

Praise for **Engineering Peace**

“Colonel Williams has written a provocative book that gets to the heart of postwar planning. His work identifies lessons from three post-Cold War interventions and offers a framework for addressing postconflict reconstruction. I’d recommend it for anyone undertaking postconflict planning.”

GEORGE CASEY

General, U.S. Army

“Anyone who doubts that inadequate planning and staffing for the postconflict phase of interventions abroad can carry high costs need only to read daily reports from Iraq. Problems of postconflict reconstruction are the subject of Colonel Garland Williams’s exceptionally timely study that includes detailed chapters on the recent cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Colonel Williams concludes his fine study with thoughtful recommendations, including about the central role that military engineering battalions should play to reconstruct the physical infrastructure during the period between the end of the conflict and the assumption of authority by international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

This timely and well-written book is highly recommended for anyone with an interest in improving outcomes in military interventions.”

OLE R. HOLSTI

Duke University

“Engineering Peace is the best treatment of the practical aspects of achieving victory in postconflict operations. Drawing upon his personal experiences on the ground and his extensive research, Colonel Williams’s analyses of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan clearly show the challenges in adapting American political-military doctrine to efficiently ‘win’ the conflicts we face in the post–Cold War period. He has laid out a proposal for preparing our political-military organizations for postconflict reconstruction that is ‘must reading’ for U.S. national security planners and operators.”

ROBERT B. FLOWERS

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

“Engineering Peace should be required reading for anyone at the Pentagon, the White House, or the Congress who is making any decisions concerning nation building, which seems to be our new mission as a country.”

MIKE PARKER

Former Member of the U. S. House of Representatives, 1989 to 1999, and Former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works

“Colonel Garland Williams has written a thoughtful and important book. It tackles the true issue of military transformation in this century by dealing with the military’s biggest challenge—nation building. His extensive engineering knowledge and experience provides an excellent model in this area for other functions that the military needs to innovatively develop to support reconstruction missions.”

ANTHONY C. ZINNI

General, USMC (Retired)

Engineering Peace

ENGINEERING PEACE

THE MILITARY ROLE
IN POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

COLONEL GARLAND H. WILLIAMS



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FOREWORD

SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS OF PEACE OPERATIONS usually reserve the term “building bridges” for interethnic reconciliation. In Colonel Garland Williams’s *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction*, the term is used in both a literal and a figurative sense. Colonel Williams commanded a U.S. Army engineering battalion in Kosovo and helped to direct NATO reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, so he and his combat engineers have bridged many divides during peace operations in those territories. Building bridges is something that combat engineers do very well—in the midst of war, they make sure armored and infantry troops can cross any terrain that has been mined or destroyed. As Williams notes in this work, combat engineers deployed in a peacekeeping mission also have a vital role to play in rebuilding a war-torn country or region. Building bridges has relevance in restoring a country’s physical infrastructure, but it also pertains to the kinds of post-conflict tasks that many actors in an international intervention undertake: they must bridge divides among a country’s warring factions and between the populace at large and the country’s governing institutions, such as they are.

When the international community undertakes an intervention in a “failed state” that has been embroiled in internecine warfare, the military plays a crucial role in halting the fighting. Its involvement usually stops there—no one wants that “endstate” more than the military itself. Although it has taken on more complex peacekeeping tasks, the military is essentially trained to fight wars. “Nation building,” as the author notes early on in this work, is something the military has eschewed, especially since the debacles in Somalia and, earlier, Vietnam. Yet there is one aspect of an intervention’s postconflict tasks that

the military is trained to do well, something that specific units can carry out in wartime or in a peacekeeping mode: reconstruction—specifically, repairing physical infrastructure, everything from roads and bridges and runways to public utilities.

Seasoned observers of multilateral peace operations in the post-Cold War era would argue that those kinds of tasks are usually handled by the myriad nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that respond instantly to disasters around the world, either natural or man-made, which are typically made more tragic—and deadlier—by the machinations of political or ethnic factions that attempt to capitalize on the chaos of a natural disaster or the loss of a central government's legitimacy. Those observers are right, of course, but NGOs can do only so much in a complex emergency or in the bloody miasma of ethnic conflict: they can feed and clothe refugees and internally displaced persons, they can provide temporary shelter, but they do so under tremendous constraints and peril. Meanwhile, military forces from many countries do the arduous task of trying to quell the fighting, and military engineers accompany peacekeeping contingents to support their maneuverability over terrain that has typically been destroyed (or mined) by the warring factions—or by the international community itself in the service of halting the fighting.

Of course, given more time, these NGOs can rebuild entire countries once the fighting stops; however, their progress is dependent on funds supplied by the international community—usually through donors' conferences—a process that can extend a year or more into the postconflict period. In the meantime, the country or region remains in a perilously ambiguous state: littered with the remnants of bombed-out houses and apartment buildings, factories and farms, electrical grids and water pumping stations, and, in most cases, government offices; the mass violence may have ended, but there are few homes or jobs to return to, and the resentments that may have fueled the fighting in the first place only have an opportunity to fester.

Rather than leave peacekeepers in a peace operation's host country during this period to stanch sporadic violent outbreaks of such resentments, why not also give military peacekeeping

forces—especially the engineering and construction battalions—a mandate to blitz the country’s infrastructural repair and reconstruction while the international community amasses funds for NGOs to undertake more long-term peacebuilding tasks? If NGOs cannot get major funding for about a year, and if the military is hesitant to take on nation-building tasks, the consequent “reconstruction gap” means that interventions will continue to be long, arduous affairs. It also means that the international community’s efforts will continue to be reactive rather than preventive—that is, they will not be directed toward getting the host country’s economy moving again by promoting freedom of movement through public works and the rebuilding and repair of the country’s economic lifelines: the roadways and shelters and services that support the country’s human capital. That task is imperative in establishing durable peace in a war-torn society.

Colonel Williams’s solution for closing this gap is surprising, given the military’s aversion to nation building. His prescription resides in the nation-building camp, yet it is a tempered proposal that focuses on the immediate postconflict environment and is aimed at extracting the military quickly and efficiently, handing over long-term physical reconstruction tasks to its civilian partners in peace operations. His recommendations for changes in defense and foreign policy planning are grounded in many years of experience not only as a battalion commander but also as an official in the defense bureaucracy, serving as liaison between the assistant secretary of the army for civil works and federal agencies, Congress, and state and local governments. He is also a scholar, holding a doctorate in political science after completing his dissertation on defense reorganization.

The fundamental changes that Colonel Williams proposes for the military’s role in postconflict reconstruction raise an equally fundamental question about the foreign policy goals of the major troop-contributing nations in peace operations—particularly the United States. As Colonel Williams aptly demonstrates in the three case studies that follow, the reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo seemed to have a predetermined course: restore the network of roads, industrial plant, and public utilities that were

mangled in a few short years of ethnic conflict and reintegrate these war-torn venues into the European project. Afghanistan, however, had very little of such infrastructure to begin with prior to its transformation as the first battleground in the War on Terror, one of whose related assumptions is the need to remove the sources of continued poverty and hopelessness that make such countries attractive breeding grounds for terrorists.

So what should be the extent of the military's participation in a peace operation, and how should its success be judged? Critics will view Colonel Williams's recommendations as just more "mission creep" toward the onerous tasks of nation building. In fact, they should be viewed as a way to make international interventions more efficient and to extract most military forces from a peace operation more quickly and more smoothly. If Operation Iraqi Freedom comes to mind as an obvious candidate for the lessons in this book, it should be noted here that senior officials at the Department of Defense requested Colonel Williams to give a presentation on the postconflict reconstruction "template" he details in the final chapter of *Engineering Peace*, and parts of the template were incorporated into the Coalition Provisional Authority's reconstruction plans.

Colonel Williams's study is the most recent installment in a series of monographs published by the United States Institute of Peace on the changing role of the military in peacekeeping operations. It also comes on the heels of another significant work on postconflict environments published by the Institute's Press—Robert Perito's *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*. Both volumes explore the challenges of stabilizing postconflict environments and the requirements of creating a durable peace, albeit from different perspectives: Perito in the realm of establishing public security in a peace operation's host country, and Williams decidedly "on the ground," looking at the physical things that need to be quickly repaired and rebuilt in order to help make a war-damaged society and country functional again.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON, PRESIDENT
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

PREFACE

THIS BOOK IS ABOUT POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION, or more precisely how to execute postconflict reconstruction in the most optimum way to secure long-term peace. These are ideas formed during twenty-two years of military experience: experience gathered during security operations on the inter-German border during the Cold War; multiple peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans; no-notice defense missions in Kuwait; numerous exercises against notional forces in the swamps of Georgia, the deserts of California and Egypt, and the rolling hills of Germany; and almost constant military plan development to prepare for possible missions in places such as Korea, Iraq, Turkey, and Greece. Throughout all of these scenarios, there exists a common thread. After the fighting is done and hostilities have essentially ceased, viable physical infrastructure is essential for a region to develop economic strength, leading to government stability and security. The earlier that the infrastructure can return to normalcy, the better are the chances that the country will grow and that long-term peace will thrive.

Despite the inherent value of infrastructure reconstruction to the long-term peace process, while deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo I experienced significant frustration at the apparent gap between the limits of military infrastructure reconstruction and the beginning of postconflict infrastructure reconstruction by civilian agencies. This frustration later evolved into critical thinking on ways to better execute postconflict reconstruction and to maximize the reconstruction potential of both the military and civilian components, while also maximizing and growing the capabilities of the host country. I developed a comparative study of the experiences of three regions that had significant U.S. forces engaged throughout the three stages of peace operations:

peace enforcement, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The criteria for my case selection were straightforward:

1. I considered only those peace operations that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, peace operations had the geopolitical task to ensure that local conflicts did not sufficiently escalate to drag in larger regional neighbors or the two superpowers. The ending of the superpower conflict created a new set of circumstances to which the military and the civilian agencies have had to adjust. Any proposed template for postconflict infrastructure reconstruction must confine itself to the current standard of peace operations and not be sidetracked by Cold War guidelines.
2. I limited my cases to those that had large infusions of U.S. military forces sent to conduct the continuum of military operations from high-intensity conflict to peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sent forces of at least a battalion size or larger to ten conflicts around the world. Table 1 outlines the possible case pool.
3. I limited my case selection to operations that reached the peacebuilding stage and that lasted longer than eighteen months in order to determine what effects the reconstruction gap had on country development. These two stipulations eliminated six cases:
 - Panama—a short operation with no requirement for large infrastructure reconstruction as part of peacebuilding.
 - Somalia—President Clinton terminated the operation when U.S. forces failed to accomplish countrywide peace enforcement. One of the prerequisites for peacebuilding is the establishment of a stable and secure environment. This was never achieved throughout the country.
 - Macedonia—U.S. forces were deployed as part of the United Nations (UN) Preventive Deployment Force. The mission ended on February 28, 1999, and later transitioned to be a part of the Kosovo Force. No infrastructure reconstruction was required in Macedonia and forces were there in a UN observer status only.

Table 1. Major U.S. Peace Operations since 1989

Location	Duration	Peak Number of U.S. Forces
Panama	1989–1990	14,000
Iraq and Kuwait	1991–present	35,000
Somalia	1992–1994	25,800
Macedonia	1993–1999	600
Rwanda	1994	3,600
Haiti	1994–present	21,000
Bosnia	1996–present	26,000
Kosovo	1999–present	7,100
East Timor	1999–present	1,300
Afghanistan	2001–present	7,100

Sources: Nina M. Serafino, *Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 20, 1999), passim; idem, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2002), 2-3; Congressional Budget Office, *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1999), xi; United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

- Rwanda—U.S. forces were not deployed long enough to enter the peacebuilding stage.
 - Haiti—U.S. forces were deployed in large numbers for less than one year, although there are still limited forces in theater.
 - East Timor—short operation; not a sufficient U.S. presence to affect reconstruction.
4. I limited my case selection to infrastructure efforts that required external funding. This eliminated Kuwait, which had the required \$14 billion to fully fund the U.S. efforts at reconstruction. Because the United States Army Corps of Engineers fully

reconstructed the country on a reimbursable basis, paid for by the legitimate government of Kuwait, this operation is an aberration from the possible case pool.¹ Most peace operations do not have the luxury of having a fully functioning legitimate government, or one with the wealth of the Kuwaitis.

Therefore, I chose to focus on the remaining cases—Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—as the cases for comparison. All three operations meet the proposed criteria and constitute highly visible test opportunities for the international community to mobilize resources and design effective interventions for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The findings of these three case studies suggest that even generous, well-intentioned external assistance is not readily available in the critical year after the cessation of hostilities. By demonstrating the problems encountered in each operation with respect to reconstruction, I fully develop a postconflict infrastructure reconstruction template in Chapter 5 to use as a planning guideline for U.S. peace operations in the future.

In the end, the critical determinants of successful peacebuilding and sustainable recovery must be *internal*. This book's focus on *external* resources may overemphasize the role of the military and the international donors in successful postconflict reconstruction. The efforts of the military, with a smooth transition to civil agencies supported by the donor community, cannot substitute for the willingness of local actors to renounce violence and to devote domestic resources to reconstruction. The value of the postconflict reconstruction proposal in the final chapter is that it will help jumpstart the host nation and will give it a rapid start to recovery with a goal of self-sufficiency. A rise in self-sufficiency will subsequently advance the redeployment of the intervening military forces and civilian agencies.

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I want to thank the United States Institute of Peace for sponsoring me as a Senior Fellow and providing the best work environment possible in which to think and write. The president of the Institute, Ambassador Dick Solomon, my adviser John Crist, my editor Peter Pavilionis, and my research assistant Ryan Sawak—they initially proposed turning my ideas into a book and patiently guided me through the process as a first-time author. I also want to thank Mark Sweberg, Larry Wentz, and Bill Baldwin, each experts in their field, who willingly gave great amounts of their time to read and edit what I wrote in an effort to not only make my writing better, but, more important, to make sure that I got it right.

Finally, I want to thank my family—from my mother who always had words of encouragement, to my brother, Pem, and sisters, Mary and Bobbie, who were very supportive. To my mother-in-law, Rachel, and my brothers- and sisters-in-law—thanks for your encouraging words. But, most important, I must thank my biggest fans—my wife, Kathy, and my daughters, Rebecca and Leah. You gave me the love and encouragement that it took to complete this project. You understood when I would work “a little” on the weekends and would endure the constant barrage of ideas that I would talk about at dinner while I worked my way through to the end.

Dad, I think you would have liked this too. This has been a true pleasure.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFSOUTH: Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
ARRC: Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)
ARRC-ENG: Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
Engineer
CE: Contingency Establishment
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command
CHLC: Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation
CJCMIC: Combined Joint Civil-Military Cooperation
CJCMOTF: Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
CMOC: Civil-Military Operations Center
CMRWG: Civil-Military Reconstruction Working Group
COMIFOR: Commander of the Implementation Force
DAC: Development Assistance Committee
DAG: Damage Assessment Group
DOD: U.S. Department of Defense
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC: European Commission
EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERDC: Engineer Research and Development Center
ETRP: Emergency Transport and Reconstruction Project
EU: European Union
FET: Facility Engineer Team
FRY: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GFAP: General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Accords)
GIS: Geographic Information Systems
GPS: Global Positioning System
H/CA: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP: Internally Displaced Person
IEBL: Inter-Entity Boundary Line (Bosnia)
IFOR: Implementation Force (Bosnia)
IFOR-ENG: Implementation Force Engineer
IO: International Organization
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KFOR: Kosovo Force
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC: Kosovo Protection Corps
MACA: Mine Action Center for Afghanistan
MAPA: Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
MCC: Mine Clearance Center
METL: Mission Essential Task List
MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit
MMR: Minimum Military Requirement
MNB: Multinational Brigade
MND: Multinational Division
MRE: Maneuver Rehearsal Exercise
MSR: Main Supply Route
MTA: Military Technical Agreement (Kosovo)
NAC: NATO North Atlantic Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
NSC: National Security Council
NSPD: National Security Policy Directive

- OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (U.S. Agency for International Development)
- OHDC: Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Civil Aid
- OHR: Office of the High Representative (Bosnia)
- OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- PDD: Presidential Decision Directive
- POL-MIL: Political-Military
- PRRP: Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program
- PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
- REO: Regional Engineering Office
- RMAC: Regional Mine Action Center
- SFOR: Stabilization Force (Bosnia)
- SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
- SNIC: Snow and Ice Clearance
- SOF: Special Operations Forces
- SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General (United Nations)
- TERO: Theater Emergency Recovery Office
- TPMO: Theater Project Management Office
- UCPMB: Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac (Kosovo)
- UN: United Nations
- UNESCO: UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
- UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
- UNMAC: United Nations Mine Action Center
- UNMACC: United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
- UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
- UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development

UXO: Unexploded Ordnance

WFP: World Food Program

ZOS: Zone of Separation (Bosnia)

Engineering Peace

