

# INTRODUCTION

A DECADE OF PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE

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When Nelson Mandela delivered the Sadat Lecture for Peace at the University of Maryland on November 14, 2001, 10,000 people turned up to hear him, seeking comfort during a particularly painful period. The fall semester had started with the tragedy of 9/11 that all Americans endured. The College Park campus had experienced another tragedy of its own less than two weeks later when a rare tornado hit the community on September 24, 2001, killing two students, uprooting trees, damaging twelve buildings, and destroying and damaging 300 cars. All grief was briefly suspended for the healing experience of listening to the words of one of the greatest leaders of the twentieth century.

This was a particularly rewarding moment. When the Sadat Chair for Peace and Development was established at the University of Maryland in September 1997 and the Sadat Lectures conceived, Nelson Mandela was the type of leader the university aspired to host. The notion from the outset was to capture the responsibility of leadership in pursuing peace, exemplified by the role that Anwar Sadat

had played, through a series of lectures by world leaders, especially those who had the kind of accomplishments that earned them global recognition, particularly winners of the Nobel Peace Prize. They were to be selected without regard to the ideological positions of the particular speakers.

From their beginning, the Sadat Lectures have not only been illuminating in their own right, but they have also provided an enlightening interpretation of a transformative period that saw the greatest hope that Arab-Israeli peace was within reach to the collapse of negotiations and the loss of faith in the prospects for peace. They have ranged from a period of almost unprecedented American leadership in the world to talk of the end of the American empire; from a period of economic prosperity for the United States and globally, with many singing the praises of globalization, to the type of economic crisis and decline that comes once in a century and brings fearful calls for protectionism. The 9/11 tragedy shook the world, and the American reaction launched two major wars and affected our lives and liberties at home.

The Sadat Lectures reflected the aftermath of these events, especially evident in Nelson Mandela's words and his gradually changing positions afterwards. Mandela was an unlikely supporter of President George W. Bush. But his meeting with the American president just before his Sadat Lecture and a few days after the Afghan war commenced showed the widespread sympathy and support the United States had received immediately after 9/11, even from states like Syria and Iran. At Maryland, Mandela described his position this way (see chapter 5):

We have had occasion to express ourselves publicly in support of the current military actions by the United States and Britain in pursuit of those they identified as the perpetrators of the acts of terror. We accept that the United States and Britain are bent on bringing to book the identified terrorists and that the unfortunate civilian casualties that arise are coincidental. We accept that they will and are taking all precautions possible within a war situation to minimize civilian casualties and suffering.

Even in the face of criticism for siding with American action in Afghanistan, back in South Africa two weeks later Mandela continued to defend the United States: "I support the strikes against Afghanistan as far as it is intended to flush out Osama bin Laden. I have no sympathy with terrorists who kill 5,000 innocent civilians. I cannot tolerate that."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, he was beginning to warn that an attack on Iraq would be "disastrous." Within two weeks, his support for the Afghanistan war was giving way to concern about civilian casualties: "I never supported the bombing of the whole of Afghanistan

and the killing of innocent children, elderly people, women and the disabled. I confined myself to bin Laden and his organization...."<sup>2</sup>

Mandela's position continued to evolve in a manner that reflected not only his own thinking but changing international attitudes. In January 2002—as American discourse became more strident after early successes in Afghanistan and talk increased about possible military action in Iraq—Mandela had second thoughts even about his early support for the Afghan war:

Our view may have been one-sided and overstated . . . such unreserved support for the war in Afghanistan gives the impression that we are insensitive to and uncaring about the suffering inflicted upon the Afghan people and country . . . Labeling of Osama bin Laden as the terrorist responsible for those acts before he has been tried and convicted could also be seen as undermining some of the basic tenets of the rule of law.<sup>3</sup>

But like many around the world, his biggest criticism of American policy was aimed at perceived American unilateralism as the United States geared up for the Iraq War. About a year after 9/11, in September 2002, Mandela stated, "We are really appalled by any country, whether it be a superpower or a small country, that goes outside the United Nations and attacks independent countries."<sup>4</sup> By January 2003, Mandela was increasingly frustrated by the American march toward the Iraq War, describing the U.S. stand on Iraq as "arrogant," and Mr. Bush as "a president who can't think properly and wants to plunge the world into holocaust."<sup>5</sup>

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He had come full circle from the day he delivered the Sadat Lecture on November 14, 2001—as had much of the world.

The very fact that Nelson Mandela delivered the 2001 Sadat Lecture was itself driven by the 9/11 tragedy. At a time when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was the leading advocate for American diplomacy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Sadat Chair had invited Secretary Powell to deliver the 2001 lecture. On September 10, 2001, the author received a phone call from then-Assistant Secretary of State William Burns to inform him the secretary of state had in principle accepted our invitation and asked him to pencil in a date in late September for Powell to deliver an important speech on Middle East peace policy at the University of Maryland. Within twenty-four hours, our national priorities were completely reshuffled.

That particular Powell lecture not given had a history of its own. A significantly modified version of Powell's prepared speech, altered to reflect the consequences of 9/11, was ultimately delivered as the Kentucky speech. By the time he delivered it, much had changed. The United States was embarked on a global war on terrorism that increasingly subsumed the Arab-Israeli conflict and redefined our national discourse. The events of September 11 also elevated the Department of Defense, as happens in times of war, to play the central role in the making of American foreign policy at the expense of the Department of State and Secretary Powell.

The Sadat Chair was inaugurated on October 7, 1997, with the first Sadat Lecture presented by then-President of Israel Ezer Weizman. Of all the Israeli politicians who had dealt with Anwar Sadat beginning with the Egyptian president's historic visit to speak at the Israeli Knesset in 1977, Weizman had a special place in Sadat's heart. Weizman's direct, casual ways and his personal warmth—and his comfort with Arab culture—earned him a close bond with the Egyptian leader that later translated into a special relationship with Egypt and Sadat's successor, President Hosni Mubarak. Weizman always felt that he could use this relationship to advance peace—but his effort was not always welcome in Israel.

Even as Weizman spoke at Maryland, tension was evident between him and his prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. As Weizman prepared to meet on his own with Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak a few weeks earlier, the planned meeting drew criticism from political sources close to Netanyahu.

“Through the meeting Egypt wants to use the president [Weizman] to assert the negative role it plays in the diplomatic process,” one source reportedly said.<sup>6</sup> Although his position was largely ceremonial, Weizman had hoped that, as president, he could arrange for a formal, perhaps state-like dinner hosted by President Clinton at the White House. But strong objections from Prime Minister Netanyahu led to only a private dinner between the two presidents to which even Weizman's wife Reuma was not invited; Dr. Jehan Sadat and the University of Maryland

arranged a private dinner for Mrs. Weizman at the Four Seasons Hotel while President Weizman met with President Clinton.

The personal tension between Weizman and Netanyahu indicated a rocky period in the peace process that the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization began in 1993. The most important breakthrough that the Oslo agreement achieved was psychological. The agreement created a widespread belief even among those who were not happy with its terms that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was finally on its way to resolution. It also created alliances across the Israeli-Palestinian divide—and in the United States among those who pushed for peace. But the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, terrorist bombings in Israel, and the slow and contentious implementation of the agreement soured the mood among Israelis and Palestinians alike. The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli opposed to his peace moves changed the political picture in Israel and led to the election of Netanyahu—a man who had opposed the Oslo agreement. There was much tension in the region, with the Palestinians angry with limited Israeli withdrawals and Israelis confronting terrorist bombings inside Israel. There was also tension in the Israeli-American relationship.

Although President Weizman was welcome in the White House and admired for his forthcoming attitude in supporting the peace process, Prime Minister Netanyahu, who had angered White House

officials by the tone of his conversation with President Clinton in his first visit to the White House, was less so. In the coming months, Clinton's anger with Netanyahu often translated into reluctance to respond to requests for meetings, even as the president was happy to meet with Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. It was also in marked contrast to Clinton's attitude to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who was elected two years later. Barak had unprecedented access to Clinton, both in person and by phone, in part due to Clinton's frustrations with the Netanyahu administration. He wanted to give Netanyahu's successor as much support as possible.

But the Netanyahu months were instructive about the U.S. relationship with Israel. A president who has the confidence of the Israeli public and of Americans who support Israel can be publicly at odds with the prime minister of Israel without losing much support—as long as there is a credible peace process on the table. Despite all the flaws of Oslo, most Americans, including supporters of Israel, believed that Oslo was the path to peace and that agreement in the end was inevitable. In that regard, Netanyahu was seen as an obstacle, creating much support for Clinton's approach. Tensions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship were probably one reason the Netanyahu government ultimately fell, giving rise to the Barak government.

Despite the tension and the short-term pessimism, like most analysts in the United States and the Middle East, in his Sadat Lecture Weizman

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expressed a sense of the inevitability of peace—and also of the significance of leadership in achieving it (see chapter 1):

There are greater historians than I who believe that there are large currents in history and that it is just a matter of time until they occur. But originality of leadership is called for on the part of one leader or more to ride these historical waves in order to realize them. Otherwise, this moment of realization may move to a later period. And if it is correct to view history as a flowing river, it will continue to flow. . . . I am convinced that the Oslo Accords, which are to no small extent a continuation of the Camp David Accords on the Palestinian issue, will be put into effect.

If Weizman had a close relationship with Sadat, President Jimmy Carter was probably closer to the Egyptian president than any other world leader. In presenting the second Sadat Lecture in 1998, Carter was personal. After Sadat's first visit to the White House, Carter noted he felt "that a bright shining light came into my life with the visit of this singular man" (see chapter 2).

Carter's lecture was important as an intimate account of his personal relationship with Sadat and his role in the diplomacy leading to the Camp David Accords. It is striking that a president of the United States would take the kind of political risks that Carter did in elevating Arab-Israeli peacemaking in American priorities during a challenging period of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Certainly, there were clear strategic benefits for the United States if it could

achieve Egyptian-Israeli peace, reduce the influence of the Soviet Union, and decrease the prospect of Arab-Israeli wars. Carter and his chief advisers clearly understood these benefits. But there were also enormous risks.

For one thing, the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is full of failed diplomacy. For another, although Carter was heartened by Sadat and his forthcoming leadership, he faced a new Israeli prime minister in Menachem Begin who was seen as ideological and uncompromising. If Benjamin Netanyahu was viewed later as a man with whom peace agreements with the Palestinians were less likely, the ascent of Begin as the first right-wing prime minister of Israel was historic and seemed to close the window for peaceful agreements. Carter's commitment and willingness to take risks, as he expressed in his lecture and elsewhere, were in part driven by his deep religious faith. But he was also encouraged by Sadat's attitude about Begin's election. Ideology aside, Sadat wanted to see a strong leader who could deliver and was prepared to take risks. The fact that an agreement was in the end concluded shows what may be possible with determined leadership. But the example is admittedly limited because Begin's most determined ideological commitments were in the West Bank, not the Sinai, and one of the benefits of concluding the deal with Egypt was to remove political and military leverage over Israel in the West Bank. Here, Carter was particularly hard on Begin because he believed that Begin mislead him on the

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important issue of freezing Jewish settlements in the West Bank.<sup>7</sup>

Consistent with his view on the possibility of making peace with seemingly hard-line leaders, Carter also surprisingly complimented Prime Minister Netanyahu (see chapter 2):

Prime Minister Netanyahu is constrained I think by his own deep beliefs and also by his alliance with elements in Israeli political society that are more reluctant than he is to make steps to implement the Oslo agreement. And I think that he at Wye Plantation had to make the most courageous decision. It took a lot of courage which I admire deeply to make the concessions that Netanyahu has made.

That peacemaking can be politically risky, even when successful, was clear in Carter's remarks (see chapter 2). He believed that many Jewish Americans let him down because of the role he played. He put it this way:

So I would say at the time we signed the peace treaty there was an almost unanimous favorable response, but over a period of time it dissipated. I would say in general the incumbent government of Israel draws support in this country from the Jewish community. And I think that is the way it ought to be. And that is probably the way I would feel if I were Jewish and were concerned about Israel being in danger. I think that makes negotiations very difficult. It made it difficult for me. It made it very difficult for President Reagan and Bush and now for President Clinton.

Carter was also critical of Arab allies in the quest for peace. In his lecture, he revealed that Saudi leaders had supported his efforts, even applauded

them privately, only to criticize them publicly in a manner that made selling the Camp David Accords to the Arab world and preventing Egyptian isolation impossible. Carter disclosed the following in his Sadat Lecture (see chapter 2):

Well, this in the past, I think, has been a secret that has not been known by anyone except me and then-Crown Prince Fahd, now King Fahd. Before we went to Camp David, I met with Crown Prince Fahd. He encouraged me to go and said he wished every success. When I left Israel in the spring of 1979 and flew to the airport in Cairo and got President Sadat's final approval of the exact text of the treaty and got into Air Force One to fly back to the States, the first message I got was from Saudi Arabia. It said: We are deeply pleased at the success you had and the peace treaty that we hope will bring an end of violence in our region. . . . So I can let you know that I had private assurances of encouragement from the Saudis to proceed. But publicly they joined in with other Arab leaders who objected.<sup>8</sup>

If President Carter and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had anything they agreed about passionately, it was their strong endorsement of, and friendship with, Anwar Sadat. When Kissinger delivered the Sadat Lecture for Peace in May 2000, the Clinton administration was intensely trying to broker an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in its last months in office. For the only time during any of the Sadat Lectures, students at the University of Maryland demonstrated against inviting Henry Kissinger to deliver a lecture on the theme of peace. The university's position was that the lectures should be diverse and the chair should invite promi-

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nent leaders who were appropriate for the theme of the lecture. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Kissinger, he was an important American decision-maker who was the first to deal closely with Anwar Sadat—and who also won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Kissinger, who described Sadat as the greatest man he had ever met in his diplomatic career, reviewed the historical context of his—and the American—relationship with Sadat. In particular, it is now clear that Sadat had made gestures toward the United States almost immediately after taking office after the death of his predecessor, President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Yet, the United States, and Kissinger in particular, did not take the Egyptian leader seriously until after the 1973 war and the subsequent Arab oil embargo. Was this a mistake? Could history have unfolded differently with an early American response? Kissinger put it this way (see chapter 3):

I am quite frank to say that I did not understand Anwar Sadat when he first became president. Our intelligence reports described him as a weak man who had been put into that position because he could represent no conceivable threat to the president. And everyone expected two or three other leaders of Egypt to overthrow him at any moment. . . . Anwar Sadat made many threats, many statements, none of which, to my shame I must say, I took very seriously. Because it was absolutely axiomatic with us that there was no conceivable way that Egypt would dare to start a war.

If Henry Kissinger's lecture came during a time of intense American mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict ultimately leading to the failed Camp David

summit in July 2000, Senator George Mitchell's lecture was given in the midst of growing violence and pessimism about the prospects of Arab-Israeli peace. During the previous autumn, the second Palestinian Intifada had broken out with devastating consequences for Israelis and Palestinians from the terrorist attacks in Israel and the harsh Israeli operations in the Palestinian territories. President Clinton appointed Mitchell to investigate the developments and make recommendations. His report was ultimately submitted to President Bush in May 2001, just before he delivered the Sadat Lecture for Peace.

At that time, pessimism about the prospects of peace was in large part due to the collapse of the negotiations in July 2000 and to the subsequent outbreak of violence. But it is also clear that the Bush administration did not perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict to be central among American priorities, and it was particularly careful to differentiate its policies from those of the Clinton administration. In addition, it was no secret that many in the Arab world had preferred Bush over Al Gore in the American elections and expected him to be more responsive to their interests than the Clinton administration had been. Instead, it was clear early on that the Bush administration would fully support Sharon's government during a particularly violent period. Mitchell's was a welcome, clear-headed, judicious assessment that was badly needed internationally and in our national discourse.

Mitchell's lecture was notable in its careful comparison of his mediation in Northern Ireland

with his mission in the Arab-Israeli arena. Although he saw many differences, the similarities were more striking, providing a sense of hope that, intractable as the Arab-Israeli issue may appear, in the end conflicts are started with people and end with people. He stressed his own source of patience and optimism in noting that mediation efforts almost always fail, sometimes in hundreds of attempts, but in the end one needs only one success. Coming in the middle of an otherwise gloomy picture of the prospects for peace, Mitchell's lecture was a notable exception.

Nelson Mandela's lecture came only a few weeks after the 9/11 tragedy. On November 13, 2002, Kofi Annan, then the secretary-general of the United Nations, became the second African leader to deliver the Sadat Lecture. This was a critical time in assessing the role of the United Nations because the Bush administration seemed determined to wage war against the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein—even if unilaterally. For example, during that same week, the author published *The Stakes: America and the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), which emphasized the risks of unilateralism, the crucial nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and potential detrimental consequences of war in Iraq. The Kofi Annan lecture and its theme were certainly timely.

Annan, like other Sadat lecturers, saw the late Egyptian president as a symbol for leadership and for understanding the importance of psychology in transforming political choices, and he noted

how being a strong leader sometimes means going against conventional wisdom (See chapter 6):

By all conventional wisdom, he should not have done what he did. Going to Jerusalem, with no assurance in advance of any concessions from the other side, seemed to almost all Arabs at the time an act of folly, if not outright treason. Yet President Sadat understood the vital importance of psychology in war and peace. He understood that political behavior is deeply influenced by the mental image that each side has of the other—and that sometimes this image can only be changed by an act of breathtakingly radical daring.

In his review of the requirements for peace for both Israelis and Palestinians, Annan positively cited the Saudi peace plan that was endorsed by the Arab summit conference in Beirut in March 2002. He projected empathy for both sides, articulating their hopes and fears, and ending by emphasizing an international role to help shatter the barriers of suspicion, fear, and rejection—without proposing any specific steps.

Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III provided a unique perspective during a difficult time in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. As a Republican supporter of President George W. Bush and his administration, he nonetheless presented views on the issues that were at odds with the Bush administration's policy. Baker had considerable experience in dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue and the Middle East more broadly. As secretary of state during the administration of George H. W. Bush, he played a vital role in putting together the international

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coalition to force Iraq out of Kuwait and raising the funds for the effort from international sources, in an episode that is considered one of the major American foreign policy successes of recent decades. He was the force behind the Madrid Conference that brought Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table after the war and also involved the Palestinians and the Syrians for the first time. In historical perspective, Baker's diplomacy is seen to be among the most successful in American policy in the past two decades.<sup>9</sup> His view during a difficult period was important.

In his Sadat Lecture, Baker praised President George W. Bush for his action to remove Saddam Hussein and for his stated policy of spreading democracy in the Middle East. But Baker called for more aggressive Middle East diplomacy and put forth one of the clearest statements presented in any of the lectures on the basic components of Arab-Israeli peace. The details of the steps he articulated and the American role in carrying them out deserve close attention. Addressing the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, he warned that "the administration must make it unambiguously clear to Israel that although Prime Minister Sharon's planned withdrawal from Gaza is a positive initiative, it cannot be simply the first step in a unilateral process leading to the creation of Palestinian Bantustans in the West Bank" (see chapter 8).

Although noting that the United States cannot create peace in the Middle East, Baker declared

that "it is clear that the United States must and will continue to play a key role in the Middle East, and we have a variety of tools to address the challenges presented there" (see chapter 8).

Mary Robinson was the first European leader to deliver the Sadat Lecture—as well as the first woman. She was well known for her effective leadership as president of Ireland and also for her role as the United Nations human rights commissioner. She was widely recognized as a passionate advocate of human rights and continued her work in that area after leaving the United Nations.

But Robinson was clearly surprised by the perception that her leadership at the UN was marked by a period of anti-Israel sentiment. Much of that perception came out of the Durban Conference, which was critical of Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories and which was held under her leadership. As a tough fighter against racism and anti-Semitism, Robinson felt that she was misunderstood and that her role in Durban, South Africa, was also misrepresented. She put it this way, "At a conference in which we were supposed to be defending human rights values, we found ourselves faced with appalling bigotry and intolerance. I and many others condemned such language and, in the circumstances, I refused to recommend the final NGO document to the conference" (see chapter 7). It was with this background that she gave her lecture. It was simultaneously a lecture for peace and one that denounced racism and anti-Semitism.

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Speaking on Saint Patrick's Day 2004, Robinson reflected on the peacemaking efforts in Northern Ireland and situated the pursuit of Middle East peace in broader human and global contexts (see chapter 7).

The title I have chosen for my address is "The Journey to Peace: Finding Ourselves in the Other." It reflects what, for me, was President Sadat's great insight as a leader. He understood in reaching out to the people of Israel that he was reaching out not so much to a different nation or culture, but to a shared human desire for acceptance, security and dignity.

When Mohamed ElBaradei delivered the Sadat Lecture, there was much focus on his work in his capacity as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—for which he had won the Nobel Prize for peace. He had felt vindicated after the Iraq War, when it turned out that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and that, as his agency had noted before the war, its nuclear program had ended many years earlier. Nonetheless, there was no hiding the fact that his relationship with the Bush administration had been tense from the days of disagreement over Iraq and concerns that disagreements were emerging in the way the IAEA and its director were dealing with the Iranian nuclear program.

Dr. ElBaradei was the first Egyptian to deliver the lecture and to reflect on his former president's legacy. He provided a perspective on what the Egyptian president sought to achieve and why his vision remains unfulfilled. Although he also talked about nuclear proliferation, he placed the issue in

the context of a broader notion of peace. His basic proposition was that, "Conventional concepts of security—rooted in the protection of national borders and old concepts of sovereignty—are no longer adequate. . . . The modern age demands that we think in terms of *human* security—a concept of security that is people-centered and without borders." Dr. ElBaradei described his expanded notion of human insecurity (see chapter 9):

Statistics indicate that the world is becoming more peaceful. Yet at the same time, the collective sense of insecurity is higher than at any time before because the forces that drive insecurity remain persistent and pervasive. These drivers of insecurity fit into four categories: First, poverty, and poverty-related insecurities. . . . A second category is the lack of good governance. . . which ranges from corruption to severely repressive regimes whose hallmark is egregious human rights abuses. . . . A third driver of insecurity is the sense of injustice that results from the imbalance between the haves and have-nots. . . . Fourth is the artificial polarization along religious or ethnic lines. . . . The human security picture would not be complete without factoring in the impact of globalization. . . .

Like other Sadat lecturers, Mohamed ElBaradei emphasized the role of leadership in international politics and described President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem as "a leap of faith to shatter deeply entrenched psychological barriers of fear, distrust and rejection" (see chapter 9).

Because many Sadat Lectures focused on the role of leadership and particularly the role of the United States, I asked a former American diplomat, Aaron David Miller, who had written about both

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leadership and American foreign policy, to write a concluding chapter reflecting on the Sadat Lectures, Sadat's legacy, and American diplomacy in the Middle East.

So much has changed in the past decade in the Middle East and in its relations with the United States—and yet so much has not. The discourse remains focused on Jewish settlements, occupation, and terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu—who was prime minister of Israel when the University of Maryland inaugurated the Sadat Lecture for Peace but whose career seemingly abruptly ended two years later—returned to play the same role in Israeli politics after about a decade. Ariel Sharon—whose prospects for political comeback seemed over in 1982 after his indirect role in the massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila, returned as a powerful prime minister—led Israeli forces out of Gaza. Sharon's subsequent ill health has created a vacuum of leadership in Israel, one that has brought back to prominence both Ehud Barak and Netanyahu.

Senator George Mitchell, who gave a Sadat Lecture as a special envoy for President Clinton, has returned as the special Middle East envoy of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Many of the same leaders, or their sons, are still in charge in the Arab world. The most consequential change may have been the division among the Palestinians into two competing centers of power, one led by Hamas and the other by Fatah. The two-state solution that seemed inevitable in 1997 appears

more at risk than at any time since the Oslo agreement. Stable alternatives that are fair and acceptable to both sides are hard to see, and a collapse of the two-state solution may entail protracted conflict for another generation of Arabs and Israelis, with challenges for American foreign policy.

Yet, in reviewing a decade of perspectives on peace by many of those who helped write international history over the past several decades, there are two striking conclusions. The first is that peace agreements are often reached when unanticipated and by those who seemingly are incapable of producing them, which suggests that diplomacy should not be deterred by short-term political shifts, even as it must take careful account of them. Second, leadership is often essential in creating change, and the example Anwar Sadat set made the theme of leadership central to the Sadat Lectures. This was particularly so in the case of the three lecturers who knew him best—Carter, Weizman, and Kissinger.

But leadership is hard to define and even harder to anticipate. Leadership is often associated with profound historical change, which by definition is difficult to foresee. Social scientists are trained to predict events by projecting patterns of the past into the future. Yet profound change is a break from the very past that guides the work of scholars. And leadership is frequently the unknown factor that accounts for change.

Although the Sadat lecturers universally hailed the acts of leadership of Anwar Sadat, what they

meant by leadership is hard to pin down. Some often mean courage, which entails a leader's willingness to take political or even personal risk. But where does one draw the boundaries between courage and recklessness? Is it wisdom when leaders ignore their advisers or public opinion based on their own convictions? Mature democracies work hard to limit the possibility that any particular leader will have a free hand to act on behalf of the state and to produce systemic checks and balances that ensure such limitations. Carter, a friend and admirer of Sadat's, reflected on and even criticized the Egyptian leader's independence. He put it this way in answering a question from the audience: "Sadat was, I think, overly immune to the condemnation of those within the Arab world who disagreed with him. I used to argue with him about that. He was impervious to this, which may be one of the causes of his assassination" (see chapter 2).

The ultimate historical judgment of leadership seems mostly based on interpreting the consequences of leaders' actions. Whether George W. Bush was a great leader, a reckless gambler, or a man of vision or of baseless convictions in taking the United States to war in Iraq will ultimately be based on—more than anything else—the historical judgment of the consequences of that war. It will also matter who will be judging because the consequences will differ across countries and peoples.

In Sadat's case, such differences explain why his legacy has been mixed depending on those affected

by his actions. For many in Egypt, Israel, the West, and other countries around the world, he was a hero for the boldness of his actions that brought about an Egyptian-Israeli peace that has endured for the past three decades. But many in the Arab world saw in his actions weakness and increasing dependence on the United States, as well as consequences that weakened the hand of Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, in relation to Israel. At the same time, these interpretations of Sadat's leadership were historically fluid: When hopes increased after the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that the type of comprehensive peace to which Sadat aspired was within reach, Sadat's popularity in Egypt and parts of the Arab world grew. After the negotiations collapsed in July 2000, the number of Arabs who judged him harshly increased. His ultimate legacy will always be connected to the extent to which a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is seen to have been served or delayed.

Beyond the theme of leadership, many of the lecturers addressed notions of comprehensive peace—not only in the Middle Eastern context but also conceptually. At one level, many of the lectures were specific to the Middle East, and in that context articulated what it would take to reach a stable, comprehensive peace in the region, encompassing Israel and all its neighbors—and beyond. A number of lecturers—including Kofi Annan, Nelson Mandela, and Mohamed ElBaradei—offered broad ideas on this issue. Former American Secretary of State

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James Baker (who was the architect of a regional approach to peacemaking in the Madrid process that followed the 1991 Iraq War) presented a detailed plan for moving forward toward a far-reaching peace in the region while avoiding being especially critical of the administration of George W. Bush, who was president at the time of Baker's lecture.

Another sense of comprehensive peace, however, is conceptual. Mohamed ElBaradei spoke of the need not only to reduce the prospect of major war but also to reduce a persistent and pervasive sense of insecurity, which, in his mind, is often a function of poverty, poor governance, an imbalance between the haves and have nots, and "the artificial polarization along religious and ethnic lines."

Nelson Mandela also addressed the need for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East but, speaking only weeks after 9/11, inevitably articulated the need to confront terrorism and tied it in part to addressing global poverty. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan understandably linked his views of Middle Eastern peace to international law and UN resolutions. Mary Robinson, a former UN human rights commissioner, centered her views of international peace and human security on notions of human rights.

A third theme in many of the lectures pertains specifically to the role of the United States of America in achieving Middle East peace. This was perhaps inevitable, given that Sadat's primary foreign policy achievement, the Camp David accords, could not

have happened without the crucial role of President Jimmy Carter. Sadat himself believed that most of the cards pertaining to Middle East peace were in the hands of the United States. And four of the Sadat lecturers (Carter, Kissinger, Baker, and Mitchell) were American leaders who worked on Arab-Israeli peace. Aaron David Miller's concluding chapter also focuses on the American role, made even more timely with the advent of the Obama administration, which started off by appointing an American envoy, Senator George Mitchell, to mediate Arab-Israeli peace.

Although scholars and American officials have often debated how crucial the American role in bringing about peace in the Middle East is and also how important the pursuit of peace is to American interests, it is notable that American leaders who delivered the Sadat lecture have all been involved in successful diplomacy. Despite the ideological and intellectual differences among the four American lecturers (two Republicans and two Democrats) about effective diplomacy and the American role—all were deeply involved in the successful episodes. Henry Kissinger, who describes his deep involvement in the negotiations but who at various times did not see a need for American engagement, succeeded in negotiating disengagement of forces agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other only when the United States elevated Middle East diplomacy in its priorities after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (even as President Nixon was consumed by the Watergate scandal).

Carter gave the Middle East considerable attention even before Sadat undertook his visit to Jerusalem but emphasized the issue even more after that visit. And Baker, with the full support of President George H. W. Bush, initiated the Madrid process only after the United States decided to make the Middle East a priority after the 1991 Iraq War.

In the end, one should keep in mind that many of the Sadat lecturers were telling the story of events in which they participated. Their involvement lends much credibility to the accounts presented, but it is always important to remember that leaders often recall facts differently in retrospect, and that there is a context that must be understood in evaluating these events.

In Carter's case, for example, his accounts are obviously important and authoritative. He strongly believes that the prime minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, misled him or violated his pledge to him on the settlement issue, as mentioned above. There are, of course, other accounts by the Israelis and

important clarifications by scholars such as William Quandt, who participated in the Camp David negotiations. Carter also believed that the Saudis reneged on their promised support for the Camp David Accords, based on direct communications he received from Saudi leaders. But it may well be the case that the Saudis' initial understanding of what was actually agreed turned out to be inaccurate, particularly on the issues of Israeli settlements and the degree of association between the proposed Palestinian autonomy and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

In the lectures to follow, and in the concluding chapter, there is much to ponder about the indispensable role of leadership in the events of the last several decades in the Middle East and in the role of the United States in that region. These lectures provide a tribute to one particular leader, Anwar Sadat, who impressed both those who agreed and those who disagreed with him with his boldness and courage in acting to transform political possibilities.

## INTRODUCTION

### Notes

1. "Mandela warns against Iraq strikes," *BBC World News*, December 3, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/1690041.stm> (accessed October 23, 2008).

2. "Mandela heckled at mosque for supporting war," *The Star*, December 13, 2001, [http://www.iol.co.za/general/newsview.php?art\\_id=ct20011213211361448U23219&click\\_id=13&set\\_id=1](http://www.iol.co.za/general/newsview.php?art_id=ct20011213211361448U23219&click_id=13&set_id=1) (accessed October 23, 2008).

3. Henri E. Cauvin, "A NATION CHALLENGED: SOUTH AFRICA; In Statement, Mandela Shifts on All-Out Support for War," *New York Times*, January 3, 2002, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E0D91330F930A35752C0A9649C8B63> (accessed October 23, 2008).

4. "Mandela calls Bush to Talk about Iraq," *Dispatch Online*, September 3, 2002, <http://www.dispatch.co.za/2002/09/03/southafrica/AAAALEAD.HTM> (accessed October 23, 2008).

5. "Mandela condemns US stance on Iraq," *BBC World News*, January 30, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2710181> (accessed October 23, 2008).

6. "Weizman and Mubarak Aim to Break Ice," *Turkish Daily News*, May 23, 2007, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=weizman-and-mubarak-aim-to-break-ice-1997005-23> (accessed on October 24, 2008).

7. It should be noted that Begin never accepted Carter's version and that there are a number of different interpretations of what happened at Camp David. For an authoritative account, see William Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).

8. The Saudis may have misunderstood the exact terms of the agreement. In particular, it is clear that two specific issues were the most important to them and other Arabs: linking the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the agreement on Palestinian autonomy and an enforceable freeze on Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories. The absence of these was a major factor in the decision of many Arab governments to oppose the Camp David Accords.

9. The work of James Baker during the George H. W. Bush administration received high marks in a study of nearly twenty years of diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli conflict by three American administrations. The study was published by the United States Institute of Peace as *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East*, by Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, with Steven Spiegel, William Quandt, and Shibley Telhami (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

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