
Introduction

The Logic of Peace

Statecraft and its exercise in the pursuit of an ordered, predictable, and peaceful international environment during times of transition is the subject of this book. Managing change while remaining constant in the nation's commitment to long-term goals is a challenging task for American statecraft. Essential for success in managing change is the articulation of a clearly defined, overarching strategic concept, a "grand design" from which tactical considerations and moves will naturally follow. During the Cold War the overarching principle was that nuclear war must be avoided. It was self-evident why peace made more sense than war, and why a *modus vivendi* that set some limits on national behavior was necessary. Norms, rules of acceptable behavior, and institutional structures flowed from this recognition.

Today, we have the chance to move beyond a grand design motivated mainly by the imperative of avoiding nuclear war and toward the promotion of far-reaching and enduring cooperation involving not only "the West" (the well-established democracies of North America and Western and Central Europe), but also the entire "Euroatlantic community" (all the nations of North America and Europe, including Russia). President Clinton provided America with a nascent strategic concept to govern its relations with Europe when he spoke on October 22, 1996, of "an opportunity to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent." He reiterated this ambition in his 1997 State of the Union address, during which he also noted that "the enemy of our time is inaction."¹ It was recorded once again in the documents of the Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki meeting in March 1997. If Clinton's aim were realized, Russia

and the United States would move beyond their present well-armed wariness, an achievement dwarfing even Franco-German reconciliation in its historical importance to Europe and the world.

The argument of this book is that past American engagement with the Soviet Union was instrumental in fostering a “logic of peace,” and that contemporary U.S. policymakers—working cooperatively in a sustained engagement with their Russian counterparts during this transition from one epoch to the next—have an opportunity to promote that logic anew. “The logic of peace” refers to a complex of interconnected norms, rules, and structures within the international systems—namely, the West and the Euroatlantic community—that are the focus of this study. The “natural” state of affairs within these systems is assumed to be one where harmony is elusive and disputes are commonplace. The internal logic of these norms, rules, and structures increases the likelihood that disputes within the systems will be addressed without resort to extralegal methods and, if possible, without resort to violence. Sometimes force must be used or threatened to uphold the prevailing norms and rules, but force itself then becomes subject to codes of behavior. The process contributes to an understood order among a set of nations.² Nothing is permanent in international relations; rules and structures need revision periodically. This was done infrequently during the Cold War. Now, in response to sweeping change, a process of wholesale revision is under way—but amid the flurry of activity it is hard to discern the organizing principles that should guide the nations engaged in this process.

One fundamental principle, this book argues, is that the logic of future norms, rules, and structures should, over time, work toward establishing or reinforcing a “stable peace.” A stable peace is one in which the use of military force between two states is simply not considered, and thus one in which nuclear deterrence has no part. By contrast, a “conditional peace” refers to a situation—like the present time—in which war is possible, although not likely, and deterrence by military means remains a factor in the relationship.³

There was no stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but that era’s carefully articulated logic of peace did ensure that the two superpowers refrained from direct military conflict in Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, however, many of the central ideas, strategic concepts,

and rules of behavior of that period suddenly became irrelevant or at least detached from the circumstances that brought them into being. Consequently, we are faced today with great uncertainty about both the longevity of Cold War creations—will the nuclear restraint regime, for instance, survive?—and the character of the future Euroatlantic region—for example, can Russia and the United States put behind them the bitter rivalry of the Cold War, considering that both are still armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons?



This book aims to stimulate pragmatic consideration of foreign policy options by demonstrating how the logic of peace evolved and functioned during the Cold War, by indicating where in the aftermath of that war it has continued to operate and where it has broken down, and by arguing why it can and should be refashioned to help engender an increasingly close-knit and stable Euroatlantic community. The book is organized around three periods and two issue areas. The three periods are early and late Cold War; early post-Cold War; and the mid- and long-term future. They were chosen because they show how U.S. statecraft responded both conceptually and in a specific tactical sense to major changes in the international system, and how it could do so in a future that is likely to remain in a state of flux for decades. The two issue areas are the management of the nuclear threat and the control of actual or potential conflict within the Euroatlantic system of nations. These were chosen to demonstrate the role of norms, rules, structures, and strategic concepts in dealing with threats to national survival and to international peace. The book progresses chronologically, with nuclear issues dominating the earliest part of each of the three periods (especially the Cold War and early post-Cold War periods), while conflict issues dominate at the end. This shift of emphasis within each period reflects the fact that norms and rules were urgently required to keep the nuclear threat under control. As that task was successfully handled, interstate or intrastate disputes rose to the top of the international agenda. There are signs that the same pattern will repeat itself in the immediate future, as well.

The starting point for this book is the proposition that during the Cold War an order was imprinted on relations between the governments of

the United States and the Soviet Union, an order that steered those governments toward decisions that yielded peaceful outcomes to their disputes. The foundations of this order were laid by clear-sighted U.S. leadership, but as its rules were elaborated over time, they came to be well understood by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Chapter 1 discusses the efforts of Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, faced with an unprecedented threat to human existence, to find concepts that would help them frame a policy to achieve the goal of defending Western Europe while avoiding nuclear war. Those efforts were crucial to the formation and character of the entire Cold War order. In the process of defining the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare, these presidents' administrations devised the strategic concepts of nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence, both based on the principle of using nuclear weapons first against the Soviet Union, if necessary. Yet all three presidents also saw clearly the absolute need to avoid nuclear war, and this became one of the central norms guiding decision-making during the Cold War. The idea that these weapons should not be used was fixed in people's minds by the early 1960s; this dramatically narrowed the range of risks that political leaders were prepared to accept. Rather more slowly in the Soviet Union than in the United States, similar worries about nuclear weapons were having their effect on Soviet leaders and on rules concerning the use of the new weapons. By 1954, many within the Soviet leadership were in broad agreement with the Americans that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought.⁴

The circumstances created by the domination over Central and Eastern Europe that Stalin had achieved by 1948 and the judgments of leaders in Moscow and Washington that nuclear weapons were not usable except in a deterrent sense fostered certain expectations. Chapter 2 begins by describing the terms of the *modus vivendi* that the United States and the Soviet Union worked out in Europe, an arrangement based essentially on tacit understandings about the use of force and about spheres of interest. As the Cold War declined in intensity, political relations between East and West become more complex. Change was in the air, and new ideas emerged to challenge some elements of the order created in the 1950s and 1960s. One of these new ideas, and perhaps the most powerful, was the issue of human rights. The West

presented a fundamental challenge to Moscow's control when, in the 1970s, the West advocated and the Soviet Union accepted the concept that human rights were a matter for international review and negotiation. Through the mechanism of the Helsinki Final Act and the processes that it originated, human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became permanently inscribed on the East-West agenda and became legitimate topics for international negotiation and debate. By undermining the implicit assumption that the Soviet government was entitled to a free hand in Eastern Europe and that its treatment of its own citizens was of no consequence to other nations, the idea of human rights accelerated the decline of the bipolar order in Europe.

In chapter 3 we shift to the early post-Cold War period, a time of dramatic change in U.S.-Russian relations and in European affairs in general. Some norms and rules endured the collapse of the order within which they had been created and contributed to the avoidance of conflict in a new era. A case in point, the successful U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 1992-94 concerning Ukraine's nuclear status, is examined in chapter 3. According to neorealist theory, a new nation like Ukraine would insist on being a nuclear power if it had the capacity to become one. Ukraine did not, however. One reason for this result was that in the minds of all the principal actors the norm of nuclear non-proliferation was firmly imprinted. As chapter 3 shows, there were two major reasons for success: active and persistent U.S. diplomacy, and a nuclear restraint regime that was well understood and well entrenched. This regime helped to simplify options for national leaders. There was a familiar logic that they understood and that their peoples understood, and it pointed toward limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. National decisions thus came easily, without much debate, in the United States. Decisions in Ukraine were tougher to make, but there, too, the nuclear restraint regime influenced the outcome. The success of this negotiation meant that the regime of nuclear restraint developed during the Cold War had proved its utility and so had survived—at least in part—the passage to a different era.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, documented cases of illicit trafficking in fissile materials apparently stolen from what had been the Soviet "atomic archipelago" gave rise to fears of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism. Cold War experience offered little guidance to U.S.

or Russian leaders on how they might work together to thwart substate entities interested in acquiring fissile materials or, worse still, an intact nuclear weapon. The thefts of fissile material that were known to have occurred, the many others rumored, and the deliberate release of nerve gas by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in a Tokyo subway convinced political leaders in Moscow, Washington, and elsewhere that action was overdue. International agreements now are helping to put in place a regime of principles and actions that address the very real threat that weapons of mass destruction can fall into the hands of criminals and terrorists. Rules by definition have little effect on outlaws, but international agreements can galvanize domestic action and foster closer intergovernmental cooperation. Chapter 4 describes how new strategies of cooperation devised jointly by Russia and the United States are attacking the problem at its source: plugging the holes in the internal systems that protect nuclear material. In the process the two countries are tearing down the barriers between foreign and domestic policies, the distinctions that President Clinton has called "the walls in our minds."⁵

Norms and rules of behavior, whether long established (like the nuclear restraint regime) or newly minted (like the evolving measures to guard against nuclear terrorism), are not self-enforcing. They must be enforced either by direct countervailing action, in the cases of the major powers, or by collective action. Sometimes, enforcement requires the threat or use of armed force; indeed, without that possibility, order-building diplomacy will be fatally ineffective. Always, enforcement requires leadership; otherwise, the political, economic, and military costs of ensuring that rules are obeyed will likely deter action on the part of an ambivalent power or a divided group of states. The failure of the West's diplomacy in the former Yugoslavia led to an enormous human tragedy and to a serious erosion of the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for frontiers, self-determination, and national sovereignty. The disaster resulted not so much from the irrelevance of well-understood norms of international behavior as from the failure of leaders of the West and the Euroatlantic community to take timely and decisive actions to enforce the norms. Striking, however, was the fact that although Russia and the United States saw the problem of the Yugoslav succession from very different angles, they were still able to patch together a collaborative effort. The lessons of Bosnia, discussed in

chapter 5, come down to the simple facts that norms and rules are not enough, and that, in the end, leadership in the collective use of force is an essential element in creating and enforcing the rules of a peaceful international order.

Strategic partners, as the United States and Russia could become, and as their leaders have already proclaimed them to be, are likely to have difficulties living up to that role if they are also rivals in nuclear weaponry and locked into mutual nuclear deterrence. Russia and the United States cannot cross the threshold from a conditional to a stable peace while they maintain thousands of nuclear weapons in a posture where prompt launch is available and while they hold many others in reserve "just in case." Chapter 6 suggests that there are possibilities for drastic cuts in nuclear weapons, perhaps down to a few hundred. The reality, however, is that nuclear disarmament has been stalled for several years, and the outlook for dramatic progress through renewed negotiations is uncertain despite the important set of understandings reached by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in March 1997. The Russian and U.S. governments have never returned to the ideas about deep reductions in nuclear weaponry that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev voiced a decade ago. They have, however, begun to address nuclear warheads themselves, an encouraging new area for negotiation. Reductions in the number of deployed nuclear missiles constitute only one element in the U.S.-Russian deterrent relationship. Other elements, such as the readiness of missile forces for rapid launch and whether or not excess nuclear warheads are dismantled, also affect the way the two countries interact. The design underlying U.S.-Russian cooperation in the future should be altered to deal with the problem of transforming nuclear deterrence itself. Obligatory reductions of excess nuclear warheads, and measures to make their elimination irreversible, which the U.S.-Russian Helsinki summit of March 1997 encouraged, should be accompanied by changes in the readiness of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for rapid launch and, if possible, the elimination of substrategic nuclear weapons. Transforming nuclear deterrence is an inherent part of a move to a stable peace in the Euroatlantic region.

The final two chapters of this volume deal with the future management of conflict in a time of change in the Euroatlantic region. And they deal with the transition from a conditional to a stable peace.

Chapter 7 looks to the midterm future, in particular to the likely character of concepts and rules that will underpin Euroatlantic security during the next decade. It seems probable that the Euroatlantic security system will be based on the principles of collective security—broadly defined as a multilaterally sanctioned use of force—and of spheres of interest—a recognition that big powers have interests both in their own neighborhoods and in the fate of nations with which they share a common outlook. Under current conditions, neither of these two strategies in its pure form is likely to meet all of Europe's requirements for security. Collective security is flawed because the great powers cannot solve problems between themselves in this fashion. But collective security—a multilateral approach to conflicts like Bosnia—must be an element in a European security system. Internal conflicts in fragmented societies are best dealt with in this way. Strong multilateral organizations and an American presence in Europe are two essential ingredients for the success of a collective security strategy.

Balance-of-power and spheres-of-interest policies have been misused in the past to serve the purposes of national aggrandizement. But spheres of interest are the natural results of strong attractions—geographic proximity, economic ties, and cultural affinities, among them. Spheres of interest need not be, and should not be, equivalent to a zone of hegemonic domination as seen in Eastern Europe in Cold War days. Norms and rules of behavior will help avoid this outcome; structures such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are key to reinforcing rules of acceptable international behavior.

If those are the midterm prospects, what ideas should guide long-term U.S.-Russian security relations in Europe? An American consensus on a framework for U.S. relations with the nations of Europe has not yet appeared. Critics of Clinton administration foreign policy complain that it lacks a unifying concept and is therefore purposeless. Not so in Europe. The president has sketched out repeatedly a strategic concept that could deservedly be called a "grand design" by speaking of "an opportunity to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent." He has suggested that "territorial politics" may be an anachronism. The goal is a lofty one, amounting to the establishment of a stable peace among the nations of the Euroatlantic community. Chapter 8 examines

the question of what it will take to achieve the goal of a truly undivided Europe at peace, finally, with itself. The effort will require long-term commitments and a level of tenacity and skill exceeding that shown by the United States during the Cold War—but the goal is not impossible to reach.

The enlargement of NATO really is only one element in a grand strategy to promote the expansion of democracy across the continent of Europe. Strengthening ties among the Western nations in political and economic areas is another essential element because an undivided Europe requires that the West serve as a powerful example of the value of integration. Transforming NATO's agenda so that it can deal effectively with conflict engendered by the fragmentation of societies is part of the process. So must be closer trade ties among the nations of the Euroatlantic community, including Russia, the United States, and the European Union. And global problems, such as crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should be the subject of a coordinated attack by the Euroatlantic community. If over the long term a democratic Russia is excluded from membership in broadly based Euroatlantic institutions, including NATO, its exclusion should be the result of a decision of the Russian people, not of anyone else. Contradictions between expanding NATO and strengthening a close and confident relationship between the United States and Russia will be inevitable, and there will be serious quarrels between the two nations unless the ultimate goal is in fact an undivided and democratic Europe.

