

1 Sustained Dialogue in Perspective

IN 1960 THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES were much more distant from each other than Russia and the United States are today. This was true in an almost literal sense. There were no regular direct flights between the countries; the first direct commercial flight did not take place until 1969. Communications were so poor that during the Cuban missile crisis it took, on average, four hours to transmit a message between Kennedy and Khrushchev. It was easier to send urgent messages over the public airwaves, despite the loss of confidentiality that one would expect to be essential.¹ Few people traveled between the two countries. In fact, one official was told that Brezhnev met his first noncommunist American in 1962, after he had been in the highest circles of the Soviet leadership for a decade.² That meeting took place in Moscow. More than a decade would pass before Brezhnev himself came to the United States.

Americans saw the Soviet Union as through a glass, darkly. They saw Soviet leaders as implacably hostile, threatening to bury us, using language that Orwell had made Orwellian, expressing ideas that were antithetical to what Americans held most dear. The tanks that faced our troops across German borders and the bombers and missiles issuing forth, it seemed, in massive quantities from Soviet factories made those threats real. The people appeared to be ciphers, their minds chained by

ideology, their bodies captured behind an iron curtain of gun posts, barbed wire, and secret police.

The Soviet view of the United States was no clearer or brighter. American leaders, too, were implacably hostile. The ideology of the United States and its system were corrupt and unfeeling, allowing a few to live in wealth while most suffered in poverty. American weapons also faced theirs across a future battlefield, and its bombs and missiles, gleaming symbols of the nuclear age, were aimed at their homes.

In the thirty years after 1960, the Dartmouth Conference continued its efforts to reduce the tensions of the Cold War. In the time since it has tried to reduce tensions in other conflicts. The format and the very concept of the conference have evolved. As time passed, hundreds of people came to take part in the conferences. Many left owing to changing personal commitments, the changing needs of the conferences, or simply old age and death. But the essence of Dartmouth remained unchanged—the belief in the importance of communication between peoples in conflict, the belief that a dialogue among people outside government can be useful.

The Dartmouth Conference outlasted the Cold War. The lessons learned by those who took part were used to extend the mission of the conference from fostering dialogue between enemies to creating partners able to work together toward peace. In the decade since the Soviet Union collapsed, the processes developed by the Dartmouth Conference have been used by people seeking peace in Louisiana, Moscow, and Dushanbe.

Much of this happened in what now seems a bygone era. So, why tell the story of Dartmouth? There are three reasons why that story remains of interest.

First, the Dartmouth Conference influenced the course of the Cold War, but scholars have known less about Dartmouth than about the Pugwash Conferences and other U.S.-Soviet dialogues. The influence of the Dartmouth Conference during the Cold War was significant. It was a channel that Washington and Moscow used to transmit information and clarify perspectives when official channels seemed insufficient. It influenced the thinking of participants who in their turn influenced both the course of the Cold War and relations between Russia and the United States since. These people included Zbigniew Brzezinski, Georgi Arbatov, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Evgeni Primakov,

David Rockefeller, Andrei Kozyrev, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Buckminster Fuller. While Dartmouth was never a secret, the traditions of the conference have kept its achievements out of the limelight.

A second reason is that developments in international relations make the accomplishments of the Dartmouth Conference during the Cold War and since relevant to the concerns of theorists and practitioners. The notion that discussions such as those that took place at the Dartmouth conferences could influence the course of international relations runs counter to the traditional, realist paradigm of how states conduct their business with each other. This paradigm is a model that has guided statesmen and scholars for centuries.

Those who view the world through this realist prism see an international system made up of states—other actors have only supporting roles. In their relations with each other, these states are concerned mostly with their power relative to each other.³ Power usually refers to a distribution of capabilities.⁴ This distribution is physical; it can be measured, at least in theory, and exists apart from perceptions.⁵ The motivations for a state's actions stem from rationally determined interests. The world is anarchic, a Hobbesian struggle of all against all. Cooperation, where it happens, stems from considerations of power. It is tactical in origin and exists only as long as it does not leave a cooperating state open to coercion by another.

This sketch of the realist paradigm is a simplification. The scholarship of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and other realists is more sophisticated and complex. But it does in large measure describe how many people—scholars, policymakers, and the public—perceived U.S.-Soviet relations. They saw two states locked in battle across the globe, like two spiders in a bottle or two fighters in a ring: taking each other's measure, countering each other's moves, defending against the knockout blow, preparing to use the opening that would allow it.

Not everyone saw international politics that way. Certainly Norman Cousins, in founding the Dartmouth Conference, had a different vision. Since 1960, an increasing number of people have found the state-centered world of realism to be inadequate. Scientists, scholars, bankers, businesspeople legitimate and shady, activists dedicated to a variety of causes, and many other people have found opportunities for activity outside boundaries set by the state. This is not a new phenomenon, but the number of

people and groups outside government involved in transnational activities has grown exponentially in the past twenty or thirty years. For example, the number of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) grew from 832 in 1951 to 4,518 in 1988.⁶ The number of NGOs with a transnational orientation is now greater than 15,000.⁷ In addition, the revolution in telecommunications that has brought us the Internet has made state borders porous as they have never been before.⁸

A growing number of scholars have seen these phenomena as growing challenges to the state and the state-centric realist paradigm. Rather than trying to replace the paradigm, most of these scholars are trying to amend it, to explain what realism in this purer form cannot.⁹ Where realists focus on the state, these scholars focus on actors whose activities cross national boundaries. They are not concerned solely with governments, but with how whole bodies politic—governments and other significant elements of society—interact. Where realists see a virtually complete absence of lasting cooperation, these scholars see the growth of community. Where realists focus on the relative power of states as the engine that drives international politics, these scholars examine other forces, such as ideas, personal relationships, and domestic political structures.

This realist paradigm in its pure form allows little or no room for the influence of a forum like Dartmouth. The Dartmouth Conference began at the height of the Cold War as an unofficial dialogue between Soviet and American citizens. Its chief founder, Norman Cousins, intended Dartmouth to be an effort to forestall nuclear catastrophe stemming from a confrontation between the superpowers. Participants in the Dartmouth conferences came to form a loosely knit transnational community, joined by their experience at the conferences, though not by unity of views of policy by a set of principled or causal beliefs.¹⁰ They hoped to have some influence on the policies of their governments. This influence might be direct or it might come by way of a change in how a problem was framed or how the intentions of the other side were perceived. This book will be, in effect, a case study of transnationalism. It will examine the kind of community Dartmouth formed, whether it had influence, and the nature of that influence.

A third reason for telling the story of Dartmouth is that it can suggest paths that can be followed by those trying to ameliorate or even resolve long-standing, bitter conflicts. Another strain of recent

scholarship, adopted by a number of practitioners, has been interactive conflict resolution and multitrack diplomacy, which involves “unofficial, informal interaction among members of adversarial groups or nations” with the goal of trying to ameliorate or resolve a conflict.¹¹ A variation on this strain is the concept of a multilevel peace process, which grew out of the interactions in the Dartmouth Conference itself in the mid-1990s.¹²

Multitrack diplomacy and a multilevel peace process are similar. In fact, they complement each other. Both look on the interconnections between efforts to reach peace, between efforts made by officials and those made by citizens of various kinds. They both have, as Louise Diamond and John McDonald say, “a systems approach to peace” that operates “on a web of personal relationships that extend across time and space, across age, gender, and national boundaries.”¹³ They also share an approach to making peace that includes both official diplomacy and the efforts of many groups of people elsewhere in society.

The multilevel peace process is distinguished by its focus on process, on how participants in the process interact. It begins, as Dartmouth did, with a decision by people from different societies—or different parts of one society—in conflict to meet, come to a table, and talk. Those who come to the table interact. If the process—the dialogue—is sustained, they come to form relationships. The relationships can make it possible for those who have talked to consider acting and then to act. In acting, they can foster an end to conflict and a solid basis for peace. Their actions, should they take them, can take place on any of several levels; one might think of them as arenas—the official level, where the formal negotiations take place; the quasi-official level, such as was used at the Oslo talks on a settlement in the Middle East;¹⁴ the public level, where sustained dialogue among nonofficial groups can occur; or in civil society. The concept of a multilevel peace process assumes that those who take part in sustained dialogue will be able to apply what they have learned in the dialogue to activity at one of the other levels, though that might not be possible until sometime after they have left the dialogue.

The Dartmouth conferences began in an effort to bridge the gap between two irreconcilable powers. It began with a group of people talking around a table. After the Cold War ended, it continued with an attempt to bring more than thirty years of experience to bear in an

effort to help end a civil war. As chapter 6 explains, the multilevel peace process has been used in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan since 1993.¹⁵ The same process is also proving valuable in the United States. Indeed, with the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union gone, this process may be Dartmouth's most important contribution to conflict management and resolution.

INTERACTING WITH STATES

The work of scholars on transnational relations suggests an approach that can help put Dartmouth in its proper place in relation to global growth of transnational activity; it can be used to develop a framework for examining the significance of the Dartmouth dialogues. These scholars approach their work with a variety of concerns. But a common thread that runs through them is a concern with the relationship between the state and the actor that they focus on. Indeed, as Thomas Risse-Kappen notes, the truly interesting question is how transnational entities interact with states.¹⁶

A central concept that lies behind this question is power. Most of the entities analyzed by Risse-Kappen, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, and their colleagues do not appear to have it, yet these entities have been able to effect changes in the behavior of states nonetheless. If states have close to a monopoly in the coercive means of power, how can nonstate actors effect such changes? Transnational firms have economic power. But international NGOs, advocacy networks, and dialogues such as Dartmouth have no apparent power of any kind, if power is defined by the resources available to an actor. Given the absence of these resources, a relational definition of power, that is, one based on outcomes rather than capabilities, is more useful to the study of transnational relations. Such a definition—one might be the ability of one actor to coerce another to do one's will—can suggest whether an actor has power even in the absence of a measurable set of capabilities.¹⁷ Scholars who look at transnational relations tend to look at resources available to actors that are difficult to measure and are not included in the usual set of power resources.

They also look at politics in a broad, relational sense. It is not an arena for governments and politicians alone. Robert Dahl defines a

political system broadly as “any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, control, influence, power, or authority.” He goes on to say that under this definition many associations not always regarded as political—labor unions, clubs, clans, and civic groups—have political aspects.¹⁸ Scholars of transnational relations examine such associations in the arena of world politics—in the world political system.

In addition, scholars of transnational relations recognize that change has many causes and that these are often not measurable. In a complex political context, many inputs are at work, and it might be that no one can know which was decisive in producing change. For instance, Risse-Kappen argues that the domestic political structure of a country affects whether transnational actors can effect change in the behavior of states. The factors that Keck and Sikkink examine in their study of networks of activists include the nature of the issues their networks address and how they are framed, the density of the networks themselves, and the vulnerability of their targets to moral suasion.¹⁹

The question for Dartmouth in this context is: Can a series of meetings between members of two hostile countries produce change in the policies of their governments? Dartmouth was but one of a small number of dialogues between Americans and Soviets that took place during the Cold War.²⁰ The Pugwash movement is the best known. Others included the Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group (SADS), begun in 1964; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), organized in 1980; the Forum for U.S.-Soviet Dialogue, started in the early 1970s; and a series of conferences sponsored by the United Nations Association of the United States. Dartmouth was distinguished from the rest by having only participants from the two superpowers, by its concern with all issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and by its longevity. Some groups, such as Pugwash, were multilateral. Most were concerned primarily with disarmament. Some—Pugwash again comes to mind—were formed as parts of advocacy networks animated by principled beliefs.²¹ Individuals were sometimes attracted to Dartmouth because they held such beliefs, but Dartmouth as an institution did not have them. In fact, the American side, at least, went out of its way to attract people with a variety of views about issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Dartmouth was also distinguished by the proximity of its participants to government. Keck and Sikkink describe advocacy networks that, for the most part, act in opposition to governments, if not their own, then governments elsewhere. But Dartmouth was founded by people who walked the corridors of power, sought government approval of what they did, and made a point of transmitting to government whatever they learned.

THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE

The significance of Dartmouth is best comprehended with a precise conception of what influence is. "Influence" is one of a number of terms that are related to power defined in relational terms. Dahl includes it with "control" and "authority." Of these terms, "influence" is the most pertinent to Dartmouth, although all four—"influence," "power," "control," and "authority"—can be of interest in the study of transnational relations. Power, in this definition, involves coercion. Dartmouth had neither the means nor the will to exercise that. The same is true of control. Whether Dartmouth was ever able to acquire authority is a more interesting question. If, however, following Dahl again, we associate authority with the right to make binding rules, then authority is left to actors such as states, the pope, and, arguably, transnational actors such as Amnesty International. That leaves influence.

As Dahl explained in *Modern Political Analysis*, this term is not easily defined. It is related closely to power, but it remains something different. Power, as defined above, is wielded through coercion: an actor wants another to do something and is able to force the other to do it.²² As will become clear, however, the participants in Dartmouth as a whole had no desire to coerce their governments even if they had had the resources.

As this suggests, this conception of power includes, implicitly, an assumption of intentionality: the powerful entity is able to exert its will on its target; the target does as the stronger entity intends. This is the classic scenario, desired by parents and coaches. On the other hand, if the target responds, but in a way the powerful entity did not intend, no power has been shown. For example, when Khrushchev came away from his talks with Kennedy in Vienna emboldened to take action against the United States, it can hardly be said that Kennedy was in any

way powerful. Quantum physics offers us the Heisenberg principle to illustrate this point about intentionality. Presumably, the scientist would prefer to have no influence at all, yet she changes the thing she observes. A neutral outcome, devoutly to be wished, cannot be had. With power, then, those who have it get the outcome they seek.

Influence, on the other hand, is not necessarily concerned with the outcomes intended by the influencing actor. It need be concerned only with whether an outcome—a policy—is affected. In this book, influence will be defined, simply, as the ability to affect outcomes.²³ Kennedy, then, was influential in regard to Krushchev, though hardly in the way he sought. Other examples of influence abound, of course. Émile Zola was highly influential when he wrote “J’accuse” and changed the debate about the Dreyfus case. Indeed, the dream of many scholars and journalists who write on public policy is to affect the course of policymaking.

There are two reasons for adopting such a definition of influence. First, this analysis must be sensitive to the possibility that whatever influence participants in Dartmouth hoped to have, they in fact achieved the contrary. Second, this definition reflects the view of politics contained in Dahl’s definition of a political system given above and implied in much of the work on transnational relations. Saunders’ formulation, derived from his experience at Dartmouth and elsewhere, is that “political life is a process of continuous interaction among significant elements in a body politic.”²⁴ Which elements count as significant varies, depending on the political structure of a country and the issue at stake. What matters to us, then, is merely whether an actor, or, rather, the actor we focus on here, is able to affect policy.

Influence over policy can be gained by means other than transmitting ideas. The mere transmission of information can be a source of influence.²⁵ Indeed, an important function of the Dartmouth Conference was to be a conduit for information from one state to the other. Policymakers need information about the intentions and capabilities of the actors with whom they deal; the policy they choose will depend on knowing whether the other actor is hostile or not, aggressive or passive, strong or weak. They get some of this information from intelligence sources, some from the media, some from diplomatic reporting, a little from scholarship, and the rest from a variety of other sources. They seek this information in order to perfect how they strive to achieve their objectives. Changes in

values tend to be forced by changes in circumstances that a policymaker believes make it necessary to reexamine values.

Philip Mosely gave a description of the early conferences that suggested a useful distinction that can be made between direct and indirect influence. An actor has direct influence over another when the two communicate directly with each other, orally or in writing. Many of the Dartmouth conferees transmitted the results of the conferences directly to policymakers through written summaries, letters, and other documents and by meeting with them formally and informally.

Indirect influence, on the other hand, comes about when ideas or other pieces of information enter the general discourse on an issue. This has happened often with transnational communities, which often seek to obtain influence by publicizing the issues that they are concerned with. The demonstrations held in Seattle, Washington, and elsewhere by those protesting the effects of globalization are a recent example of this. Many efforts at obtaining indirect influence are less obvious. The Heritage Foundation, for example, encourages staff members to write op-ed pieces for newspapers and has programs set up in-house to facilitate them. Heritage, like other think tanks, understands that the ideas and information offered by those seeking indirect influence become a part of the climate of opinion and help form the parameters within which arguments about the issue are made. People concerned with an issue read about it, talk about it, and formulate their ideas about how to act on it. Policymakers develop and carry out policy on the basis of that information without being able to attribute it to any specific source or sources. There can be little doubt, for example, that U.S. policy in Bosnia was influenced by perceptions stemming from a figure for the number of people killed in the war that came to be accepted by the public and policymakers without knowing where the number came from or whether it was accurate.²⁶

The concept of indirect influence naturally raises the question of evidence. How can one know whether one group or another has had influence on an issue? Particularly when, as with Dartmouth, the ideas generated by the conferees might be attributed to several sources: Pugwash, other meetings of Soviets and Americans, and a variety of official sources. The short answer is that one cannot. An analyst can say, however, that there is some probability that indirect influence over pol-

icy has been exercised when the ideas communicated by a group have become available in some form to a policymaker.

This access to a policymaker is merely the first step in gaining influence over policy. The policymaker must then incorporate whatever he or she has learned into policy. The information acquired can merely add detail to pictures of the other side already acquired and either confirm a course of action already chosen or foster a minor shift in tactics. That can happen at any time in the policy process. But a significant shift in policy can happen only when the policymakers themselves change or the previous policy proves inadequate. These circumstances create “policy windows” that allow the entry of new ideas either pushed by “policy entrepreneurs” or grasped from the set of ideas that are in the air, available to the policymaker.²⁷

The first step—gaining access—is the easier of the two to determine. It is often easy to discover how a policymaker was exposed to certain ideas. In the case of the Dartmouth Conference, there are documents that show, for example, that Norman Cousins met with President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev and that David Rockefeller spoke to Premier Kosygin and President Johnson. There is often evidence that shows that a policymaker held conversations with proponents, that certain memoranda and reports crossed his or her desk, or that certain ideas or pieces of information were “in the air” around the policymaker; that is, they were discussed among people with whom he or she had contact or were spread through the media available to the policymaker. The tools available to us do not, however, make it possible to understand clearly and precisely how the policymaker thinks. We cannot know enough about his or her cognitive processes to divine whether and how the policymaker incorporated these ideas or that information into policy. To determine whether the ideas came from one particular source—such as the Dartmouth Conference—is often impossible.

The second step in gaining influence, which links ideas and action, returns us to the realm of what can be observed. The task of determining how a policy was influenced is made difficult by a number of factors. First, the implications of ideas or information for policy may not always be clear. The ideas that lie behind any policy may be ambiguous. For example, the deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system by the United States may have been driven by the belief that an

ABM treaty was desirable and that such a "bargaining chip" made it easier to achieve. But at least some of those who favored deployment probably believed simply that an ABM defense was preferable to a treaty. In addition, the processes through which policy is made often involve discussions and compromises among a number of people and bureaucratic institutions. The deployment of Safeguard was, in fact, driven by both motivations, as those who advocated Safeguard as a bargaining chip and those who saw deployment as preferable to a treaty found common ground. The way in which policy is made often also requires that a public face be put on private thinking, which can make statements about the sources of influence misleading or incomplete.

Efforts to determine the influence of an actor on policy, therefore, must often satisfy themselves with conclusions that are probabilistic. There can rarely be certainty in such analyses. Our efforts to determine the influence of the Dartmouth Conference, therefore, will focus first on the more easily proven question of access. That ideas and information that originated within a transnational community such as Dartmouth were circulated among policymakers is itself significant. Our efforts to determine whether those ideas found their way into policy must remain more tentative. Yet the incorporation of ideas and information into policy is the most certain test of influence.

PATHS OF INFLUENCE

The definition of influence given here is a passive one, and purposely so. It leaves open the paths through which influence is exercised. By definition, transnational communities stand between states. In the case of the Dartmouth Conference, which was bilateral in nature, the community stood between the United States and the Soviet Union. The participants could have exerted influence in either country. Their influence could have been exerted either directly or through their colleagues in the other delegation. The Soviet delegation, therefore, could seek influence in the United States by meeting or speaking with policymakers themselves or by transmitting ideas and information to American policymakers through their American colleagues. A similar statement could be made about the American participants.

But when we seek to detect influence it can be useful to distin-

guish between decision makers and bureaucrats. They are both officials, but the path to influence through them is different. Decision makers decide what policy should be, which makes the path to influence that runs through them direct. In the American political system, decision makers include preeminently the president and Congress taken as a whole, but also, depending on the latitude they are given by the president, cabinet officers and the national security advisor. In the Soviet system, decision makers were generally understood to include members of the Politburo. As in the American system, however, cabinet members and others sometimes made policy when the issue and relationship between an official and the Politburo allowed it.²⁸

Bureaucrats provide information and alternatives needed to make decisions and carry the decisions out after they are made. This unloved category is used here to include a number of people who do not think of themselves as bureaucrats: diplomats, soldiers, and analysts, for example. They are united by their function as people who support decision makers after policy has been made and, often, before. They are usually more accessible than decision makers. There are also more of them. Because they do not make policy themselves, they provide a less certain road to influence.

Like many such distinctions, this one is less clear-cut in reality than these descriptions suggest. As noted, bureaucrats can sometimes make policy. Compelled to interpret the sometimes ambiguous or simply confusing dictates of policymakers, bureaucrats can, in effect, make policy themselves. Members of Congress, decision makers according to the Constitution, are well known for providing their own extensive analyses of policy. Nor was the distinction between bureaucrat and decision maker always clear in the Soviet system.²⁹

Both groups of officials share constraints that participants in an unofficial dialogue such as Dartmouth do not.³⁰ This can leave room for a transnational dialogue to provide officials with something of value. The primary limitation is that in the international arena, decision makers and bureaucrats alike represent not themselves but their country and the particular government of which they are a part. They work to further the positions their government has adopted officially. Informal conversation can be important, but it is used to explore the limits set by official positions.³¹ A Dartmouth-style dialogue, however, can step outside those limits to explore them. As one delegate said, Dartmouth "can consider

questions that are unnatural for diplomats to consider.”³² Such a dialogue strives to understand the perceptions and attitudes that lie behind the official positions of two countries, operating from the assumption that the official positions reflect a relationship between countries that can be improved. By virtue of their position, officials must speak carefully and exercise caution before entering dialogues and relationships that take them outside the strict requirements of their positions.

Another limitation is that officials tend to work in the short term. Day-to-day responsibilities and deadlines set by the press of events make it difficult to focus on (or allow time for) a long-term process such as Dartmouth or the long-term changes that the process is about. The limitation here is inherently more physical than intellectual; it is simply a matter of time and the priorities that the official must set. An official usually has too much to do to empty his or her in-box to spend much time contemplating the broader implications or more profound aspects of current issues.

SOVIET POLICYMAKING

Whatever influence Dartmouth had, it was exerted within the limits set by the Soviet system, and the Soviet system put severe constraints on efforts to influence it. Secrecy ensured that not all of these constraints were well understood during the Cold War by those who took part in Dartmouth or, for that matter, by anyone else in the West. It was clear to everyone that the system was highly centralized with the locus of control at the top, in the Politburo. But the precise ways in which information flowed and decisions were made were somewhat hidden.

The number of decision makers on foreign policy in the Soviet system as it existed was decidedly small, a function of its centralized state structure. Western scholars believed that it was limited to the members of the Politburo. There is some indication that on many issues it was effectively much smaller than that. In his memoirs, Anatoli Dobrynin, the longtime Soviet ambassador to the United States, indicates that, owing to the disinterest of most Politburo members, often only General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko made the decisions.³³ On larger issues the Politburo would have had to express its approval, but while the number of bureaucrats was legion, on

many issues the number of decision makers did not extend beyond its membership. During the Gorbachev era, major foreign policy decisions appear to have been made by Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Aleksandr Yakovlev.³⁴ Recent research has shown that merely four men, Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Gromyko, and Dmitri F. Ustinov, the defense minister, made the decision to invade Afghanistan.³⁵ Decisions about arms control were handled somewhat differently. They were effectively made by a small committee of the heads of the agencies concerned—"the Big Five"—with recommendations from another small committee of specialists—"the Five."³⁶ The Politburo gave its approval. That approval was routine but still necessary.

Another characteristic of the Soviet decision-making system was that it limited the flow of information, not only the amount that was made available, but also the channels through which it could move. The prime example of this was the oft-cited complaint of General Nikolai V. Ogarkov to an American delegate at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) talks that his civilian colleagues need not know the specifics of Soviet military hardware.³⁷ Arkadi Shevchenko, a Soviet official with the United Nations who defected to the United States in the 1970s, provides another example:

The American delegation could contact their ambassadors to African, Asian, or Latin American countries directly and ask them to do business at the highest levels of the host governments. We, however, had no right to communicate with Soviet embassies abroad. We had to ask Moscow to issue instructions to our ambassadors to hold such discussions.³⁸

Anatoli Adamishin, who was deputy foreign minister in charge of sub-Saharan Africa under Shevardnadze, gives this example: "[O]ur ambassador in Luanda had no protected telephone link with Moscow and was obliged to drive to the staff of the Soviet military mission advisers whenever he had to put an urgent call through to the Foreign Ministry."³⁹

This suggests that it cannot be assumed that ideas and information acquired by the Soviet participants would have been able to influence policy even if they had been passed through to relevant sections of the bureaucracy. Whereas in the U.S. government information often spreads more or less freely from agency to agency, it was more likely to remain bottled up in the Soviet system. This is not to mention the wealth of

information available from public media and organizations in the United States and the dearth of the same in the Soviet Union, a reflection of the differences in the domestic structures of the two countries.

Two more points need to be made about the Soviet approach to ideas and information from sources such as Dartmouth. First, as Mosely, George Kennan, and others among the first participants knew, the Soviets were accustomed to transnational dialogue and had long tried to use it to their benefit. Indeed, Soviet foreign policy had had a transnational element from the beginning in the form of like-minded parties and people across the world. The Comintern and, briefly, the Cominform formalized the link between these parties and the Soviet Communist Party. The International Department of the Central Committee maintained these links into the Gorbachev era. By 1960 the importance of these parties and people to the interests of the Soviet Union in its relations with the United States had diminished relative to Soviet relations elsewhere. But this history assuredly colored how Soviet officialdom saw Dartmouth. In the zero-sum game that the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union played in 1960, Dartmouth could not have happened without this perspective taken from Soviet history. But Mosely and others on the American side believed that despite this history the dialogue could become something more than a tool of the Soviet propaganda machine.

Second, some of those who began the Dartmouth dialogue in 1960 assumed that the Soviet citizens who took part in Dartmouth could speak from the heart without merely echoing the trite phrases of the party line and Soviet ideology. Those who assumed this were undoubtedly naive. It must be remembered that the Soviet citizens allowed to participate in dialogue with foreigners were chosen from those regarded by Soviet officialdom as "safe" and that the controls placed on them were formidable.⁴⁰ All the same, people such as Mosely and Kennan, who knew the Soviets intimately, found the dialogue useful.

THE DARTMOUTH PROCESS

This book tells the story of the development of what the people who took part in the Dartmouth conferences have come to call the "Dartmouth process." This process was not born whole, and the reader will find that

what was done at Hanover, New Hampshire, more than forty years ago differed in many ways from what is now being adapted and used in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the United States, and elsewhere. The conference can be seen, in fact, as a search for a process that would make it possible for two enemies to reduce their hostility.

