
INTRODUCTION

A peace support operation is one endorsed by the international community in order to contain a crisis or conflict; its aim is to keep the crisis from worsening while also providing scope for indigenous peoples, peacemakers, and humanitarian workers to make things better. Military personnel nearly always constitute the most numerous participants in peace support, and our study concerns their utilization in UN-sanctioned missions, in areas racked by civil strife, where peace support elements may confront significant local resistance as they carry out assigned tasks. Suggestions that the international community should forgo or cease intervention in such cases may often constitute wise counsel, but moral imperatives reinforced by accounts of human suffering or calculations of national interests such as sparked by a massive inflow of refugees can at times make (continued) intervention the best option. The question then is how to proceed. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali alluded to this when he wrote in 1995 that the United Nations' recent unhappy experiences in peace support, particularly in Bosnia, have "compelled renewed reflection on the instruments available to the international community in its efforts to maintain international peace and security."¹

We offer this book as part of the reflection process. Although numerous reasons have been offered to explain the difficulties plaguing UN-sponsored peace support in the first half of the 1990s, our focus is on concepts, doctrinal principles, and operational guidelines. They go to the essence of what a peace support mission is about and how it ought to be undertaken. Agreement on them is the basis for resolving other well-publicized issues such as resource requirements and command-and-control arrangements.

A 1995 observation by Adam Roberts captures our perspective. He concluded that proposals to provide the United Nations with more military muscle may have the undesired effect of deflecting attention from

deficiencies “which are as much conceptual as physical,” and he suggested that the United Nations and its members “may need to recognize that occasionally there is a need for, and a possibility of, an approach which is conceptually distinct both from impartial peacekeeping based on consent of the parties and simple enforcement action on behalf of an attacked state” such as South Korea in 1950 or Kuwait in 1990.² Although there remains today resistance to recognizing a middle or third approach, we believe that such an approach constitutes a practicable alternative that should not be ignored. Indeed, we are convinced that, if left with only traditional peacekeeping and simple enforcement as options, the international community may likely reject responding to a crisis—seeing peacekeeping as ineffective and enforcement as too bloody-minded—when response might have been the best course for all concerned. In the end, one reason some may not want to recognize a middle option is that they do not want to act.

In an article published in late 1996, we offered a concept, “inducement,” to fill the need to which Roberts refers.³ Kofi Annan, then under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, built on it and differentiated between its positive and coercive elements, the first employing carrots and the other sticks.⁴ Our focus is on the latter, and we readily accept his more specific term, “coercive inducement,” to designate the central concept advocated and described herein.

In addition to clarifying the option designated by that concept, we suggest doctrinal principles and operational guidelines for its implementation.⁵ Doctrine encompasses broad basic principles that may require judgment in application and are usually the province of higher-level political and military leaders. Operational guidelines constitute still broad but more specific directives for commanders in the field, and they encompass what logic and experience have shown to be generally effective ways of implementing doctrine. Developing doctrinal and operational principles within a national military establishment is usually a long and laborious cycle of drafting, argument, testing, and refinement or redrafting. The cycle is longer and more trying when the principles are being devised to govern the combined employment of different national military forces, each with its own doctrines, directives, capabilities, languages, and cultures. We hope this study will contribute to the initial drafting step.

This book has eight chapters. The first frames our focus. It provides a short historical background and identifies problems of, and reasons for, the conceptual confusion and operational discord that characterized recent, important peace support operations. Chapter 2 offers coercive inducement as a distinct and practicable option that can help avoid such problems, and also lays out doctrinal principles to guide its implementation. Chapters 3 through 6 present four case studies of UN-controlled and UN-sanctioned operations: in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. These case studies demonstrate the consequences of abiding by or contravening the principles laid out in chapter 2. They also provide the basis for the specification in chapter 7 of operational guidelines for implementing principles. Finally, chapter 8 contains a few final thoughts about when and to what degree the international community should commit itself to undertake coercive inducement.

