

INTRODUCTION

In his classic work *Diplomacy*, Sir Harold Nicolson identified four national styles of diplomatic negotiation: Warrior, Machiavellian, Manipulative, and Compromising.¹ The bargaining styles of the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese, and the British, respectively, may seem to fit into Nicolson's four categories. But what of the Japanese? To which group would they belong? One Japanese diplomat, after reflecting on Nicolson's typology, concluded that Japanese negotiating behavior could not be placed into any of the four groups. When asked why not, he dryly replied, "Because Japan has no style in the first place!"

Is there any truth to such a claim? Have the Japanese somehow managed to evolve a negotiating style that defies categorization because—unlike, say, Russian or Chinese diplomacy—it exhibits no distinctive characteristics? Alternatively, can Japan be said to have no style of its own because its diplomats—acculturated into a transnational elite who embrace Western norms and modes of thought, dress, and behavior—act no differently than the diplomats of other Western nations?

To these questions, this volume offers an unambiguous answer: no. In the following chapters, we examine four diplomatic encounters between Japan and the United States over the past twenty-five years. Two of our cases center on U.S. access to Japanese markets for agricultural products. The other two focus on security issues; one involves Japanese proposals to develop a new fighter aircraft, the other examines efforts to refashion the U.S.-Japanese security relationship in the 1990s. In each case, distinctive patterns can be seen in the approach and behavior of the Japanese negotiators. Moreover, as our concluding chapter makes clear, those patterns are replicated, to a greater or lesser extent, across the four cases.

This finding, we should note, would not surprise the majority of practitioners and scholars of international negotiation. Most experts agree that national diplomatic styles differ. While particular moves are not unique to any country, the mix of tactics employed by diplomats from a given nation adds up to a distinctive composite portrait of that nation's style. This volume, indeed, is part of a broader project designed to facilitate international communication by identifying and analyzing such differences in national negotiating styles. Sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, the cross-cultural negotiation project has already yielded book-length studies of Chinese, Russian, North Korean, and German negotiating behavior; an analysis of French behavior is also under way.² *Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior* is less ambitious than most of those studies insofar as it focuses on a limited number of case studies rather than on portraying the full range of its subject's motivation, style, and conduct. Nonetheless, if this is more a sketch than a definitive portrait, the lines of the drawing are clear enough.

DESCRIBING JAPANESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

Most of the literature on negotiating with Japan falls into the category of "how-to" manuals for conducting business-level negotiations. The Japanese *diplomatic* style has attracted far less attention from non-Japanese writers, although a few general works and a dozen or so studies of single issues are available.³ Most Japanese-authored accounts that claim to address negotiations really deal with foreign policy or diplomacy. Of the works that discuss negotiating conduct, virtually all are blow-by-blow chronologies of bilateral (typically Japanese-American) interactions on single issues. Only a handful of Japanese analysts have examined Japan's approach toward and management of the negotiating process itself, including an assessment of the pros and cons of alternative bargaining moves, strategies, and tactics.

When Japanese writers have explored the behavior of Japan's negotiators, they have assigned much weight to Japanese-style communication patterns, sociocultural traits, and psychological characteristics. Widely cited examples include seeking harmony (*wa*), expecting to be looked after (*amae*), taking a stance on reading the opponent (*haragei*), balancing the sur-

face (*omote*) and the behind-the-scenes (*ura*), concern for face (*mentsu*), instinctive communication (*ishin denshin*), and building consensus before moving (*nemawashi*). To Japanese authors, these attributes not only impart an identifiable Japanese flavor to the behavior but also explain why Japanese diplomats and negotiators have encountered so much criticism for their way of dealing with other countries across the bargaining table.

What, exactly, *is* Japan's way of dealing with its negotiating counterparts? The answer that emerges from our four case studies may help to explain why the Japanese diplomat quoted at the outset of this chapter denied the existence of a Japanese style. Perhaps he was merely being mischievous. Perhaps, however, he was reflecting, albeit obliquely, the unease with which the Japanese have tended to approach international negotiation, an unease that has produced a negotiating style that is more cautious and more reactive, less demonstrative and less visible, than that of other powerful nations.

Most Japanese today would no doubt agree with a remark made by Toshimichi Okubo over a century ago. "Dealing with foreigners," the Meiji-era statesman observed, "can be a troublesome and difficult task." Ever since 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry's "black ships" sailed into Edo Bay, piercing the curtain of Japan's centuries of virtual isolation from the outside world, the Japanese people and their leaders have regarded diplomacy and diplomatic negotiations as formidable, face-threatening undertakings. As the first three of our cases show, even during the Cold War, when Japan emerged as an important strategic ally of the United States and a powerhouse of the global economy, Japan usually approached the negotiating table warily, especially when its negotiating counterpart was the United States and especially when the subject for discussion was trade. Since the end of the Cold War (as our fourth case reveals), some Japanese diplomats have displayed signs of a new, more self-confident, demeanor, which has contributed to more cooperative and productive relationships with their opposite numbers. Even so, much of this new-found assertiveness seems superficial; underneath, one suspects, the same wariness and unease remain.

This characterization of Japan's approach to diplomatic negotiations might seem dubious to American businesspeople and trade representatives who spent frustrating and often fruitless years wrestling with obstinate and

sometimes aggressive Japanese negotiators for access to Japan's domestic markets in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Such Americans might well paraphrase Okubo's remark to read, "Dealing with *Japanese* can be a troublesome and difficult task." Indeed it can—but two qualifications need to be made. First, in Japanese-U.S. negotiations over the past thirty years, trade issues have generally excited much more rancor and contention than have strategic and security issues—a point that comes out clearly in the fourth of our case studies. Second, many of the traits that U.S. trade negotiators have found most galling in their Japanese counterparts—for instance, a snail-like pace and an obsessive attention to detail—are products of, not aberrations from, an underlying cautiousness and defensiveness.

According to Michael Blaker, author of the first three of our case studies, a good label for the behavior of Japanese negotiators is "coping," an attitude that is consistently evident both at the loftier plateau of diplomacy and down in the trenches at the level of direct negotiations. Coping captures the go-with-the-flow essence of the Japanese bargaining approach: testing the waters through a process of consultations, discussions, information gathering, and reconnaissance; cautiously appraising the external situation; methodically weighing and sorting each and every option; deferring action on contentious issues; crafting a domestic consensus on the situation faced; making minimal adjustments or concessions to block, circumvent, or dissolve criticism; and adapting to a situation with minimal risk.

Japan, Blaker argues, typically prefers to avoid negotiating with the United States. When Japan is forced to do so, it then seeks to minimize the scope of the issues at stake. This issue-avoidance and issue-minimization behavior springs in part from Japan's self-image as a vulnerable island state with few natural advantages and always in danger of being isolated internationally. In part, too, it arises from recognition of the fact that in negotiations with the United States, Japan tends to give up far more than it gets. Blaker traces a recurrent pattern in which Japanese negotiators, faced with U.S. demands, first insist on the inflexibility of Japan's position and seek to wear down the U.S. side's resolve; gradually, however, Japan makes a series of concessions, each of its compromises being rationalized as the least-worst option available and as necessary to prevent Japan's isolation.

In their case study, Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra paint a picture of Japanese behavior that seems at first quite different. Their account of the Nye ini-

tiative undertaken in the mid-1990s to refashion the U.S.-Japanese security relationship tells of a remarkable level of mutual understanding achieved through close and frequent consultation among diplomats and policymakers on both sides. Discussions proceeded relatively smoothly and speedily, and within just a few years an agreement was signed that reflected the post-Cold War environment and promised a larger role for Japan in regional security.

Yet, while the pace and cooperative tenor of these negotiations stand in stark contrast to the cases analyzed by Blaker, similarities can be found. For instance, as in the bargaining over imports of rice and oranges and development of the FSX aircraft, so in the security negotiations of the mid-1990s progress toward agreement hinged on creating a favorable consensus within the Japanese bureaucracy. Indeed, Vogel and Giarra, who were themselves key players in the initiative, emphasize the vital importance of securing support from a broad array of groups.

Moreover, the negotiations of the mid-1990s were to a large extent atypical of U.S.-Japanese encounters on security matters. Much more typical was the kind of behavior described in the other case studies. Prior to the Nye initiative, U.S.-Japanese relations on security and military issues had been manageable but highly constrained and marked by mutual dissatisfaction. The American side had long been frustrated by Japan's refusal to shoulder more of the burden of its own defense and to make more explicit commitments to supporting U.S. military operations in a regional crisis. For their part, the Japanese feared being abandoned by the United States at a critical moment, had political misgivings about assuming a more active military role, and sought to avoid entangling arrangements that would lead to a loss of national prerogatives. In a manner very similar to the pattern of issue avoidance and issue minimization that Blaker describes, Japan, wary of U.S. motives, reflexively resisted American attempts to broaden the security relationship. This attitude changed significantly but only temporarily during the Nye initiative. Almost immediately after the signing in April 1996 of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the Twenty-First Century, the cooperation and consultation that had begun to blossom began to wither. Once the initiative's leading sponsors departed Washington, high-level U.S. officials paid little attention to Japanese security matters, leaving Tokyo to contemplate forging a more independent role for itself on the international stage.

To a large extent, the Nye initiative was the exception that proved the rule about Japanese negotiating behavior vis-à-vis the United States. Wary of U.S. ambitions and conscious of its own relative weakness, Japan has preferred to avoid or minimize negotiations. When it has accepted that it must negotiate, it has tended to do so cautiously, methodically, and slowly and has signed an agreement only after crafting a broad internal consensus and persuading itself that the agreement is the least-worst option available. This pattern *may* be changing, not least because of the advent of a generation of younger officials who are readier to cooperate and pursue constructive, mutually beneficial solutions. Any such change, however, is likely to be piecemeal and gradual.

EXPLAINING JAPANESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

Where do these behavioral traits and characteristic approaches come from? This book is much too short for us to embark on a comprehensive exploration of the origins of Japanese negotiating behavior. However, the behavior of Japanese negotiators described in the following chapters may be more comprehensible if we outline, albeit briefly, three factors whose interplay shapes much of the Japanese bargaining style. Those factors are culture; domestic institutions and political processes; and Japan's subordinate position in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Culture

Culture—in the sense of a “complex system of meanings created, shared, and transmitted (socially inherited) by individuals in particular social groups”⁴—undoubtedly plays a role in molding the uniquely Japanese brand of negotiating conduct. In particular, beliefs about and perceptions of the outside world, and values and norms concerning social relationships, exercise a powerful influence.

The Japanese tend to display a “fortress mentality,” regarding their island country as surrounded and vulnerable but also as distinct, separate, and in many ways superior. This attitude is expressed through various powerful ideas and concepts that pervade the language and culture. It can be seen, for example, in paired terms such as *uchi* (inside, we) and *soto* (foreign, them), and *honne* (innermost feelings, as expressed to other

Japanese) and *tatema* (verbal or superficial expression, as embodied in official statements). This outlook helps to explain why Japanese negotiators often display an uneasiness toward and suspicion of the outside world, an ultrasensitivity to foreign opinions and criticisms, and a near-obsessive concern with Japan's weakness and vulnerability. This unease is tempered to some degree in relationships that Japan regards as fundamentally positive; in such relationships, Japanese negotiators feel sufficiently confident to make a series of small adjustments in order to reach a consensus with their negotiating partners. However, where Japanese negotiators feel that there is not a basically good relationship, they can become very stubborn.

Within Japanese society, it has traditionally been the case that the individual is seen as subordinate to the group to which he or she belongs, be it the family, extended family, corporation, or government ministry. Society is very hierarchical; everyone has a well-defined position and role, and dissension and outspokenness are strongly discouraged. The individual is seen as potentially disruptive of a highly prized concept—*wa* (harmony). Being assertive and inventive, taking risks and initiatives: these tend not to be actions that are rewarded within Japanese society. (The Japanese, it may be noted, do not have their own word for “initiative”—or for “give-and-take” or “partnership”—but they have fifty words that mean, more or less, “reading the situation.”) The effect of these attitudes is evident at the negotiating table, where Japanese diplomats rarely make bold moves or propose new initiatives, and where a change in the personnel of the Japanese delegation rarely alters the complexion or dynamic of the discussions.

Yet, while Japan is a stratified society, that does not make it a tranquil society. To the contrary, it is in many ways fragmented and pluralistic. It is, to be sure, a vertically organized society, but it is also structured horizontally—and at each level there are numerous groups (almost independent domains) fiercely assertive of their own interests and locked in competition with one another. The Japanese have to take these separate elements and combine them in a mutually accommodative way; decisions are thus not so much reached by a logical analysis of options as arranged by the interests and relative power of the various actors. Effective Japanese leaders are consensus builders, able to figure out how to accommodate the interests of each group or to compensate those groups whose interests are

harmful by an agreement. In part because of this, negotiation is not seen as a legitimate clash of different points of view but as a failure of the consensus process. International negotiation is to some extent not negotiation at all but an attempt to carry out the domestic agreements reached by a consensus-building process. Negotiation represents, in Japanese eyes, a failure on the Japanese part to communicate their point of view, which if communicated would have been understood as valid and accepted by the negotiating counterpart. If an impasse occurs, it is attributed to the failure of Japan's diplomats to explain to the other side Japan's position and the constraints under which it is laboring. Hence, we see such bizarre aspects of Japanese negotiating behavior as rounds of delegations coming from Japan to hurl themselves against foreign resistance, convinced that they have just to convey the Japanese point of view in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

Some cultural influences exert a distinctly visible and audible (or conspicuously inaudible) impact on negotiations. The Japanese cultural disinclination to utter an outright "No" and the inclination to smile and nod to indicate understanding, but not necessarily agreement, have often misled Western negotiators. So, too, has the Japanese use of silence. Silence is perfectly acceptable in Japanese social interactions. Indeed, it is expected of senior officials and respected elders. Non-Japanese, however, tend to misinterpret Japanese silence in the face of a counterpart's proposal as signaling agreement or at least acquiescence. As UN undersecretary general Yasushi Akashi remarked, Japanese diplomats have "big ears and small mouths."⁵ Body language is another element of Japanese negotiating behavior whose significance and meaning have often been overlooked. The art of taking a physical stance and reading the opponent (*baragei*, literally, "stomach art") is refined and eloquent and is used chiefly for communication among Japanese.

Domestic Institutions and Political Processes

As noted, Japan is a highly pluralistic society. Reaching public policy decisions is an intensely combative, heavily bureaucratic, consensus-driven process of accommodating diverse interests and viewpoints. The executive has very limited ability to impose its decisions on government bureaucracies, which tend to be extremely powerful entities, each a dis-

ciplined hierarchy within itself and fiercely competitive with other ministries or agencies for the dominance of its viewpoint. Various interest groups, the politicians who represent them, and the policy *zoku*, or "tribes" (issue-specific cadres of Diet members), also shoulder their way into the decision-making process. All bureaucratic, democratic societies face similar difficulties. But what distinguishes Japan is the utter complexity of the domestic consensus-building process.

The need to reach consensus means that Japan is slow to develop a negotiating position and is severely constrained from departing from it during negotiations. It enters negotiations with very little room for maneuver, which largely rules out the use of trade-offs, bluffs, and Machiavellian tactics. Anticipatory concessions have already been made at home, in the process of reaching a consensus on an initial negotiating position. Thus, when confronted with demands for concessions at negotiations, the Japanese may say, in effect, "We already did that!" When the other side presents a new proposal or raises new issues, the Japanese negotiating team cannot offer any substantive response until a new domestic consensus has been forged.

Furthermore, the Japanese government is structured in such a way that negotiating responsibility rests on a foreign ministry that serves a largely coordinating role, or on negotiators who represent parochial, narrow interests with little independent power, even as they officially are assigned responsibility to reflect the hopes, interests, and values of the nation as a whole. In other words, the negotiating team is essentially a representative for the domestic coalition that has been forged. One consequence is that delegations are often large, unwieldy, and even disunited, with representatives of the different domestic groups refusing to share information with one another. Another casualty of bureaucratic parochialism is that the negotiating process channel is poorly linked to the negotiating policy channel. Only a political crisis activates the process sufficiently to engage the top Japanese leaders who can work out the last-minute compromises among domestic players to permit a final settlement to be reached.

Japan's Subordinate Position

A third factor exerts a strong influence on Japanese bargaining behavior toward the United States; this factor, not surprisingly, is Japan's relationship

with the United States. It is a relationship that since Japanese independence in 1952 has been decidedly asymmetrical. The “strategic bargain”—an unstated bargain, it should be noted—then struck essentially meant that Japan would allow the Americans to shelter it under the U.S. security umbrella and would give up some of its self-respect and sovereignty in exchange for U.S. help in rebuilding and developing its economy and access to the U.S. market. For the United States, the strategic bargain was attractive because it effectively precluded the reemergence of a militaristic and aggressive Japan, hostile to U.S. influence in the region; instead, Japan would be a base for U.S. power in Southeast Asia.

As a consequence, Japan has been willing to defer to the United States, especially on security and strategic issues, though it has expected the United States to recognize and respect Japanese interests and sensitivities. At the highest political levels, Japanese leaders have also been wary of resisting U.S. trade demands too forcibly, fearful of alienating U.S. support and imperiling the security relationship. The U.S. agenda has been—by dint of Japan’s deference and hesitancy about introducing its own initiatives—Japan’s agenda.

However, although the basic security relationship has endured, it has certainly undergone shifts in character. During the Occupation of 1945–52, the Japanese felt they had no choice but to be compliant with the U.S. authorities, but they created some leverage by adopting the classic strategy of the underdog in a tight-knit society: when faced with an unpalatable order from the occupying power, the Japanese would purposely misunderstand, raise innumerable practical objections, and repeatedly delay action. From the mid-1950s until 1972 (with one very brief exception), all Japanese prime ministers came from the so-called Yoshida school, which was named after the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime minister who held office for most of the period from 1947 to 1955. The Yoshida school recruited talented former bureaucrats and trained them into a cadre of young and highly talented politicians with a disciplined commitment to overall national goals that had traditionally been found in the bureaucracy. These LDP leaders recognized the need to work with the United States for the security alliance and were thus prepared to push through the security treaty agreements in 1959–60 and 1969 despite great public opposition in Japan.

Well into the 1970s, most Japanese dealings with other countries were handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ministry officials learned to adapt to the United States and worked closely with U.S. State Department officials, developing relationships of trust and understanding. They felt comfortable in dealing within this context, much in line with the traditional Japanese pattern of working with trusted partners to resolve issues. However, as relations with foreign countries continued to expand, more branches of government had to increase their direct contacts with other countries. At first some of these relationships were awkward, but gradually various ministries acquired expertise. Furthermore, from the 1970s into the mid-1990s, relations between Japan and the United States were strained by a succession of trade wars. As disagreements and ill feelings multiplied, those officials on both sides who had established close and cooperative relationships with their counterparts came under suspicion for being too willing to make concessions. During the Cold War, the White House and the Department of Defense had sought to restrain U.S. trade negotiators from pushing the Japanese too hard, fearing the consequences for national security. But with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government saw less reason to restrain its negotiators. Soon, even top-level political encounters could no longer be guaranteed to yield a compromise agreement.

The origins of these trade wars can be found in the economic and trade strategies Japan adopted early in the Cold War. As described in chapter 1 (see p. 18), Japan embraced the so-called Yoshida doctrine of separating politics from economics (*seikei bunri* in Japanese), and Japanese leaders were willing to bend to satisfy American security goals as long as Japanese economic development was not threatened. Japanese economic strategy emphasized the importance of importing as few industrial products as possible in order to build up Japan's own industries and to maintain a positive trade balance to pay for the resources and the food that Japan must import. Japan also sought to protect its agricultural sector, which had powerful political support, from foreign competition. Japanese exporters focused their attention on the large U.S. market—indeed, Japan was heavily dependent on that market until the Asian markets began to develop in the 1980s and 1990s.

At first, the United States viewed Japanese protectionism with equanimity, but once Japanese industries (in areas such as textiles, steel, consumer electronics, and automobiles) began to claim a significant and

increasing share of the U.S. market, U.S. companies pressed for barriers to Japanese imports and for greater access to the Japanese market. Although the Japanese government was careful not to imperil its security relationship with the United States, it resisted U.S. demands and was slow to open its markets. As noted above, the result was a succession of trade wars that ran from the 1970s into the 1990s.

Fortunately, as the 1990s advanced, relations began to improve. The establishment of the World Trade Organization and the gradual multilateralization of trade agreements prompted many Japanese to proclaim the end of the era of bilateral trade wars. At much the same time, an economic downturn in Japan prompted an opening of the Japanese financial markets, which in turn greatly reduced pressure from the American side. Furthermore, as detailed in chapter 4, the two countries adjusted their security relationship to reflect the changed conditions of the post-Cold War environment and to guard against instability in the region. The negotiations over this new security framework were conducted in a remarkably cordial and cooperative atmosphere. Subsequently, however, progress toward closer military cooperation has faltered.

Since the end of the Cold War, many observers claim to see signs of a more self-confident Japan. They point to a group of younger Japanese diplomats, who seem more at ease in international forums than did their predecessors, and more inclined to develop an independent role for Japan in the region and the world at large. Japan is indeed showing greater independence, but it is a very gradual process. The Japanese today are reevaluating the strategic bargain struck fifty years ago, but they do not seem to have arrived at any far-reaching conclusions. Even when pressured by other countries—including the United States—to play a more active role on the international stage, Japan has usually shown a marked reluctance to assume new responsibilities. Perhaps, however, such trepidation is finally eroding. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the government of Junichiro Koizumi announced plans to back up the international effort to combat terrorism. To facilitate these measures, it submitted an antiterrorism bill and a proposed amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law to the Diet.

Within the context of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, Japan clearly remains the junior partner. Moreover, it continues to play that role in much

the same manner as it has done since the 1950s: as a generally loyal, if sometimes exasperated and resentful, subordinate. Unlike, say, Israel and South Korea, which are no less dependent on the United States, Japan has rarely sought to act in defiance of U.S. wishes or to manipulate the United States for its own ends. Instead, the fundamentally reactive, defensive, and cautious nature of Japanese negotiating behavior has been accentuated in encounters with the United States. This is not to say that Japan has not sought to enhance its bargaining position whenever possible; for instance, it learned early on in the trade wars the value of working with Congress to influence negotiating outcomes and of locating Japanese industries in many U.S. states. Even so, rather than advancing their own agenda, Japanese diplomats have sought to anticipate U.S. demands, to moderate them, and then to satisfy them, albeit at the lowest cost to Japan.

CAVEATS AND CASES

Does Japan display the same negotiating behavior in encounters with countries other than the United States? Unfortunately, this question must be left to future studies. This volume focuses squarely on bilateral U.S.-Japanese negotiations. We caution against applying our analyses and conclusions automatically to other bilateral relationships or even to multilateral forums involving other countries as well as Japan and the United States. This is not to say that we would expect to find an entirely different Japanese bargaining style in negotiations involving other major powers. It seems likely that even in negotiations between Japan and middle-ranking and smaller powers, the cultural, institutional, and political factors outlined above would exert a similar influence on Japanese conduct. Nonetheless, we emphasize that our findings relate only to encounters between Japan and the United States.

We should also stress that our cases by no means exhaust the variety of subjects that have exercised the diplomatic skills of the two countries. For example, we do not cover the high-profile, highly charged struggles over issues such as textiles, automobiles, steel, and semiconductors. Nor do we cover bargaining from the standpoint of business negotiators. Certainly, we note the involvement, direct and indirect, of corporations from both countries in official negotiations (and in the case of Japan especially, the line between the public and the private sectors can be extremely fuzzy),

but our focus throughout is on governmental, not corporate, negotiators. Thus, we do not discuss, for instance, questions as to whether Japanese corporate negotiators launch more initiatives and take greater risks than their diplomatic colleagues (they almost certainly do) or whether corporate culture can reflect variant streams of Japanese culture.

With these caveats in mind, however, we trust that readers will find our four cases illuminating. They range across much of the past twenty-five years—and thus reflect the vicissitudes in Japanese-U.S. relations during that period. They deal not only with trade issues but also with security matters—and thus allow comparisons to be drawn between Japanese behavior in those two fields. And they cover negotiations that yielded mutually rewarding outcomes as well as encounters that left one or both parties feeling aggrieved and defeated—and thus they counter simplistic but not uncommon stereotypes that paint one or the other side as omniscient and omnipotent.

Furthermore, our authors provide complementary perspectives on the events they describe. Michael Blaker offers a scholar's perspective, one informed by extensive reading of Japanese sources, interviews with influential U.S. and Japanese negotiators, and his expert knowledge of the history of U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra give us an insider's account of one such set of negotiations. Both men were closely involved with the effort to develop a new security framework for U.S.-Japanese relations in the 1990s. Professor Vogel is a Harvard academic who served as national intelligence officer for Asia from 1993 to 1995. Commander Giarra is a career navy officer specializing in Japan. Their account of those talks is authoritative and revealing.

The insights of all three authors are brought together in a concluding chapter by Patrick Cronin. Cronin—who has considerable experience in facilitating the exchange of ideas between the policymaking and scholarly communities, and who is thus perfectly suited to his task in this volume—draws out the similarities and the differences among our four case studies. Not only does he offer explanations for those variations but also he sketches out a dynamic model of Japanese negotiating behavior that puts continuity and change into perspective.