

The United States and Coercive Diplomacy



I

Introduction

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THE DECADE AFTER THE COLD WAR'S DEMISE is often viewed as the era when economics reigned supreme. With the end of the Soviet-U.S. conflict and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, it looked to many as if the overweening role that military power had played in international politics in general and in U.S. foreign policy in particular would come to an end. The United States and large parts of the world began to experience unparalleled prosperity, democratic market capitalism appeared to be the wave of the future, and globalization seemed to be an unstoppable force. Subsequent events, however, belied the prognostications about the devaluation of force, at least in U.S. foreign policy.

Indeed, during the dozen years between 1990 and 2001, the United States continued to rely heavily on its military instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. During these years the United States maintained more than a quarter of a million troops abroad. In Europe the United States did not disband the NATO alliance but in fact enlarged it, thereby expanding its commitments to defend more nations against attack. Through military training and military education programs under NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, the United States established military ties with most of the other nations of Europe (and several in Central Asia) that were not yet permitted to join NATO. With a short but effective bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in September 1995, the United States helped bring the Bosnian War to

an end, and in 1999, in a more sustained and intense bombing campaign against Serbia, it effectively ended Serbian control over Kosovo. In East Asia the United States reinvigorated the alliance with Japan in the middle of the decade and sought to make it less a unilateral U.S. guarantee and more a two-way street. Later in the decade the United States began to bolster its alliance ties with Australia and the Philippines. In 1994 the United States found itself in a severe crisis with North Korea over the latter's nuclear weapons program and came, according to those intimately involved in the crisis, very close to war. In the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States demonstrated its naval muscle to China and reaffirmed its quasi-alliance commitments to Taiwan, in part to reaffirm its other bilateral commitments in East Asia. In the Middle East in 1990-91, the United States planned for and then waged war against Iraq, evicted it from Kuwait, and then continued throughout the decade, in conjunction with the British, to coerce, punish, and generally harass Saddam Hussein's regime. In the Caribbean in 1994, the United States invaded Haiti to evict a thuggish military government and install the rightfully elected one. In Africa in 1992, it sent its soldiers into Somalia to feed starving civilians. In 1998 the United States launched cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in a bid to punish al Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, for its bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and in 2001 it waged war against the Taliban regime and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in response to the latter's September 11 attack on New York and Washington. Finally, throughout the decade U.S. military forces were engaged in numerous diplomatic, training, and other exercises with well over one hundred militaries in the world. In short, during the twelve years after the Cold War, the U.S. military was busy.

Several factors account for Washington's heavy reliance on its military forces during these years. First, there was no other superpower to constrain it. As a consequence, the United States did not need to worry that its actions would be countered by another power with global reach, nor did it have to fear the escalatory dangers that a confrontation with such a power could bring. Second, the troubles of the world did not magically go away with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, many regional disputes that had been suppressed by the U.S.-Soviet com-

petition forced their way into the international limelight. Third, as a status quo power, the United States believed it could not ignore many of these disputes because they were felt to affect its global interests adversely. Fourth, many of the disputes that ultimately came to require the use of U.S. and allied military power were not solved through the prior exercise of political and economic means. Fifth, the United States found itself in the enviable position of having the only military force that could operate globally, but also, as a consequence, in the unenviable position of being frequently asked to use that force to help solve world problems. Sixth, finally, threats arose that challenged core and long-standing U.S. interests or those of its allies and that required the use of military force. For whatever reasons, after the Cold War's end the United States resorted to its military instrument on numerous occasions and in many ways to advance its political goals.

This volume examines one particular way that the United States employed its military forces after the Cold War's demise: its resort to "coercive diplomacy." As we shall see, coercive diplomacy is not meant to entail war, but instead employs military power short of war to bring about a change in a target's policies or in its political makeup. The chapters in this volume analyze eight instances—a few of which feature multiple episodes—between 1990 and 2001 when the United States employed coercive diplomacy to achieve its goals: Somalia (1992–94), Haiti (1994), North Korea (1994), Bosnia (1995), China (1996), Iraq (1990–98), Kosovo (1999), and combating terrorism (1993, 1998, and 2001).

These cases are important to examine because the conditions that gave rise to them will not soon disappear. This means that there will be more U.S. attempts to employ coercive diplomacy in the future. For starters, the United States will remain a global military power and will likely continue with its overseas military presence for the next several decades, while other states will continue to call upon it to use its military power on their behalf. Civil wars will continue to happen, especially in Africa, and the demands for military intervention to stop them will continue. The Persian Gulf and its oil supplies will remain important to the United States and the world and so, consequently, will the need to protect them from aggression. The United States and

its allies will be in the Balkans for a generation, and their position is likely to be challenged by groups within the region. China's power will continue to grow—and along with it the threat to Taiwan—giving rise to future crises between China and the United States. North Korea may implode, but other states that the United States opposes will attempt to acquire or may even obtain nuclear weapons and may then threaten to sell them or the raw materials to produce the weapons to other actors, including terrorists, requiring U.S. attempts to prevent their acquisition or sale. Down the road, still other states that the United States opposes will likely acquire nuclear weapons and then use them as a deterrent shield behind which to challenge U.S. interests in their region, calling forth U.S. attempts to check or reverse these challenges. Other terrorist groups may well attempt additional grand terror attacks with conventional means against the U.S. homeland, as al Qaeda did in September 2001. Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups may well acquire chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps even nuclear ones, too, and may threaten to use them against the United States unless it bends to their will. Finally, in spite of the lesson that the United States taught with its overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, some states may sponsor grand terror attacks against the United States or its forces abroad.

In short, the need to back U.S. diplomacy with force will not go away; consequently, political-military coercion short of all-out war will remain a highly attractive option to U.S. leaders. Therefore, these leaders need to understand what coercive diplomacy can and cannot accomplish. That is the purpose of this volume: to assess coercive diplomacy's efficacy for U.S. statecraft.

WHAT IS COERCIVE DIPLOMACY?

Coercive diplomacy is, in Alexander George's words, "forceful persuasion": the attempt to get a target—a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a nonstate actor—to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force. It is a strategy that "seeks to *persuade* an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping."¹

Coercive diplomacy can include, but need not include, positive inducements, and these inducements can involve either a transfer of resources to the target or the offer of things that do not involve resource transfer but that are nonetheless of tangible benefit to the target. Coercive diplomacy is intended to be an alternative to war, even though it involves some employment of military power to achieve a state's desired objective. It is a technique for achieving objectives "on the cheap" and has allure because it promises big results with small costs (to the coercer). Next to outright war, however, coercive diplomacy represents the most dangerous way to use a state's military power because, if coercive diplomacy fails, the state that tries it then faces two stark choices: back down or wage war. The first risks loss of face and future bargaining power; the second, loss of life and military defeat. Because both outcomes are possible, a state should never undertake coercive diplomacy lightly.

In this volume we distinguish between coercive diplomacy and coercive attempts. The feature that distinguishes the two is the presence or absence of the employment of force. Coercive diplomacy has as one of its essential features, and often its only feature, the threat or the limited use of force. Coercive attempts utilize levers over a target, but these levers do not involve the threat or use of force. Therefore, we have excluded from our cases of coercive diplomacy those coercive attempts that involve only the use of economic sanctions, only the withholding of benefits to a target, only the cessation of benefits that a target currently enjoys, or more generally any coercive attempt that does not entail some employment of military power. Clearly, all these actions are coercive in nature, but they do not constitute coercive diplomacy as we have defined it. In distinguishing between coercive attempts and coercive diplomacy, we follow the convention set by George: coercive diplomacy must involve the threat or limited use of force, even though it can also include some of these other types of coercive actions.

Because it entails coercion, coercive diplomacy is a form of compellence—a term first coined by Thomas Schelling in order to distinguish it from deterrence. For Schelling, the distinction between compellence and deterrence is the difference between an action "intended to make an adversary do something"—compellence—and an action "intended to keep him from starting something"—deterrence.² The

change in behavior sought by compellence can be manifested in one of two ways: either the adversary starts doing something it is not now doing, or the adversary stops doing something it is now doing. Either way, the adversary changes its behavior. Deterrence, in contrast, is a strategy designed to prevent an adversary from changing its behavior by dissuading it from initiating an action. Deterrence seeks to get the adversary not to change its behavior—that is, to continue “not doing what it is not doing.” Thus, compellence aims to alter an adversary’s behavior; deterrence, to keep it the same. Deterrence generally involves only threats to use force, whereas compellence can involve both the threat to use force and the actual use of force. In a deterrent situation, if the threat has to be carried out, then, by definition, the adversary has changed its behavior and deterrence has failed. In contrast, because compellence can entail both threats and actual use of force, compellence has not necessarily failed if the threats are carried out.

Although deterrence and compellence are analytically distinct strategies, they usually become conflated when disputing parties contest the legitimacy of the status quo, which they generally do. The deterrer defends the status quo because of the benefits it confers; the target tries to overthrow the status quo because of the injury it inflicts. The target views the deterrer’s attempt to maintain the status quo as compellence: “You are coercing me (the target) to accept a situation that benefits you but not me.” If the target attempts to alter the status quo, however, then the deterrer will view that attempt as compellence: “You are attempting to coerce me (the deterrer) to stop defending the status quo and accept a revision in it that is less beneficial to me.” In such a situation, deterrence and compellence become intermingled. Similarly, deterrent threats can become transformed into compellent actions in situations where deterrence has failed, for in that case the would-be deterrer must decide whether to carry out its threat. If it does so, not for purposes of revenge but to get the adversary to stop its objectionable behavior, then, by definition, execution of the deterrent threat becomes a compellent action. Finally, the deterrer may calculate that deterrence is weakening, even though it has not totally failed, and may decide to bolster deterrence by engaging in actions that are compellent in nature. In that case, compellence is exercised to deter.³

Compellence can come in three doses or forms: (1) diplomatic use—the issuance of threats to use force against an adversary if it does not change its behavior, (2) demonstrative use—the exemplary and limited uses of force, and (3) full-scale use, or war—the use of whatever amount of force it takes to get the adversary to change its behavior. The first form of compellence does not use force physically against the target state but only threatens use. The second form uses “just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one’s interests and to establish the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.”⁴ The third form is to be understood as war—the large-scale use of military power to make the adversary change its behavior. In this volume we follow Alexander George and define coercive diplomacy to encompass only the first two forms of compellence—the diplomatic and demonstrative uses of force. The third form—war—is coercion but not coercive diplomacy, even though diplomacy is never totally absent from war.⁵

The meanings of threat and war are clear. Threat can involve mobilizing and moving large amounts of military force to make the coercer’s seriousness of purpose as credible as possible to the target state, or it can simply mean the issuance of verbal warnings. The one thing threat does not mean is the actual physical use of force against the target. War involves sustained, large-scale combat operations against the target, with the goal of either militarily defeating it or bringing about its surrender short of achieving a complete victory over it. Either way, war involves the use of force that is massive, at least to the target.

The meaning of demonstrative use is more difficult to pin down. Although George argues that demonstrative should mean only the “quite limited” use of force, we have used a somewhat broader meaning of demonstrative use. How much is “just enough force” to demonstrate resolution and establish credibility can vary enormously from one situation to another and depends on the nature of the coercer’s goals, on the one hand, and on the military capabilities and intensity of interests of the target, on the other.⁶ We have therefore defined demonstrative use to include both exemplary and limited use. Exemplary use serves as both a model and a warning of what can or will

come: "You did not believe my threat; here is an example for you to chew on of what I can do to you if you do not change your ways." Exemplary use can encompass a one-time employment of force, or a few instances of use, but the major constraint is that it is at the low end of force employment, close to the boundary between threat and use. Exemplary use means moving just beyond the border of threat to make clear by the actions taken that the coercer is deadly serious about escalating the use of force if the target does not comply. In this volume limited use can mean anything from one to several steps beyond exemplary use. The meaning of limited use is this: "You failed to take both my threat and my exemplary use seriously; you obviously need more persuading; let me now give you a better idea of the consequences that your continued noncompliance will bring." More force is used, but not so much such that the boundary to war has been crossed.

A central point follows when coercive diplomacy is conceived to encompass only threat and demonstrative use, but not full-scale use: coercive diplomacy has failed when full-scale use occurs. Wherever one draws the line between limited and full-scale use, if the coercer has to cross that line to achieve its objectives, then, by definition, coercive diplomacy has failed. In this case, war, not coercive diplomacy, produced the change. Any employment of force beyond threat, exemplary use, or limited use signals the failure of coercive diplomacy, even though the subsequent full-scale use of force may succeed in accomplishing the original objectives. As a consequence, exactly where the boundary between limited and full-scale use is drawn becomes crucial for coding cases in which limited use involves escalatory steps that skirt the boundary. Such cases can be coded as either successes or failures of coercive diplomacy, depending on which side of the boundary it is placed. Categorizing such cases becomes an exercise in qualitative judgment.

WASHINGTON'S COERCIVE DIPLOMATIC GAMBITS, 1990-2001

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of coercive diplomacy, we build upon the path-breaking work of Alexander George, who was the first

to define and systematically assess this diplomatic technique.⁷ George and his colleagues studied seven cases in which the United States resorted to coercive diplomacy: U.S. opposition to Japanese expansion in the late 1930s, the Laos crisis of 1961–62, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, U.S. coercive pressure on North Vietnam in 1965, U.S. coercive pressure against Nicaragua in the early 1980s, U.S. coercive pressure against Libya in the 1980s, and U.S. coercive diplomacy in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–91.⁸ Our volume adds eight cases to the seven previously studied. The eight cases examined here, together with the United States' prime goals in each, are listed in table 1. These fifteen cases (George's seven and our eight) span a sixty-year period and provide a good base from which to draw some suggestive conclusions about the utility of coercive diplomacy, as will be made clear in chapter 9.

Three of our cases—Iraq, China, and North Korea—involved states that had nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. Two of the cases—Somalia and Bosnia—involved states in which civil wars ensued after the state's authority had disintegrated. Two cases—Haiti and Kosovo—involved states whose governments were engaged in savage repression of their peoples. And one—the campaign against terrorists—involved either state-sponsored terrorism or nonstate groups that were aided and abetted in one form or another by state sponsors. Two cases—Haiti and Bosnia—fall right on the boundary between coercive diplomacy and war. (The 1994 Haitian case involved the landing of an invasion force as the Cedras government finally complied with U.S. demands. The 1995 Bosnian case involved the coercive use not only of NATO airpower but also of an increasingly successful Croatian-Muslim ground war offensive against the Bosnian Serbs.) Two cases—North Korea and China—involved a situation in which the United States and its adversary were each engaged in exerting coercive diplomacy against the other. One case—China—involved a U.S. attempt to use coercive diplomacy to shore up deterrence. In half of our cases, the United States offered some type of positive inducement to help persuade the adversary to bend to Washington's will, in addition to issuing threats to resort to force, with some degree of success.

Table I. U.S. Coercive Diplomacy Cases, 1990–2001

| Case | Specific U.S. Goals |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Somalia 1992–94 | End starvation and reconstruct the government |
| Haiti 1994 | Install a new government |
| North Korea 1994 | Freeze the nuclear weapons program |
| Bosnia 1995 | Reduce Serbian conquest and end the Bosnian war |
| China 1996 | Demonstrate U.S. resolve and stop China from coercing Taiwan |
| Iraq 1990–98 | Free Kuwait and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction |
| Kosovo 1999 | End Serb repression of Albanian Kosovars |
| Terrorism 1993, 1998, and 2001 | Retaliate against terrorists and force state actors to yield them up |

In three cases coercive diplomacy did not work at all and the United States therefore went beyond the demonstrative use of force to full-scale war: Iraq in 1991, Afghanistan in 2001, and Kosovo in 1999. In two cases coercive diplomacy was a borderline success because the United States resorted to measures that arguably crossed the boundary of limited use: Haiti in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995. In two cases—Somalia in 1992–93 and North Korea in 1994—coercive diplomacy ultimately failed, although it did enjoy some success initially. In one case the results of coercive diplomacy were ambiguous: China in 1996. The results of coercive diplomacy in dealing with terrorism are also problematic but are mostly failures. Based on these results, coercive diplomacy appears to be an instrument that fails more often than it succeeds. More refined results are presented in chapter 9, after the eight cases are broken down into their multiple episodes and then reanalyzed, but the overall result—that failures exceed successes—does not change.

Any final judgments about the overall record of these cases, however, must be held in reserve because four of them—North Korea, Iraq, China,

and terrorism—are ongoing sagas. The ultimate fate of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is still to be determined. As of this writing (March 2003), the results of the U.S. war to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government and rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction are not yet clear. The Chinese-Taiwanese relationship is quiescent for now, but the underlying issue is not resolved; therefore, the ultimate meaning of the 1996 crisis for U.S.-China relations cannot be fully determined. Finally, the battle against al Qaeda is by no means won, and the efficacy of the coercive principle set by the 2001 war against Afghanistan—that states that harbor terrorist organizations aiming to attack the United States will be held to account—has yet to be fully tested. Nonetheless, even though these four cases are ongoing, they can still be treated as discrete incidents in their own right, and all eight cases can be viewed as a snapshot of a given time period. Moreover, because the results from our period accord reasonably well with those from the larger time span covered by Alexander George and his colleagues, we should have a high degree of confidence about the overall conclusions reached in this volume regarding the efficacy of coercive diplomacy.

Finally, every one of our cases, taken as a whole or as a set of multiple episodes, represents a legitimate example of coercive diplomacy because each one satisfies the two conditions laid down by Alexander George. First, in each case the United States was trying to compel the target (or targets) to change its behavior. Second, in each case the United States either found that diplomacy alone could not produce this change in behavior or else believed that diplomacy by itself could not do so and, as a consequence, bolstered its diplomacy by issuing threats to resort to force, by engaging in the demonstrative use of force, or by doing both. The employment of force short of war to produce a change in the target's behavior is the hallmark of these cases.

Somalia

In the Somalian case, as Nora Bensahel shows, the United States had two objectives: to relieve the widespread starvation of civilians and then to support the United Nations and its efforts at civil and governmental reconstruction. The United States acted to coerce the warlords to stop using starvation of noncombatants as one of their means to

wage war against one another. Robert Oakley, Washington's representative in Somalia, made crystal clear to these warlords that if they interfered with the delivery of food or attacked U.S. troops, they would be met with overwhelming force. This phase of the operation proved successful. In the next phase, after the United States had engaged in half-hearted attempts to disarm the warlords and had twenty-four of its peacekeepers killed in the process, the United Nations tried to hunt down the killers, ended up in a firefight with the troops of the most powerful warlord (Mohammed Farah Aideed), and subsequently evacuated its forces from Somalia. This phase of governmental reconstruction was an abject failure.

Bosnia and Kosovo

Steven Burg treats the Bosnian and Kosovo cases together in one chapter. In Bosnia the United States, together with its NATO allies, acted to bring an end to the Bosnian War by coercing the Serbs and the Muslims to stop the fighting and ultimately to reach a peace accord. It used air strikes, as well as heavy artillery pounding by British, French, and Dutch forces, to coerce the Serbs to the bargaining table and then employed the threat to stop the air strikes to achieve the same objective with the Muslims. This case is a borderline success for coercive diplomacy because Serb compliance also depended upon the rapid advances made by the Croats in their full-scale ground offensive war against the Serbs in western Bosnia. In Kosovo the United States, once again in concert with its NATO allies, acted to stop Slobodan Milosevic's oppressive and repressive counter-guerrilla policies against the Albanian Kosovars. It threatened to bomb Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia proper unless Milosevic stopped his counterinsurgency campaign against the Albanians. Coercive diplomacy ultimately failed and only a full-scale air war brought Serb compliance with NATO's demands.

Haiti

The goal in the Haitian case was to get rid of a repressive military government and reinstate the freely elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. To achieve this objective, the United States threat-

ened to invade unless Raoul Cedras and his military cohorts who ran the government gave up power. They did so, but only after the United States invaded the country. (As Robert Pastor points out in his chapter, military leaders reached an agreement not to oppose the U.S. invasion as the troops were landing, but they signed an agreement for the change of government only the day after the invasion.) This case falls on the borderline between coercive diplomacy and war because invasion of a country, especially one that takes place without loss of life on either side, is difficult to code and can be viewed as either a success or failure of coercive diplomacy. I have coded it as a borderline success, for reasons I make clear in chapter 9, although Robert Pastor's judgment is that it was a failure of coercive diplomacy, as he makes clear in his chapter. The difference in coding illustrates the difficulty of drawing judgments about cases that fall squarely on the borderline.

North Korea

The North Korean case centered on Washington's attempt to convince the Kim Il Sung government to halt its program to acquire nuclear weapons. To achieve this objective, as William Drennan explains, the United States threatened to impose economic sanctions on North Korea, which the North Koreans said would be a cause for war, and then it made threats to use force unless the North Koreans stopped proceeding with their weapons program. The United States ultimately succeeded in stopping the North from reprocessing its plutonium, but after the North Koreans had agreed to freeze that program, they began, covertly in 1997 or 1998, to open another route—uranium enrichment—to acquire nuclear weapons, as the U.S. government discovered in the fall of 2002. Even the partial success of coercive diplomacy—the freeze on plutonium reprocessing—worked only because former president Jimmy Carter made a trip to Pyongyang in June 1994 and through his unauthorized actions, especially his public declaration that sanctions were dead, helped avert what appeared to most in the U.S. government in the early summer of 1994 to be a collision course to war. Overall, this case represents a failure of coercive diplomacy because even though it adhered to the freeze on its

reprocessing program, North Korea contravened both the terms and the spirit of the October 1994 Agreed Framework by beginning the uranium enrichment program.

China

As Robert Ross shows, in the 1996 crisis, the United States acted to demonstrate to China the seriousness of its commitment to ensure the peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status and, in the process, to shore up its alliances in East Asia. In 1996 China resorted to displays of force by firing missiles around Taiwan's waters in order to halt what it viewed as Taiwan's creeping moves toward independence. The United States responded with its own coercive actions: it sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait to send a message to China that the United States was serious about its commitment to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status. Clearly, Washington's actions were designed to shore up the credibility of the U.S. commitment to come to Taiwan's aid with military force should China attack it or otherwise try to coerce it, and in this sense the United States was shoring up its deterrent posture. Looked at another way, however, the United States was also engaged in coercive diplomacy: it was making a display of force and an implicit threat to use its air and naval power to stop China from its future attempts to use coercive diplomacy against Taiwan. The China case falls into that category of coercive diplomacy discussed earlier, when threats or limited use are employed to strengthen deterrence because the deterrer believes that its deterrence posture is weakening.

Iraq

Jon Alterman demonstrates that the Iraqi case involved a series of six discrete coercive diplomatic incidents, beginning in the fall of 1990 with the attempt to reverse Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and ending in December 1998 with the attempt to force Saddam to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq. As he points out, before August 1990 Washington's goal was to engage Iraq, not coerce it; after December 1998 the goal was to change the regime, not coerce it, and regime change in the case of Iraq would likely mean death for its key mem-

bers. In the Iraqi case the United States threatened war in 1990 unless Saddam Hussein evacuated Kuwait, and then, after the war was won, it used the threat of air strikes and actual air strikes to coerce Saddam into stopping his interference with the weapons inspectors.

The Iraqi case also involved four other goals. The first goal was the destruction of a significant portion of Iraq's conventional military power, which only war could accomplish. The second was the containment of Iraq within its borders once the war was won, which was accomplished mainly through deterrence. The third was to keep Iraq's conventional forces in a weak state, which was accomplished by a combination of economic sanctions and military blockade. The fourth was to destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons programs, which was only partially successful. In the Iraqi case, therefore, war waging, deterrence, economic and military containment, NBC disarmament, and coercive diplomacy were all present. Alterman confines his analysis to the discrete coercive diplomatic attempts that took place within the general deterrence and containment rubric, and while deterrence and containment worked, Alterman concludes that Washington's coercive diplomatic attempts over this nine-year period brought mixed results. For reasons spelled out in chapter 9, I judge these multiple coercive diplomatic attempts overall to be a failure.

Terrorism

Finally, the responses to terrorism involved attempts to find ways to stop contemplated and actual attacks against Americans overseas and at home, and employed threats or limited uses of force to achieve these objectives. The threat in September 2001 to subject the Taliban government to the same fate as al Qaeda unless it turned over the al Qaeda leadership clearly fits the profile of a coercive diplomacy gambit, but so, too, do the other cases. Retaliation against Saddam's intelligence headquarters complex in 1993 in response to his attempts to kill former president Bush may be classified as retaliation but also as coercion: the use of force to change Saddam's behavior. Similarly, the 1999 attacks against al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan can be seen as

retaliation for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and also as an outright attempt to kill Bin Laden. Retaliation and decapitation of a terrorist organization's leadership is a form of coercive diplomacy; after all, both are designed to get the terrorist organization to stop its terrorist attacks. Judging the efficacy of coercive diplomacy against terrorists is exceedingly difficult, as Martha Crenshaw explains, but she concludes that overall this technique has not worked well.

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Chapters 2 through 8 flesh out the brief descriptions of the eight cases presented here. In each case the author lays out the essential details of the story and then addresses three fundamental questions: what goals did the United States seek, how did it employ threats of force to achieve them, and what results did coercive diplomacy produce? Chapter 9 puts the case studies into an analytic summary and derives conclusions and policy prescriptions by answering these five questions:

- Why is coercive diplomacy difficult?
- What are the prerequisites for the successful exercise of coercive diplomacy?
- What is the United States' experience with coercive diplomacy?
- When does coercive diplomacy work?
- What guidelines can be offered to U.S. policymakers who may contemplate resort to coercive diplomacy?

NOTES

1. Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5 (emphasis in original).

2. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 69.

3. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is a good example of the bolstering of deterrence by compellent actions and is discussed later. For further discus-

sion on the conflation of compellence and deterrence, see Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, *Airpower as a Coercive Instrument* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 10–15.

4. George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5.

5. By treating coercive diplomacy as a form of compellence, however, we depart somewhat from George's usage. He does not put coercive diplomacy under the general rubric of compellence for two reasons. First, he believes that compellence implies "exclusive or heavy reliance on coercive threats to influence an adversary," whereas he wishes "to emphasize the possibility of a more flexible diplomacy that can employ noncoercive persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats." Second, he believes that coercive diplomacy implies a defensive use of coercion, not an offensive use, or what he calls blackmail. Defensive use constitutes an effort "to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon," whereas offensive use constitutes an aggressive effort "to persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance." As a consequence, George treats coercive diplomacy as something distinct from compellence, even though he argues that "coercive diplomacy is a response to an encroachment already undertaken." (Quotes are from George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5.) We find neither point compelling. First, what is defensive lies in the eyes of the beholder. The coercer views its attempt to change the target's behavior as defensive because it wants to stop the target's objectionable behavior. The target, however, does not view its behavior as objectionable because it is trying to alter a situation that it considers unjust or unacceptable; consequently, from its standpoint the actions it is taking are also defensive. Moreover, the target's objectionable behavior may have been unprovoked, though the target more likely views its behavior as a response to prior actions of the coercer or others. Second, nothing that Schelling wrote about compellence implied that it had to be mostly coercive. Indeed, a strong emphasis on communication and bargaining is found throughout his work. For both reasons, then, we treat coercive diplomacy as a form of compellence and make no distinction between defensive coercive diplomacy and offensive coercive diplomacy.

6. George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5.

7. See Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy—Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994). Other useful works on coercive diplomacy are Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Peter

Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Byman et al., *Airpower as a Coercive Instrument*; Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and David F. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, *Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).

8. These cases were examined in the first and second editions of *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. The second edition revised three cases—Laos, Cuba, and Vietnam—that appeared in the first edition.