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# Index

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- ABM systems. *See* Antiballistic missile systems
- Acheson, Dean, report to Kennedy by, 31
- Adams, John Quincy, 193
- Administrative Behavior* (Simon), 214–215*n*3
- After Hegemony* (Keohane), 215*n*3
- Aggression, problem of rewarding, 132  
    encouraging by renouncing use of force, 138
- Ahtisaari, Martti, in ICFY, 122
- Akhromeyev, Marshal, 143–144
- Albania  
    conflict with Serbia, 178  
    NATO membership and, 161
- Albright, Madeleine  
    on inclusion of Russia, 200  
    on NATO, 174–175, 223*n*7
- Alliance, in collective security vs. collective defense model, 168, 169
- The Anarchical Society* (Bull), 224*n*3
- Angell, Norman, 187
- Antiballistic missile (ABM) systems  
    demarcation agreement on (August 1997), 155  
    preserving ABM treaty, 152
- Arab-Israeli relationship, as “precarious peace,” ix
- Arms control, as explicit rules, 43
- Arms reduction. *See* Disarmament; Nuclear disarmament
- Arms supplying, Eisenhower’s views on, 18–19
- Arzamas-16, nuclear security at, 218*n*10
- Asia, U.S. participation in Europe vs., 203, 204
- Aspin, Les, proposal to Ukraine by, 80
- Atlantic Union, proposals for, 189, 225*n*12
- “Atomic archipelago,” 93
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), transfer of weapons to Defense Dept. from, 24
- Aum Shinrikyo sect, nerve gas attack by, 8, 94
- Austrian State Treaty of 1955, German unification and, 42
- Authorization for use of nuclear weapons  
    Eisenhower and, 19–24  
    Kennedy and, 29, 31  
    U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39–40  
    USSR disintegration and, 70–74
- Autonomy, Yugoslav conflict lessons, 137
- Avoidance of war, as U.S.-Soviet rule, 39, 44, 45
- Baker, James  
    on nuclear restraint challenge, 69, 72, 215*n*10  
    preventive diplomacy by, 70, 147  
    strategic warhead negotiations by, 74
- Balance-of-power policies  
    collective security model vs., 167, 169–170, 179

- Balance-of-power policies (*cont.*)  
in nineteenth century, 184  
spheres-of-interest model vs., 10,  
210<sup>n8</sup>  
U.S.-Russian relationship and, 173
- Balkan states, NATO enlargement  
and, 161, 162. *See also specific  
states*
- Ballistic missiles, disarmament and,  
149, 150, 151
- Baltic states  
*See also specific states*  
Euroatlantic community and, 164  
NATO enlargement and, 161,  
165, 176–177
- Bartholomew, Reginald  
Bosnia conflict role, 127–128  
preventive diplomacy by, 70
- Baturin, Yuri, on nuclear weapons, 149
- Bay of Pigs, Vienna summit and,  
31–32
- Behavioral rules. *See* Rules of behavior
- Belarus  
Lisbon Protocol and, 74–75, 78,  
147  
NATO enlargement and, 162  
nuclear disarmament aid to, 71–72  
nuclear weapons control issues,  
66, 72  
START I treaty and, 73, 89  
U.S. uranium purchase and, 73, 75
- Belgium, Ukrainian disarmament aid  
by, 89
- “Belligerent reprisal,” 108
- Bergsten, C. Fred  
on currency change, 188  
on free trade, 225<sup>n11</sup>
- Beria, German unification proposed  
by, 42
- Berlin  
1948 blockade of, 15, 39  
Khrushchev’s threat to, 28, 32, 39  
Quadrupartite Agreement on, 60  
U.S.-Soviet rules and, 38–39, 45  
Berlin Wall, 39
- Bihac region, 1995 fighting in, 128,  
129
- Biological weapons  
international norms and, 108  
substate entity problems, 95  
terrorism and, 94, 96–97  
U.S.-Russian cooperation and, 96  
U.S.-U.K.-Russian agreement on,  
96
- Bipolar order  
challenges to, 37, 46–64  
Helsinki Final Act and, 46–47  
redefinition of after Cold War, 66,  
169–170  
renewal of conflict after, 184  
rules of behavior in, 35, 37–43, 44
- Black Sea fleet, Russian-Ukrainian  
conflict over, 77, 78, 80, 216<sup>n16</sup>
- Blair, Bruce G., 207<sup>n18</sup>
- Boban, Mate, 118–119
- Bohlen, Charles, on spheres-of-  
interest policy, 41
- Bombers, in Ukraine, 81, 83, 216<sup>n15</sup>
- Border inviolability, in Helsinki Final  
Act, 171
- Bosnia-Herzegovina  
*See also* Yugoslavia, former  
British-French force in, 129, 131  
cantonization plans for, 120–122,  
126  
confederation plan and, 115  
“Contact Group” plan for, 126,  
130, 132  
Dayton agreement on, 131–133  
decentralization plan for, 123–126  
diplomatic approaches to  
(1991–95), 119–126  
“ethnic cleansing” in, 119, 122  
ethnic pluralism in, 117, 118, 133  
historical context and, 113–114,  
116–119

- Bosnia-Herzegovina (*cont.*)  
international leadership failure in,  
112–114  
NATO role in, 175  
1990 election results in, 117  
OSCE intervention in, 172  
partition plan for, 119–120  
referendum call for, 118  
Russia and, 126–128, 199  
UN peacekeepers in, 116–117,  
118, 128, 129, 130, 131  
“Bounded rationality,” 91, 92, 214–  
215*n*3  
Brandt, Willy  
Ostpolitik policy, 37, 42, 47, 60  
and seeds of change, 47  
Brezhnev, Leonid  
CSCE and, 46, 53  
1972 summit with Nixon, 61  
Nixon’s “era of negotiations” and,  
47, 49  
Ostpolitik and, 47  
SALT I agreement and, 68  
on U.S. troops in Europe, 40–41,  
210*n*6  
Brezhnev doctrine, 46, 49, 53, 54  
Brioni Declaration (July 7, 1991), 115  
Britain. *See* United Kingdom  
Budapest, START I ratification in,  
67, 89, 147  
Budapest Appeal (March 1969), 47  
Budapest Warsaw Pact meeting  
(June 1969), 53–54  
Budget concerns. *See* Military budget  
Bulgaria, NATO enlargement and,  
161, 162  
Bull, Hedley, on Grotian society,  
224*n*3  
Bundy, McGeorge  
on authorization to use nuclear  
weapons, 31  
on Eisenhower legacy, 29  
on “existential deterrence,” 34  
Bureau of European Affairs, on  
CSCE, 59, 61–62  
Bush, George  
newly independent states and,  
69–70, 73, 75, 78, 141  
nuclear disarmament and, 68, 71,  
74, 76, 146–147  
Nunn-Lugar program and, 71–72,  
76, 78, 100  
on peace in Europe, 111  
post-Cold War order and, 66, 67  
preventive diplomacy by, 70–71  
START I treaty and, 68, 75, 146  
START II treaty and, 68, 146–147  
Canada, Ukrainian disarmament aid  
by, 89  
“Cantonization,” as alternative for  
Bosnia, 120–122  
Carr, E. H., on collective security,  
169, 223*n*5  
Carrington, Lord Peter  
on Russian role, 127  
Yugoslav peace attempts, 116–117  
Carter, Jimmy, Bosnian truce role,  
128  
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
on fissile materials, 93  
nuclear security role, 107  
Chain-of-custody techniques, 157  
Chechnya, Russian disarmament  
and, 148  
Chelyabinsk-70, nuclear security at,  
220*n*10  
Chemical weapons  
international norms and, 96, 108  
substate entity problems, 95  
terrorism and, 94, 96–97  
U.S.-Russian cooperation and, 96  
U.S.-U.K.-Russian agreement  
on, 96  
Cheney, Richard, strategic warhead  
negotiations by, 74

- Chernomyrdin, Viktor  
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission,  
102, 103  
trilateral accord and, 86
- China  
disarmament negotiations and,  
149, 155–157  
U.S.-Russian relationship and, 155  
U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- Chrétien, Jean, Transatlantic Free  
Trade Area proposed by, 188
- Christopher, Warren  
Bosnia conflict role, 124, 132  
visit to Kiev by, 83–84
- Churchill, Winston, on spheres of  
interest, 41
- Churkin, Vitali, Bosnian conflict  
role, 127, 128
- CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency
- CIS. *See* Commonwealth of Independent States
- Civil war, aggressive acts vs., 113–114
- Classified information, new international norms and, 99
- Clinton, Bill  
Bosnia conflict and, 124,  
125–126, 129, 131, 132, 135  
on cooperation for nuclear deterrence, 8  
on Euroatlantic community, 164  
“grand design” of, xi–xii, 3–4,  
10–11, 181, 182, 198, 200, 204  
Helsinki meeting with Yeltsin  
(March 1997), 3–4, 9, 148,  
152–153, 155, 164, 175  
Hyde Park summit with Yeltsin  
(October 1995), 103, 105,  
217–218n10  
on international organizations,  
171–172  
meeting with Kravchuk, 85, 87  
Moscow summit with Yeltsin  
(January 1994), 87–88  
Moscow summit with Yeltsin  
(May 1995), 102, 164  
NATO enlargement and, 160,  
161, 162, 163, 174  
newly independent states and,  
69–70, 141  
nuclear disarmament and, 148, 175  
on nuclear security, 101  
Nunn-Lugar program and, 71–72  
OSCE and, 170  
on peace in Europe, 111  
post-Cold War order and, 67  
START I treaty and, 79, 147  
START II treaty and, 147–148  
START III treaty and, 148  
on territorial politics, 164, 166  
Ukrainian crisis and, 67, 76,  
78–79, 80, 85, 89  
U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral  
accord, 76, 87–88  
Vance-Owen Bosnia plan and,  
124, 125–126  
Vancouver summit with Yeltsin  
(April 1993), 79, 101, 218n14  
“Coalitions of the willing,” 176, 202  
“Cold Peace,” 176
- Cold War  
conditional peace in, x  
détente and, xi, 45  
Gorbachev and ending of, 144, 147  
“grand design” in, 3  
Helsinki Final Act and, 63  
nationalism revived after, 137  
nuclear deterrence policies, 33–34  
nuclear restraint after, 7, 65–91  
“stable peace” goals and, 4–5  
U.S.-Soviet cooperation in, 43–45  
U.S.-Soviet rules in, 35, 38–43, 45
- Collective security  
balance-of-power policies vs.,  
167, 169–170  
Baltic states issues, 176–177  
conditional peace and, 173–177

- Collective security (*cont.*)  
in conditional vs. stable peace, 178  
“contact group” and, 170  
defined, 10, 199  
democracy as aid to, 170, 171  
economic sanctions and, 168  
European Union and, 170,  
189–190  
international organizations and,  
171–173  
long-term strategy for, 189–190  
need for, 10  
norms enforcement required for,  
159–160  
OSCE and, 170  
as policy guide, 166–167  
premises of, 168–171  
spheres of interest and, x–xi, 160,  
165–166, 179, 199–200  
Ukraine issues, 176–177  
U.S.–Russian relationship and, 173
- Combined Joint Task Force, Russian  
participation in, 191
- “Commonwealth and Concert”  
(Goodby), 223*n*2
- Commonwealth of Independent  
States (CIS)  
creation of, 72  
nuclear weapons control and, 70,  
72–73  
Russian intervention and, 173  
START I treaty and, 72, 73
- Communications revolution, Soviet  
breakdown and, 63
- Compellance, in stable peace, x
- Conant, James B., 206*n*1
- Concepts, importance of, 38
- Concert of Europe, current situation  
vs., 184, 186, 224*n*7
- Conditional peace  
collective security and, 173–177,  
178  
as current status, 183  
defined, x, 4, 205–206*n*3  
for European Union, x–xi  
moving to stable peace from,  
150–157, 173, 177, 179, 204  
rules enforcement and, 111  
spheres of interest and, 165–166,  
173–177, 178
- Conference on Disarmament in  
Europe (1986), 143–144
- Conference on Security and Cooper-  
ation in Europe (CSCE), 46,  
48–63  
*See also* Helsinki Final Act  
criteria for acceptability of, 50–51  
final preparations, 60–63  
human rights issues, 46–47, 49, 53,  
54–55. *See also* “Freer movement”  
Moscow summit and, 61  
NSSM 138 on, 58–59  
security-related issues, 60, 63  
Yugoslav failure and, 112, 136
- Conflict resolution, OSCE role in,  
172
- Congress of People’s Deputies  
START I treaty and, 70  
Ukrainian crisis and, 77, 84  
Yeltsin’s dissolution of, 84
- Constitution, for Euroatlantic com-  
munity, xiii, 182
- “Contact Group” Bosnia plan, 126,  
130, 132  
collective security and, 170
- Containment, 15  
in Eisenhower strategy, 17  
seen as impractical, 195  
success of strategy of, 181, 204
- Conventional forces  
CSCE preparations and, 60–61  
firebreak doctrine, 40, 44  
Kennedy’s buildup of, 32  
NATO enlargement and, 175  
nuclear weapons use debate and,  
20, 21, 30–31, 32

- Cost issues. *See* Military budget
- Craig, Gordon  
 on bipolar order, 210*n*1, 210*n*8  
 on Concert of Europe, 224*n*7
- Crimea  
 Massandra accords, 82–83, 86  
 Russian-Ukrainian conflict and, 80
- Criminal activities, nuclear threat  
 and, 69, 94
- “Critical date”  
 Eisenhower and, 24–26  
 in Truman policy, 15–16
- Croatia  
*See also* Yugoslavia, former  
 confederation plan rejected by,  
 115  
 declaration of independence by,  
 116  
 diplomatic approaches to Bosnia  
 and (1991–95), 119–126  
 “ethnic cleansing” strategy of, 119,  
 122  
 historical context, 114–119  
 normalization attempts in, 128
- CSCE. *See* Conference on Security  
 and Cooperation in Europe
- Cuba, U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39, 45
- Cuban missile crisis  
 policy impact of, 29  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 41, 44
- Cultural exchanges, CSCE and, 49,  
 53–54, 57
- Currency change, effects of, 188, 190
- Cutileiro, José, Bosnian cantonization  
 plan by, 120–122, 132, 133,  
 135, 220*n*16
- Czechoslovakia  
 1948 coup in, 15  
 1968 invasion impact, 47, 52  
 bipolar order challenged in, 37  
 UN Charter and, 38
- Czech Republic, NATO enlargement  
 and, 161, 165
- Davis, Lynn  
 in Kiev negotiations, 84  
 trilateral accord role, 86
- Dayton agreement, 131–133
- Decisionmaking, rules as aid to, 90–91
- Defense Department. *See* Depart-  
 ment of Defense
- Defense policies, denationalization  
 of, 175–176
- Defensive use of nuclear weapons,  
 authorization for, 23–24,  
 207*n*18
- De Gaulle, Charles, CSCE and, 48
- Demarcation accord, going beyond,  
 155
- Democracy  
 collective security enhanced by,  
 170, 171  
 as Euroatlantic community goal,  
 11, 181, 183–184, 194  
 as policy goal, 196, 197  
 stable peace and, 178, 183–184
- Denationalization of defense policies,  
 175–176
- Denmark, Ukrainian disarmament  
 aid by, 89
- Department of Defense  
 Eisenhower’s concerns about,  
 27–28  
 nuclear disarmament role, 71–72  
 transfer of weapons from AEC to,  
 24
- “Design exercise,” peace model as, xi
- Détente  
 bipolar order and, 45  
 CSCE preparations and, 48, 58,  
 59  
 long-range policy planning and, xi
- Deterrence  
*See also* Nuclear deterrence  
 in conditional peace, x  
 “general,” ix, x  
 “immediate,” ix, x

- Deterrence (*cont.*)  
in precarious peace, ix  
stable peace and, x, 151, 199
- Deutch, John, 216*n*1
- Developing world, intervention in,  
Eisenhower's views on, 18–19
- Diplomacy  
*See also* Order-building diplomacy  
Gorbachev/Shevardnadze suc-  
cesses, 142–143  
importance of objectives in, 134  
importance of shared values in,  
38, 63–64, 214*n*50  
international aid for disarmament,  
88–89  
involving other nuclear powers in,  
155–157  
in long-range strategy, 195  
for nuclear security, 101–103  
in nuclear succession crisis, 67,  
70–71  
preventive, 70–71  
rewarding aggression through, 132  
rule-building, 97  
rules as aid to, 90–91  
rules enforcement and, 111–112  
top-down approach, 104, 109  
Yugoslav conflict approaches,  
119–126, 127–128, 129, 130,  
132–133  
Yugoslav conflict failure, 111–114,  
117–119  
Yugoslav conflict lessons, 133–138,  
168  
Zartman's ripeness theory, 221*n*44
- Diplomatic mission access, in  
Helsinki Final Act, 55
- Disarmament  
*See also* Nuclear disarmament  
CSCE preparations and, 60  
current status of, 148–149
- Dmitrovgrad, nuclear security at,  
103, 218*n*10
- Dobrynin, Anatoli, CSCE and, 52
- Domenici, Senator. *See* Nunn-Lugar-  
Domenici legislation
- Dubrovnik, response to attack on,  
122, 220*n*19
- Dulles, John Foster  
“critical date” views, 25  
on “massive retaliation,” 18  
nuclear weapons authorization  
debate and, 20, 21, 22, 23  
Radford and, 26
- Eagleburger, Lawrence, 121, 212*n*25  
“Early deactivation,” in Ukrainian  
proposal, 81
- Early warning systems, reducing  
reliance on, 154
- Eastern Europe  
challenges to bipolar order in, 37,  
63–64  
Cold War human rights issues, 7  
CSCE preparations and, 50, 52,  
53, 54  
economic development recom-  
mendations, 192  
Euroatlantic community and, 164  
European Union membership  
for, 192  
Gorbachev and, 143  
Helsinki Final Act and, 46–47, 171  
NATO enlargement and,  
160–166  
Ostpolitik and, 47  
in Partnership for Peace, 161  
U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39,  
41–42, 45
- Eastern Treaties, CSCE preparations  
and, 60
- East Germany. *See* German Demo-  
cratic Republic
- EC. *See* European Community
- Economic aid, Eisenhower's views  
on, 18–19

- Economic interdependence  
 currency change and, 188, 190  
 proposals for strengthening,  
 192–193, 204  
 prospects for stable peace and, 186
- Economic sanctions, in collective  
 security model, 168
- Economic strength, proposals for  
 bolstering, 188
- Eisenhower, Dwight  
 “critical date” and, 24–26  
 firebreak doctrine and, 40  
 historical context and, 16  
 Khrushchev and, 32  
 leadership of, 43  
 legacy of, 28–29  
 nuclear age policies, 13–14, 16–29  
 on nuclear deterrence, 16, 17, 33  
 nuclear weapons authorization  
 and, 19–24, 28–29, 208–  
 209*n*34  
 Project Solarium and, 16–17  
 in Suez crisis, x  
 U.S.-Soviet relations and, 6, 43
- Elections, Dayton agreement and,  
 132, 133
- Elektrostal  
 nuclear security at, 103, 218*n*10  
 test project at, 101
- Ellsworth, Robert, CSCE and, 52,  
 56, 57, 212*n*25, 212*n*29
- Enforcement  
*See also* Intervention  
 ambivalence and, 135  
 collective security model and, 167,  
 168  
 need for, 8–9, 111–112, 159–160  
 objectives required for, 134  
 opposition to U.S. participation  
 in, 196  
 spheres of interest and, 10  
 Yugoslav conflict lessons, 138,  
 139–140, 159–160, 199
- “Era of negotiations”  
 bipolar order and, 37, 47, 48  
 Brezhnev and, 47, 49  
 U.S. Mission to NATO and,  
 50–51
- Estonia, NATO enlargement and,  
 161
- “Ethnic cleansing,” 118–119  
 cantonization plan and, 122  
 collective security model and, 169  
 lessons of Yugoslavia, 134, 159
- Ethnic pluralism  
 Bosnia intervention approaches  
 and, 119–126, 133  
 possibility of conflict with, 178  
 Yugoslav conflict lessons, 117,  
 118, 136–137
- EU. *See* European Union
- Euro, transition of currency to, 188,  
 190
- Euroatlantic community  
 constitution for, xiii, 182  
 defined, 3  
 democracy as goal for, 181  
 Eastern Europe and, 164  
 free trade proposals for, 188  
 long-term strategy for, 182–184,  
 200  
 norms enforcement required in,  
 8–9, 10  
 peace model for, xi, xii, 10–11  
 proposals for strengthening,  
 190–193  
 security system development for,  
 xii–xiii, 10, 200–204  
 stable peace as goal for, 10–11,  
 141, 181  
 U.S. as part of, 185–186
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council  
 Baltic states and Ukraine in, 177  
 long-range goals and, 164, 175,  
 191  
 peacekeeping role for, 173

- Europe  
proposals for strengthening,  
187–190  
Russian differences with, 183,  
224*n*4  
structural changes affecting,  
184–185  
U.S. interests in, 197  
U.S. presence in, 188–190. *See also*  
Overseas forces  
U.S. role in security of, 139, 185  
U.S.-Soviet conflict rules, 38–39
- European allies  
*See also* North Atlantic Treaty  
Organization  
Eisenhower and, 19  
Kennedy policies and, 33–34
- European Community (EC)  
*See also* European Union  
Bosnian cantonization plan and,  
120, 121  
Bosnian partition plan and, 120  
Bosnian referendum call by, 118  
CSCE preparations, 55–56  
1991 Yugoslav peace conference  
(The Hague), 115–116  
transition to European Union,  
219*n*4  
Yugoslav conflict lessons, 135,  
136, 138  
Yugoslav republics recognized by,  
116
- European Monetary Union, U.S.  
influence and, 189
- European security conference. *See*  
Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe  
(CSCE); Helsinki Final Act
- European Union (EU)  
*See also* European Community  
Atlantic Union proposal and,  
225*n*12  
Baltic states and Ukraine in, 177  
in collective security model, 170,  
189–190  
“contact group” and, 170  
creation of, 219*n*4  
Eastern European states and, 192  
economic agenda for, 187, 188  
nationalism as threat to, 186–187  
proposals for enlarging, xiii, 164,  
192  
proposals for strengthening, 190  
prospects for stable peace and,  
186  
types of peace in, x  
Yugoslav conflict and, 112, 135,  
136. *See also* Yugoslavia, for-  
mer; *specific countries*
- “Existential deterrence,” 34
- Family reunification, in Helsinki  
Final Act, 55
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),  
nuclear security role, 107
- “Federation of Peace,” 183
- Fermi, Enrico, 206*n*1
- Finland  
Helsinki site offered by, 47–48  
Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- Firebreak doctrine, 40, 44
- First-use policies, 23, 30, 33–34
- Fissile material  
*See also* Fissile materials trafficking  
P-8 summit (1996), 106  
recommendations for controlling,  
106–109  
Russian success at controlling,  
105–106  
storage issues, 88, 93–94  
top-down approach to control of,  
104, 109  
U.S. Congress and control of,  
141–142  
U.S.-Russian cooperation and,  
101–103, 150–151

- Fissile material (*cont.*)  
 USSR disintegration and control of, 65, 69, 93, 98, 217<sup>n6</sup>
- Fissile materials trafficking  
*See also* Fissile material  
 dangers of, 69  
 international norms and, 106, 109  
 U.S.-Soviet cooperation and, 7-8, 108-109
- "Flexible response" strategy, 29-32  
 Floyd, Arva, 212<sup>n25</sup>
- Foley, Tom, on confidence in government, 194
- Force, use of  
 aggression encouraged by renunciation of, 138  
 for collective security, 10  
 in conditional vs. stable peace, x, 4-5  
 enforcement of rules by, 8-9, 139-140  
 in "logic of peace," 4
- Force and Statecraft* (Craig and George), 224<sup>n7</sup>
- Foreign policy, importance of concepts in, 38
- Founding Act. *See* NATO-Russia  
 Founding Act
- "Four Policemen," xi
- France  
 Bosnia conflict role, 129, 130  
 in "contact group," 170  
 CSCE and, 47, 48, 50, 53, 60, 61  
 disarmament negotiations and, 149, 155-157  
 nuclear weapons development by, 32  
 Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- Frasure, Robert, Bosnia conflict role, 129, 130
- Freedom of the press issues, CSCE preparations and, 55, 57. *See also* "Freer movement"
- "Freer movement"  
 CSCE preparations and, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 59, 63  
 German position on, 58  
 security issues vs., 60  
 seeds of change and, 61-62  
 specifics, 55, 56-57
- Free trade, prospects for stable peace and, 188, 225<sup>n11</sup>
- Frontier inviolability, in Helsinki Final Act, 171
- GDR. *See* German Democratic Republic
- General deterrence, ix, x
- "General war," Eisenhower policy on, 19, 20, 22
- Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 122-124
- George, Alexander, 205-206<sup>n3</sup>  
 on bipolar order, 210<sup>n1</sup>, 210<sup>n8</sup>  
 on Concert of Europe, 224<sup>n7</sup>
- German Democratic Republic (GDR)  
 CSCE and, 52  
 Gorbachev and, 143  
 UN Charter and, 38  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- Germany  
*See also* German Democratic Republic; West Germany  
 in "contact group," 170  
 European Union and, 190  
 Gorbachev and, 143  
 international vs. internal security and, 216-217<sup>n3</sup>  
 refugee problem in, 134, 137  
 Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89  
 unification of, 42-43, 45  
 U.S. response to reunification of, 66, 214<sup>n2</sup>  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 40-41, 42-43

- Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Zelikow and Rice), 214*n*2
- Glasnost, 144
- Gligorov, President Kiro, 115
- Global economy, local autonomy and, 137
- Global war, nuclear weapons use and, 20
- Goodpaster, Andrew J.  
on Eisenhower's firmness, 208–209*n*34  
on Eisenhower's strategy, 17, 207*n*17
- Gorazde  
Bosnian cantonization plan and, 126  
Dayton agreement, 132  
1995 attack on, 129
- Gorbachev, Mikhail  
diplomatic revolution by, 142–143  
European missile withdrawal and, 41  
“glasnost” program, 144  
miscalculations by, 145  
motivation of, 63, 143, 144, 145  
“new thinking” paradigm, 143, 144  
nuclear disarmament and, 9, 68, 71, 74, 142–143, 146, 147  
resignation of, 72  
Reykjavik summit with Reagan, 144, 150  
Russian criticism of, 143  
START I treaty and, 68, 144, 146–147  
USSR breakup and, 70, 71, 72
- Gore, Al  
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, 102, 103  
trilateral accord and, 86  
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, 103, 109, 217–218*n*10
- Gottmoeller, Rose, 80
- Grachev, Pavel, 80, 128
- “Grand design”  
Clinton and, xi–xii, 3–4, 10–11, 181, 182, 200, 204  
in Cold War, 3  
Eisenhower and, 16–19  
feasibility of as goal, 198  
importance of in times of change, 14, 38  
in long-range policy plan, xi, 3, 10–11, 181–204  
NATO enlargement and, 176, 177, 200  
Truman and, 15–16  
U.S. public opposition to, 196–197  
U.S. public support for, 193–195, 202–204
- “Grand strategy”  
economic component in, 187, 188, 192–193  
Eisenhower's development of, 16–19  
Kennedy's “flexible response,” 29–32  
in long-range policy plan, xi, 10–11, 196–204  
needed in times of transition, 14  
nuclear disarmament and, 157  
success of, 181
- Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom  
*The Great Illusion* (Angell), 187
- Grinevsky, Oleg, on opposition to Gorbachev, 143–144, 222*n*2
- Grotian society, Europe as, 183, 224*n*3
- Group of Seven plus Russia (Political 8), Moscow summit, 106
- Gulf War, chemical weapons use in, 96
- The Hague, 1991 Yugoslav peace conference in, 115–116
- Halperin, Morton, on arms control, 145, 222*n*4

- Hegemonic domination zone, Eastern Europe as, 42
- Helman, Gerald, 212*n*25
- Helms-Burton bill, 189
- Helsinki Clinton-Yeltsin meeting (March 1997)  
Clinton's "grand design" at, 3-4, 177  
Euroatlantic community and, 164  
nuclear disarmament and, 9, 148, 152-153, 155, 175
- Helsinki Final Act, 46-47  
*See also* Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
human rights issues and, 7, 46-47, 53-54, 55, 171  
NATO and, 48-51  
OSCE founding at, 46, 171  
precursors of, xi  
as seeds of change, 63-64, 171  
three "baskets" of, 57-58  
trilateral accord and, 88  
Yugoslav failure and, 112
- Herzegovina. *See* Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Highly enriched uranium (HEU)  
purchase, 73-74, 75, 215-216*n*11  
advance payment on, 87  
revenue-sharing agreement with, 86  
Ukrainian negotiations and, 79, 83, 85, 86
- Hillenbrand, Martin, 212*n*25, 212*n*28
- Holbrooke, Richard, 129, 130, 132, 135
- Holloway, David, 206*n*4
- Humanitarian aid  
collective security model and, 167  
Yugoslav conflict lessons, 138
- Human rights issues  
CSCE and, 46-47, 49, 53, 54-55, 56-58, 171  
diplomatic approaches to Bosnia and (1991-95), 119-126  
Eastern Europe and, 41-42, 53  
introduction of, 6-7  
normative change and, 144  
shared values and, 63-64, 214*n*50
- Humphrey, George, 20, 21, 22
- Hungary  
NATO enlargement and, 161, 165  
UN Charter and, 38
- Hussein, Saddam, 95, 96
- Hyde Park summit (October 1995), 103, 105, 219-220*n*10
- IAEA. *See* International Atomic Energy Agency
- ICBMs. *See* Intercontinental ballistic missiles
- ICFY. *See* Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
- IFOR. *See* Implementing Force
- Immediate deterrence, ix, x
- Implementing Force (IFOR), Russian participation in, 128
- Imprinting norms, 104, 217*n*3
- Indiscriminate destruction, weapons of  
international norms and, 95-96, 104-105, 107  
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation and, 107
- Individual rights, Bosnia intervention approaches and, 119-126
- Indochina, Eisenhower and, 18
- Information access, revolution and, 63
- INF. *See* Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
- Inspection on demand, as requirement for disarmament, 157
- Intelligence, Euroatlantic community ties and, 190

- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)  
 nuclear disarmament and, 9  
 Ukrainian crisis and, 77, 81, 216*n*15
- Interdepartmental Commission for the Protection of State Secrets, 99
- Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet rules and, 41
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 72  
 U.S.-Russian cooperation with, 96
- International organizations  
 collective security and, 10, 171–173  
 importance of in times of change, 38  
 in long-term strategy, 182, 185–186, 203–204
- International Science and Technology Center (Moscow), 100–101
- Intervention  
*See also* Enforcement  
 by “coalitions of the willing,” 176, 201  
 collective security model and, 167, 169, 171  
 decision-making dilemmas, 114, 167  
 justifications for, 139  
 OSCE results, 172  
 in stable peace, 178
- Intrastate conflicts, collective security model and, 166, 167
- Iran, Russian nuclear aid to, 96
- Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, 153, 156
- Irwin, John, 57, 213*n*36
- Isolationism  
 post-World War I organizations and, 185–186  
 in U.S. public opinion, 194  
 Yugoslav conflict lessons, 139–140
- Israeli relationship with Arabs, as “precarious peace,” ix
- Italy, Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- Izetbegovic, President Alija, 115  
 cantonization plan and, 121  
 decentralization plan and, 124
- Japan  
 atomic bomb use against, 26, 208*n*26  
 international vs. internal security and, 216–217*n*3  
 Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 88, 89
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), nuclear weapons use debate, 20–22, 23, 24, 27
- Journalism issues, CSCE preparations and, 55, 57
- Jupiter missiles, withdrawal of from Turkey, 41
- Kahn, Herman, on nuclear war, 13, 206*n*2
- Kampelman, Max, on self-determination, 137
- Kantian international community, 183
- Karadzic, Radovan  
 Bosnian Serb support for, 118  
 decentralization plan and, 124–125  
 Russian influence on, 127
- Kazakstan  
 Lisbon Protocol and, 74–75, 147  
 nuclear disarmament aid to, 71–72  
 nuclear weapons control issues, 66, 72, 74, 78  
 START I treaty and, 89  
 U.S. uranium purchase and, 73, 75
- Kennan, George  
 on future hope for Russia, 195  
 grand strategy and, 15  
 on nuclear deterrence, 151

- Kennan, George (*cont.*)  
 nuclear disarmament and, 146  
 on spheres-of-interest policy, 41, 163
- Kennedy, John F.  
 European policies and, 30–31  
 firebreak doctrine and, 40  
 “flexible response” strategy, 29–32  
 leadership of, 43  
 1961 summit with Khrushchev, 31–32  
 nuclear age policies, 14, 29–32  
 nuclear deterrence and, 33–34  
 nuclear weapons use authorization and, 29, 31  
 U.S.-Soviet relations and, 6, 31–32, 39, 43
- Keohane, Robert, 215*n*3
- Khrushchev, Nikita  
 Berlin threat, U.S. policy and, 28, 32, 39  
 Eisenhower and, 32  
 1961 summit with Kennedy, 31–32  
 status quo challenges by, 44–45
- Kissinger, Henry  
 on Concert of Europe, 186  
 CSCE and, 46, 51, 58–59, 60–61, 211*n*19  
 détente and, xi, 45  
 on European-Russian differences, 224*n*4  
 on NATO-Russia Founding Act, 173, 223*n*6
- Korea  
 troop withdrawal from, 21–22  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- Korean War  
 armistice, 20  
 beginning of, 15  
 nuclear weapons use debate, 20, 22
- Kosovo  
 intervention in case like, 178  
 Serbian annexation of, 117
- Kostenko, Yuri, 77
- Kozyrev, Andrei, 127
- Krajina Serbs, 128, 129, 130
- Krasnoyarsk-26, nuclear security at, 218*n*10
- Kravchuk, Leonid, 66–67, 73  
 challenge to authority of, 76–77  
 defeated in election, 89  
 Lisbon Protocol and, 75, 76, 83  
 meeting with Clinton, 85, 87  
 nuclear missile deactivation and, 85  
 Russian politics and, 84  
 trilateral accord role, 76, 86, 87  
 U.S. negotiations with, 84  
 Washington visit by, 89
- Kuchma, Leonid, 89
- Kupchan, Charles A., 225*n*12
- Kurchatov, nuclear security at, 218*n*10
- Kurds, Saddam Hussein and, 95, 96
- Lake, Anthony, 129
- Latvia, NATO enlargement and, 161
- Law enforcement  
 Euroatlantic community ties and, 190  
 international, recommendations for, 106–108
- Leadership  
 consensus on values and, 64, 214*n*50  
 importance of, 43  
 for nuclear security, 107–109  
 for rules enforcement, 111–112
- Ledogar, Steve, 212*n*25
- Levi, Primo, 224*n*4
- Libya, effect of internal affairs in, 95
- Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty  
 as explicit rules, 43  
 policy impact of, 29
- The Limits of Safety . . .* (Sagan), 207*n*18

- Lippmann, Walter, on strategy of containment, 195
- Lisbon Protocol (1992), 74–75, 76  
 Clinton policy and, 78–79  
 Massandra accords and, 83, 86  
 normative change and, 147  
 Ukraine and, 74–75, 76, 78–79, 84–85, 87, 88, 216*n*12
- Lithuania, NATO enlargement and, 161
- Local autonomy, Yugoslav conflict lessons, 137
- The Logic of Accidental War* (Blair), 207*n*18
- “Logic of peace”  
 defined, 4  
 for Euroatlantic community, 191–193  
 German unification and, 45  
 nuclear restraint and, 90–91  
 presidential policies and, 14  
 as stable peace requirement, 178  
 tacit U.S.-Soviet rules and, 44
- London Conference on the former Yugoslavia (August 1992), 127
- Long-range policy planning  
 advantages of, xi  
 elements of, xi–xii  
 goal for, 181–182  
 “grand design” and, xi, 3, 181–204  
 “tests” of, xii
- Lugar, Richard  
*See also* Nunn-Lugar umbrella program  
 nuclear disarmament role, 71–72, 76, 79, 142  
 on top-down approach, 104
- Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 219*n*4  
 currency conversion and, 187, 190
- McCone, chairman of AEC, 27–28
- Macedonia  
*See also* Yugoslavia, former confederation plan and, 115  
 historical context, 114–119  
 NATO membership and, 161
- McGuire, Ralph, 212*n*25, 213*n*44
- McNamara, Robert S., “flexible response” strategy and, 30, 32
- Madrid Declaration (July 1997), 161, 162, 177
- Malenkov, view of nuclear war, 206*n*4
- Maresca, John, 62, 212*n*25, 212*n*26, 213–214*n*45, 214*n*50
- Markovic, Ante, 114–115
- Massandra accords, 82–83, 86
- “Massive retaliation,” 18  
 authorization to use nuclear weapons and, 23–24  
 “flexible response” strategy vs., 29
- Mayak, nuclear security at, 103, 218*n*10
- MBFR. *See* Mutual and balanced force reductions
- Mendelevich, Lev, 62
- Metastable peace, in former Yugoslavia (1995), 131, 221*n*42
- Middle East  
 “precarious peace” in, ix  
 U.S. participation in Europe vs., 202  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- Mikhailov, Viktor, 102, 148
- Military aid, Eisenhower’s views on, 18–19
- Military budget  
 conventional force buildup and, 32  
 nuclear weapons use debate and, 20, 21, 22  
 overseas forces and, 21, 22  
 transparency requirements for, 161
- Military intervention, Eisenhower’s views on, 18–19
- Miller, Bill, 85

- Milosevic, Slobodan  
diplomatic approaches to, 129, 130  
EC peace plan rejected by, 116  
encouragement of aggression by, 138  
support for, 118
- Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), 97, 217<sup>n4</sup>  
cooperation with U.S. by, 97–98, 105  
top-down leadership and, 109  
uranium purchase and, 75
- Minority groups. *See* Ethnic pluralism
- Minority rights, Bosnia intervention approaches and, 119–126, 136–137
- MIRVs. *See* Multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles
- Missile defense systems. *See* Antibalistic missile systems
- Mladic, General, in 1995 fighting, 129, 130
- Moldova, NATO enlargement and, 162
- Monroe Doctrine, 184
- Montenegro, historical context, 114–119
- Morgan, Patrick, ix
- Morgenthau, Hans, on collective security, 168–169, 223<sup>n3</sup>, 223<sup>n4</sup>
- Morozov, Ukrainian defense minister, 80
- Moscow summit (1972), CSCE and, 61
- Moscow summit (1994), trilateral accord and, 87–88
- Moscow summit (1995)  
Euroatlantic community and, 164  
nuclear security and, 102
- Moscow summit (1996), Group of Seven plus Russia, 106
- Mostar, 133
- Mueller, John, on obsolescence of war, 223<sup>n1</sup>
- Multilateral organizations. *See* International organizations
- Multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 34  
START II treaty and, 68
- Munich, lessons of, Bosnia and, 120
- Munkki, Olavi, 212<sup>n28</sup>
- Mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), CSCE and, 60–61
- Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, OSCE and, 167
- Nationalism  
European Union and, 186–187  
inevitability of conflict with, 184, 194  
revival of after Cold War, 137
- National Security Council (Bush administration), USSR disintegration response, 70
- National Security Council (Clinton administration), Ukrainian crisis and, 80
- National Security Council (Eisenhower administration), 16  
Net Evaluation Subcommittee, 27, 30  
nuclear war objectives paper, 26–27  
Project Solarium findings, 16–17
- National Security Council (Truman administration), NSC 68 statement of objectives, 15–16
- National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 138, 58–59
- NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NATO Combined Joint Task Force, 191
- NATO-Russia Charter. *See* NATO-Russia Founding Act

- NATO-Russia Founding Act, 174  
 collective security and, 173–174  
 expansion models and, 161  
 long-range goals and, xii–xiii,  
 165, 175, 191  
 OSCE peacekeeping role in, 172
- NATO-Russia Permanent Joint  
 Council, 174, 175, 189, 201
- Nazarbayev, Nursalton, 74
- Nechai, Vladimir, 98
- Negotiations. *See* Diplomacy
- Neo-Sovietism, Ukrainian crisis and,  
 77
- Nerve gas attack  
*See also* Chemical weapons  
 by Aum Shinrikyo sect, 8, 94  
 on Kurds, 96
- Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NSC),  
 27, 30
- Netherlands, The, Ukrainian disar-  
 mament aid by, 89
- “New medievalism,” 109
- “New thinking” paradigm, 143, 144
- New Transatlantic Agenda, 188
- New York, ICFY meetings in, 124
- New York World Trade Center  
 bombing, 94
- Niles, Tom, 212*n*25
- Nixon, Richard  
 CSCE and, 49, 51, 56  
 détente and, xi  
 “Era of Negotiations,” 37, 47,  
 48, 49  
 1972 summit with Brezhnev, 61  
 SALT I agreement and, 68  
 and seeds of change, 46–47
- Non-first-use policy, 107–108
- Noninterference in internal affairs  
*See also* Intervention  
 collective security model and, 171  
 terrorism control problems, 5–96
- Nonuse of nuclear weapons, 28, 34,  
 209*n*35
- Norms  
*See also* Rules  
 bipolar order maintained by,  
 210*n*1  
 force required for enforcement  
 of, 8–9, 111–112. *See also*  
 Enforcement  
 Gorbachev and changes in,  
 144–145  
 “grand design” as basis for, 3, 4  
 Helsinki Final Act and, 46–47  
 methodology of imprinting, 104  
 new international obligations and,  
 97–100, 103  
 nonuse of nuclear weapons, 34  
 and nuclear terrorism prevention,  
 95–97, 106, 107–109  
 for post-nuclear weapons era, 141  
 in UN Charter, 38
- Norstad, Lauris, on nuclear deter-  
 rence, 18
- North American Free Trade Agree-  
 ment, 188
- North Atlantic Council, 48  
 CSCE and, 49, 50, 52, 60  
 détente process and, 48  
 “freer movement” declaration, 50,  
 52, 53
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 (NATO)  
 Acheson report to Kennedy on, 31  
 Article V relevance, 201  
 associate membership in, 161  
 Atlantic Union proposal and,  
 225*n*12  
 Bosnia conflict role, 126, 127, 129,  
 130, 131  
 Bosnia conflict lessons, 135, 136,  
 137–138  
 Brezhnev doctrine and, 53, 54  
 “coalitions of the willing” within,  
 176, 201  
 as collective defense system, 168

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (*cont.*)
- as collective security–collective defense system, 173–174, 200, 201–202
  - conflict resolution goals for, 11
  - CSCE and, 48–51, 52–63
  - denationalization of defense policies by, 175–176
  - enlargement issues, xiii, 10, 11, 160–166, 173–177, 191, 197–198, 200–204
  - German reunification and, 66, 214<sup>n2</sup>
  - Gorbachev and, 143
  - “grand design” and, 176, 177, 182, 200
  - importance of in times of change, 38
  - importance of U.S. participation in, 186, 190
  - intermediate-range ballistic missile deployment, 41
  - McNamara speech to (1962), 32
  - Madrid Declaration (July 1997), 161, 162, 177
  - on mutual and balanced force reductions, 60
  - nuclear deterrence role, 18, 19, 30–31, 33–34
  - OSCE and, 172
  - peacekeeping role for, 172–173
  - proposals for transforming, 191–192
  - Russia and, 11, 161, 163–166, 174, 175, 197–198, 200–204, 224<sup>n4</sup>
  - Russian nuclear weapons and, 149
  - START III treaty and, 148
  - transformation in, 175
  - U.S. “sphere of interest,” 41
  - Yugoslav conflict lessons, 135, 136, 137–138
- North Korea
- See also* Korea; Korean War
  - Soviet support for, 15
  - U.S.–Soviet rules and, 39
- Norway, Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- NPT. *See* Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- NSC. *See* National Security Council
- NSC 68 (1950) statement of objectives, 15–16
- Eisenhower policy and, 24–25
- NSC 162/2 (1953), 17–18, 23–24
- “critical date” and, 25
- NSC 5440 (1954), preventive war policy rejected in, 25
- NSSM 138, 58–59
- Nuclear deterrence
- Cold War policies and, 5–6
  - concept of, 6
  - conditional peace and, 153
  - Eisenhower’s views on, 16–19, 26
  - explicit arms control rules, 43
  - fissile materials trafficking and, 7–8, 108–109
  - future negotiations on, 156–157
  - Kennedy’s “flexible response” strategy, 29–32
  - NATO role in, 18, 19, 30–31, 33–34
  - non-first-use policy, 107–108
  - Russia as nuclear power and, 148–149
  - stable peace prevented by, 151, 200
  - U.S.–Russian relationship and, 141–142
  - U.S.–Russian-Ukrainian negotiations and, 7
- Nuclear disarmament
- See also* START *treaties*
  - aid to Ukraine for, 71–72, 76
  - Bush and, 68, 71, 74, 76, 146–147

- Nuclear disarmament (*cont.*)  
challenge to nuclear restraints  
and, 68–70  
going beyond, 153–157  
Gorbachev and, 9, 68, 71, 74,  
142–143, 146, 147, 150  
“grand strategy” and, 157  
irreversibility requirements, 153,  
156  
need for, 9, 145, 156–157, 199  
other nuclear powers and, 155–157  
Reagan and, 9, 68, 145–146, 150  
Reykjavik summit as beginning  
of, 150  
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations  
on, 82–83  
transparency requirements, 153,  
155–156  
trilateral accord, 86–88  
in Ukraine, 88–89, 90  
U.S.-Russian cooperation and,  
141–142, 150–151  
U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations on,  
80–82, 83–84  
U.S. uranium purchase and, 73–  
74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87,  
215–216<sub>n11</sub>  
verification techniques, 157  
weapons scientists and, 100–101
- Nuclear era  
beginning of, 13, 14–15, 206<sub>n1</sub>  
presidential policies and, 13–35
- Nuclear material. *See* Fissile material
- Nuclear nonproliferation treaty  
(NPT). *See* Treaty on the  
Nonproliferation of Nuclear  
Weapons
- Nuclear restraint, post-Cold War, 7,  
65–91  
as decisionmaking framework,  
90–91
- Nuclear security. *See* Fissile material;  
Nuclear terrorism
- Nuclear succession crisis, diplomacy  
in, 67, 70–71
- Nuclear terrorism, 93–109  
cooperation to prevent, 7–8, 106,  
150–151  
fissile material protection, 65, 69,  
93, 98, 101–103, 105–106,  
217<sub>n6</sub>  
international norms and, 95–100,  
106, 107–109, 216–217<sub>n3</sub>  
P-8 summit on (1996), 106  
recommendations for preventing,  
106–109  
USSR disintegration and, 69
- Nuclear test ban, other nuclear pow-  
ers and, 156
- Nuclear war  
avoidance of in “grand design,”  
3–6, 14  
“critical date,” 15–16  
Eisenhower’s views on, 17, 26–29,  
208<sub>n26</sub>  
“firebreak” and avoidance of, 40, 44  
hypothetical outcome of, 27  
Kennedy’s views on, 30  
as unthinkable, 182, 223<sub>n1</sub>  
as unwinnable, 14, 24, 27, 208<sub>n31</sub>
- Nuclear weapons  
authorization for use of, 19–24,  
28–29, 30, 31, 39–40, 208–  
209<sub>n34</sub>  
“conventionalization” of, 28  
defensive use of, 23–24, 207<sub>n18</sub>  
European ownership of, 31, 32  
firebreak doctrine, 40, 44  
first-use policies, 23, 30, 33–34  
increasing numbers of, 28, 34  
limiting future role of, 154–157  
nonuse of, 28, 34, 209<sub>n35</sub>  
predelegation to use, 23–24, 31,  
40  
reciprocal withdrawal of, 71  
retaliatory use of, 23–24, 207<sub>n18</sub>

- Nuclear weapons (*cont.*)  
 Russian attitude toward, 148–149  
 Soviet fears about, 40–41  
 tactical, McNamara on, 32  
 terrorism and, 94  
 in Ukraine, 77, 81, 216*n*15  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39–40  
 USSR disintegration and control of, 65–66, 70–74
- Nunn, Sam  
 nuclear disarmament role, 71–72, 76, 79, 142  
 top-down approach advocated by, 104
- Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation (1996), 104, 107, 142
- Nunn-Lugar umbrella program,  
 71–72, 76, 214*n*1, 216*n*13  
 nuclear security and, 218*n*10  
 Russian Congress and, 78  
 START III proposals and, 153  
 Ukrainian negotiations and, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85
- Nye, Joseph, 216*n*2
- Objectives, importance of, 134
- Obninsk  
 fissile materials protection training at, 101  
 nuclear security at, 103, 218*n*10
- Obsolescence of war, 182, 223*n*1
- Oklahoma City federal building  
 bombing, 94
- Okun, Herbert, 138
- O'Leary, Hazel, 102
- On-site inspections  
 Gorbachev and, 143  
 Russian opposition to, 143–144
- "Operation Cerberus," 102
- "Order"  
 in international relations, 4, 205*n*2  
 nuclear succession crisis and, 67
- Order-building diplomacy  
*See also* Rule-building diplomacy by Gorbachev, 144–145  
 in collective security model, 168  
 Yugoslav conflict lessons, 136–137, 168
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Russian membership in, 192
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  
 Baltic states and Ukraine in, 177  
 Bosnia intervention results, 172  
 collective security model and, 166, 167, 170, 171  
 Helsinki Final Act and, 46, 171  
 long-range goals and, 10, 164, 191, 192  
 peacekeeping role for, 172  
 Russia as member of, 175  
 U.S. cooperation with, 190
- Ostpolitik  
 as challenge to bipolar order, 37, 47  
 CSCE preparations and, 60  
 German unification and, 42
- Overseas forces  
 authorization for nuclear weapons use by, 23–24, 30  
 Bosnian conflict and, 131, 132, 136  
 CSCE preparations and, 60–61  
 Eisenhower's position on, 21, 22  
 Kennedy's position on, 30–32  
 military budget and, 21  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 40–41
- Owen, Lord David, as ICFY cochair, 122–124, 135–136
- Owen-Stoltenberg plan, 120, 133
- P-8 (Political 8), 1996 Moscow summit, 106

- Pale  
 Bosnian Serb withdrawal to, 118  
 NATO attack on, 129
- PanAm Flight 103, 107
- Partnership for Peace, 161  
 Baltic states and Ukraine in, 177  
 joint training and, 106  
 long-range goals and, xii–xiii,  
 164, 175, 176, 191  
 peacekeeping role for, 172–173
- Peace  
 “logic of,” defined, 4. *See also*  
 “Logic of peace”  
 metastable, in former Yugoslavia  
 (1995), 131, 221*n*42  
 risk-avoidance required for, 44  
 types of, defined, ix–x. *See also*  
*specific types*
- Peace enforcement. *See* Enforcement
- Peacekeeping forces  
 OSCE and, 172  
 Russian participation in, 128  
 UN, in Bosnia, 116–117, 118
- Peace of Westphalia, 184
- Perry, William, 86, 90, 128, 133
- Pickering, Thomas, 85
- Podolsk, nuclear security at, 103,  
 218*n*10
- Poland, NATO enlargement and,  
 161, 165
- Policy planning. *See* Long-range  
 policy planning
- Political 8 (P-8), 1996 Moscow  
 summit, 106
- Political exchanges, CSCE and, 53  
*Politics among Nations* (Morgenthau),  
 168
- Pompidou, Georges, and seeds of  
 change, 47, 48
- Post-nuclear weapons era, rules of  
 behavior for, 141, 199
- Powell, Colin, on need for objec-  
 tives, 134
- “Prague Spring”  
 as challenge to bipolar order, 37  
 CSCE and, 51–52  
 Nixon’s “era of negotiations” and,  
 47
- Precarious peace, defined, ix, 206*n*3
- Predelegation to use nuclear  
 weapons, 23–24
- Presidential leadership, importance  
 of, 43
- Preventive diplomacy, 70–71
- Preventive war, 13, 15, 16  
 Eisenhower’s rejection of, 25, 28,  
 29  
 Kennedy’s rejection of, 30  
 Reagan’s rejection of, 14, 208*n*31
- Project Solarium, 16–17
- Prompt launch. *See* Rapid launch
- Qadhafi, Mu’ammar, 95
- Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin,  
 CSCE preparations and, 60
- “Quick fix approach,” to nuclear  
 security, 102
- Racism, state-sponsored, 119
- Radford, Arthur  
 “dynamic” policy example by, 26  
 nuclear weapons authorization  
 debate and, 20, 21, 22
- Radio broadcast jamming, CSCE  
 preparations and, 55, 57
- Rapid launch, reducing reliance on, 154
- Reagan, Ronald  
 CSCE opposed by, 46  
 Gorbachev and, 146  
 nuclear disarmament and, 9, 68,  
 145–146  
 on nuclear war as unwinnable, 14,  
 34, 44, 208*n*31  
 Reykjavik summit with Gorbachev,  
 144, 150  
 Soviet changes and, 144–145

- Reddy, Leo, 212*n*25
- Redman, Charles E., 128
- Refugees  
     Dayton agreement and, 132  
     as destabilizing element, 119  
     Yugoslav conflict lessons, 134, 137
- Regional conflicts. *See specific regions*
- Restraint, bipolar order maintained by, 45, 210*n*1
- Retaliatory use of nuclear weapons, 23–24, 207*n*18
- Retreat from Doomsday* (Mueller), 223*n*1
- “Reviving the West” (Kupchan), 225*n*12
- Revolutions in Eastern Europe, acceleration of, 63–64
- Reykjavik summit meeting (1986), 144, 150
- Rice, Condoleezza, 214*n*2
- Ripe for Resolution* (Zartman), 221*n*44
- Risk avoidance, as requirement for peace, 44
- Rogers, William  
     challenge to status quo and, 37  
     CSCE preparations and, 50, 62, 214*n*47
- Romania, NATO enlargement and, 161, 162
- Roosevelt, Franklin, security plan by, xi
- Rosenfield, Stephen S., on policy strategy, 224*n*4
- RPM. *See* Office of Regional Politico-Military Affairs
- Rule-building diplomacy, 97. *See also* Order-building diplomacy
- Rules of behavior  
     *See also* Norms  
     bipolar order based on, 37, 199  
     in collective security model, 168  
     in Concert of Europe, 186, 224*n*7  
     conversion of strategy to, 182  
     explicit, efforts to codify, 43  
     force required for enforcement of, 8–9, 111–112, 139–140  
     Gorbachev and changes in, 144–145  
     governmental decisionmaking simplified by, 90–91  
     “grand design” as basis for, 3, 4  
     Helsinki Final Act and, 46–47  
     implicit U.S.-Soviet, in Cold War, 38–43, 44  
     as irrelevant, 65  
     methodology of imprinting, 104  
     nuclear security cooperation and, 101–103, 217–218*n*10  
     nuclear succession crisis and, 67  
     for post-nuclear weapons era, 141, 199  
     terrorist activity and changes in, 94, 97, 216–217*n*3  
     U.S. presidents and development of, 13–14  
     Yugoslav conflict lessons, 138, 139–140, 199
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 212*n*25
- Russell, Bertrand, 13, 206*n*2
- Russia  
     in biological/chemical weapons agreement, 96  
     Bosnian conflict and, 126–128, 136, 137–138  
     in “contact group,” 170  
     differences with Europe, 183, 224*n*4  
     economic goals for, 192–193  
     in Euroatlantic community, 164  
     international vs. internal security and, 97, 98–99  
     Lisbon Protocol and, 74–75  
     long-range goal with, xi, xii, 10–11, 195, 197–198

- Russia (*cont.*)
- Massandra accords with Ukraine, 82–83, 86
  - NATO enlargement issues, 11, 161, 163–166, 174, 175, 191, 197–198, 200–204, 224<sup>n4</sup>
  - nuclear disarmament aid to, 71–72
  - nuclear redeployment to, 74
  - nuclear security successes in, 105–106
  - nuclear weapons control issues, 66, 72, 73, 107–109
  - nuclear weapons priority in, 148–149
  - in OECD, 192
  - as OSCE member, 175
  - START I treaty and, 89, 147
  - START II treaty and, 146–147, 148, 175
  - START III treaty and, 148
  - trilateral accord with U.S. and Ukraine, 76, 82–83, 86–88
  - Ukrainian negotiations with, 82–83, 216<sup>n16</sup>
  - Ukrainian nuclear weapons and, 66–67, 70, 77–78, 79–80, 216<sup>n14</sup>
  - U.S. interests in, 197–198
  - U.S. uranium purchase and, 73–74, 75, 79, 86, 87, 215–216<sup>n11</sup>
  - in World Trade Organization, 192
- Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service
- on internal security vs. international cooperation, 98–99
  - top-down leadership and, 109
- Rutskoy, Alexander, 78
- Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons (SSD), 214<sup>n1</sup>
- fissile materials protection and, 101
  - Ukraine and, 81, 85
- Sagan, Scott D., 207<sup>n18</sup>
- SALT I agreements, 40–41, 68
- Sarajevo
- 1995 fighting in, 128, 129
  - Dayton agreement, 132
  - effects of attack on, 126
  - ethnic pluralism in, 118
  - “Satisficing,” 70, 214–215<sup>n3</sup>
- Schelling, Thomas
- on arms control, 145, 222<sup>n4</sup>
  - on nonuse of nuclear weapons, 28, 34, 209<sup>n35</sup>
- Schmidt, Helmut, 212<sup>n24</sup>
- Schumann, Maurice, CSCE and, 50, 60
- Scientists, international aid to, 100–101
- Security
- See also* Collective security
  - assurances to Ukraine on, 88, 89
  - general deterrence and, x
- Security
- noninterference in internal affairs and, 95–96, 98–99
  - policy goals for, xii–xiii
  - substate entity problems, 95–96
- “Seeds of change,” 63–64, 171
- Self-determination
- Bosnia intervention and, 113, 119–126
  - limits of, 137
- Self-fulfilling prophecy, Russia’s differences with West and, 183
- Serbia
- See also* Yugoslavia, former
  - collective security model and, 168
  - conflict with Albania, 178
  - declaration of independence by, 116
  - diplomatic approaches to Bosnia and (1991–95), 119–126

- Serbia (*cont.*)  
 "ethnic cleansing" strategy of,  
 119, 122  
 historical context, 115–119
- Sevastopol, Russian-Ukrainian conflict over, 77, 78, 80
- Shakespeare, Frank, 57, 213*n*36
- Shevardnadze, Eduard, 142–143, 147
- Shultz, George, 146, 150, 151
- Simon, Herbert, 70, 214–215*n*3
- Slessor, John, 19
- Slovakia, NATO enlargement and,  
 161, 162
- Slovenia  
*See also* Yugoslavia, former confederation rejected by, 115  
 in Dayton agreement, 132  
 declaration of independence by, 116  
 historical context, 114–119  
 NATO enlargement and, 161, 162  
 1995 fighting in, 128
- Smuggling of nuclear materials, 93, 106. *See also* Fissile materials; Fissile materials trafficking
- Sorensen, Theodore C., on first-strike briefing, 30
- Southeast Asia, U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- South Korea, 1950 attack on, 15. *See also* Korea; Korean War
- Sovereignty, Yugoslav conflict lessons, 137
- Soviet Union. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Spain, Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- Spheres of interest, 160–166  
 Cold War understandings, 6, 41–42  
 collective security and, x–xi, 10, 160, 165–166, 179, 199–200  
 conditional peace and, 165–166, 173–177  
 in conditional vs. stable peace, 177–178  
 defined, 200  
 human rights issues and, 6–7, 41, 42  
 NATO enlargement and, 163–166, 176–177  
 U.S. Russian relationship and, 173  
 U.S.-Soviet rules and, 41–42  
 Springsteen, George, 212*n*25
- Srebrenica, fall of, 129
- SS-19s ICBMs, in Ukraine, 81, 82, 83, 216*n*15
- SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 41, 44
- SS-24 ICBMs, in Ukraine, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 216*n*15
- Stable peace  
 Cold War remnants and, 4–5, 177  
 defined, x, 4, 205*n*3  
 democracy as required for, 178, 183–184  
 Euroatlantic community proposals and, 191–193  
 feasibility of as goal, 198  
 historical change and, 184–186  
 moving from conditional peace to, 150–157, 177, 179, 204  
 nuclear deterrence and, 151, 199  
 spheres of interest and collective security in, 178  
 strategies for, xi, xii, xiii, 177, 182–184  
 as U.S.-Russian goal, 10–11, 150–151, 191
- Stalin, Joseph  
 bipolar order and, 45  
 death of, 16  
 German unification and, 42, 211*n*10
- Stalin and the Bomb* (Holloway), 206*n*4

- START I treaty, 68  
 CIS and, 72, 73  
 Clinton policy and, 79  
 Gorbachev and, 68, 144, 146–147  
 Lisbon Protocol, 74–75  
 Massandra accords and, 83  
 ratification of, 67, 89  
 Soviet disintegration and, 69–70, 74–75  
 Ukraine and, 73, 74–75, 84–85, 87, 88, 89, 216*n*12  
 U.S. economic aid and, 71–72  
 U.S. uranium purchase and, 73–74, 75, 80, 81, 87
- START II treaty, 68, 150  
 Bush-Yeltsin signing of, 146–147  
 Russian opposition to, 143, 152, 175  
 strategic warheads and, 74  
 Ukrainian and, 79
- START III treaty  
 issues arising from, 153–157  
 key components of, 152–153  
 Yeltsin and, 148, 153
- Status quo  
 collective security model and, 171  
 cooperation to preserve, 43–45  
 Helsinki Final Act and, 171  
 long-term strategy for changing, 183
- Steel, Ronald, 196, 226*n*21
- Stoessel, Walter, 212*n*25
- Strategic arms reduction treaties, 68.  
*See also specific treaties*
- Strategic concept. *See* “Grand design”; “Grand strategy”
- Strategic nuclear systems, in CIS, 74
- Strategic warfare, Kennedy policy on, 32
- The Strategy of Conflict* (Schelling), 209*n*35
- Strategy for the West* (Slessor), 19
- Streator, Edward, 212*n*25, 213*n*41
- Structural changes in Europe  
 effects of, 184–185  
 “grand design” as basis for, 3, 4
- Substate entities  
 international norms and, 107–109  
 terrorism control problems, 95–96  
 U.S.-Russian cooperation and, 97–103
- Suez crisis, stable peace and outcome of, x
- Summit meetings  
 Helsinki (Clinton-Yeltsin), 3–4, 9, 148, 152–153, 155, 164, 175, 177  
 Hyde Park (Clinton-Yeltsin), 103, 105, 217–218*n*10  
 Moscow (Clinton-Yeltsin), 87–88, 102, 164  
 Moscow (Group of Seven plus Russia), 106  
 Moscow (Nixon-Brezhnev), 61  
 Reykjavik (Reagan-Gorbachev), 144, 150  
 Vancouver (Clinton-Yeltsin), 79, 101, 218*n*14  
 Vienna (Kennedy-Khrushchev), 31–32
- Surprise attack, authorization to use nuclear weapons and, 23
- Sverdlovsk-44, nuclear security at, 218*n*10
- Sweden, Ukrainian disarmament aid by, 89
- Tacit understandings, “logic of peace” and, 44
- Tactical nuclear weapons  
 McNamara on, 32  
 reciprocal withdrawal of, 71  
 “Tactics,” in long-range policy planning, xi

- Talbott, Strobe  
 on Russian transformation, 201–202  
 trilateral accord role, 86, 87  
 visit to Kiev by, 80
- Tarnoff, Peter, 129
- Taylor, Maxwell, 22
- Territorial integrity, Bosnia intervention approaches and, 113, 119–126
- Territorial politics, as outmoded, 165, 166
- Terrorism  
*See also* Nuclear terrorism  
 fissile materials control and, 7–8, 93–94  
 government-sponsored biological/chemical weapons programs and, 96–97  
 international norms and, 107
- Theft of nuclear materials, 93  
 international norms and, 106
- Timbie, James, 86, 216*n*11
- Tito, Marshal, internal collapse after, 112, 115
- To Helsinki* (Maresca), 62, 212*n*26, 213–214*n*45
- Tokyo, nerve gas release in, 8
- Tolubko, Volodymyr, 77
- Tourism  
 CSCE and, 49, 53  
 in Helsinki Final Act, 55
- Trade, long-range goals for, 11, 188, 225*n*11
- Transatlantic Free Trade Area, proposal for, 188
- Transitional periods, “grand design” needed in, 14
- Transparency  
 in defense budgeting, 161  
 future negotiations on, 155–156  
 in nuclear disarmament, 153
- Travel restrictions, in Helsinki Final Act, 55
- Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), 68
- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)  
 as explicit rules, 43  
 other nuclear powers and, 156  
 Russian-Ukrainian dispute and, 79, 80, 81, 216*n*14  
 substate entity problem, 95  
 Ukrainian accession to, 67, 70, 87–88  
 U.S.-Russian cooperation on, 96  
 USSR disintegration and, 65, 69, 70, 75
- Trilateral accord (U.S.-Russia-Ukraine), 76  
 Massandra accords and, 82–83, 86
- Truman, Harry  
 firebreak doctrine and, 40  
 nuclear age policies, 13, 15–16  
 U.S.-Soviet relations and, 6
- Turkey, Jupiter missile withdrawal from, 41
- Ukraine  
 Lisbon Protocol and, 74–75, 76, 78–79, 84–85, 87, 88, 147, 216*n*12  
 Massandra accords with Russia, 82–83, 86  
 NATO enlargement and, 161, 162, 175, 176–177  
 nuclear disarmament aid to, 71–72, 76, 81–82  
 nuclear disarmament completed by, 88–89, 90  
 nuclear restraint norms and, 7, 65–66, 91  
 nuclear weapons control issues, 66–67, 69–70, 72–73  
 Russian negotiations with, 82–83, 216*n*16

- Ukraine (*cont.*)  
Russian politics and, 77, 84  
START I treaty and, 73, 74–75, 84–85, 87, 88, 89, 216*n*12  
trilateral accord with Russia and U.S., 76, 82–83, 86–88  
U.S. negotiations with, 80–82, 83–84, 85–86  
U.S. uranium purchase and, 73, 75, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87
- Ukrainian Science and Technology Center, 100–101
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)  
“atomic archipelago,” 93  
Bosnian conflict and, 126–127, 136  
disintegration of, nuclear restraint threat and, 65–66, 68–69  
end of (December 1991), 147  
as expansionist, 15  
Gorbachev’s impact on, 142–143  
human rights issues in, 6–7  
relationship with U.S. *See* U.S.-Soviet relationship  
systemic failure in, 63
- United Kingdom  
in biological/chemical weapons agreement, 96  
Bosnia conflict role, 129, 131  
in “contact group,” 170  
CSCE preparations and, 60  
disarmament negotiations and, 149, 155–157  
nuclear weapons development by, 32  
Suez crisis and, x  
Ukrainian disarmament and, 88, 89
- United Nations  
behavioral norms established by, 38  
in Bosnian negotiations, 126, 127  
Bosnia peacekeepers, 116–117, 118, 128, 129, 130, 131  
British-French rapid reaction force and, 129, 131  
as collective security system, 168, 173  
ICFY meetings at, 124  
nuclear security role for, 106, 107, 108  
OSCE and, 164, 170  
peacckeping weakness of, 116–117, 118  
terrorism prosecution role for, 107  
U.S.-Russian cooperation in, 97  
Yugoslav conflict lessons, 135
- United States  
Bosnian cantonization plans and, 121, 126  
Bosnian decentralization plan and, 125–126  
Bosnian partition plan and, 120  
Bosnian referendum call by, 118  
confidence in government in, 194  
in “contact group,” 170  
Dayton agreement, 131–133  
as Euroatlantic community member, 185–186  
Euroatlantic economy and, 188, 189, 225*n*11  
Euroatlantic politics and, 189–190, 203  
European security role, 139, 185  
public support for “grand design” in, 193–195, 197–198, 202–204  
Vance-Owen Bosnia plan and, 124, 125–126  
Yugoslav conflict lessons, 135, 136, 137, 138  
“Universal alliance,” in collective security model, 168, 169
- Universality  
in collective security vs. collective defense system, 168  
in OSCE, 170

- Uranium, U.S. purchase of, 73–74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 215–216*n*11
- U.S. Congress  
*See also* U.S. Senate  
 Bosnia conflict and, 129, 131  
 fissile materials control and, 141–142  
 NATO issues, 137–138, 161
- U.S. Information Agency, freer movement issues and, 57
- U.S. Mission to NATO, CSCE preparations, 50–51, 52, 54, 56–57, 58
- U.S.-Russian relationship  
 agenda for improving, 153–157  
 Clinton administration and, 147–148  
 as conditional peace, 173  
 “contact group,” 170  
 demarcation agreement (August 1997), 155  
 international vs. internal security and, 97, 98–99  
 nuclear disarmament and, 141–142, 150–151, 153–154  
 nuclear security recommendations, 107–109  
 nuclear security successes, 105–106  
 nuclear terrorism prevention and, 7–8, 97–103, 150–151  
 stable peace as goal of, 150–151, 191  
 substate entities and, 97–103  
 top-down leadership and, 109  
 trilateral accord with Ukraine, 76, 86–88  
 Ukrainian conflict and, 67  
 weapons of indiscriminate destruction and, 96, 104–105  
 Yugoslavian conflict and, 8–9, 127–128, 133, 136, 137, 199
- U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian trilateral accord, 76, 86–88  
 Massandra accords and, 82–83, 86
- U.S. Senate  
*See also* U.S. Congress  
 Bosnia conflict and, 129  
 chemical weapons debate in, 96  
 NATO enlargement and, 200–201  
 nuclear disarmament role, 71–72  
 START II ratified by, 147
- U.S.-Soviet relationship  
 bipolar order challenges, 37, 46–64  
 Cold War cooperation, 43–45  
 Cold War rules, x, 38–43  
 as conditional peace, x  
 CSCE preparations, 50–52, 61  
 “dynamic” policy proposals, 26  
 Eisenhower policies and, 24–26  
 Gorbachev and, 68  
 Kennedy policies and, 31–32  
 Truman policies and, 15–16
- USSR. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations, 80–82, 83–84, 85–86
- U.S.-Ukrainian disarmament aid, 89
- Values, importance of in Western diplomacy, 38, 63–64, 214*n*50
- Vance, Cyrus  
 as ICFY cochair, 122–124, 135–136  
 Serbian-Croatian conflict role, 138  
 UN peacekeeping and, 118
- Vance-Owen Bosnia plan, 124, 125–126, 132
- Vancouver summit meeting and Declaration (April 1993), 79, 101, 216*n*14
- Verification of warhead dismantlement, 157

- Vest, George, 62, 212*n*25, 213*n*46
- Vienna, Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in, 31–32
- Vietnam, U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39
- Vojvodina, Serbian annexation of, 117
- Vukovar, Croatia, “ethnic cleansing” in, 119
- “Walls in our minds,” Clinton on, 8
- War
- See also* Nuclear war
  - as “abolished,” 19
  - avoidance of as U.S.-Soviet rule, 39, 44, 45
  - “general,” Eisenhower policy on, 19, 20, 22
  - global, nuclear weapons use and, 20
  - preventive, 13, 15, 16, 25, 28, 29, 30
  - strategic warfare, Kennedy policy on, 32
  - as “subrationally unthinkable,” 182, 223*n*1
- War Crimes Tribunal, Dayton agreement and, 132
- Warsaw Pact
- Budapest Appeal (March 1969), 47
  - Budapest meeting (June 1969), 53–54
  - CSCE and, 50, 52, 53–54
  - Gorbachev and, 143
- Weapons of indiscriminate destruction
- international norms and, 95–96, 104–105, 107
  - Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation and, 107
- “The West”
- defined, 3
  - proposals for strengthening, 187–190
  - prospects for stable peace in, 185–186
- Western Europe
- American military presence in, 40–41
  - nuclear deterrence for, 19
  - U.S.-Soviet rules and, 39, 40–42
  - U.S. spheres of interest in, 41–42
- Western European Union, peace-keeping role for, 173
- West Germany
- See also* Germany
  - challenges to bipolar order in, 37
  - CSCE preparations and, 58, 60
  - U.S.-Soviet rules and, 40–41
- Westphalia, Peace of, pessimism since, 184
- Wilkinson, Ted, 212*n*25
- Wilson, Charles
- containment and coexistence and, 25
  - nuclear weapons authorization debate and, 20, 21, 22
- World Trade Organization, Russian membership in, 192
- World War II, U.S. influence after, 185
- “Worst plausible case” analysis, European view vs., 33
- Yalta Conference, 41
- Yazov, Russian defense minister, 144
- Yeltsin, Boris
- Clinton’s “grand design” and, 181
  - on “Cold Peace,” 176
  - domestic opposition and, 147, 148
  - Helsinki meeting with Clinton (1997), 3–4, 9, 148, 152–153, 155, 164, 175, 177
  - Hyde Park summit with Clinton (October 1995), 103, 105, 217–218*n*10
  - on international organizations, 171–172

- Yeltsin, Boris (*cont.*)
- Moscow summit with Clinton (January 1994), 87–88
  - Moscow summit with Clinton (May 1995), 102, 164
  - NATO enlargement and, 161, 174, 176, 177
  - new international norms and, 99
  - nuclear disarmament and, 71, 148, 175
  - on nuclear security, 101, 105
  - on nuclear weapons, 148–149
  - Nunn-Lugar program and, 100
  - OSCE and, 170
  - START II treaty and, 68, 146–147
  - START III treaty and, 148, 153
  - trilateral accord role, 76, 87–88
  - Ukrainian crisis and, 66, 77, 78, 84
  - Vancouver summit with Clinton (April 1993), 79, 101
  - weapons scientists and, 100
- Yugoslavia, former, 111–140
- collective security model and, 168, 169
  - Dayton agreement, 131–133
  - diplomatic approaches to (1991–95), 119–126
  - disintegration of, 114–115
  - failure of norms enforcement in, 8–9, 111–114, 117–119, 159–160, 199
  - historical review, 114–119
  - humanitarian aid in, 168
  - intervention delay in, 159
  - lessons learned in, 133–138, 159, 169, 199
  - 1991 peace conference (The Hague), 115–116
  - 1995 fighting in, 128–131
  - noninterference in internal affairs and, 95
  - Russia and, 126–128
  - UN peacekeepers in, 116–117, 118
  - U.S.-Russian relationship and, 8–9, 127–128, 133, 136, 137
  - Yugoslav Collective State Presidency, 115
  - “Yugoslavia with nukes,” 69
- Zagreb, 1995 fighting in, 128
- Zartman, William, 221<sup>n44</sup>
- Zelikow, Philip, 214<sup>n2</sup>
- Zepa
- Bosnian cantonization plan and, 126
  - fall of, 129
- Zimmerman, Warren, 115
- Zone of hegemonic domination, Eastern Europe as, 42