of the international and national communities, conflict over values such as sovereignty, liberty, self-determination, identity, creed, and power will continue to take place.

The conflict over appropriate measures occurs on two levels—opposing sides fight for the specific and the general, the case and the principle, the exception and the precedent. Serbs in Yugoslavia fight for a Greater Serbia against Croats, Bosnians, Montenegrins, and Kosovars battling for recognition of established republics and boundaries. But Serbs also fight to establish an ethnic (nation) state, Bosnians for a multiethnic state with a constructed national identity principle (with Croats putting a foot on each principle), and Kosovars for an independent state based on a neighboring ethnicity. Old limits, criteria, and principles were broken and new ones are being tried. Southern Sudanese wrestle with the advisability of secession, spurred not only by

the aggressiveness of the Muslim Sudanese of the north but also by the idea that the new Eritrean precedent for secession might apply to them as well, while the Fur, Beja, Nuba, and other Muslim groups in the north fight for the same autonomy southerners have obtained. While African and Western intellectuals contest the principal of inherited boundaries, Ivory Coast tears itself apart over the principle of *ivoirité* (“Ivoryness”), defined as citizenship based on certain ethnic groups within the colonial boundaries; elsewhere, in Congo and Zambia among others, a nationality principle excludes migrations into the country over the past century. The uncertainty following the passing of the old order allows conflict to break out with such abandon.

Conflict Management

Uncertainty also pervades the norms of response to the conflicts. The lack of consensus about world order and normal conduct within it, and confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits on deviant behavior, have given rise to conflict in the new era. Not only is the international response to conflict weak, but its very weakness causes an increasingly stronger challenge in a vicious circle of inaction and action. With the lifting of the nuclear balance of terror and the lessening of bipolar tensions, the world’s leaders have lost interest in mediation and engagement as ways to impose restraint. This inertia is doubtless caused by a sense of relaxation and relief that follows a half-century of hot-war conflagrations and Cold War tensions, a political demobilization akin to those that characterized the latter half of the 1940s following the decomposition of world order in the two world wars.

This demobilization breaks down into many specific components. The absence of a system of world order has left leaders and their publics without a sense of the shape of the world, without a notion of friends and enemies, even without an idea of friendly and inimical behavior on which to base appropriate reactions. At the domestic level, notions such as “sovereignty as responsibility” turn established principles on their heads in the search for better guidelines for behavior (Deng et al. 1996; Obasanjo 1991; Evans and Sahnoun 2001; United Nations 2004). The search for principles involves testing alternative actions of prevention, management, resolution, and transformation—testing for acceptability and effectiveness that is part of the creation of new order. Thus, there is uncertainty not only about what to do when confronted with conflict but also about what not to do—uncertainty about what is normal and permissible and the limits and constraints in the evolving norms.

At the interstate level, the most striking collapse of order concerns the fragile conventions and norms on nuclear armament. Agreements born in the tensest moments of the Cold War—strategic arms limitation, nonproliferation,

and international atomic energy monitoring—have been set aside by signatory great powers and challenged by upstarts such as India, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, and Iran. As a result, only rags restrain aspiring nuclear club members, and concerned states search among a range of diplomatic and military means to manage the problem.

In the absence of a world order to defend, a sense of appropriate solutions is missing. Although most mediators work toward any solution that the parties to a conflict will accept, they usually have some guidelines of appropriateness and some notions of stability. Mediators in the Namibian and Rhodesian conflicts would accept any outcome acceptable to the parties as long as it was independence, and they were ultimately successful; mediators in the Eritrean, Cypriot, Great Lakes, and Sri Lankan conflicts were not so sure where stability lay, and they failed. The absence of clear solutions has dogged the many attempts at mediation throughout much of the former communist world, from Chechnya to Yugoslavia. Mediators and parties alike are still experimenting with stability. Elections are deemed the appropriate mechanism for conflict resolution and the symbolic indication of conflict management from violent to political means, but the aftermath of such elections remains unclear. The Angolan experience of 1992 taught that a winner-take-all outcome was not wise, yet the Mozambican elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004 led to a winner-take-all government. For decades (since 1963) the Organization of African Unity proclaimed the sanctity of colonial boundaries (*uti possidetis*), reaffirmed under strained conditions over the former Italian colony of Eritrea. Yet the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement promised independence as an option to half of Sudan, whereas independence was denied to half of Senegal and a third of Nigeria and to a separate colonial part of Somalia. The international community held the (reinterpreted) line on *uti possidetis* in Yugoslavia by dismantling the state into preexisting republics rather than allowing the established principle of national self-determination to be observed. When norms for management and resolution are malleable, conflicts are hard to resolve.

Because contemporary conflicts tend to be internal, the legitimacy of intervention is questionable. In a democratic age, people are sovereign and they get the government they deserve. In the absence of law-based world rule, violence is still the ultimate means of asserting basic internal rights and values, and so there is a strong argument for letting conflict run its course. Some things are worth fighting for—and against. The weak international law that does exist has protected the sovereignty of states and their internal affairs from foreign interference since the Peaces of Westphalia in 1648, and for good reason: relaxing the inhibitions on internal interference can leave power unrestrained and invite the strong to overrule the weak. The prohibition also

protects would-be intervenors from involvement in cultures and arenas that are not their own. Ultimately, all these arguments are half-sound, reasoned justifications for inaction against the trumpeted need for action and responsibility. Yet they are dangerous to populations needing protection against both the incapacity and the rapaciousness of their own governments. The alternative, sovereignty as responsibility, permits intervention under certain conditions to protect populations rather than states. But sovereignty as responsibility, too, is dangerous, removing the license and inviolability of the state. We are still working out the details of the conditions surrounding the new doctrine, in principle, such as in the UN Charter (United Nations 2004), and in action, such as in Iraq.

In the absence of established systems of order and consensus on solutions, one defends one's own interests. Yet there is no clear sense of interest in dealing with the present era's many conflicts. It is clear to decision makers and the public alike that Rwanda does not fall into the geographic area of U.S. interests, and the one outside state that seems concerned—France—is widely decried for its involvement. It is not even clear to many that the former Yugoslavia fits into U.S. interests, because it resides just outside the area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) purview; even those European countries that saw themselves concerned—Germany and France—are criticized for their narrow-minded engagement. It is not clear what levels of interest govern the debate between the United States and continental European states over appropriate engagement in Iraq, recognition of genocide in Sudan, or conflict resolution in Cyprus. The compelling interest to become involved in messy internal conflicts or international regime changes, where peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement are likely to be viewed as unfriendly behavior by all sides, is nowhere apparent.

The lack of a clear sense of interest and legitimacy results in an absence of public commitment. All these doubts and arguments, repeated authoritatively by world leaders, feed the cautiousness and inaction behind which the leaders hide. Yet many polls have shown that the public is strongly committed to the management and resolution of international conflicts for reasons of both morality and interest, under specific conditions: when leaders show that they know what they are doing, have a plan, explain it confidently, and pursue it deliberately (Yankelovich 1994; Nelson 1992). Conflict prevention, management, and resolution are good politics, good business, and good morality, and need to be sold as such (Zartman 2005). A commitment to these goals allows leaders to turn conflict into an occasion for decisiveness and allows parties to get on with productive activity. It reduces debilitating conflict in three ways: by dealing with the specific conflict; by contributing to the con-

struction of the principles of order; and, in turn, by reducing the ambiguity and uncertainty that give rise to conflict. Such commitment requires courage and compassion, a hard defense of basic interests under dangerous conditions, a contribution to local reconciliation, and global leadership.

This book displays the tools and skills available when a commitment to peacemaking is exercised. It begins with a discussion of how the field of conflict resolution has evolved into such a broad discipline, as described by Louis Kriesberg. The current state of the art has built explicit bodies of knowledge, concepts, and prescriptions out of a number of components, combining politics, psychology, sociology, economics, and historical experience. Both hard-nosed interests and soft-handed charities join in providing insights and inspiration on human behavior. Underlying the concepts of conflict and its management are the social-psychological dynamics of both elements, discussed by Herbert Kelman. Although an understanding of conflict escalation and deescalation alone cannot encompass the specific issues in contention, it does provide the context and atmosphere that admit resolution and transformation into the equation. These insights come together at a time when there is a greater, though incomplete, knowledge about human interaction, and an increased, though imperfectly coordinated, involvement of many levels of society in foreign relations.

Officials undertake three major types of activities to manage and resolve conflicts, as presented by Daniel Druckman, Jacob Bercovitch, and Richard Bilder. Although these activities in international conflict resolution are generally carried out by states and their representatives, the mechanisms, effects, and relations are as applicable in interpersonal relationships and are based on a well-grounded understanding of social and human behavior. Parties undertake bargaining and negotiation to resolve their differences directly, overcoming conflict and establishing cooperation. Parties need specific tactics and strategies to move from conflicting to reconciling mindsets and behavior. When they are unable to do so, they need the involvement of third parties through mediation and conciliation. The introduction of a third party creates a triangle of relationships that complicates—but also helps to facilitate—reconciliation, requiring special tactics and relations. When parties are unable to reconcile or be reconciled, but only plead their antagonistic causes, the reconciling decision is transferred to an arbitrator or adjudicator. In this case, the third party's decision is binding, and the external third party, rather than to the adversaries themselves, is responsible for finding an appropriate solution to the problem.

None of the forms of reconciliation and resolution can function in the absence of incentives and constraints. The chapters by David Cortright, on

inducements, and Jane Holl Lute, on force, lay out the gratifications and deprivations closely associated with peacemaking. Parties in conflict need to be shown a better future than the conflicted present, which often is not inherent in resolution but needs to be sweetened by enticements. Parties in conflict need to see that the present course is painful in order to perceive the better future promised by reconciliation, a vision of the present that often involves the use—or at least threat—of force to keep the conflict within limits and to hold the peace afterward. The question of norms is particularly important in controlling the use of counterforce to confront conflict, although inducements, too, have their limits, since another word for “inducements” is “bribery.”

In the interstices of these activities lie other approaches to conflict resolution, generally practiced by nonofficials, as presented by Ronald Fisher and Cynthia Sampson. Reconciliation efforts deal with the affective aspects of conflict, which are often more powerful driving forces than the cold items at issue. Interactive conflict resolution uses the third party to help conflicting parties work out the nest of relationships in which the conflict is situated. It presents techniques whereby the third party can take a facilitating role in improving the relations among the parties. Faith-based approaches are often torn between an effort to bring peace and a role of advocacy for the weaker side.

The book closes with a review of education and training in peacekeeping as conducted at home and in the conflict area itself. The notion of education is basic to this or any work on peacemaking. Any skill (and even art) requires training on the use of the tools. Although personality helps, the ability to handle conflict is not inherent, and the skills and tricks of an experienced peacemaker need to be conveyed to avoid eternal reinvention of the wheel and to permit progress. Education and training programs convey these skills and approaches in packages that range from short courses to longer training sessions to higher education programs. In providing education and training, these teachers also practice conflict resolution, building skills and reflexes in preparation for the real thing.

KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE

Conflict

The very notion of training is based on a belief, current since the writings of the encyclopedists in the late eighteenth century, that conflict resolution is a skill that can be transmitted, not (as earlier believed) an inborn personality trait (de Felice 1987; de Callières 1963). But myths die slowly, and even today some practitioners believe that peacemaking skills cannot be analyzed or transmitted. Although some personalities are certainly better suited to

managing conflict than others, management and resolution comprise such a broad range of activities that there is a role for just about any personality, and everyone can benefit from analysis, training, and the study of seized and missed opportunities. Although any situation, just as any person, has its unique elements, no situation—or person—is unique. Keys to understanding how to deal with a situation come from examining it in a comparative or generalized (conceptual) context.

The knowledge we have about what works and what does not work in conflict resolution is based primarily on studies of what practitioners do. (The only other source of data is experiments, whose relevant results are presented here in Daniel Druckman's chapter.) That information is either examined for regularities, correlations, and causal sequences (i.e., used inductively) or used to test ideas, hunches, and hypotheses (i.e., deductively). Only when information about practitioners' activities becomes ordered and focused does it become knowledge, and only as knowledge—not as isolated anecdotes—can it be useful in the maintenance and improvement of conflict resolution practices. So the cycle runs from practice to knowledge and back again, and that is the only way humanity improves itself in any field.

The knowledge reported in this work is new when seen as an accumulation. Probably none of the isolated acts that provide data for this knowledge is new, however; even the most modern twist on conflict resolution has doubtless been used somewhere in the past, perhaps accidentally, perhaps consciously. Even the first recorded case of negotiation, between Abraham and the Lord over the fate of Sodom (Genesis 18:16–33), carries pertinent conceptual lessons, for example, about formulas and details. What is new is the discovery of regularities, correlations, and causal sequences on the basis of newly accumulated, ordered, and focused information, an aspect of the subject that is every bit as exciting as the resolution of a particular conflict by a practitioner. Indeed, the field of conflict resolution was only identified by name during the interwar period, and the component activity of negotiation was so named (in that meaning) only in the eighteenth century. (Several languages have not named either term yet.) Other components of the field—prenegotiations, conflict management, positive-sum outcomes, ripeness, formulas, to name a few—have been discovered and identified in the past few decades, although, of course, they have existed unnamed as long as there has been human interaction.

Epistemologically, an object does not exist until it has a name, and it cannot be the subject of meaningful communication until its name, with its attendant definition, has been broadly accepted. In this new field, many aspects require definition at the outset (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman 2007; Toolkit 2007). The subject of this work, conflict resolution, refers to removing the

causes as well as the manifestations of a conflict between parties and eliminating the sources of incompatibility in their positions. This process is a long-term proposition, for, in the last analysis, only time resolves conflicts. Conflict management refers to eliminating the violent and violence-related means of pursuing the conflict, still unresolved, leaving it to be worked out on the purely political level. Conflict transformation means replacing conflict with positive relationships, such as satisfaction, cooperation, empathy, and interdependence, between parties. Conflict prevention means eliminating the causes of foreseeable conflict, generically or specifically, before it occurs (or reoccurs, so that prevention of a new round may follow a previous outbreak). Each of these levels begs for the next in order to be fully stable, although relations among the parties or the nature of the conflict may be such that stability can be induced simply by norms and rules for the conduct of the conflict at a particular level; for example, elections are a conflict management device, governed by a stable regime, and do not require resolution or transformation. Corresponding peace-related terms are defined by their UN usage: “peacemaking” refers to diplomatic efforts to manage or resolve conflict according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter; “peacekeeping” (not specifically provided for in the charter) refers to forces interpositioned with the parties’ consent to monitor a peace agreement; “peace enforcement” refers to military efforts to bring conflicting parties under control, as provided for under Chapter VII; and “peacebuilding” refers to structural measures to prevent a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 45–46).

By identifying important questions and seeking appropriate answers, we discover explanations for outcomes produced in the past and prescriptions on how to produce outcomes desired in the future. Such explanations and prescriptions are likely to become more and more complex as we discover variables that intervene between cause and effect. That complexity brings explanations closer to reality but must be balanced against simplicity and directness in order to be useful and nonideosyncratic. More and more knowledge is being created about the methods of conflict resolution; that very knowledge, in turn, opens up more opportunities to ask new questions, create new countermeasures, and find new answers. Such knowledge is not a procrustean bed, a fixed set of rules and regulations, or a body of incontrovertible doctrine and dogma. Rather, it invites creativity and constructive innovation to create better solutions to conflict.

One major objection can be validly raised, however, to the claim that knowledge is accumulating. The claim assumes that, despite changing world conditions, human interactions are similar enough for knowledge to accumulate and be relevant across time. Specifically, many of the lessons about conflict

resolution were formulated during the Cold War; therefore, findings from that era are claimed to be applicable to post-Cold War conflict resolution. That claim needs to be examined critically. Where findings about conflict management depend on a structural context defined by two superpowers, those findings should be reevaluated. For example, accepted wisdom on bipolar stability and hegemonic cooperation was the product of its era and needs to be checked against new (and older) conditions. Where the findings are independent of a specific structural context, however, they can be considered relevant and examined for the insights they bring.

Yet, even bipolar confrontations have been studied in comparison with other conflicts and found to yield useful knowledge (Armstrong 1993; Kriesberg 1992). Much of the conflict resolution literature derives from a tradition and an approach independent of the Cold War and offers even more contexts for comparative assessments of conflicts now that the bipolar era has passed. In short, the Cold War was the aberration in international conflict, not in the ongoing efforts at conflict resolution.

No similar body of knowledge has been developed from the post-Cold War context of terrorism, in part because the twenty-first century is not old enough to have yielded much experience. But also it is because the very nature of terrorism seems to have changed, or at least broadened, from the dedication of nationalists and social revolutions in specific countries to a more global application. *Peacemaking in International Conflict* adopts the considered assumption that such changes make peacemaking more difficult, but also that the basic tools developed through experience have not changed and are still applicable. Terrorist conflict borrows the causes and grievances of past local conflicts to anchor itself in local scenes; it makes its principal, specific cause the corruption and inadequacies of local governments and their foreign, globalizing backers; and it draws on alienated populations for a permissive countervailing sea of support. But the tools available to meet terrorist outbursts are both broad and limited, comprising the same array of prevention, management, resolution, and transformation that can be applied to any conflict. If something new is demanded by the new era, it is the need to put greater emphasis on handling structural causes (grievances and alienation) and on pursuing post-conflict reconstruction (peacebuilding). Peacemaking measures should be extended to prevention before the conflict erupts into violence and to implementation before the conflict erupts again into violence.

Resolution

Conflict demands resolution, but not because of the evil of its perpetrators—although incorrigibility and venality often make things worse. Were evil

alone the problem, exemplars of the international community could band together, level a collective finger against the perpetrators, and ban their nefarious machinations. Such was the prevailing wisdom in a previous era among such seasoned but idealistic statesmen as President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, and French premier Aristide Briand, and it failed because its assumptions were false. The experience of the intervening wars has taught us not only something about how to resolve conflicts but also that such earlier hopes were misguided. Conflict is a permanent feature of social and political interaction, and it often occurs for good reasons (Coser 1956; Bernard et al. 1957). The resolution of conflict depends on recognizing the concerns of the parties. “[T]he great secret of negotiation is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any proposal, and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally balanced to both parties, . . . to harmonize the interests of the parties concerned,” wrote François de Callières to Louis XV in one of the first and still authoritative writings on negotiation (de Callières 1963, 110).

Thus, conflict resolution depends on recognition that parties have at least some interest in the conflict, even though they may also be caught up in it beyond their interests, and that these interests need to be met, outweighed, and reduced in order to be reconciled (Udalov 1995; Zartman 1995a). Parties’ interests need to be addressed and their interest in reconciliation need to be enhanced. Before this can take place, though, the parties must understand that reconciliation is not surrender (otherwise, conflict resolution would have a deservedly bad name) and interests are not the same as needs. Peacemakers need to realize that parties do not negotiate to commit suicide. Some approaches have suggested that a conflict can be transformed (and as a result disappear) only after the basic human needs of one or both of the sides are satisfied (Burton 1990; Azar and Burton 1986). Yet human needs are ever only temporarily satisfied: those sated today may be hungry tomorrow, the people who know who they are today may wonder tomorrow, those who have found dignity today may lose it tomorrow, and so on. Because only time resolves conflicts, time can also invent or revive conflict. If human agents can aid resolution by providing post-conflict outcomes that at least address the question of durability—producing solutions that are processes and mechanisms, not judgments and awards—they will have made a respectable contribution to the well-being of the conflict’s inheritor generation.

Parties to the conflict may be able to produce such outcomes by themselves, although someone—an internal party of “doves,” the opponent in the conflict, or a friendly third-party adviser—needs to draw each conflicting party’s attention away from the conflict itself as a means of attaining its interests and

toward alternative means through reconciliation. If conflicting parties have interests, so do intervening third parties. Some external parties may have an interest in continuing the conflict, others may have an interest in one side in the conflict (Touval and Zartman 1985, 2007). If the intervenors had no interest of their own in resolution, they would be unmotivated and disarmed indeed.

Even “mediators without muscle,” humanitarian agencies and good-willed individuals, have an interest in defending their own efforts and profession by bringing conflict away from violence and toward resolution. The Vatican had powerful interests in mediating the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, the Carter Center had strong interests in mediating a cease-fire in southern Sudan, the Kettering Foundation and the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis have their interests in promoting dialogue in Tajikistan and the Caspian basin, and the conflict management programs at George Mason University and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies had their own interests in their diverse efforts at reconciliation in the Liberian civil war (see Princen 1992; Touval and Zartman 2007). These interests may be simply in arriving at an agreement, not in any particular agreement, although most third parties also have an idea of what constitutes a stable and durable resolution and thus have an interest in seeing it achieved for the sake of their reputations. They all seek to launch a process that the conflicting parties themselves will take over and make their own, letting the mediators tiptoe away, carrying the wisdom of experience to put to use somewhere else.

Conflict resolution needs all the help it can get. Because parties to a conflict typically are already well entrenched in their conflicting behavior, for reasons they have often repeated to themselves to justify their resistance toward the other party, all the knowledge that can be brought to bear in favor of conflict resolution is badly needed, and all the hands that can be brought to the task can help. The only requirement is that multiple efforts be well coordinated so that they do not work against one another or allow conflicting parties to play the mediators against one another. At the official level, this requirement means cooperation among assisting parties. On a broader level, it means cooperation between official and unofficial efforts.

Although some agencies are better organized for conflict resolution than others and some states are better positioned to handle a particular conflict than others, conflict resolution is everybody’s business. It should be part of the role of global leadership and shared among concerned states and international agencies. Above all, because conflict resolution is a crucial component of global leadership, it should be a leading plank in the foreign policy of the state with the widest global interests, the United States, with the backing of

other supporting actors in the international community. Conflict resolution can be practiced quietly or assertively, directly or indirectly, unilaterally or cooperatively, as the particular circumstances require. However it is done, U.S. political leaders must always be cognizant of the fact that it is the country's role, part of America's traditions and calling, and expected by other members of the community of nations. The United States invented the peace process in the Middle East and is best placed to help other parties there and elsewhere out of their conflicts. U.S. foreign policy has been at its finest when it has been able to do so.

A cooperative security system that enlists the collaboration of the major powers in conjunction with regional security organizations is needed to meet the challenge of this century (Zartman and Kremenjuk 1995). Conflict management and resolution should be the leitmotif in every major state's foreign policy, helping each other in the process. The U.S.-mediated negotiations at Dayton, which produced the Bosnian peace agreement in Paris, were the occasion for unseemly squabbles among the two host countries and others regarding which one had made the largest contribution to peace. In fact, all were gravely deficient in peacemaking earlier and could claim significant contributions to the peace process only in the end.

States, too, need help in their efforts to resolve conflicts. They need help both in practicing the calling and in focusing on broader, positive-sum benefits rather than on narrow interpretations of their interests. Private parties can prepare and supplement state efforts and may have an advantage in overcoming problems of legitimacy in officials' efforts to deal with internal conflicts. Because private actors are not geared to producing final results in the same sense as official mediation, they can work on the problem longer. The Sant'Egidio community undertook mediation that no state could do in the Mozambican and Algerian conflicts (although it was backed and surrounded by official efforts in the first case), and Herbert Kelman's long efforts to prepare Israelis and Palestinians for the peace process gradually came to fruition in the early 1990s, as analyzed in this volume. Official and unofficial parties need to recognize the legitimate roles the other can play. Once they recognize these roles, they must cooperate.

Dilemmas

It would be fine to end here, with a clarion call for more and better cooperation in resolving conflict according to the state of the art and practice summarized here (see also Raiffa 1982). But that step would come too soon, because a final caveat is needed if the self-righteousness and self-interest that have so often dogged the field are to be avoided. Not only is there a lot that

analysts and practitioners still do not know and practice about conflict resolution, but even when the preaching is well practiced, inherent dilemmas exist that have no easy answers.

One is the dilemma of legitimacy, addressed in the chapters by Daniel Druckman and Jacob Bercovitch. How can intervention be justified if it runs up against the conflicting parties' own interest to pursue the conflict? Is intervention by anyone in the type of conflict that dominated the 1990s—internal conflict and civil war—legitimate under international law and norms? In response, third parties and the international community can ask whether the means that conflicting parties use to pursue their interests are justifiable as well, whether the use of violence to oppress populations or resist government is not an abuse of a state's or a people's sovereignty. Third parties can arrogate the right to enter these debates, as thinking world citizens should, but they need to recognize the preeminent right of parties to set their own goals and interests.

A second dilemma concerns justice, touched on in this volume by Cynthia Sampson. Peace is sometimes the enemy of justice, and conflict can be ended only at the price of objectively fair outcomes. Such peace, so the objection goes, is illusory: there is no lasting peace without justice. But justice has many referents and is ultimately subjective (Zartman et al. 1996; Kolm 1997; Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). A conflict resolution that perfectly combines peace and justice is as rare as other moments of perfection in human action. Mediators are often—perhaps usually—troubled by the choice between peace, however temporary, that saves lives and continuing efforts in order to better reconcile interests. Conflict resolution among consenting parties is likely to be achieved only at the cost of letting some of the villains go free, often as the price for their signature. But how much injustice is peace worth?

A third dilemma involves management, discussed by Louis Kriesberg. Even if the other two dilemmas are avoided, efforts at reducing violence by managing conflict may impede its resolution. Eliminating violence in the pursuit of conflict may do nothing to resolve the conflict and may even perpetuate it by rendering it economical to do so. Conflicts that cost little have little reason for settlement; they just simmer along, waiting for the moment when they can boil over. The best moment for resolution would appear to be when the parties to the conflict are stalemated at a high level of intensity from which they cannot unilaterally escalate their way out (Zartman 1989; Zartman and Faure 2005). But conflict management can actually work to inhibit such mutually hurting stalemates.

The fourth dilemma is that of force, examined here by Jane Holl Lute. Conflict resolution is peacemaking and peacebuilding. But it may also be peace

enforcing; even in peacemaking there may be a need for force and threats of force. “*Si vis pacem para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare for war),” said the Romans, who knew something about both. Mediators in the most active phase of intervention (as the best manipulators will tell you) may have to reinforce the stalemate that makes the parties come to terms: it took the 1973 October War to start the peace process in the Middle East, and nothing less than NATO bombing drove Bosnian combatants to peace in 1995. Yet parties cannot be forced to resolve conflicts in the absence of other interests and perceptions. How much force and when to apply it remain dilemmas of foreign policy, unresolved by the good intentions of peacemakers.

The fifth dilemma is that of power, raised by Ronald Fisher. A myth is circulating that peacemaking is the opposite of power (see Burton 1995). Power is an action designed to move another party in an intended direction (Zartman and Rubin 2000; Dahl 1969; Simon 1969; Tawney 1964; Russell 1938). Persuasion is a form of power. Those who inveigh against “power politics” (a redundant term) merely want to put power in their own hands. Conflict resolution requires power in order to work, as does any other effort at changing a party’s course. The dilemma arises when conflicting parties’ actions are changed, or blocked, without changing their minds. In this case, the mediator or the reconciling party has exercised enough power to accomplish only a postponement—rather than a resolution—of conflict. This dilemma confronted the Camp David peacemakers, who had to wait more than a decade before the next round of the peace process, starting at Madrid, could begin to work. Even in such cases, conflict resolution arouses the nostalgia for conflict, as witnessed in the popularity of Hamas and Likud.

The last dilemma is that of prevention, evoked by Herbert Kelman. The ultimate in conflict resolution, it would seem, is conflict prevention, which recognizes conflict’s causes and deals with them before the conflicts have a chance to become violent. Governance is indeed conflict management, and most conflicts at the heart of politics never become violent because they are handled (within states) by politics or (among states) by diplomacy (Zartman 1996). Many conflicts that become crises in international relations could have been prevented had they been the subject of more intense diplomatic attention earlier. But how can the attentions of public and government be mobilized when a potential crisis is still cold? And how can one distinguish a conflict that will become a crisis, and therefore needs prevention, from one that will burn out on its own and blow away without causing damage? The business of conflict resolution, for all its pride of accomplishment, needs humility—and excitement—to recognize that there are many more worlds to discover.

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NOTES

1. Conflict management in some of these cases is examined in Hopmann (2001).
2. For analyses of the role of greed and grievance in perpetuating conflict, see Berdal and Malone (2000), Ballentine and Sherman (2003), Collier et al. (2003), and Arnson and Zartman (2005).
3. On conflict resolution measures in some of these conflicts, see Zartman (1995b) and Damrosch (1993).
4. For a good debate on the issue of contamination, see Lake and Rothchild (1998).