

Foreword

Madeleine K. Albright

U.S. Secretary of State, 1997–2001

This timely volume about the negotiating behavior of U.S. diplomats brings to mind a story about one archetypical American—Ulysses S. Grant. When still a boy of eight, Grant was sent by his father to buy a horse from a neighbor. Upon reaching the neighbor’s house, Grant burst out: “Papa says I may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you don’t take that, I am to offer you twenty-two-and-a-half, and if you don’t take that, to give you twenty-five.” Grant notes, in his autobiography, that the story “caused me great heart-burning [when it] . . . got out among the boys in the village and it was a long time before I heard the last of it.”

This tale, simple as it may be, incorporates several useful lessons about bargaining—including the value of patience, the importance of leverage, and the wisdom of concealing one’s bottom line.

Like diplomacy, of which it is a core element, negotiation is an art. As such, it demands both careful preparation and a certain measure of inherent skill. In the context of American foreign policy, negotiation is among the essential tools used to advance the interests of the United States. Its purpose is to persuade foreign governments to act in a manner that is helpful to us, or at least acceptable, and to do so in a binding and enforceable way.

Men and women negotiating on behalf of the United States enjoy certain built-in advantages, including the power of our military, the size of our economy, and the historic political influence of our nation. However, they also have to navigate the minefields of our democratic system, which exposes them to intense pressure from Congress and private interest groups, as well as nonstop scrutiny from the media. At every turn, they are asked to explain their strategy, disclose the status of talks, speculate about the outcome, and characterize the attitude of their negotiating partners. The day has long since passed when major international agreements could be reached behind closed doors and then remain secret for years.

Preparatory to any bargaining, U.S. diplomats must negotiate with competing power centers within our own government. The diplomats’ purpose will be to secure

as many chips and as much independent authority as possible. At the same time, they will try to determine the strategy of each of the foreign parties involved in the negotiation in order to discern the line between what those parties are certain to demand and what they can be made to accept. When discussions begin, our diplomats will often try to take charge of the process by defining the terms, outlining the issues, and proposing a timeline for making decisions. In so doing, they may adopt the tactful approach favored by one early ambassador, Benjamin Franklin, who was careful not to contradict anyone but instead quietly asked questions and raised doubts; or they might prefer a more dramatic style—storming around, threatening to call in the press, assigning blame for failure. In either case, they would be well advised to seek an outcome that will enable all participants to claim at least partial victory. This will inevitably involve the creative use of words, but an agreement that can be welcomed by all sides is more likely to endure than a settlement that is transparently a triumph for one and a defeat for the other.

To some Americans, negotiating is inherently a sign of weakness. The truly strong, it is thought, do not need to talk; they just flex their muscles and impose their will. In rare cases, this may indeed be our country's only alternative; after all, not every issue has two sides, not every adversary is reasonable, and not every problem is best dealt with through discussion. More often, however, diplomacy will prove a valuable instrument for creating change in the existing order, whether by formalizing new friendships, creating a consensus on matters that have been in dispute, or originating rules to keep pace with the rush of events.

Given this reality, it is in America's best interest to ensure that its negotiators have the fullest possible backing when they sit down at the bargaining table, whether the issue at hand involves nuclear security, economic fairness, energy, the environment, or modifications in international law. We may all be thankful that far more issues of public policy are settled peacefully than through force of arms. We should be concerned, however, that the amount of resources available for what might generally be described as international diplomatic purposes is only about 1 percent of our federal budget. If we want those who represent and defend our interests to succeed, we should do a far better job of equipping them to do so.

In *American Negotiating Behavior*, Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney provide a wealth of information about the art of negotiation and about its application in the world today. Their focus on how America's diplomatic style is viewed by those with whom we deal around the globe is particularly valuable for scholars, foreign policy analysts, and prospective U.S. negotiators. The United States cannot influence a world that we do not understand, nor can we understand the world if we fail to listen to what our friends, our critics, and—perhaps especially—those who are both our friends *and* our critics have to say.

Foreword

Condoleezza Rice

U.S. Secretary of State, 2005–2009

Transformational Diplomacy

In his memoir *Present at the Creation*, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson portrayed the world confronting the United States at the dawn of the Cold War “as just a bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis.” In 1946, as more than two million Europeans found themselves starving in the aftermath of World War II, the concern was not whether Eastern Europe would fall to communism; it was whether Western Europe would succumb. In 1946, the communists won a significant number of legislative seats during national elections in France and Italy. In 1947, civil conflicts broke out in Greece and Turkey. The following year, war erupted in the Middle East, and Czechoslovakia fell to a communist coup. And in 1949, roughly five years earlier than anticipated, the Soviet Union detonated a nuclear weapon—just one month before Mao Zedong’s Communist Party declared victory in China. In the face of such seemingly insurmountable odds, few might fault Acheson for suggesting that, just as the world had been born from chaos at Creation, the United States was tasked “to create half a world, a free half, out of the same material without blowing the whole to pieces in the process.”

Sixty years later, after a nearly bloodless reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we remember Acheson for his efforts to transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes in a struggle that was driven as much by ideology as it was by traditional great power competition. As the Cold War hardened into place, we focused our diplomacy on Europe and parts of Asia. We hired new people. We taught them new languages and gave them new training. We partnered with old adversaries in Germany and Japan and helped them to rebuild their countries. We created new institutions such as NATO and leveraged innovative diplomatic tools such as the Marshall Plan to rebuild a more democratic Europe. Our diplomacy proved instrumental in transforming devastated countries into thriving democratic allies who joined with us for decades in the struggle to defend freedom from the Soviet challenge.

With the end of the Cold War, America again rose to new challenges. In the 1990s, we opened fourteen new embassies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and we repositioned over one hundred of our diplomats to staff them. Our outreach helped newly liberated peoples transform the character of their countries, opening the door to greater freedom and transparency that facilitated their integration into the larger international community. Few observers in the 1950s would have imagined that former members of the Warsaw Pact would attain membership in NATO and an organization like the European Union.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, America was confronted with a world challenged by a different kind of threat, one posed by violent extremists seeking to destroy the very ideals and institutions that form the foundation of democracy. The primacy of sovereignty in the modern state system is now challenged by a variety of non-state actors—from transnational corporations to terrorist networks—that have proved capable of exerting influence in ways once thought to be the exclusive domain of the state. The greatest threats to peace today seem to emerge from within states rather than from conflict between them. The fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power.

In this new century, it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts, and our democratic ideals—yet that is precisely what the current structure of our foreign policy institutions would have us do. America’s diplomacy must instead integrate and advance all of these goals together. That is why in 2006 I directed our diplomats to pursue “transformational diplomacy,” with the objective of working with our partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that can respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This initiative is rooted in partnership, not paternalism; in doing things *with* these states—not *for* them.

To advance transformational diplomacy, I built on the work of my predecessors to modernize the State Department so that our diplomatic posture would better reflect the realities of the international system in the early twenty-first century. As of 2006, we had nearly the same number of State Department personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people, as we had in India, a country of 1 billion people. With the support of Congress, President Bush created 2,000 new State Department positions. Over four years, under Secretary Powell and during my tenure, I requested annual budget increases for our international operations totaling \$8 billion, a 25 percent increase. I also worked to dramatically increase the number of diplomats we deploy overseas. In President Bush’s 2009 budget request we asked Congress to fund 1,100 new positions for the State Department and 300 new positions for USAID. Finally, we worked to shift about one-tenth of our political,

economic, and public diplomacy officers to new emerging centers of international power such as China, Brazil, and India.

Simply reallocating our resources, however, will not be enough; our transformational vision requires America's diplomats to localize our presence and be active in new places far beyond the walls of foreign chancelleries and our embassies. It will require them to work with new partners, not just with a nation's government but also with its local leaders, its entrepreneurs, and its NGOs. This effort to modernize our diplomacy will demand much from our foreign service officers and AID workers, who will have to manage greater amounts of risk while serving in some of the most challenging—yet most essential—diplomatic posts in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Angola. These are countries where we are working with foreign citizens in difficult conditions to maintain security, fight poverty, and promote democratic reforms. To succeed in these challenging assignments, our diplomats must be trained not only as experts of policy but also as first-rate administrators of programs, capable of helping foreign citizens strengthen the rule of law, start businesses, improve health, and reform education.

Decades of experience have shown that foreign assistance is most effective when paired with plans for good governance, sustainable growth, and investments in people and institutions that help countries lift themselves permanently out of poverty. It was this logic that spurred the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which has devoted at least \$5.5 billion in development grants to sixteen partner countries. America will also need to forge a stronger partnership between our diplomats and our military. Our goal of fostering country progress will not always be pursued in peaceful places. Without security there can be no development, and without development there can be no democracy. Leading security experts are increasingly thinking about our fight against terrorism as a kind of global counterinsurgency campaign in which the center of gravity of conflict is not just the terrorists themselves, but the populations they seek to influence and radicalize. Our success will depend upon unity of effort between our civilian and military agencies. Our fighting men and women can create opportunities for progress and buy time and space. But it is our diplomats and development professionals who must seize this opportunity to support communities that are striving for democratic values, economic advancement, social justice, and educational opportunity.

Transforming our diplomacy to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century will not be the work of a single secretary of state or presidential administration. It will require the work of a generation. To move beyond the diplomacy of the past, we need to cultivate diplomats of the future. This new cohort of foreign service professionals needs to reflect the rich diversity of America. The past three secretaries of state—the daughter of European immigrants, the son of Jamaican immigrants, and a daughter of the segregated American South—should not be more diverse than the Foreign Service that supported their efforts.

These men and women will not be managing problems; they will be working with partners to solve problems. To enable them to do so, we need to give our diplomats the best technology to liberate them from embassies and offices and let them work anytime, anywhere. We will need to be better at fostering and rewarding creativity, innovation, and independent thinking, especially among our youngest professionals. And we must not only continue to recruit America's best and brightest to our ranks—we must make them even better and even brighter. That means training in languages such as Chinese, Urdu, Arabic, and Farsi, and honing their skills as negotiators in unfamiliar cultures.

In this volume, Richard Solomon and Nigel Quinney tackle a key component of this transformational vision by critically examining American negotiating practices. This work builds on broader efforts by the United States Institute of Peace to enhance the negotiating skills of military and diplomatic personnel through its Cross-Cultural Negotiation project, described in part I of this book. By analyzing how America's diplomats engage with their counterparts across the world, Solomon and Quinney give us valuable insights into the process of negotiation as we seek to transform our diplomatic practice to meet the demands of twenty-first-century foreign policy.