

Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific

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edited by Yoichi Funabashi



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Foreword

Ezra Vogel

IT IS NOW ALL TOO CLEAR that globalization does not mean homogenization. As the forces of globalization bring peoples of the world into closer contact, is it inevitable that different ethnic groups, different religions, different civilizations will clash? Are nations and peoples that have fought in the past destined to repeat their conflicts?

In 1945, looking back at the history of wars between Germany and Poland, one might have said that the bitter hatreds from past conflicts would condemn them to fight again. Yet today, future fighting between them is almost unthinkable. How did Germany and Poland achieve such reconciliation?

Those of us who work in the Asia-Pacific region know that no issue is more important for the future of the region than overcoming the hatreds that history has spawned. Yet very little has been done to understand why some peoples have achieved reconciliation and others have not. One can only admire the pioneering efforts of Richard Solomon and his colleagues at the United States Institute of Peace, and of Yoichi Funabashi and other Japanese, who have worked together to assemble a talented and thoughtful group of scholars, journalists, and government officials to find ways to advance reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The authors in this volume address a broad range of cases of inter-ethnic and international animosity fueled by histories and memories of

injustices and human rights abuses. Masahiro Wakabayashi, for instance, examines the infamous 2-28 Incident that occurred in Taiwan in February 1947, when the KMT military forces that took over Taiwan slaughtered thousands of local leaders who might have led resistance to the KMT. For the next forty years—as the percentage of “Mainlanders” among Taiwan’s population rose from 1 percent in 1947 to 8 percent in 1952 to 14 percent in 1990—the KMT leadership maintained a tight crackdown on dissent. But beneath the surface hostility simmered. In the 1980s the two sides finally began to face their history. The issue has not died down and may flare up again as Taiwan debates how to respond to mainland pressure for reunification. But historical grievances have been faced squarely and tensions have been greatly reduced. Wakabayashi explains how this progress was achieved.

Other authors in the volume address such problems as hatred between North and South Korea that lingers from the Korean War, the animosities between different groups within Cambodia and between Cambodia and Vietnam, and the strained relations between Indonesia and East Timor and among the East Timorese themselves. Another problem examined in this volume—a problem that in sheer scale dominates East Asia—is relations between Japan and its two large neighbors in East Asia, China and Korea. Here national differences reinforce cultural differences and historical memories have become powerful symbols for a host of problems that stymie efforts at reconciliation. The animosity has a powerful internal aspect, too, for within China and Korea enmity continues to smolder between those who worked with the Japanese during World War II and those who hated such “collaborators.”



Bold leaders who seek reconciliation can accomplish a great deal. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in China in 1978 he had to contend with deep divisions between, on the one side, victims of the Cultural Revolution who wanted to settle accounts and, on the other side, those who wanted to forget the entire episode or who refused to acknowledge that its victims deserved any form of restitution or rehabilitation. He worked hard to create a climate in which history could be reexamined and realities

faced, but rather than allow retribution to be vented, he moved on to deal pragmatically with the problems ahead.

In the same way, when Deng was about to launch his policy of reform and opening, he realized that China's growth required peaceful relations with other major countries. Relations with Japan were particularly strained. In the fall of 1978, just before he launched his new policies, Deng visited Japan. He stressed that the two countries should concentrate on the future rather than on the past. At the time, with Japan and China (along with the United States) cooperating against the Soviet Union, the geostrategic climate was very favorable. The historical issue did not go away, but for fifteen years it remained relatively quiet. In the early 1990s, however, the issue again broke out and has hobbled Sino-Japanese relations ever since.

In 1965, President Park Chung Hee, knowing that South Korean economic growth required cooperation with Japan, boldly concluded a peace treaty with Japan. The treaty brought economic assistance from Japan for South Korea's economic takeoff, but Park's policy was forced on the South Korean people and protests were suppressed. The process of reconciliation was superficial; public attitudes were not changed.

In 1998 President Kim Dae Jong made a dramatic visit to Japan in which he advocated thinking about the future, not the past. His speech took on added meaning because he had been kidnapped in Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which then prepared to kill him. In a heartfelt speech in Japan, Kim thanked his Japanese friends who had helped save his life. A few weeks later President Jiang Zemin of China also visited Japan, but his repeated attacks on Japan for inadequately dealing with its history led Prime Minister Obuchi to refuse to issue an apology. In contrast, during Kim Dae Jong's visit, Obuchi was deeply moved by Kim's efforts to put the past behind. He happily signed an apology and Korean-Japanese relations took a dramatic turn for the better.

In the wake of Kim Dae Jong's 1998 visit to Japan, individual Koreans and Japanese—in business, in government, in universities, in the press, and in casual tourist encounters—reported a dramatic improvement in their mutual relations. Public opinion polls in Japan reflected a marked increase in positive attitudes toward Japan. But in 2001, when a new textbook in Japan sought to minimize the suffering that Japan had caused to the Korean people, the progress threatened to unravel. Many

Koreans who had begun to feel more positively toward Japan became enraged again.

Leadership alone clearly is not enough. In an era when much of the public follows national news through the media, reconciliation cannot work unless it enjoys broad support among the people.



Many Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s hoped that, with the passage of time, painful memories of World War II and the powerful emotions of the families of those who suffered during the war would gradually fade. Within Japan, when Japanese quarrel, they do often deal with the problem by remaining silent and going about their business, and with the passage of time, enmities do often begin to fade away. But between nations this approach evidently has not been working. Other nations will not forget Japan's past conduct, whether because they cannot suppress spontaneous public expressions of outrage and injustice, or because they want to promote national unity against outsiders, or because they want to contain Japanese power and guard against a rebirth of Japanese militarism, or because they hope to secure further compensation from Japan.

Within China and Korea, the stories of those who bravely fought the Japanese have never been entirely forgotten. In China, the songs, stories, novels, and movies from the 1930s and 1940s of heroic Chinese fighting against the cruel invaders are periodically revived, refreshing the public's sense of Japanese iniquity. In Korea, painful memories can still be stirred by the essays written before 1945 by Koreans living outside the reach of imperial Japan, essays intended to appeal to global public opinion. It is through such material, and through the reminiscences of those who suffered at the hands of the Japanese, that Koreans and Japanese pass on the pain of injustice to later generations. Today young Chinese boys, in tune with the world by mastering electronic games, play games in which they are Chinese guerrillas fighting Japanese invaders.

Furthermore, Chinese and Korean spokesmen now criticize not only those Japanese who participated in wartime atrocities but also present-day Japanese who refuse to acknowledge the full extent of such atrocities and who fail to display public sorrow and make further compensation.

Time alone will not heal the wounds.



Chinese and Koreans ask why the Japanese cannot apologize more thoroughly, show real remorse, make a clean breast of all the atrocities they caused, and offer more generous compensation. “Why,” they ask, “do not the Japanese condemn their history as roundly as the Germans do?” In fact, most Japanese, as shown in polls, do acknowledge that Japan committed atrocities in Asia, do believe that Japan should have apologized, and do want to achieve reconciliation. Nonetheless, clearly they have not been sufficiently forthcoming to satisfy their Asian neighbors. Why?

In Europe after World War II, Germany, bordered by France and Poland, was an integral part of the economic reconstruction of Europe. The building of NATO and of the European Economic Community—and later of the European Union—forced Germany to address the issues that divided it from its neighbors. By contrast, Japan after 1949 had almost no contact with communist China or North Korea, and even relations with South Korea, separated from Japan by an ocean, were never as close as the relations between Germany and its neighbors.

One atrocity perpetrated by the Germans—the attempt to exterminate an entire people—was never attempted by the Japanese. The horrors of the Holocaust created demands for expiation not only among Germany’s neighbors but among Germans as well. Japanese could more easily persuade themselves that their atrocities were inseparable from war and that Japan’s behavior was not qualitatively worse than that of other colonial and warlike powers.

Many Japanese people who lived under the military in the 1930s and early 1940s have long argued that they, the ordinary people, were not responsible for the decisions of their government. After all, they contend, they had been subjects of the Japanese military in World War II and, like the Koreans, had suffered at the hands of that military. Those Japanese who were born after 1945 feel even less responsible for the actions of Japan’s military government.

The issue of war apology and atonement became a political issue in Japan soon after World War II. Japanese socialists and communists attacked mainstream politicians for not doing more to make amends for the country’s atrocities, and quickly passed on to Korea and China news of incidents and of efforts to whitewash atrocities. In response, Liberal Democratic

Party officials often tended to play down the atrocities and to dismiss their domestic opponents as tools of foreign interests.

China and Korea have sometimes given extraordinary publicity to certain Japanese textbooks that try to explain away the horrors that Japan perpetrated in the war and to certain politicians who outrageously understate the scope of human rights abuses committed by Japanese forces. These textbooks and politicians do not necessarily reflect broad segments of Japanese public opinion but, when widely publicized, they can have an enormous impact on opinion in China and Korea.

The effects can be felt in Japan, too, especially when it appears that the Chinese and Korean media have reminded their audiences of Japanese atrocities in order to stir up anti-Japanese sentiments in other parts of Asia and to elicit more economic aid or more compensation from Japanese. Even Japanese who are prepared to apologize for their country's past behavior become annoyed when they feel they are being manipulated.

Japanese point out that Japan agreed in 1965 to give large sums to South Korea, either directly or indirectly through industrial assistance. Japanese are also well aware that they will have to give comparable amounts to North Korea as and when relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang are normalized. China's leaders agreed not to ask for reparation, so Japan has given far more economic aid to China than to other countries. In the view of the Japanese, these aid programs are at least psychologically an effort to offer some compensation for the horrors of World War II. In Japanese eyes, the Chinese media has shown almost no recognition of Japanese generosity.

Many Japanese feel that Japan has apologized enough. The emperor apologized in China in 1992, and prime ministers who have visited China have repeatedly offered apologies. They have come to believe that they can never satisfy Chinese and Korean requests for apology. Enough is enough, they conclude. Other colonialists have done horrible things: the British in India, the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indochina, the Americans in the Philippines. No one any longer asks these nations to apologize. Why should only Japan be asked to apologize?

By the 1990s, as the Chinese economy was taking off and Chinese military expenses were growing rapidly, many Japanese came to suspect that China might be taking advantage of Japan's contrition. At the same time,

many Japanese who used to feel somewhat condescending toward Chinese achievements began to fear what might happen as China grows stronger. Such sentiments help explain why Chinese demands for apologies—like that made by President Jiang in 1998—may make the Japanese less willing, not more willing, to apologize.

This explanation of Japanese attitudes is not intended to justify those attitudes. But it is necessary to understand the complex emotional and psychological dynamics of the situation if full reconciliation is to be achieved. And full reconciliation must also deal with the fact that some people in China and Korea use historical issues for their own ends.



What, then, is to be done? It is clear that reconciliation is a many-sided process that requires a variety of ingredients and action at many levels. Among other things, it requires the following:

- Political leadership that can provide a vision for the future and can pilot a steady course toward that future.
- More objective textbooks and media in all the affected countries. Japanese textbooks sometimes understate the horrors, but textbooks in China and Korea often overstate the horrors and understate the peaceful efforts of the Japanese since 1945. Commissions made up of widely respected and relatively objective scholars from various countries could help to pinpoint and correct errors and exaggerations in textbooks and media.
- Objective research to create the basis for a more accurate understanding of disputed historical events. Working together, scholars from various countries—including countries directly affected by a particular historical dispute as well as countries not involved in that dispute—can help create a relatively objective picture of what is known and, no less important, what cannot be known and thus cannot be fully resolved on the basis of historical understanding.
- Opportunities for former belligerents to work together in common projects of mutual benefit.

Some potentially valuable elements of a reconciliation process can also be provided by outsiders. For instance, outsiders such as Americans can

convene meetings and facilitate discussions that enable the parties to a dispute to adopt a more objective tone than they employ in purely bilateral encounters.

Clearly, all of us who believe in the importance of reconciliation have ample opportunity to contribute to the process of restoring relationships poisoned by historical animosities. The chapters in this volume provide an excellent basis for us to move forward in our search for reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific.

Preface

IT MUST HAVE BEEN AROUND 1996 when Dr. Richard Solomon, president of the United States Institute of Peace, asked me whether I would be interested in conducting a research project on Japan's historical issues.

Dr. Solomon and I had known each other for some time, dating back to his days as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Reagan administration. We had often met and exchanged views on a range of issues, particularly issues on the relations of the United States, Japan, and China. On such occasions, our conversation would inevitably gravitate to the persistent historical issues. Despite the fact that World War II ended over fifty years ago, Japan's historical past refuses to fade away quietly. On the contrary, it is becoming an increasingly entangled Gordian knot of emotion and ideology, complicating Japan's diplomatic relationships with its neighbors.

Dr. Solomon once asked me how exactly Japan is attempting to resolve this persistent problem, and whether, if the problem is left unresolved, there is not a danger of Japan being saddled with this heavy burden indefinitely. He suggested that I conduct a research project on the subject, which he thought would offer an excellent opportunity for intellectual cross-stimulation.

At the time, I had little choice but to decline his kind invitation as I was busy with my duties as *Asahi's* bureau chief in America. Nonetheless,

it was indeed a compelling proposition, particularly given my long interest in the issue. Later, my interest in historical reconciliation grew even keener, especially after the 1990s, when it had become all too apparent that Japan's unresolved historical problems were posing a roadblock to the success of new diplomatic initiatives in Asia, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN+3 summit meeting.

Upon returning to Japan from Washington, I had the good fortune to meet and make friends with the German ambassador, Frank Elbe. A lawyer-turned-diplomat, Ambassador Elbe was first posted to Poland; ever since, he has been working on the issue of reconciliation between West Germany and Poland. Through my extensive discussions with him, I learned two salient points about how issues of historical reconciliation should be addressed: first, the problem must be tackled not only in moral terms of what should be done but also in pragmatic terms of what can be done; and second, that whoever addresses the problem should have a policy-oriented perspective, that is, a clear and feasible policy on how to pursue reconciliation.

Reminded of Dr. Solomon's invitation, I met with him in Washington. I noted that it would still be difficult for me personally to conduct a research project at the United States Institute of Peace, but that I would be interested in organizing an international workshop in order to address the issue in a more broadly defined global context. Dr. Solomon readily acceded to my request for the support of the Institute in this endeavor.

It was through this chain of events that the International Workshop on Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific came to be organized and held on February 16–17, 2001, at the International House of Japan in Tokyo, cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Tokyo Foundation. Dr. Solomon and I served as cochairs of the workshop. We were joined by seven scholars who presented papers and five commentators, each of whom I had had the opportunity to meet previously and who offered rich insights on historical reconciliation. We were also favored with keynote speeches by Gareth Evans, the former Australian foreign minister, and Yasuhiro Nakasone, the former Japanese prime minister.

All of these individuals participated in the workshop of their own volition. The discussions among them were lively, with much give-and-take.

Scholars presented papers and practitioners offered commentaries, stimulating further discussion and honing sharper insights on the topics addressed.

In the twenty-four months following the workshop, the authors of the papers revised their contributions to incorporate new insights, refine analyses, and reflect recent developments. Those developments, it should be noted, have been significant. In several of the cases discussed in this volume, the first years of the twenty-first century have seen bold and surprising steps being taken toward reconciliation. For instance, governments in North Korea and Japan have candidly acknowledged and apologized for past wrongs, although normalization talks have subsequently appeared to stall over the abduction cases and the nuclear issue. In other cases, recent developments have been less positive. For example, many in the international community have been disappointed by the outcomes of trials of Indonesian military officers charged with human rights abuses in East Timor.

Whether recent events are seen as encouraging or discouraging overall, there is no doubt that reconciliation is high on the agenda of many people in the Asia-Pacific region. This book reflects and, we trust, enhances that interest. It offers seven case studies spanning a considerable geographical area and a remarkably wide range of issues. It also includes as an appendix comments made at the workshop by Ambassador Elbe, Ambassador Yukio Sato, and Dr. Marianne Heiberg. Regretfully, because of limitations of space, the comments of other speakers and participants at the workshop had to be omitted. However, I have done my best to capture the essence of their observations in the concluding chapter, which tries to identify many of the keys that can unlock the paths to reconciliation.

Acknowledgments

THIS PROJECT ON RECONCILIATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC began as a workshop in February 2001 and has since evolved into the present volume. Throughout the course of the project, I have been blessed with both the moral and the material support of many individuals and institutions. First and foremost, I wish to thank the workshop participants for their active and insightful contributions. I am also most grateful to Gareth Evans and Yasuhiro Nakasone for having kindly agreed to serve as our keynote speakers. Furthermore, I am deeply indebted to Richard Solomon and the United States Institute of Peace, whose generous and kind support has been vital to achieving this project's success.

I am honored that Ezra Vogel of Harvard University has written the foreword to this volume. As an understanding friend of not only Japan but also China and South Korea, he has over a long span of years organized a wide range of projects on war and history at Harvard and elsewhere. There is simply no other Asia expert in the world who is as well versed in the languages, histories, and societies of all three of these countries. Nor is anyone better respected in both the scholarly and the policymaking communities. I am, therefore, delighted to express our deepest gratitude to him for the distinguished contribution he has made to this publication.

Numerous other colleagues and associates have supported these efforts in a variety of ways. Among them, I would like to thank the staff of the

United States Institute of Peace, particularly Patrick M. Cronin (former director of the Research and Studies Program), Neil J. Kritz (director of the Rule of Law Program), William M. Drennan (deputy director of the Research and Studies Program), Judy Barsalou (director of the Grant Program), Deepa M. Ollapally (a program officer in the Grant Program), and April R. Hall (grant administrator in the Grant Program), for so kindly extending to this endeavor their intellectual, logistical, and financial support. I also wish to express my appreciation to the affiliated members of the Tokyo Foundation, which cosponsored and co-organized the workshop, for providing their strong support in implementing the project. My thanks go to Kimindo Kusaka (chairman), Heizo Takenaka (president), and Takahiro Suzuki (director of the Research Division), as well as to the staff: Nami Uesugi, Takeshi Tamamura, and Kori Urayama.

Finally, I am grateful to Nigel Quinney, the editor of this publication, for his deep interest in the topic, strong encouragement, and unrelenting moral support. This volume could not have been realized without his editorial expertise and support.

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His books in English include *Alliance Tomorrow*, ed. Tokyo Foundation (2001); *Alliance Adrift* (1998), winner of the Shincho Arts and Sciences Award; *Asia-Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC* (1995), winner of the Mainichi Shimbun Asia Pacific Grand Prix Award; and *Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre* (1988), winner of the Yoshino Sakuzo Prize. His books in Japanese include *Globalization Trick* (2002) and *How to Come to Terms with Japan's War Responsibility* (2002).

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Chanda is the author of *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* and coauthor of over a dozen books on Asian politics, security, and foreign policy, including *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* and *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia*. His most recent book is the *Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11*, which he coedited with

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Todung Mulya Lubis is a senior partner of Lubis, Santosa & Maulana Law Offices in Jakarta and a lecturer on human rights in the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia. He has defended a number of important and widely publicized cases, among them HR. Dharsono (1985), Prioritas (judicial review, 1992), Tempo (1995), Jakarta Post (1997), Time Magazine (1999), and Washington Post (2002). Between 1971 and 1986 he worked as a legal aid lawyer and chaired the Indonesian Institute of Legal Aid (1983–86) and its Jakarta chapter (1979–85). Currently, he is the chairman of the Board of Ethics at Indonesian Corruption Watch and vice president of the Indonesian Bar Association.

He has written and edited numerous articles, papers, and books on legal aid, human rights, and economic laws, and has been a regular columnist for various newspapers and magazines in Indonesia, among them *Kompas*, the *Jakarta Post*, and *Tempo*.

A graduate of the University of Indonesia, he also studied at the Institute of American and International Law in Dallas, the Boalt Law School of the University of California at Berkeley, and Harvard Law School. He is a member of various international and national organizations, including the International Bar Association, the Regional Council for Human Rights in Asia, Human Rights Internet, Human Rights Advocate, and the International Crisis Group.

Greg Sheridan is foreign editor of the *Australian*. He has also been its diplomatic correspondent in Canberra, chief editorial writer, and correspondent in Washington, D.C., and Beijing. His work has appeared in the *Sunday Times* (London), *Asian Wall Street Journal*, *Quadrant*, *South China Morning Post*, and numerous anthologies. He is the author of *Tigers: Leaders of the New Asia Pacific* (1997).

Scott Snyder is the Asia Foundation's representative in Korea. Previously, he was an Asia specialist in the Research and Studies Program of the United States Institute of Peace, where he wrote *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (1999). A former Abe Fellow of the Social

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Snyder received his B.A. from Rice University and an M.A. from the Regional Studies East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of a Thomas G. Watson Fellowship in 1987–88 and attended Yonsei University in South Korea.

Masahiro Wakabayashi is professor at and director of the Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Tokyo in 1985. His academic interests focus on the role of Taiwanese intellectuals in anti-Japanese movements, Taiwan's democratic transition, and identity politics in Taiwan. Wakabayashi's publications include *Taiwan: Democratization in a Divided Country* (in Japanese, 1992; in Chinese, 1994) and *Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui* (in Japanese, 1996; in Chinese, 1998). He was a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, in 1995 and 1996. He served as president of the Japan Association for Taiwan Studies in 1998–2002.

Daqing Yang teaches modern Japanese history at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where he is an associate professor of history and international affairs. He also regularly lectures on modern Japan at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute.

A native of Nanjing, Yang received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has twice studied at Keio University in Tokyo and is a recipient of the Japan Foundation Research Fellowship, the ACLS/SSRC/NEH International and Area Studies Fellowship, and the Abe Fellowship sponsored by the Center for Global Partnership and the Social Sciences Research Council. He is author of *Technology of Empire* (forthcoming), which deals with telecommunications networks and Japanese expansion before 1945. His articles have appeared in the *American Historical Review*, *Journal of Asian Studies*, *Monumenta Nipponica*, *Gionji Shigaku*, *Shiso*, and *Ronza*.