

NURTURING PEACE

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WHAT MAKES A PEACE SETTLEMENT STICK?

Pace agreements sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction. The most famous instance of this is the Versailles peace treaties that followed World War I. The harsh punitive terms of the settlement, which severed Prussia and demilitarized the Rhineland, helped pave the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. But even a peace treaty with less exploitative terms than those of Versailles may still fail to establish a lasting and durable political order. As Kalevi Holsti argues in his monumental study, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989*, the success of peace settlements to a large extent depends upon their ability to “anticipate and devise means to cope with the issues of the future.”¹ Failure to do so may “set the stage for future eras of conflict and war.”²

Peace agreements can unravel for other reasons, however. The parties may simply come to the conclusion that it is no longer in their interest to abide by the agreements they have negotiated. Without proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, agreements negotiated in good faith can still self-destruct in an escalating spiral of *alleged* violations and counter-recriminations. Without the assistance of third parties who can do what adversaries are unwilling or unable to do themselves, the peace process can grind to a halt.³ Ambiguities in the text of an agreement may also become major points of contention; these often cannot be resolved

in subsequent negotiations or by mediation and arbitration. Conversely, agreements may be too rigid in their initial formulation to adapt to changing circumstances and political forces. Clearly, there are many reasons peace treaties fail.

This study explores why peace agreements succeed or fail, emphasizing how the implementation process affects the possibilities of achieving a durable peace settlement. The focus is on peace settlements that have been negotiated to deal with substate or intercommunal conflicts where third parties, notably the United Nations, have been actively involved not only in peacemaking but also in what UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls "post-conflict peace building," that is to say, "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."⁴

We must note at the outset that, in addition to the enormous difficulties of bringing conflicting parties to the negotiating table in civil or intrastate conflicts, the problems of reaching a settlement and making sure the parties continue to abide by it are by no means less formidable. Why is this so? Part of the reason has to do with the nature of civil conflicts in today's world. Unlike the ideologically driven bloc-to-bloc struggles of the Cold War, these "protracted social conflicts" are characterized by intense factional struggles between rival groupings additionally motivated by non-ideological factors. Typically, these conflicts are rooted in a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping tensions evolving from ethnicity, religion, nationalism, communal strife, socioeconomic problems, regional grievances, and so on. These conflicts are marked by self-sustaining patterns of hostility and violence. They usually involve fierce competition among differing factions for access to and control of the state's political institutions and/or the search for national autonomy and self-determination.⁵

The rejection of any sort of political authority is obviously one source of difficulty in these conflicts. Another is the tendency for these conflicts to spill across borders, drawing in outside actors intent on exploiting the internal situation for their own ends. The emergence of what Barry Buzan calls "regional security complexes," which are characterized by "intense and relatively durable patterns" of amity and enmity and reinforced by "the addition of resources and allies," makes it difficult for outside actors to "moderate or control the local security dynamic."⁶ Indeed, one of the enduring legacies of the Cold War is that many internal and regional conflicts were exploited by the two superpowers in their quest for global influence. Furthermore, the arming of different factions by

other outside interests has only served to deepen the level of hostility and violence at both the intrastate and regional level.⁷

For third parties intent on offering their mediation services and other "good offices," these conflicts are not easily split into manageable and negotiable components. Much of the literature on third-party intervention suggests that conflicts are most amenable to resolution when issues (and parties) are well defined and are structured in a way that permits a confidence-building process to emerge over time.⁸ Nevertheless, in many protracted social conflicts it is often difficult to identify a formula or pattern in which issues can be resolved first so as to lend momentum to the peacemaking process.

Getting the parties to the negotiating table and building momentum toward an agreement are only part of the difficulty, however. If one is lucky enough to secure an agreement, an even greater challenge is to translate the agreement into a concrete package of mutual commitments and undertakings that will end violence once and for all while restoring political order. Here, too, the peacemaking/peace-building process can break down. Like sand castles in quicksand, peace agreements can easily dissolve as a result of a renewed outbreak of civil violence. In the hostile environment of protracted social conflicts, antagonisms run deep. There is no socially cohesive society within the borders of the state, but rather a multiplicity of different communal groupings each struggling for power. The difficulties of implementing a viable peace process are thus fundamentally linked to what Brian Job identifies as (1) the state's lack of "effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order, as well as the conditions for satisfactory physical existence, for the population"; and (2) the ongoing sense of "internal threats to and from the regime in power."⁹ The goal of political elites under these conditions is political survival, not cooperation or power sharing with those who seek to overthrow them.

It should therefore come as no surprise that most civil wars in the twentieth century have ended, as Stephen Stedman notes, "in elimination or capitulation." In the period from 1900 to 1989, out of a total of sixty-five cases, only 15 percent were resolved through negotiation, and "of these eleven cases of negotiated settlement, six were terminated through international mediation." The figure is somewhat higher (twenty out of sixty-five cases) if one includes "colonial wars, cases formalized by one-sided agreements, and cases that ended in the negotiated partition of the country."¹⁰ Furthermore, a growing body of evidence reveals

that negotiated settlements of civil conflicts are more likely to collapse than “settlements” achieved when one side is victorious on the battlefield. According to Roy Licklider, only “one-third of the negotiated settlements of identity civil wars that last for five years ‘stick.’” And those conflicts that end in military victory “may be more likely to result in genocide or politicide after the war.”¹¹

Success and Failure in Postconflict Peace Building

Given that negotiated settlements are difficult to achieve, and obviously somewhat rare, the question of what determines success in restoring domestic order and ending civil violence is a critical one. The recent history of international relations is marked by some notable successes and some conspicuous failures in postconflict, peace-building efforts directed at ending civil conflict. Whereas some peace settlements have proved durable and have succeeded in bringing about an end to military hostilities and violence, others failed to prevent a relapse into armed confrontation and violence or, at best, to transform a cease-fire into a genuine political settlement. In light of the fact that negotiated success is rare, but far more desirable than conflicts that end in “elimination” or “capitulation,” it is vital to study why some settlements succeed and others fail. With such knowledge, we can reduce the probability of repeating past mistakes that result from ignoring the important lessons of history. In particular, this study will examine five cases of settlements that succeeded or failed.

- On August 16, 1960, the Republic of Cyprus became an independent state. The country’s constitution, which had been negotiated between the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain in Zurich the preceding year, called for a constitution adapted to the ethnic composition of the island, which was 80 percent Greek Cypriot and 18 percent Turkish Cypriot. Following a series of constitutional crises, in 1963 Archbishop Makarios, president of Cyprus, unilaterally offered a series of amendments that were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community. The situation continued to deteriorate; serious fighting eventually occurred on the island. On March 13, 1964, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 187 establishing a UN force (UNFICYP) to be deployed on the island to help restore peace. Although UNFICYP succeeded in supervising a cease-fire, there were numerous crises over the years. The most serious came in 1974 when Turkey launched

an extensive military invasion on the north coast of Cyprus following a staged coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios by the Cypriot National Guard, then under the heavy influence of the ruling junta in Greece. Fighting was eventually halted, but the result was a partition of the island into two separate ethnic communities. In 1983 the Turkish community declared its independence and created the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Amid the two Cypriot states, UNFICYP forces remain deployed in an effort to maintain intercommunal peace. To date, in spite of numerous attempts at mediation by the UN secretary-general and other third parties, a lasting political settlement between the two communities remains elusive.

- On December 22, 1988, representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa formally signed an agreement calling for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which set in motion concrete plans for peace building in Southern Africa—of which Namibian independence was a central element. In 1989 and 1990 the United Nations with its phalanx of soldiers, police, and administrators helped steer the former puppet state of South West Africa through its first elections as the fully independent and democratic country of Namibia. Although the road to independence and free elections was a rocky one, Namibia succeeded in making the transition, enabling its people to live in peace.
- The deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in Angola in January 1989 also resulted from the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). The Gbadolite Accords of 1989 calling for a cease-fire and other measures broke down almost immediately, and fighting resumed sporadically throughout the country. The Bicesse Accords signed in 1991 called for a new cease-fire between the government and UNITA rebels, new electoral laws, demobilization of troops, and national elections no later than November 1992. However, war broke out again in Angola after UNITA rebels rejected the results of the UN-monitored election, and it was another three years before a new settlement was concluded.
- In 1989 the FMLN guerrilla movement and the government of El Salvador formally invited the United Nations to broker peace negotiations to end a civil war that had claimed 75,000 lives. Following several rounds of negotiations, a preliminary peace accord was signed in New York City on December 31, 1991, followed by a final peace

agreement in Mexico City on January 16, 1992. The accords led to a cease-fire, demobilized the FMLN, and paved the way for legal reforms of the electoral system that would allow the FMLN to participate in future elections.

- On October 23, 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, calling for national reconciliation in Cambodia, self-determination, free and fair elections, the disarming of all factions including the rebel Khmer Rouge, the installation of a transitional authority in Phnom Penh, and elections for a new Cambodian government to be organized by a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). On October 16, 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 717 providing for the establishment of a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to prepare Cambodia for the deployment of UNTAC. Although the deployment of UNTAC proceeded on schedule, fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the government continued, with the Khmer Rouge refusing to cooperate and to fulfill its obligations under the peace settlement. The election campaign was conducted in an atmosphere that was threatened by repeated violations of the cease-fire and by the Khmer Rouge's refusal to allow UNTAC to register voters in locations under Khmer Rouge control. Nevertheless, almost 90 percent of eligible voters went to the polls in a fair and remarkably peaceful vote. The election was the culmination of the biggest effort in UN history. Approximately 20,000 personnel from more than a dozen countries effectively ran the country for two years, repatriated 700,000 refugees, monitored a cease-fire, and operated key government departments. However, UNTAC's failure to maintain the cease-fire in the run-up to the elections undermined its credibility with the Cambodian people, and the Khmer Rouge has continued to wage war against the government since the elections.

Alternative Explanations of Success and Failure

How do we account for these different outcomes that are marked by varying degrees of success and failure in bringing about an end to civil strife and to recurring patterns of violence? A number of hypotheses or analytic approaches are suggested in the conflict resolution literature centering on (1) the role of third-party intervenors in facilitating dispute resolution; (2) the structural characteristics of conflict processes; (3) the

changing dynamics of regional and/or systemic power relationships; and (4) the range of issues covered by the peace settlement in question, all of which can potentially affect the prospects of its durability. Before we turn to these different explanations, we need to clarify what we mean by "success" in assessing the outcomes of a peace settlement.

Needless to say, the definition of a successful settlement is highly problematic in the conflict resolution literature. For some, the conflict termination process must produce some set of arrangements that lasts for generations or stands some other test of time, demonstrating robustness and permanence.¹² The problem with this definition is one of infinite regress—that is, exactly when do we conclude definitively that a peace settlement has succeeded? We cannot, because the prospect of failure may lie just around the corner. Alternatively, as Christopher Mitchell argues, the notion of success is inherently relative because "some processes never manage to get the parties into dialogue, let alone to agree to a cessation of fighting. Others reach dialogue but fail to find a possible agreement. Still others . . . achieve agreement only to see it repudiated. Still others break down at the implementation stage and the process ends in recrimination and accusation of bad faith."¹³

Linking the notion of success to different phases of the peace process avoids the problem of defining the concept in terms of an unrealized, and possibly unattainable, end point. However, the definitional problem is not fully resolved. Do we define success in minimalist terms, as associated with, for instance, the onset of negotiations, the conclusion of a formal agreement, or the maintenance of a cease-fire? Or should we associate it with more comprehensive criteria like the demobilization of forces, the laying down of arms, and the eventual restoration of political order? Furthermore, should we include the establishment and maintenance of participatory, democratic political institutions in our definition of political order and success?

While there are no easy answers to these questions, we obviously must consider first whether the signatories abided by the terms of the initial agreement. (Typically these include provisions for a cease-fire and the laying down of arms according to some predetermined schedule.) Because the renunciation of violence by warring factions is clearly a necessary precondition for the restoration of political order, our definition of success begins with the ending of civil violence and armed confrontation. But success, in this sense, is only partial. For a peace settlement to be durable, institutions and support structures must be put in place so

that the parties are discouraged from taking up arms again. As Boutros-Ghali explains in his report, *Agenda for Peace*:

Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.¹⁴

Greater levels of success are thus associated with the comprehensiveness and durability of the confidence-building measures that are put in place during the postsettlement or peace-building phase of an agreement. Beyond keeping the peace itself, the list of tasks includes (1) reconstructing civil society at both the national and local level, (2) reintegrating displaced populations into the society and economy, (3) redefining the role of the military and police forces in the maintenance of law and order, (4) building communities and allowing them to survive by bridging the gap between emergency assistance and development, and (5) addressing the needs of particularly vulnerable sectors and groups in society such as women and children.¹⁵ The ultimate success of the peace-building process in situations of civil conflict is thus directly related to a society's ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the reemergence of civil society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions. However, in the short term, if societies are to make this transition, the key considerations are these: Did civil strife and violence end? And did the parties fulfill the commitments they agreed to under the settlement?

By these criteria, Cyprus was a failure because the main provisions of the London-Zurich Accords and the subsequent constitutional settlement were not implemented, and violence between the two communities on the island erupted into a full-scale civil war. Namibia is a success because the civil war did come to an end, and key provisions in the peace settlement calling for Namibian independence, free elections, and the establishment of a new Constituent Assembly (which drafted the country's constitution) were implemented. In contrast, the 1991-92 settlement in neighboring Angola was an abysmal failure. Successive cease-fires failed

to hold and although elections were held, they were disputed by UNITA. This dispute led to the outbreak of a full-scale civil war shortly thereafter. Like Namibia, El Salvador is a remarkable success story. After more than ten years of a bloody civil war, the rebel FMLN forces agreed to negotiate with the government in order to bring the war to an end. Negotiations were assisted by the United Nations and the United States, and a negotiated cease-fire managed to hold. The resulting peace agreements launched a process of national reconciliation that shows good promise of restoring democracy to El Salvador. The outcome in Cambodia was mixed. On the one hand, against all odds, free elections for a new government were held; voter turnout was high throughout the country. On the other hand, the leading rebel faction, the Khmer Rouge, opted out of the peace process and continued its civil war against the newly established government of Cambodia.

How do we explain the wide variation in outcomes in these five cases? Why have disputants abided by the terms of peace settlements in some instances and not others? And why has the postconflict, peace-building process advanced further in some countries than in others? A number of hypotheses or potential explanations are discussed here and explored more fully in the case histories in subsequent chapters.

Third Parties and the Politics of Peace Building

Some would argue that whether or not a peace agreement stands up during the postsettlement phase depends upon the degree of political commitment of the disputing parties to the peace process itself. However, this truism belies the fact that there always remain incentives for parties to take up their first option, that is, to return to armed struggle if they cannot achieve their objectives through cooperative means. This incentive is usually quite high during the early phases of the peace process. Moreover, if during the course of implementation the conditions underlying the parties' decision to pursue a negotiated settlement are significantly altered, then no piece of paper will be able to prevent them from pursuing their self-interest. Thus, a central question is what keeps parties on track and otherwise dissuades or deters them from taking up the first option.

One hypothesis is that the successful implementation of peace agreements depends upon the presence or availability of third parties that can proffer carrots or wield sticks to ensure that the process does not

become detailed.¹⁶ This proposition follows from much of the literature on third-party mediation, which suggests that third parties can facilitate conflict resolution by restructuring issues, identifying alternatives, modifying adversaries' perspectives, packaging and sequencing issues, building trust, offering side payments, or threatening penalties and/or sanctions. Through their intervention in the peacemaking process, third parties can change disputants' perceptions of the costs, risks, and benefits associated with an agreement versus a no-agreement situation. Third parties therefore serve as a crucial catalyst in developing a supportive relationship between adversaries and establishing the conditions that lead to not only conflict deescalation but also a redefinition of the conflict "as a problem to be solved and not as a contest to be won."¹⁷

The intervention of the third party thus transforms a dyadic bargaining system into a three- or multicorned relationship in which the third party effectively becomes one of the negotiators in a now transformed multilateral negotiating system. The tasks of the third party can cover a wide range of functions throughout the prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation phases of the peace settlement process. These tasks include meeting with stakeholders to assess their interests, helping choose spokespeople or team leaders, identifying missing groups or strategies for representing diffuse interests, offering guarantees, drafting protocols and setting agendas, suggesting options, identifying and testing possible tradeoffs, writing and ratifying agreements, serving as observers, and monitoring and facilitating implementation of agreements.

By being involved in the implementation phase of a peace settlement, third parties can help to restore confidence, build trust, and change the perceptions and behavior of disputing parties. These include otherwise technical activities ranging from peacekeeping and monitoring of cease-fires, which help reduce the likelihood of armed confrontation and "accidental" encounters,¹⁸ to assisting with the establishment of participatory political institutions—for example, via externally supervised and monitored elections that channel the frustrations and aspirations of the politically mobilized elements of society, thus reducing the prospects of armed violence.¹⁹ As Mandell notes, confidence-building measures are especially crucial in the early stages of a peace settlement because they can forestall a resort to the use of force by the disputants, generate additional confidence-building measures beyond those initially implemented, heighten the cost of returning to the status quo ante, and create additional incentives for collaboration.²⁰ Mediation, conciliation, and arbitration by

third parties can also help to resolve outstanding or unanticipated issues that emerge during the postconflict, peace-building phase and that threaten to derail the peace process.

Who are these third parties? Typically they include international organizations like the United Nations and its associated relief and development agencies, regional organizations, great powers, regional powers, and even groupings of smaller states. By acting independently or in unison, these third parties can help to sustain the commitment and cooperation of the disputing parties in the overall peacemaking and peace-building process.²¹ Skillful and properly executed third-party interventions can have important implications for the long-term management and resolution of the conflict. The converse is also true. Clumsy and poorly timed or badly executed interventions can raise tensions and undermine the goals and objectives of the peace agreement and peacemaking process.²²

Effective intervention also requires a careful sequencing of strategies and approaches. As Keashly and Fisher observe, protracted conflicts contain a large number of different constituencies with different demands, interests, and belief systems. "With such a large number of elements, it seems unreasonable to expect that a single intervention strategy could deal fully with all of them. It seems more useful to envision intervention . . . as a *coordinated* series of concurrent and consecutive strategies directed towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict."²³

The role that third parties play in the full range of activities associated with the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements is therefore possibly a key element in explaining why some peace settlements succeed and others fail. Peace settlements that enjoy high levels of third-party assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peace-building process are arguably more likely to succeed than those that do not.²⁴ In the chapters that follow, we explore the roles third parties have played in the settlement of conflicts in Cyprus, Southern Africa (Namibia and Angola), El Salvador, and Cambodia in order to assess whether their involvement and performance had a positive or negative impact on the fate of the settlement in question.

The Role of Ripeness in Peace Building

In addressing the role of third parties in postconflict peace building, we should recognize that conflict resolution and settlement processes may well depend upon factors that are *intrinsic* to the conflict itself, such that

the contributions of outside third parties are marginal, at best, to the achievement of a durable and lasting peace settlement. It is axiomatic in much of the burgeoning literature on international mediation and negotiation that many conflicts have a self-sustaining dynamic of their own. In order for third-party interventions to be effective, it is often argued, the conflict has to reach a plateau or the level of a "hurting stalemate," at which point the parties no longer feel they can use force to gain a unilateral advantage and become willing to consider other options. At this point, the conflict, to use Zartman's phrase, is "ripe for resolution"²⁵ insofar as the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continued confrontation to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of a settlement.

There are, however, important differences in the way "ripeness" is defined by scholars. Zartman argues that there are four independent conditions for ripeness—a hurting stalemate to the conflict, a looming catastrophe, valid representatives, and a way out of the conflict—though not all conditions need be present for ripeness to occur.²⁶ In contrast, Haass defines ripeness in terms of "the prerequisites for diplomatic progress" or "the circumstances conducive for negotiated progress or even a solution." These prerequisites or circumstances are based on the following conditions: "a shared perception of the desirability of an accord," willingness to reach a compromise, compromises based on formulas in which national interests of the parties are protected, and approaches or processes of dispute resolution that are acceptable to the parties.²⁷

Haass's "conditions" come perilously close to defining ripeness in terms of the willingness of the parties to seek a negotiated compromise to settle their differences—that is, equating parties' often difficult-to-discern motivations and interests in a settlement with the negotiated outcome. Furthermore, shifting power balances and the emergence of a hurting stalemate are not the only factors that may make resolution more attractive in certain conflicts. Additional requirements for ripeness include the following: (1) the parties have redefined their interests—because of changes in leadership or constituency pressures, for example—and are no longer content with the status quo; (2) old norms and patterns of behavior have been replaced with new norms facilitating the possibilities for compromise and the achievement of a durable settlement; (3) the parties share perceptions about the desirability of an accord; (4) the parties have agreed on a common bridging process to settle differences; and (5) a formula allowing for compromise and a negotiated end to hostilities is available.²⁸

The central importance of ripeness underscores the fact that third parties are only one element, and possibly a minor one at that, in the overall peacemaking/peace-building process. Haass, for instance, makes the claim that the success or failure of diplomatic efforts depends almost exclusively upon ripeness: "Whether negotiation will succeed will hinge on the shared perception by the disputants that an accord is desirable." And he suggests that

too much diplomacy or mediation in an unripe situation can be counterproductive. Such activism, no matter how well intentioned or politically useful as a demonstration of concern, can lead parties in a dispute to avoid facing reality and making tough, but necessary, decisions. Paradoxically, outside activism can actually discourage the emergence of a situation in which outside activism might be productive.²⁹

What some conflicts lack, therefore, is not so much a shortage of skilled third parties as ripeness to the conflict itself. For example, the continuing division of Cyprus between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities may have more to do with a lack of ripeness than a shortage of third-party mediators—of which there have been many. In this instance the lack of ripeness is due to a preference for the status quo over any of the possible alternatives—alternatives that would dilute the political authority and autonomy of the island's two communities. Furthermore, the long-standing presence of a UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus has kept violence to a minimum that is obviously tolerable to both sides.

The question arises whether success or failure in the postconflict, peace-building phase of the peace process is also associated with a lack of ripeness. It is entirely conceivable that peace settlements may fail because the conditions associated with ripeness were not met at the time they were negotiated; that is, the conflict had not reached the level of a plateau or hurting stalemate, but the parties decided to negotiate an agreement anyway, possibly as a delaying or regrouping tactic, because the agreement was forced on them or for some other reason.

The notion of ripeness implies, wrongly perhaps, that a conflict has reached a new, stable equilibrium. However, this equilibrium can be upset by the terms of the agreement itself or by the fact that the parties view their positions and interests differently following the signing of the agreement. Thus the parties may seek to regain unilateral advantage shortly thereafter by the use of force. Paradoxically, a peace settlement

may set in motion political forces that lead to an “unripening” process in which forces upset the new equilibrium that facilitated the agreement in the first place. This equilibrium can also be destroyed by the actions of outside actors that do not want the agreement to succeed and therefore take active measures to undermine it, for example, by providing arms or other kinds of support to various factions that initially had strong incentives to lay down their arms and pursue a negotiated settlement.

The possibility of unripening—that is, of a peace process that turns rotten during the settlement phase—is a real risk in civil conflicts where the basic infrastructure of the conflict is marked by a shifting constellation of group loyalties and identities that are not necessarily eliminated or abated by formal attempts at cooperation.³⁰ The fact that these conflicts are rooted in an extraordinarily complex mix of factors (including multiethnic and communal cleavages and disintegrations, underdevelopment and poverty, and distributive justice) also complicates the task of identifying the ripe moment and ensuring that a negotiated agreement is not jeopardized by a renewed flare-up of violence.

The fundamental elusiveness of the ripe moment in protracted social conflicts suggests that some, though obviously not all, conflicts may *not* be amenable to peaceful intervention by *any* third party—be it a great, middle, or small power, or an international organization. And for those conflicts that *are* amenable to the good offices of intermediaries, the prospects for success may well depend more on the dynamics of the conflict itself and situational pressures (internal or external) than the presence or absence of skilled third parties. In other words, the actions and contributions of outside third parties to peace building may have less to do with the reasons a settlement succeeds or fails than the structural characteristics of the conflict itself and whether or not the hurting stalemate at the time of the negotiated settlement is durable enough to make the peace last.

Systemic and Regional Power Balances

At a systemic level, great-power relationships and the changing dynamics of the East-West competition have been identified as having a major impact on the possibilities for diplomacy and resolution of regional conflicts.³¹ During the height of the Cold War when competition was viewed as a zero-sum game, the superpowers relied on military instruments to achieve their aims, limiting the prospects for achieving negotiated and

durable settlements. Conversely, the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union have been associated with the settlement of many disputes and the promotion of security cooperation in some regions, notably in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Southern Africa. Many see a strong link between improving East-West relations in the late 1980s and the negotiation of peace agreements in Angola and Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia.³²

Systemic explanations suggest that great powers have been able to facilitate conflict resolution and settlement processes by bringing pressure to bear on client states and other parties to conflict, and by working toward joint solutions based on a non-zero-sum view of their respective interests. Thus, for example, the settlement of conflict in Southern Africa is arguably part of a more general trend in systemwide relations that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union (although the continuation of fighting in Angola is obviously not part of this trend).

The use of force and changing politicomilitary balances of power may explain bargaining outcomes and the durability of certain peace settlements. Realist and neorealist writers in international relations see military strength and diplomatic resolve as the crucial ingredients of state power.³³ In this view, victories and losses in international politics are determined by the relative power resources that state actors can bring to bear on particular issues and problem areas. Declining Soviet hegemony in the face of American resolve may, therefore, best explain outcomes in certain conflicts.

Underlying all systemic-level explanations—be they of the “super-power détente bringing peace” or the “United States prevailing” variety—is the assumption that East-West rivalries lay at the heart of many (though clearly not all) regional and intrastate conflicts. Thus, according to this assumption, systemic change brought about subsystemic change and a corresponding shift in the behavior of regional actors to shifting power balances at the geostrategic level.³⁴ This view sees regional and even intrastate conflicts (the line between these two is often blurry) as largely driven by external factors and forces. Internal or subregional forces will be refracted through the prism of great power competition and global politics. The prospects for conflict resolution thus depend significantly on the ability of great powers to accommodate their divergent preferences or one great power's ability to prevail over the other.

The assumption that political behavior has subsystemic versus systemic roots informs the recent work of a group of scholars writing about

regional security politics in the Third World following the end of the Cold War. As superpower influence has waned, so the argument runs, the importance of subsystemic patterns of relations among states that are "locked into geographical proximity with each other" has correspondingly grown.³⁵ These relations are marked by what Buzan calls patterns of amity and enmity that are shaped not just by the regional distribution of power but "specific things such as border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations, ideological alignments . . . [and] long-standing historical links."³⁶ Anarchy thus interacts with geography to create a distinct and unique set of regional political relations of which the actors may or may not be fully cognizant. "Like a balance of power," Buzan argues, "a security complex can exist and function regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognize it. They will, of course, recognize the particular lines of threat that bear on them, for if they did not, the whole idea of security complexes would be void. But they may well not see, or appreciate fully, the whole pattern of which they are a part."³⁷

In spite of the importance of history, geography, and culture, Buzan still sees behaviors at the regional level as being "threat driven" and informed by the degree of anarchy that prevails at the regional level. For example, he argues, "Typically, states will be much more aware of the threats that others pose to them than they will be of the threat they pose to others."³⁸ He also notes, "The individual lines of security concern can be traced quite easily by observing how states' fears shape their foreign policy and military behavior."³⁹ However, the fundamental point is that geography and propinquity are crucial to the way states perceive their allies and enemies. "Security interdependencies will be more strongly focused among the members of the set than they are between members and outside states."⁴⁰

Although Buzan does not directly address the implications of the existence of "regional security complexes" for conflict resolution and settlement processes, other writers have. In exploring the origins and development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sandler argues that the conflict has evolved from a state-communal conflict to one that includes important interstate interactions (regulated by deterrence rationales, balance of power mechanisms, arms races, and so forth). The spatial expansion of the conflict introduced new parties and actors so that the linkage between "internal" conflict systems and regional, interstate, and even international conflict systems is increasingly pronounced. According to Sandler, understanding the pattern of spatial expansion and a conflict's

"compound structure" is central to any attempt at conflict resolution. Not only does the compound structure require third parties to contain this process of expansion, but it also implies that a combination of international and intercommunal intervention strategies will be prerequisites for conflict termination.⁴¹

Different intervention strategies are also required for each of these levels. At the communal level, issues of group identity and political participation must be addressed in order for conflict termination to be effective. At the interstate level, Sandler suggests that more traditional, power-based approaches directed at meeting the security requirements of affected regional powers are in order. It may be necessary not only to persuade, but also to dissuade regional powers from interfering in the affairs of their neighbors. Security guarantees and other kinds of incentives may also have to be offered as part of the settlement package.

The notion that most civil conflicts are usually embedded in the politics of a "regional security complex" is an important insight with significant implications for both peacemaking and peace building. It suggests that the success of a peace settlement is inextricably tied to the interests of neighboring regional powers and their overall commitment to the peace process. Regional powers can stand in the way of the peace process if they feel their interests are threatened by a settlement. They can also reinforce or shore up the peacemaking/peace-building process if they feel it will advance their interests. Third-party interventions that fail to take into account the impact of interstate or regional interests at the intercommunal level of conflict, according to this point of view, are doomed to failure. The ultimate success of a peace settlement thus may well hinge on a stable regional environment in which key regional actors are interested in taking constructive measures that promote conflict resolution.

Settlement Provisions

How does the actual design of a peace settlement affect the prospects of achieving peace? Holsti argues that the success or failure of peacemaking efforts in international politics is determined by whether or not a peace settlement fulfills a number of separate but interrelated functions. These functions are intended to support a stable international order in which stability is defined in terms of the avoidance of "system-threatening wars" and the maintenance of "effective control over those who might seek to destroy the order."⁴²

According to Holsti, the prerequisites for peace include:

1. the provision of a system of governance that embodies certain norms of what constitutes acceptable behavior;
2. legitimacy, based on shared principles of justice that are incorporated into the peace settlement;
3. assimilation, which demonstrates "that the gains of living within the system . . . outweigh the potential advantages of seeking to destroy or dominate it";
4. a deterrent system powerful enough to prevent defections;
5. conflict-resolving procedures and institutions that "include procedures and institutions for identifying, monitoring, managing, and resolving major conflicts between members of the system," including the capacity "to impose settlement terms where continuation of a conflict poses a threat to the system as a whole";
6. consensus on war, that is, the recognition that war is a fundamental problem so that the design of new orders develops and fosters explicit norms against the use of force;
7. procedures for peaceful change, including "methods and procedures for reviewing settlement terms, for raising grievances, in general for adjusting commitments and responsibilities to new social, economic, demographic, and diplomatic conditions"; and
8. anticipation of future issues, that is, a system for anticipating issues that are potential sources of new conflict and for monitoring and handling them before they erupt into violence.⁴³

Peace settlements therefore should be judged according to whether or not they meet these criteria.⁴⁴

Holsti's suggestion is that we should carefully scrutinize the terms of a peace settlement in order to assess whether it is sufficiently comprehensive and durable to prevent, or otherwise deter, new challenges to the order that has just been created. Holsti's eight criteria are intended to apply to peacemaking efforts at the interstate level, but there is no *a priori* reason to exclude them from peacemaking efforts at the intrastate level, particularly since many so-called intrastate conflicts have a significant regional or international dimension as noted earlier. Holsti makes an important point that is not addressed by structural or systemic theories, or by theories of third-party intervention. It is that some peace agreements are simply badly designed, and this is the main source of their failure.

One factor that Holsti does not mention, but which other analysts have identified as crucial to resolving the problems of ethnic division, is the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in any negotiated settlement. Arend Lijphart defines power sharing as the “participation of the representatives of all significant groups in the government of the country and a high degree of autonomy for these groups.”⁴⁵ Additionally, power sharing can include proportionality in political representation and public service appointments and the minority veto. Other authors view political relations as “negotiable” through the party system and mechanisms such as vote pooling and the formation of multiethnic coalitions. Donald Horowitz argues that these kinds of institutional mechanisms have alleviated some of the strains in ethnically and religiously divided societies.⁴⁶

To the extent that peace settlements include provisions for free elections and the establishment (or reinvigoration) of democratic political institutions, an important question is whether they also contain provisions (explicit or implicit) for power sharing—either along the lines suggested by Lijphart or according to some other formula or set of principles. The general hypothesis is that a settlement is more likely to fail if it does not include power-sharing provisions than if it does.

Overview of the Study

In the case studies of Cyprus, Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia that follow, I explore the conditions under which a negotiated peace settlement led to cooperative behavior among disputing parties and laid the foundations for an effective process of peace building, or otherwise failed to do so. The above discussion has suggested a rich array of variables to consider. One of the challenges is to assess the relative importance of these different factors to the overall peacemaking and peacebuilding process.

These cases have been chosen for historical study and comparison because (1) the peace settlement in each case was directed at not only ending military violence and conflict but also creating a new set of political institutions; (2) *prima facie* implementation appears to have been important to the settlement process of the conflict; (3) third parties were involved in the negotiations that led to the settlement; (4) third parties were active in performing a variety of roles and functions during the implementation phase of the settlement that went beyond traditional peacekeeping, including assistance with the demobilization of forces,

resettlement of refugees, domestic rehabilitation and reconstruction, electoral monitoring and supervision, and, in some cases, civil administration; (5) all of these conflicts had the potential to escalate into regional or even international conflicts; and (6) all at some point captured the attention of the United Nations and therefore the international community.

All of the cases analyzed in this study, with the exception of the Cyprus conflict, meet all six of these criteria. In the case of Cyprus, third parties were not actively involved in the initial implementation of the London-Zurich Accords of 1959. Nevertheless, Cyprus is included as an example of the critical role of third-party involvement, or specifically the lack thereof, not in nurturing a viable settlement, but in bringing the provisions of such an agreement to fruition. Furthermore, it is arguable that Cyprus served as an exemplar to be avoided in subsequent international peacekeeping and peace-building efforts.

The following specific questions inform the case studies and delimit the general scope of the inquiry:

- When did the settlement phase of the peacemaking process begin? Was there a lag between the negotiation of a set of principles or an agreement and its actual implementation?
- What were the “terms of trade” in the peace agreement? Were the zones of “constructive ambiguity” and terms of trade in the agreement so broad that they created new conflicts? Were there unresolved or unanticipated issues that could not be avoided during the implementation phase of the settlement?
- Did the conditions or assumptions under which a negotiated settlement was reached reflect the actual situation on the ground? Was there any change in these assumptions or on the ground during the post-conflict, peace-building phase of the agreement?
- What was the relationship between the disputing parties at the time the peace accords were signed? Was the relationship characterized by what Zartman, Haass, and others have called a “hurting stalemate,”⁴⁷ or was the relationship asymmetrical? Was the degree of mistrust high or low?
- What were the apparent motivations of the parties for signing the peace accords when they did? Were the parties genuinely interested in moving the relationship to a more cooperative footing, or were they simply interested in using a lull in fighting to regroup and consolidate their forces for future armed confrontation? (Were there also

differences of opinion among different factions as to what might be gained by a settlement?)

- Were regional actors supportive of the accords?
- What disputes, if any, emerged concerning the interpretation accorded to various aspects of the agreement and the manner of their implementation? Did perceptions of the costs and benefits of the agreement change during implementation?
- What role, if any, did third parties (including the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations, and outside powers) play in the negotiation and settlement process? Was agreement or compromise reached bilaterally or with the assistance of third parties?
- What functions were outside third parties called upon to perform to facilitate implementation, including mediation, conciliation, fact finding, verification, monitoring, observation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, refugee relocation and assistance, and electoral supervision and monitoring? How well were these roles performed? Did they contribute to or detract from trust and confidence building between the parties to the dispute?

This study attempts to situate peacekeeping and other third-party initiatives within the broader context of general peace-building and dispute settlement processes. It asks when third-party initiatives are likely to be most effective and whether they can affect the long-term outcomes of a peace settlement. At the same time, this study relates the role of third parties in dispute resolution to the structural characteristics of conflict and regional and/or systemic power relationships that arguably play a greater role in determining whether a settlement lasts or not.

It is the argument of this book that for peace settlements to succeed third parties must entrench and institutionalize their role in the peace-making and peace-building process. Third parties must also possess significant resources and staying power to remain fully engaged in the negotiations leading up to the settlement and subsequent peace-building process. Interventions that fail are associated with a lack of staying power or an inability to muster the resources that are needed to build a secure foundation for a settlement. Ripeness is an extremely elusive goal in situations of civil conflict. To the extent that ripeness exists at all, it must be cultivated through a combination of carrots and sticks that are brought to bear on the conflicting parties themselves. Moreover, the equilibrium of forces that is achieved at the time of a settlement is easily

upset as different factions jockey for power in the postsettlement phase of an agreement. Regional interests can also overturn a settlement unless they too are brought into the peace process or, at the very least, dissuaded (or deterred) from interfering in the affairs of their neighbors. With the end of the Cold War, regional powers have acquired greater potential to affect the situational dynamics of these conflicts. Thus, peace-building efforts at the intercommunal or domestic level must be complemented by security measures and other initiatives at the regional level. Third-party interventions that focus exclusively on one level to the exclusion of the other are doomed to failure.

Given the potentially large number of activities and tasks associated with the peacemaking and peace-building process, it is unreasonable to assume that any single organization or country can perform them on its own or can shoulder the full responsibility of ensuring that a settlement succeeds. Major costs are attached to intervention. For example, costs may be incurred as a result of taking on the process of mediation or taking responsibility for implementation, regardless of whether or not the intervention is a success. For third parties with limited influence or an indirect stake in the conflict, the costs and risks of intervention will usually outweigh the foreign policy benefits to be gained by involvement. This argues for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution, whereby the costs and risks of intervention can be shared within a larger group. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the problems of coordination among third parties that may not share similar interests and/or resources remain.

In view of these constraints it is truly remarkable that the peace-building process has advanced as far as it has in some cases. The experience and understanding of the causes of this success can be applied to ongoing peacemaking efforts in other regional settings. The current confrontations in the Balkans and Nagorno-Karabakh region of the former Soviet Union (and elsewhere in East Europe and Eurasia) are ample testimony to the difficulties of bringing about an end to armed violence. And the success of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia will depend significantly on the skill of outside third parties in helping with their implementation.

Past agreements provide strong evidence that negotiated agreements cannot be put on autopilot; they require skillful, committed people at the controls. Peace settlements, no matter how precisely worded, are not comprehensive instruction manuals providing specific (let alone wise)

answers to hundreds of questions that arise each week. Rather, they set forth the expectations, goals, and compromises that the parties and mediators held or accepted at a given point in time. The successful implementation of peace accords thus demands the full-time and sustained engagement of outside implementing agents.

