

Introduction

PEACEMAKING AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF operations are usually as complex and multifaceted as the problems they address. It's rare to find an operation that involves only military personnel, or relies wholly on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), or calls only for the expertise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It's much more typical for members of two or all three of these communities to be in the field. And when they are there together, it's important for the success of the operation that they work well together. This book aims to make it easier to establish a good working relationship by giving each group—IGO, NGO, and military—a better idea of how the other two work.

In case anyone doubts the need for such mutual understanding, let us note here at the outset that peace operations are not about to disappear. Peacekeeping as practiced by the United Nations evolved slowly at first, with only thirteen missions being authorized in the forty years to 1988, but since then developments have been rapid and dramatic. Since 1988, the United Nations has been engaged in operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Iran, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia (including Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo), Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Haiti, Liberia, Chad, Libya, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara, Georgia, Tajikistan, the Central African Republic, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As of April 2000, no fewer than fifteen UN peace operations were under way (see pp. 52–57 for a complete list of past

and present UN peacekeeping missions and pp. 23–32 for a discussion of the evolution of peacekeeping). Several other operations have also been undertaken by regional organizations such as NATO and the Economic Community of West African States. The increase in numbers has been matched by a startling increase in operational variety and complexity. Members of the military and of IGOs and NGOs are more likely than ever before to find themselves working side by side in the effort to build or rebuild peace and stability within divided societies and failed states.

Why the end of the Cold War brought with it so many intrastate conflicts will likely be a matter for debate for years to come. Some analysts claim that these conflicts were the result of power grabs by ambitious politicians in the post–Cold War reshuffling of regimes and borders. Others argue that the very nature of the Cold War had kept these conflicts in check, with the two superpowers continually reining in their client states. Yet others point to resentments built up over the centuries and to long-seething ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of colonial empires.

Whatever the cause, it was clear that the nature of international and intrastate conflict changed in the 1990s, producing such intense civil conflicts that the international community felt impelled to respond, either on its own initiative or at the request of the parties to the conflict. The response might be a humanitarian relief operation involving the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, international NGOs, and logistical support from military units, or it might be a full-blown UN-authorized peace operation, uniting military peacekeepers and civilian agencies in a long-term attempt to encourage and consolidate peace.

The sheer number of these peacemaking efforts has provoked a sharp debate about the international community's obligation to respond to every conflict. It seems, however, that as long as these conflicts target civilians and result in gross violations of human rights and humanitarian disaster,

the international community will continue to intervene. Even if the international community changes its mind and opts not to intervene in man-made tragedies, it will continue to respond to natural disasters—and will do so by calling on the talents and capabilities of civilian organizations and military forces, whether individually or jointly.

The stage on which these organizations and forces must operate is typically crowded, not only with warring factions and hard-pressed local populations but also with a multifaceted cast of foreign entities—other militaries, IGOs, and NGOs; diplomats and aid workers from national governments; private individuals and foundations—that are likewise working to alleviate suffering and restore peace. Despite their broadly similar objectives, however, cooperation between these third parties is by no means inevitable. There are numerous activities that such cooperation can facilitate: policing, security, refugee resettlement, physical reconstruction, transportation, the provision of food, shelter, and health services, and so on. Yet, establishing cooperative relations among the various external players is one of the most challenging aspects of the international response to conflict and disaster.

Exactly who, if anyone, is responsible for coordinating the work of the various players varies from operation to operation. In UN missions, for example, the United Nations often appoints a special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) either to head the entire operation or to manage its political and administrative elements. The SRSG's authority, however, is usually limited. In the first place, the SRSG is typically given little room for maneuver by UN Headquarters, which is itself constrained by the need to maintain the support of interested major powers. Second, while the SRSG generally has control over the components of the mandated mission, he or she does not control the aid agencies of various governments or the special envoys of other IGOs. Nor does the SRSG usually exercise

direct authority over the military component of an operation. Additionally, the SRSG may well have very little control over international and local NGOs. NGOs, which may number more than a hundred and which in many cases will have been on the scene long before a mission is launched, may form—or already have formed—their own network to share information and coordinate activities, or they may not.

Some idea of the variety and complexity of arrangements for managing UN operations can be gauged from figures I.1 and I.2 (pp. xiv–xv and xvi–xvii). Yet even these figures offer oversimplified and incomplete portraits of organizational structures; the reality is less tidy. The two figures do show, however, that in many cases the smooth functioning of an operation depends as much on establishing a network of consultation as it does on creating a structure of control.

In operations run by regional organizations rather than by the United Nations, the picture is much the same, because regional organizations are subject to the same kind of decision-making procedures and constraints as the United Nations and have no more control over NGOs or other IGOs.

In short, most peace and relief operations are complex activities in which no one is completely in charge. This situation makes it all the more important to ensure that all players function cohesively but also all the more difficult to do so. The feature box on pages xviii–xxiv illustrates the complex evolution over time of a “typical” peace or humanitarian operation. Although the feature box illustrates a best-case scenario, it conveys an impression of the scale of the challenges involved in trying to get all players to function cohesively.

The various players in an operation may regard one another warily, preferring where possible to be in charge or to function independently. Almost as if they were different countries, they speak different languages, saturating their documents and conversations with terms, acronyms, and jargon that mean little or nothing to the others. Each has its

own philosophy, methods of operation, and organizational culture—and these may not merely differ but actually clash. However, no matter the differences or the complexity of the operation, it is important to remember that each player is involved because it has been mandated to act by some authority or because it wants to help. In order to help, all sides must get to know one another, recognize and respect their differences and learn or agree to modes of coordination and cooperation.

A wide variety of mechanisms have been tried in previous operations to foster closer coordination and cooperation, ranging from informal exchanges of information on activities being undertaken independently to well-organized civil-military operations centers that can coordinate joint or at least mutually supportive activities. As a consequence, the extent of mutual understanding has in fact grown since the early 1990s. There is still a long way to go, however, before that understanding runs as deep and as wide as it should. It is also true that in some instances even a rudimentary awareness is still lacking.

The purpose of this handbook is to help field staff of IGOs, NGOs, and peacekeeping forces develop a basic understanding of the outlook and operations of these major third-party institutions. By offering sketches of the philosophies, cultures, and working practices of the different external players, this book aims to dispel some of the misconceptions and prejudices that exist on all sides, to build mutual understanding and respect, and to facilitate cooperation and coordination of effort. This book makes no attempt to present comprehensive portraits that detail every feature and nuance of the three types of organization, as will be apparent to a reader familiar with one or another. Instead, it offers a series of quick but recognizable sketches, outlining both the general characteristics and the most important variations. It is intended to be a general but reliable guide to one's partners in peace operations.

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



Figure I.2. IGO-NGO-Military Consultation, Command, and Coordination during UNMIBH
 (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2000)



CIMIC—Civil-Military Cooperation organization

IPTF — International Police Task Force

OHR — Office of the High Representative

OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PIC — Peace Implementation Council established by the Dayton Accords as a liaison between NATO SFOR and the OHR

SFOR — Stabilization Force

*The High Representative was created by the Dayton Accords and is the final authority regarding interpretation and monitoring of the accords on civilian implementation.

**The regional offices of the High Representative in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Brcko assist the main OHR in Sarajevo.

***UN agencies include the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN Development Programme (UNDP).

Lines of command

---- Lines of consultation and coordination

THE EVOLUTION OF A UN PEACE/ HUMANITARIAN OPERATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO

No two peace or humanitarian operations are the same. Each confronts different circumstances and obstacles; each has its own cast of players and its own constellation of timetables and goals.

Yet, despite their uniqueness, many operations evolve in roughly comparable ways and present kindred challenges in terms of cooperation and coordination among the intervening third parties. Here we trace the evolution of the most common kind of civilian-military operation: an operation launched under the authority of the United Nations. This scenario reflects, to a greater or lesser extent, the successful elements of a relatively large number of past operations and how they can ideally be organized. It is, however, still no more than a best-case example.

Those who have had firsthand experience in peace and humanitarian operations don't need to be told that the reality is a lot more untidy than this scenario suggests. For instance, different phases of an operation will certainly overlap and may be skipped altogether; conditions on the ground may steadily improve, only suddenly to worsen; mechanisms to coordinate third-party efforts may break down and new mechanisms may have to be devised; and so forth. Furthermore, the order in which phases/actions are presented in the scenario may change. But for those who are new to these kinds of civilian-military endeavors, this sketch may offer a rough-and-ready idea of how the international community should and sometimes does respond to a crisis.

A UN-Authorized Operation to Combat Famine/Restore Security

<i>Phase/Action</i>	<i>Examples/Specifics</i>
■ Crisis develops	Famine looms/civil unrest spreads in Country X.
■ NGOs respond	NGOs send resources (staff, funds, supplies, etc.) and/or bolster preexisting in-country programs.
■ IGOs respond	UN agencies (e.g., UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP) send resources (staff, funds, supplies, etc.) and/or bolster preexisting in-country programs. UN and regional IGOs monitor developments.
■ Crisis worsens	Famine becomes acute/violence escalates.
■ Pressure grows for the international community to act	Media and NGOs spotlight the crisis, stimulating public concern to help the people of Country X; foreign governments and IGOs grow alarmed at the scale of human suffering and/or the threat of the crisis spilling over to neighboring countries. NGOs may pull out.

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THE EVOLUTION OF A UN OPERATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO *(cont.)*

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| ■ International community studies its options | Regional and/or global powers discuss dangers and options. Some undertake bilateral or multilateral efforts to resolve or ameliorate the crisis. At the United Nations, the secretary-general and the Security Council review reports and debate if and how best to act. |
| ■ UN decides to act | The Security Council approves a UN operation for Country X with a mandate to deliver supplies and/or restore or maintain security. (A UN assessment team has visited Country X to judge needs for civilian and military funds, matériel, and personnel; a report from the UN secretary-general to the Security Council follows, which forms the basis for a mandate and follow-up action.) A UN special envoy may be appointed. |

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| ■ SRSG arrives, assesses the situation, and fosters coordination and/or communication | The special representative of the UN secretary-general (SRSG) appointed to head the UN operation arrives in Country X to prepare for the arrival of civilian and military components of the new operation. S/he will coordinate, but not direct, the work of UN agencies already in Country X. S/he establishes mechanisms, formal or informal, to improve coordination and/or communication among NGOs, IGOs, the diplomatic community, etc. |
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| ■ Military components of UN mission begin arriving | The first troops from contributing countries arrive. Combat forces begin to establish security, and they are followed by support forces, which provide limited assistance to help UN agencies and NGOs meet civilian needs. Individual units are led by national commanders, who report to an overall UN force commander but remain tied to their national command. The SRSG coordinates with or has authority over the force commander. Plans are made for subsequent cooperation with civilian actors. |

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THE EVOLUTION OF A UN OPERATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO *(cont.)*

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| ■ Civilian components of UN mission begin arriving | UN staff and other civilian personnel arrive, as needed, to undertake reconstruction and other postsettlement implementation tasks (e.g., policing, rebuilding infrastructure, election monitoring). |
| ■ NGO presence increases | NGOs already in the country expand or refocus their activities; other NGOs arrive to render assistance in various areas, including peacebuilding and conflict resolution. |
| ■ CMOC created | The military component establishes a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as a point of contact for NGOs, IGOs, and the military, both on security and humanitarian issues. |
| ■ NGO council established | NGOs form a council to share information among themselves and interface with IGOs and the military. |

- Civilian and military components are fully deployed

With its full complement of civilian and military personnel, the UN operation makes its presence felt throughout the affected areas of Country X. Disarmament/arms control begins, as does planning for the demobilization/retraining of local security forces.

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- Crisis begins to stabilize

As supplies are delivered and/or security restored, the crisis begins to abate. Meanwhile, the SRSG, IGOs, and relevant NGOs build dialogue with and among local parties to resolve long-standing problems. International media interest in Country X fades. Military combat forces begin to draw down. NGOs, IGOs, and local authorities pick up some of the responsibilities of the military.

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THE EVOLUTION OF A UN OPERATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO *(cont.)*

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| ■ Food security/
security begins
to return | As the crisis recedes, emergency relief NGOs scale back their efforts while development, conflict resolution, and/or democracy-building NGOs intensify their efforts. The military further redeploys and/or reduces its forces; the civilian component of the UN operation likewise refocuses its energies and/or scales back its activities. |
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| ■ Situation
stabilizes | All or most military units exit Country X. The SRSG is withdrawn, along with all or most of the civilian components. Regional IGOs and/or UN agencies bolster local efforts to maintain and develop enduring mechanisms to preserve food security/security. Long-term-development NGOs retain a significant presence in the country. |

This guide does not cover *all* the players. Aside from the fact that little is said about the numerous local players—governments, armies, militia, warlords, political parties, community groups, indigenous NGOs, and so forth—only passing reference is made to external third parties such as the diplomatic corps, donor governments, agencies of foreign governments, and private foundations. Each of these groups can be integral to the success of a peace process but none of them is dealt with individually in this book, partly because of limited space, partly because the enormous diversity within these groups makes it very hard to offer any observations that are general enough to be valid yet specific enough to be useful. It is hoped that the members of these groups will understand these reasons and that they will find this book to be a useful guide despite its limitations.

There is no need in this handbook to read the chapters sequentially. In fact, readers are encouraged to use the table of contents and the index to quickly locate a specific subject or organization. For instance, civilians trying to decipher the uniforms of their military colleagues will find it useful to turn to the chart in part III that explains military insignia. Similarly, military personnel assigned to work alongside an NGO will find it helpful to leaf through the profiles in part II of many of the more commonly encountered NGOs. NGO staffers and soldiers alike will find it helpful to turn to the organizational profiles provided in part I, which cover not only the wide variety of organizations and entities within the United Nations system but also the regional organizations that are likely to be involved in peace operations. As well as offering such specific information, each part also provides general discussions—of the mission, culture, organization, operating procedures, and other characteristic features of the military, NGO, and IGO worlds.

The United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping Institute began work on this handbook when efforts were first under way in Bosnia to implement the Dayton peace agreement. As the situation in that fractured and bloodied country graphically illustrated, those whose job it was and is to stabilize and reconstruct war-torn societies face quite enough dangers and difficulties; these challenges should not be compounded by miscommunication and mistrust among the intervening parties seeking to reconstruct a devastated society. The players in peace and relief operations are likely to find that the degree of collaboration differs from one case to the next, dependent as much on the personalities involved and the demands of the situation as on formal arrangements. The aim of this volume is to make such cooperation more likely by increasing mutual understanding and respect among not only the key institutions but also, and more especially, the individuals on the ground whose interaction can make the difference between the success and the failure of a peace operation.

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