

Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises

COERCIVE

[and the Containment of
International Crises]

INDUCEMENT

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and

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with

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The views expressed in this book are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of their employers or of the United States Institute of Peace.

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FOREWORD

The 1990s has been a busy decade for peacekeeping. From 1989 through 1994, we saw an unprecedented proliferation of peacekeeping *missions*, as the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council celebrated the end of the Cold War by authorizing two dozen new operations, many of them much more ambitious than the “traditional” operations mandated during the preceding forty years of their rivalry. In the latter half of the decade, we witnessed a proliferation of peacekeeping *studies*, as scholars and practitioners have tried to figure out what exactly the international community accomplished in the early '90s, and, more particularly, what worked and what didn't.

While it is inevitable that reflection should follow action in this fashion, it is unfortunate that attempts to formulate the basic concepts and precepts of the new, more ambitious types of peacekeeping should not have preceded the operations themselves. Lacking a clear concept of how they were supposed to act, the peacekeeping troops and their commanders were often left to invent their own ground rules, set their own concrete objectives, and otherwise fend for themselves. In a number of cases, especially those where the peacekeeping forces were sponsored by the United Nations but were actually under the control of their own governments, this learn-by-doing approach worked remarkably well. But in other instances, especially those plagued by a divided chain of command, disasters occurred and the missions collapsed. After the fatal mistakes made in Somalia and Bosnia, the international community's eagerness to authorize these new forms of UN peacekeeping missions quickly faded—along with references to “muscular multilateralism.”

At about this time, analysts began to increasingly review and critique what the politicians and troops had done. In truth, a good deal had already been written on peacekeeping in the early '90s; but from 1995 onward, the

literature has swelled considerably. Although the torrent of essays, articles, and books has at times threatened to overwhelm even those who specialize in the subject, it has also helped to bring to the surface the key issues regarding the theory and practice of contemporary peacekeeping. For that reason, it is a most propitious time for this book to appear, since it addresses the most important of these issues—how to define and employ the new, more ambitious types of operations attempted this decade.

First, should we categorize these operations as a variant of traditional UN “Chapter 6” peacekeeping (based on consent and characterized by the minimum use of force), as a variant of peace enforcement (“Chapter 7,” nonconsensual operations with a mandate imposed by force), or as a distinct category that lies between these other two categories? Second, if indeed a “middle option” does exist, what are its distinguishing features, and what guidelines should govern when and how it is employed?

To the first of these questions, the authors of this volume answer that there is indeed a middle option, which they name “coercive inducement.” (Actually, this name is not their invention but that of Kofi Annan, who coined the term in 1996 while he was UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping. However, it should be noted that Annan was responding to the broader concept of “inducement” that had earlier been introduced into the peacekeeping debate by coauthors Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes.) “By coercive inducement,” the authors explain, “we mean the judicious resort to coercive diplomacy or forceful persuasion by the international community in order to implement community norms or mandates vis-à-vis all the parties to a particular crisis.”

To the second question, the authors respond by defining coercive inducement with admirable care and cogency. It would be unproductive to try and summarize those defining characteristics here, and the reader must turn to chapter 2 for a complete portrait. Perhaps, though, the following quotation will serve as a thumbnail sketch: “[Coercive inducement’s] focus is on getting one’s way through the employment of military forces as opposed to using force per se. It aims to persuade rather than to seize or bludgeon, and it must form part of a concerted campaign involving a variety of means—politico-diplomatic, economic, hortatory, as well as military—to influence behavior.”

After laying out the principles of coercive inducement and contrasting them with the principles governing peacekeeping and enforcement

missions, the authors then present four case studies of UN-controlled and UN-sanctioned operations—in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti—to show the results of following or ignoring those principles. Drawing on the case studies, chapter 7 moves from analysis to prescription, and offers operational guidelines for future coercive inducement operations.

Throughout, the authors proceed systemically and carefully, marrying analytical rigor with in-depth research and unambiguous presentation. The result is a book that stands out from the crowd of peacekeeping studies; a study that by virtue of its merits and the reputation for pioneering work enjoyed by its authors is sure to find readers within UN headquarters and a host of state departments, defense ministries, and foreign policy think tanks. This is not to say that all readers will agree with its approach and conclusions. *Coercive Inducement* itself acknowledges that “the principles and guidelines presented in this analysis are not chiseled in stone. They remain subject to refinement and are not intended to preempt judgment.”

In publishing this book, produced with the support of the Institute’s Grant Program, we seek not to silence but to stimulate debate. Debate spurs conceptual progress. And as I remarked above, the new-style peacekeeping of the early 1990s suffered from the fact that it was implemented before it was conceptualized. Now, at least, the process of conceptualization is well under way, and everything that can be done to facilitate its refinement is surely to be welcomed.

Coercive Inducement is by no means the first study on peacekeeping and related topics to be published by the Institute. One of this book’s inspirations was the concept of “coercive diplomacy” as outlined by Alexander George in *Forceful Persuasion*, which the Institute published in 1991. Since then, we have funded and published a wide variety of studies that address the theory and practice of peacekeeping activities, including Fen Hampson’s *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen’s edited volume *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, Michael Lund’s *Preventing Violent Conflict*, John Hirsch and Robert Oakley’s *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, Mohamed Sahnoun’s *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Richard Synge’s *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action*, Paul Hare’s *Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace*, and David Yost’s *NATO Transformed*. In our Peaceworks series of reports, the Institute has published Denis McLean’s *Peace Operations and Common Sense*,

Roxanne Sismandis's *Police Functions in Peace Operations*, and Michael Hardesty and Jason Ellis's *Training for Peace Operations*.

In addition to these published works, the United States Institute of Peace's Grant Program and its Education and Training Program actively support creative research into peacekeeping, and our Research and Studies Program organizes seminars and workshops for military and civilian participants in ongoing and future peace operations.

It remains to be seen if peace operations will be as widely employed and discussed at the start of the twenty-first century as they have been at the end of the twentieth. Whatever turns out to be the case, we trust that analytically rigorous and pragmatically grounded studies such as *Coercive Inducement* will help prepare U.S. policymakers and practitioners, and the U.S. public, to more effectively face the challenges of managing international conflict in the 2000s.

Richard H. Solomon, President
United States Institute of Peace

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APC	armored personnel carrier
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination Organization
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CNN	Cable News Network
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FAdH	Forces Armées d’Haiti
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FNDC	Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie
FRAPH	Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrès Haitien
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HRS	humanitarian relief sectors
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia)
IPSF	Interim Public Security Force
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JNA	Yugoslav People’s Army

MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
MICVIH	OAS-UN International Civil Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MNF	Multinational Force (Haiti)
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHR	Office of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUVEH	United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDC	Parti Démocrate Chrétien
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PL	Parti Libéral
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RGA	Rwanda Government Army
ROE	rules of engagement
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RTLMC	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SDA	Muslim Party of Democratic Action (Bosnia)

SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia)
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNF	Somali National Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRS	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF	Somali Salvation Front
TNC	Transitional National Council
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force (Suez)
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USC	United Somali Congress
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USF	United Somali Front
USLO	United States Liaison Office
USP	United Somali Party
VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
WEU	Western European Union

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