

# Part I

## **Introduction**



# 1

## Introduction

How do American officials negotiate? Few writers have previously attempted to explore this question.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, many authors have asked how *specific individuals* have negotiated or how the United States has handled *specific negotiations*, but few have explored how American officials—as a *general proposition*—negotiate.

Such reticence on the part of scholars and diplomats—two groups not famed for their bashfulness—seems curious at first consideration. After all, the United States has been a major world power for more than a century and thus a country of significant, often compelling, interest to most other countries. Moreover, despite loud complaints in recent years that America—as the world’s sole superpower—has all but eliminated negotiation from its diplomatic repertoire and relies excessively on its political, economic, and military power to gain its ends by pressure and intimidation, the United States negotiates not just frequently but continually. The global breadth of U.S. interests ensures that its negotiators are always engaged in a multitude of bilateral and multilateral settings.

How, then, to explain the fact that this book, if not blazing a new trail, is certainly exploring a path seldom traveled? The answer has much to do with the deceptively straightforward nature of that succinct question, “How do American officials negotiate?” For all its apparent simplicity, that question is laden with assumptions and riddled with complications. One major assumption is that one can actually discern behavioral and stylistic patterns in an activity as complex and context-dependent as negotiation—a claim that must always be armored in caveats about exceptions if it is not to be immediately shot down with a quiverful of counterexamples. A second and perhaps more forbidding assumption is that Americans negotiate differently than officials from other countries—a notion that goes against the grain in a world conscious of global interconnectedness and sensitive to the dangers

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1. See the bibliography toward the end of this book for a list of other literature relevant to American negotiating behavior. See also the helpful annotated bibliography in Michelle LeBaron, “Culture-Based Negotiation Styles,” in *Beyond Intractability*, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, July 2003), [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture\\_negotiation/?nid=1187](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_negotiation/?nid=1187).

## 4 American Negotiating Behavior

of ascribing particular traits to particular peoples. As for the complications, consider the difficulties of trying to identify and tease out a single thread—officials' behavioral patterns—from a negotiating fabric made up of numerous, closely interwoven strands that include the subject of a given negotiation, the personalities of individual negotiators, and the policies and decision-making procedures of the governments involved.

The analytic challenges are, indeed, real and substantial. But so, too, are the potential benefits of acquiring a better understanding of how U.S. policymakers and diplomats manage and conduct negotiations. For American policymakers, a keener understanding of the stylistic traits of U.S. negotiators can be useful because those traits help shape how foreign policies are formulated, implemented, and perceived. Moreover, American officials can use better self-knowledge to hone their craft and effectiveness. To quote the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu: "Know your adversary, know yourself; in a hundred battles, a hundred victories." Remarkably, American diplomats, until recently, received virtually no formal training in negotiation from the U.S. State Department. Those diplomats who did not acquire negotiating skills in the private sector before they joined the Foreign Service had to rely on observation and mentoring to develop a fundamental skill of their profession.<sup>2</sup> This book may provide another resource to assist in that process. For officials from other countries, a better knowledge of U.S. negotiating behavior can help to avoid misunderstanding and misreading the American side, thereby enhancing the prospects for mutually beneficial outcomes to negotiations.

We wrote this book with these objectives and benefits in mind. Like the other contributors, we recognize the difficulties of grasping so elusive a subject as negotiating behavior, but we also see the *possibility* as well as the advantages of trying to do so. Some academics may raise an eyebrow at the very notion of national negotiating styles, but few seasoned practitioners would share their skepticism. Certainly, the contributors to this volume, like dozens of other experienced diplomats and scholars who participated in the multiyear project from which this book has emerged, believe that American officials bring with them to the negotiating table a set of distinctly American attitudes and behaviors.

The portrait of American negotiating practice that emerges from this volume is a complex one, more complex than one might expect of a preeminent power with a reputation for throwing its weight around in the international arena. That

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2. For instance, Ambassador Stapleton Roy, who served as ambassador to three different countries, including China, recalls that he received absolutely no training in negotiation. "You learn from experience," he notes. Stapleton Roy, interview, Washington, D.C., August 11, 2008. Similarly, when asked if he ever had received training in how to negotiate, Ambassador Charles W. Freeman replied: "Formal training, absolutely not." Freeman points out that the United States, unlike many countries, has no diplomatic academy that offers an extensive grounding in a wide range of topics; instead, the State Department offers its diplomats "short courses in things like negotiation, but whether you actually get to take those or not is hit and miss." Charles W. Freeman, interview, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2008.

reputation may be deserved, but it is only part of the story, a story of sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary American impulses interacting in a world of cultural diversity, varied political influences, and competing national interests.

This volume argues that four distinctive mind-sets or professional perspectives have combined to shape U.S. negotiating behavior: a businessperson's pragmatism and interest in securing concrete results from a negotiation; a lawyer's concern with careful preparation, precision, and binding commitments; a superpower's inclination to dictate terms, adopt take-it-or-leave-it attitudes, and flex its muscle in pursuit of national interests; and a moralizer's sense of mission, self-worth, and inclination to sermonize.

At the heart of American negotiating behavior, ironically, lies a deep ambivalence about negotiation itself. On the one hand, businesslike and legalistic impulses combine to make American officials inclined to sit down and solve problems, reach deals, and negotiate with confidence that both sides can reap concrete and mutual benefits from an agreement. On the other hand, moralistic and hegemonic impulses make U.S. officials reluctant to negotiate with foreigners whose beliefs and behavior go against American mores. Indeed, they may be skeptical of the need to do so given America's substantial economic, political, and military resources.

The relative weight of these four mind-sets varies from negotiation to negotiation and administration to administration. Journalists and historians have often associated specific impulses with specific presidents (and sometimes even with specific political parties). President Jimmy Carter, for instance, has been portrayed as the archetypal moralist, while President George W. Bush has been characterized as exemplifying a unilateralist or hegemonic outlook. Yet, this quartet of impulses transcends political ideology and personal predilection. Foreign diplomats struggling to make headway in negotiations with the United States have been known to look forward to a change in administration, anticipating that a new president and a new political agenda will transform the approach of American negotiators. Their hopes are usually misplaced. They discover that the attitudes, behavior, and temperament of the new team of negotiators are not so dissimilar to those of the old guard. Policies may change abruptly but negotiating behavior usually changes less dramatically, and even when it does shift markedly to give greater prominence to one of the four mind-sets, the change is usually temporary, as the other mind-sets gradually reassert their influence. (For instance, by the his second term in the White House, President George W. Bush's negotiating behavior vis-à-vis North Korea was not so different from that of President Bill Clinton's, which Bush had entered office determined to change.) In short, sometimes one or another tendency predominates; more often, they coexist. The result is a negotiating style that is highly professional but also pushy, informal but also urgent, cordial but also blunt, calculating but also given to sermonizing.

The American negotiating process is also strongly shaped by the nature of the government's political and bureaucratic system, with intense interagency rivalries waged to win the ear of the president—whose authority is considerable yet circumscribed by congressional pressure, which in turn is shaped by public opinion and the influence of private-sector interest groups. The president and Congress are also keenly aware of the electoral cycles that not only usher them into office but also threaten to remove them before they have left their imprint on the nation and its foreign relations. Such a system limits U.S. negotiators' room for maneuver, places them under considerable time pressure, makes them highly dependent on presidential support for high-profile negotiations, and leaves them vulnerable to domestic political criticism. It also gives them, however, leverage with their counterparts, who recognize that when an American negotiator says, "This is the deal that Washington is prepared to offer you—I can't offer any more," the American official is probably telling it like it is.

Shifts in the fluid constellation of bureaucratic or political forces within Washington can swiftly undermine an interagency consensus on the goals of an ongoing negotiation or thrust a recently concluded agreement into the congressional spotlight. As a consequence, American negotiators often find themselves pressured to increase their demands or to call for the renegotiation of a deal already reached with their foreign counterpart. This phenomenon of "moving the goalposts" is not unique to U.S. officials, but it is certainly highly characteristic of American diplomacy.

Another dynamic form of tension also underlies much of the negotiating behavior and institutional context that this book describes, a tension—so fundamental to American culture—between an emphasis on individualism and a paradoxical capacity for team effort. Even as different agencies and lead negotiating officials vie to persuade the president to adopt a particular strategy, members of different agencies often, but not always, come together to implement a negotiating strategy that the president or one of his senior lieutenants ultimately decides to support.

At the risk of offending those foreign diplomats who complain, not without reason, about the American obsession with sporting terminology, one can draw an analogy between this individual-team tension and the sport that seems to embody the cultural dynamic of American society—football. On the sidelines stand the coaches/agencies arguing over the best plays to call and acutely conscious of the clock; on the field is a team of competitive individuals, each determined to outshine other team members. But when a play is finally chosen, the president, the quarterback, directs the rest of the team, which, at his signal, executes a variety of carefully choreographed moves that together advance the entire team toward the designated goal before the time available runs out. The analogy might be extended even further, for as the following chapters show, American negotiators evince a businesslike preoccupation with advancing toward their goal, a legalistic preoccupation with complex rules and precise measurements, an imperialistic readiness

to charge through or steamroll over obstacles in their way, and sometimes even a moralistic tendency to attribute their successes to divine dispensation.

## Culture and Negotiation

As is detailed in the preface, this volume is part of the United States Institute of Peace's ongoing Cross-Cultural Negotiation (CCN) project, a major endeavor to assess and compare the negotiating behaviors of different countries and governments. The rationale for comparing negotiating behaviors across cultures is straightforward: negotiating is a preferred method of international problem solving; governments manage and conduct negotiations in different ways; and knowledge of those differences will allow officials to better prepare for and manage negotiating encounters.

The CCN project assumes that at least five factors influence the conduct of any given international negotiation:

- the issues at stake;
- the personalities of the negotiators;
- structural factors such as the institutional process for decision making, negotiating, and policy implementation;
- the geopolitical context, including the relationship of the parties to a negotiation; and
- the cultures involved.

The first of these factors changes from negotiation to negotiation and the second from negotiator to negotiator, thus precluding efforts to relate either factor to enduring patterns or generally shared behaviors in national negotiating styles. In contrast, the third, fourth, and fifth factors typically change slowly and incrementally, and thus it is possible to gauge their longer-term influences. The influence exerted by structural and geopolitical factors on negotiations has occupied the attention of more than a few historians and political scientists. In the case of the United States, for instance, they have devoted much thought and ink to determining how various kinds of power—geopolitical, military, and economic power, as well as “soft power” (cultural influence)—have shaped various diplomatic encounters between the United States and its less powerful negotiating counterparts.<sup>3</sup> But the fifth factor—culture—has received comparatively little attention.<sup>4</sup>

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3. Among the many studies that explore the influence of power on negotiation, particularly well-known titles include Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); and Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

4. The literature on the role of culture in *business* negotiations involving Americans is more voluminous, but the differences between the corporate world and the diplomatic world are so numerous and pronounced that any attempt to view both through the same analytical lens would be problematic, to say the least.

No doubt part of the reason for this lack of attention is that culture is such an elusive and amorphous concept. With this in mind, contributors to the CCN project have gone to great efforts to define the term, and have built upon the definitions and usages of “culture” developed in the twentieth century by anthropologists and political scientists such as Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Clyde Kluckhohn.<sup>5</sup> In this book, as in Raymond Cohen’s *Negotiating across Cultures*, we regard culture as “human software . . . made up of ideas, meanings, conventions, and assumptions,” as well as behavioral patterns, shared by a particular group—as “a grammar for organizing reality, for imparting meaning to the world.”<sup>6</sup> More precisely, in the definition employed by Tamara Cofman Wittes in *How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate*, culture is “the product of the experiences of individuals within a given social group, including its representations in images, narratives, myths and patterns of behavior (traditions), and the meanings of those representations as transmitted among the group’s members over time and through experience.”<sup>7</sup>

Another author of a book from the CCN series, Kevin Avruch, points out that there are multiple, overlapping subcultures, “generic” and “local,” national and ethnic, social and political, and so forth. Any given negotiator will be influenced by his or her distinctive set of cultures; thus, no two negotiators are culturally identical.<sup>8</sup> This distinctiveness, however, does not make cultural analysis impossible or irrelevant—just harder, as well as potentially more useful in disentangling the various strands that shape negotiating behavior and negotiating outcomes.

Some observers claim that within the arena of international diplomacy, culture is an irrelevant influence.<sup>9</sup> Others contend that diplomats have long shared

Within the field of diplomacy, one book that does link culture and the conduct of American foreign policy is Walter Russell Mead’s *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001). Mead’s study is concerned with the making and implementation of foreign policy, rather than negotiation, but it certainly argues that broad cultural patterns within American society affect the conduct of diplomacy. Mead’s approach is discussed later in this chapter; see 11.

5. Kluckhohn, for instance, wrote that “culture consists of patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reaction, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values.” Clyde Kluckhohn, “The Study of Culture,” in *The Policy Sciences*, eds. D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951), 86.

6. Cohen, *Negotiating across Cultures*, 12.

7. Wittes, *How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate*, 4.

8. See Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, part II, 23–55. In a similar vein, Wittes emphasizes that the definition of culture she presents “allows, importantly, for individuals within a group to be differently situated by class, race, or other social attributes, such that identifiable subcultures can exist within a broader recognized culture.” Wittes, *How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate*, 4–5.

9. See, for instance, I. William Zartman, “A Skeptic’s View,” in *Culture and Negotiation*, eds. G. Faure and J. Rubin (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993), 17–21. Zartman claims that culture is “every bit as relevant as breakfast [for negotiators] and to much the same extent.” Avruch, however, sees significant flaws in the arguments advanced by Zartman and others; see Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, 42–48.

a professional and international culture that trumps national cultures.<sup>10</sup> In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, a shared culture of diplomacy was French-speaking and defined by elaborate forms of conduct and attire. In our globalized age, cultural conformity among diplomats is claimed by some to span the entire world—wherever one goes, one encounters a professional culture that is English-speaking, Western-educated, suit-wearing, and soft-spoken. Many seasoned negotiators, however, disagree: cultural differences among negotiators may not be as pronounced as in earlier decades and centuries, but those differences still exist and can exert a palpable influence on the conduct and outcome of negotiations. Their influence can be felt in such numerous and diverse areas as patterns of interpersonal interactions, styles of both verbal and nonverbal communication, attitudes toward time, the use of enticements and pressure tactics, attitudes toward compromise, and the use of hospitality. This diversity of cultures in the world of diplomacy is maintained, in part, by the lack of formal training in negotiating practice in almost all foreign ministries. National cultures prevail.

One could argue that the degree of cultural difference among diplomats—at least European diplomats—has actually increased over the past century. As the retired American career diplomat Monteagle Stearns notes, “The practitioners of modern diplomacy until the end of the First World War tended, in the words of British diplomat and author Harold Nicolson, to be men who ‘possessed similar standards of education, similar experience and a similar aim’—men who ‘desired the same sort of world.’” The Russian Revolution of October 1917 disrupted this conformity, with the young Soviet Union initially rejecting established diplomatic conventions—just as the United States disdained diplomatic and consular uniforms and the title of “ambassador” between the Civil War and 1893.<sup>11</sup>

The chapters that form part IV of this volume testify eloquently to the profound belief that many non-American diplomats have in the influence of culture on negotiating behavior. Several of those chapters also investigate the circumstances under which cultural differences become more or less pronounced and influential.

This book is particularly interested in the intersection of two kinds of cultures: national (i.e., American) and institutional (i.e., the structures, norms, and behavioral predispositions of U.S. government agencies such as the State Department,

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10. For instance, in his seminal work *The Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull defines diplomatic culture as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states,” which was developed over the course of centuries and which is an integral part of the “society of states.” See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 316.

An interesting review of the idea of diplomatic culture, and an argument for its continuing relevance, is offered by Geoffrey Wiseman, “Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture,” *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005): 409–430.

11. See Monteagle Stearns, *Talking to Strangers: Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 13, 21.

especially the Foreign Service).<sup>12</sup> The following chapters do not assume that all U.S. negotiators are acculturated similarly in these two cultures; as Jeswald Salacuse rightly notes, “No negotiator is a cultural robot.”<sup>13</sup> Nor does this volume disregard the influential roles that other kinds of cultures play in shaping outlook and conduct; indeed, U.S. negotiators come from a variety of professional backgrounds, and thus bring to their official duties a variety of negotiating styles. This book does contend, however, that the shared national background and institutional context of U.S. negotiators exert a significant and recognizable impact on many facets of negotiating encounters.

Whether that impact makes American officials better or worse negotiators is a very good question, but it is a question to which this book offers no definitive answer. Our aim in this volume is to assess *how* American officials negotiate, not *how well* they do so. If this seems like a disappointing lack of ambition on the authors’ part, we would point out that disentangling behavioral patterns from a tangled knot of personalities, issues, institutions, and interests seems to us an adequately Herculean task. Trying to gauge with any precision the degree to which those patterns of behavior *typically* affect negotiating outcomes seems, if not a Sisyphean occupation, then a task for another, far bigger research project, one able to squeeze a multitude of variables through a statistical meat grinder and produce something intellectually digestible at the other end.<sup>14</sup> This is not to say that we are silent on the subject of the effectiveness of American negotiators. What we can—and do—point out are instances in which particular behaviors and stylistic traits had a clear effect on a specific negotiation. Evidence of such an impact is also to be found in part IV of this book, in which those who have sat across the bargaining table from American officials recall how various characteristic American traits and tactics made a specific negotiation more or less productive.

The contributors to part IV have no doubt that the behavior of American negotiators reflects to some degree American cultural influences. The precise degree is—for the reasons just noted—impossible to determine, but clearly the impact is both positive and negative. Impatience, for instance, is something of a hallmark of U.S.

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12. The Austrian diplomat Winfried Lang contends that “national cultures compete with professional cultures.” Among the latter is what Lang terms a “negotiation culture,” which features, among other elements, a sense of accommodation, a high regard for flexibility, and an awareness of the need for efficient communication. However, Lang recognizes that “this negotiation culture is constrained . . . by national interests imposed by the respective government on its negotiators by means of more or less stringent instructions.” Winfried Lang, “A Professional’s View,” in *Culture and Negotiation*, eds. Faure and Rubin, 44–45, 46.

13. Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Implications for Practitioners,” in *Culture and Negotiation*, eds. Faure and Rubin, 201.

14. The kinds of variables that would have to be considered include the relative power and resources of the parties to the negotiation; the history of their relationship; each party’s intentions and perceptions; domestic political, economic, and other pressures and constraints; the personalities of the negotiators involved and their personal and professional relationships with their own side and with their negotiating counterparts; the main issues under discussion, together with secondary and linked issues; the influence, interests, and actions of third parties, including not only other governments but also intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and media coverage—not to mention behavioral patterns.

diplomacy, but it often leads American negotiators to focus on short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests. On the other side of the coin, many American officials have a reputation for saying what they mean and meaning what they say, which typically reduces the danger of ambiguities and misunderstandings but also upon occasion complicates or even poisons the negotiating atmosphere.

In his book *Special Providence*, the historian Walter Russell Mead argues that certain American mind-sets, each with strong cultural roots, have helped shape American foreign policy over the course of the country's history. From Mead's perspective, the net effect has been overwhelmingly beneficial, for "American foreign policy . . . has done a remarkably good job of enabling the United States to flourish as history goes on."<sup>15</sup> Insofar as we would venture an overall assessment of the impact of culture on American negotiating behavior (not, of course, the same thing as American foreign policy), we would offer a less emphatic and more mixed judgment. The impact of culture can both help and hinder American negotiators. Moreover, as we discuss in the concluding chapter of this book, any given cultural trait can be a boon *or* a handicap, or even a boon *and* a handicap, depending on the context of a specific negotiation.

## The Organization of This Book

This book is organized into five parts. The first part consists of this introductory chapter, which lays out the objectives, themes, and contents of the volume. The second part, consisting of chapters 2 through 5, may be regarded as the analytical distillation of the material gathered together for this project. As described in the preface, we have fashioned an interpretative framework around the assessments offered by non-American officials during two CCN workshops while also incorporating the viewpoints and experiences of American diplomats, policymakers, and scholars. Our goal in this section is to provide an integrated portrait of the primary characteristics of U.S. negotiating behavior.

Chapter 2, "The Four-Faceted Negotiator," seeks to capture the essence of the American approach by exploring the businesslike, legalistic, superpower, and moralistic mind-sets that combine to shape the behavior of U.S. officials at the negotiating table.

The next chapter, "At the Bargaining Table," dissects the tactics and behaviors that U.S. diplomats typically employ within the formal negotiating arena. The chapter begins by examining the positive incentives deployed by American negotiators. These include efforts to engage the other side and build institutional and personal ties, and a variety of inducements such as providing economic compensation and offering political recognition or security guarantees. The chapter then assesses

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15. Mead, *Special Providence*, xviii.

U.S. pressure tactics, which range from creating linkages between issues to the use of pressures, leaks, ultimatums, and outright coercion.

In chapter 3, we devote significant attention to the uses made of language and of time. Americans—whose conceptual vocabularies suggest that they view negotiation as part science, part sport—often use English as a blunt instrument but can also exhibit great dexterity in crafting the wording of agreements. When it comes to time, however, U.S. negotiators are less flexible. They have a short-term perspective and are usually driven by domestic considerations to press ahead rapidly before perceived windows of opportunity close; their sense of urgency manifests itself in numerous self-imposed deadlines. Chapter 3 also examines how tactics vary according to the identity of the negotiating counterpart, the subject being negotiated, and the forum (bilateral or multilateral) within which negotiations are conducted.

The focus shifts in chapter 4 to how the United States conducts negotiations *away from* the formal bargaining table. It looks in particular at how American officials use three techniques in support of the formal negotiating process: back-channel communications, hospitality, and the media. Far from being a relic of the Cold War, the use of back channels to explore positions and issues remains a distinctive feature of American negotiating behavior. With their extensive network of diplomatic and political contacts, and their readiness to do what it takes to secure concrete results, American officials are well equipped to navigate in treacherous bureaucratic and political waters through the use of back-channel, or off-line, communications. In the case of hospitality, however, Americans are comparatively disadvantaged by a political disinclination to lavish attention upon their counterparts. To be sure, there are exceptions to this lack of interest in impressing, intimidating, or rewarding counterparts with pomp and protocol, but as a general rule American diplomatic hospitality is modest, if not upon occasion miserly.

The possibilities presented to American negotiators by adroit use of the media are less neglected, with U.S. officials sometimes feeding stories to journalists and “spinning” coverage in efforts to shape perceptions of U.S. ambitions and of the process of ongoing negotiations. Yet such efforts are sporadic and rarely amount to media campaigns, in part because the media are independent actors (“the fourth estate”) and are seen as unpredictable and unreliable, and in part because the U.S. side expects to succeed at the bargaining table regardless of media coverage.

Americans and foreigners alike often remark that the most difficult and important negotiations Americans undertake are with other Americans, thrashing out negotiating strategies and defending negotiating gambits in Washington’s interagency arena. Chapter 5, “Americans Negotiating with Americans,” tackles this distinctive aspect of U.S. negotiating behavior, exploring how the structure, culture, and internal dynamics of the U.S. government and bureaucracy influence the conduct of negotiations with foreign counterparts. The chapter covers a variety of subjects: the role of Congress, which is probably more influential than any other legislature in the

world in shaping the conduct of foreign policy; America's electoral calendar, which accentuates negotiators' sense of time urgency and short-term outlook; changeovers in administration, which can retard the progress of ongoing talks, oblige negotiators to raise their demands ("move the goalposts"), and cause the loss of institutional memory; the fierce and sometimes destructive rivalries among different agencies and officials for the ear of the president and control of the negotiating agenda; and the political vulnerability of individual diplomats, who may be accused of giving away too much at the bargaining table if not—on rare occasions—disloyalty.

Although most of this volume centers on negotiations conducted during and, more especially, since the Cold War, part III traces the evolution of the relationship between American presidents and their negotiators since the founding of the republic. Written by Robert Schulzinger, one of America's leading diplomatic historians, this historical overview examines the development of the U.S. government's negotiating machinery and management style, from the lone emissaries of the nineteenth century to today's elaborate bureaucratic structures. Schulzinger emphasizes the central role played by the president in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. His chapter begins with the Revolutionary War but focuses chiefly on the period after 1919, when the United States—as a newly emerged major world power—institutionalized the management of its foreign relations. As he charts the major developments in U.S. diplomatic practice, he touches on several themes that resonate throughout subsequent chapters, including the conviction that America has a special role to play in world affairs, the use of back channels, the influence of political and interagency rivalries within the Washington establishment, and the domestic political vulnerability of individual diplomats.

Part IV consists of a series of foreign perspectives on different facets and aspects of U.S. negotiating behavior, written by senior non-American diplomats or officials who, with one exception, participated in the 2007 workshop. These accounts are not meant to be a tour d'horizon of the most pressing events, relationships, or issues in American diplomacy; nor are they comprehensive, systematic, or exhaustive in their treatment of their respective subjects. Instead, each is intended to throw a personal light on one or more of the topics discussed in part II, offering firsthand experiences and insights acquired by foreign officials on the other side of the negotiating table.

The selection of foreign contributors was not entirely within our hands. Some officials who were invited to contribute chapters declined to do so, some for personal reasons, others for more diplomatic ones. Future editions of this book will, we trust, feature a wider range of foreign perspectives, including the views of officials (and nongovernmental representatives) involved in negotiations over subjects such as climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, and economic regimes. Even so, as the reader will discover, the chapters that form part IV of this book do not lack for variety—nor for insight and candor.

Chan Heng Chee, Singapore's ambassador to Washington since 1996, examines U.S. behavior in three types of fora—bilateral encounters, negotiations with regional intergovernmental organizations, and negotiations within the context of global multilateral organizations. She sees American negotiators as empowered by their country's superpower status but constrained by its political system and inter-agency wrangling over negotiating positions.

As Japan's deputy minister for foreign affairs, Koji Watanabe was deeply involved in trade negotiations with the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In his chapter, he dissects those negotiations, contrasting what he characterizes as the bitterness of that experience with the less adversarial and more constructive talks of later years, when Japan became more of an economic partner and less of an economic threat to the United States.

Faruk Logoglu, a former Turkish ambassador to Washington, focuses on the high-powered and ultimately unsuccessful U.S. effort to persuade Turkey to let U.S. troops invade Iraq through its territory, and examines how the U.S. tendency to throw its weight around in security negotiations increased dramatically in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

John Wood, who served two terms as New Zealand's ambassador to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s, recounts his experience of protracted negotiations within Washington in the mid-1980s, when New Zealand and the United States wrestled over New Zealand's antinuclear stance, which barred U.S. warships from New Zealand's waters.

Yuri Nazarkin, who headed several of the Soviet Union's delegations in arms control negotiations and who served as the Russian Federation's ambassador at large for international security and disarmament, offers a candid account of what it is like to negotiate with American officials when one's country is regarded as an adversary of the United States.

Lalit Mansingh, a former foreign secretary of India, portrays the bilateral relationship between his country and the United States since the 1960s, charting what he characterizes as an evolution of U.S. negotiating behavior from coercive to persuasive diplomacy.

Britain's former permanent representative to the United Nations, David Hannay, looks at how America's exceptionalist instincts, the often-skeptical or idiosyncratic approach of political appointees, congressional interference, interdepartmental feuding, and an overloaded policymaking machinery have conspired to make the United States less influential in the United Nations than its international position would justify.

In the last chapter in part IV, Gilles Andreani, former head of the Centre d'analyse et de prévision in the French Foreign Ministry (the equivalent of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff), offers a dozen managerial "rules"

drawn from his personal experience of how to minimize obstacles and maximize outcomes of negotiations with U.S. officials.

Informed by the observations of these foreign contributors, the final chapter asks how well equipped American negotiators are for the challenges presented by a changing global landscape. Collectively, the four defining facets of American negotiating behavior seem to have served American diplomacy well in the past. But will they continue to do so in the future? Negotiation is becoming more, not less, important as a tool of American foreign policy, and the nature of international negotiation is rapidly shifting in response to globalization, the emergence of problems that demand a collective response, and the weakening of the nation-state system and collective organizations of international action.

The second half of the concluding chapter proposes a series of reforms designed to allow American negotiators to function as effectively as possible in this new international environment. Not much can be done to change behavior rooted in national and institutional cultures, but the negotiating skills of negotiators can be enhanced in other ways. The conclusion recommends a variety of practicable measures, ranging from better training of career diplomats in the arts of negotiation, to improvements in the U.S. government's institutional memory and assessments of past negotiating records, to more supportive congressional funding of diplomacy.

Attitudinal changes are no less important than concrete ones. If U.S. officials are to perform effectively in the coming decades, American negotiating behavior may have to acquire a fifth facet: the mind-set of a "politician" with a capacity for empathy, an ability to nurture and sustain useful relationships, and a sensitivity to the fact that all parties need to leave a negotiation with something to give their constituents. Negotiators from all levels of government need to supplement their use of political, economic, and military resources with greater attention to building relationships and greater self-awareness of American negotiating characteristics. The conclusion of this volume thus ends where the rationale for this book begins, with Sun Tzu's admonition to "know yourself."