

# Europe Undivided



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*The New Logic  
of Peace  
in U.S.-Russian  
Relations*

**James E. Goodby**

*Foreword by Alexander L. George*

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For Priscilla, Sarah, Laurence, and Lucy



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## Foreword

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**E***urope Undivided* is a significant, timely, and unique contribution to the theory and practice of foreign policy. Not only does Ambassador Goodby provide an incisive analysis of the nature of the peace during the Cold War and how it was accomplished, he also presents a sober, realistic identification of the challenges in the post-Cold War era that must be met if we are to construct a new basis for peace in Europe.

Although Goodby modestly refrains from referring to his role in developments leading to the end of the Cold War and in prevention of nuclear proliferation since then, it was a distinguished contribution that superbly qualifies him to be heard regarding the challenges that lie ahead and ways of dealing with them.

The new European security structure that is evolving and the nature of the peace associated with it remain to be decided. The reader may wonder why Goodby and I refer to “the nature of the peace” instead of just “peace.” As he states in the introduction to the book, there are several distinctively different types of peace: “precarious peace,” “conditional peace,” and “stable peace.” Precarious peace refers to an acute conflict relationship between two states when “peace” means little more than the temporary absence of war. Such a peace depends not merely on “general deterrence,” to use a term Patrick Morgan introduced into the literature some years ago to describe the kind of deterrence that is ever present in the background of a highly conflictful relationship and serves to contain it.<sup>1</sup> To keep war from breaking out in such a relationship also requires frequent resort to “immediate deterrence”—that is, the timely use of threatening actions and warnings in war-threatening crises. The Arab-Israeli relationship, until recent times, is an example of precarious peace.

Conditional peace, on the other hand, describes a less acute, less heated conflict relationship, one in which general deterrence plays the predominant, usually effective role in discouraging policies and actions that might lead to war-threatening crises. As a result of general deterrence, such crises seldom occur. Therefore the parties to the conflict do not often need to resort to immediate deterrence. The U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War qualifies as an example of conditional peace. During the Cold War there were only a few diplomatic crises in which general deterrence had to be supplemented and augmented with immediate deterrence.

Neither in precarious peace nor in conditional peace does either party to the conflict rule out initiating force as an instrument of policy, and deterrent and compellant threats do occur on occasion. In contrast, stable peace is a relationship between two states (or groups of states) in which neither state considers engaging in the use of military force, or even making a threat of force in any dispute between them. Deterrence and compellance backed by military force are simply excluded as instruments of policy. Two states or more states (as in the European Union) that enjoy a relationship of stable peace may continue to have serious disputes, but they deal with them by nonmilitary means. An example of this is the Suez crisis of 1956 in which President Eisenhower made strong, credible threats of economic sanctions to pressure the British government to withdraw its forces from the Suez.

In discussing possible European security structures that may develop in the years ahead, Goodby focuses first on a type of peace that he hopes can be achieved in the midterm, a variant of conditional peace. If it is achieved, general deterrence will suffice. Disputes between the two sides will be managed without war-threatening crises.

Chapter 7 of the book discusses the requirements and modalities for such a new variant of the conditional peace model. I need not summarize his discussion except to call attention to Goodby's forthright, realistic recognition of the tension in such a security system between the two pillars on which it would be based: "collective security" and "spheres of interest." The reader will find particularly interesting the case Goodby makes that these two shopworn models and the practices associated with them need to be reconsidered. Indeed, he provides a significant reconceptualization of both collective security and spheres

of interest that, if accomplished in practice, would enable them to coexist and jointly contribute to maintaining conditional peace.

An even more important contribution is to be found in chapter 8. Here Goodby addresses in a novel and creative way the need to look beyond a conditional peace. He examines the prospects and the requirements for a transition to a security system that would provide a stable peace for the entire Euroatlantic community. This community would include Russia and some other countries that formerly lay on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

In this part of the book Goodby provides the architecture for a U.S. foreign policy that would aim at developing stable peace. In the terms used by academic scholars, Goodby engages in a “design exercise.”<sup>2</sup> In more familiar language, chapter 8 is an example—all too seldom achieved in the U.S. government—of serious long-range policy planning. Policy planners worth their name are architects of efforts to create a new and better international security system. Franklin Roosevelt referred to his abortive plan for a new post-World War II security system as “the Four Policemen.” American leaders, as Goodby indicates in chapters 1 and 2, were the architects of the system that contained communism in ways that avoided war, and American diplomacy deserves credit for some of the critical steps taken in the Helsinki Accord of 1975 and thereafter that helped pave the way for the end of the Cold War. Far less successful was the effort Nixon and Kissinger made to develop a new international system based on a “constructive relationship” with the Soviet Union that would replace or modify the Cold War under the ambiguous term “détente.”

A *full-blown* design exercise or long-range policy plan comprises several elements: first, what might be called a “grand design” (the term Roosevelt used in referring to his “Four Policemen” model) that identifies in general terms the essence of a new security system; second, a “grand strategy”—the outlines of a strategic plan for achieving the long-range goal; third, of course, the various “tactics” that have to be improvised to implement different elements of the grand strategy. Chapter 8 provides a skeletal architecture of this kind. Goodby depicts both the grand design and elements of the grand strategy.

Where does Goodby’s grand design come from? As he explains in the introduction and in chapter 8, he believes that President Clinton

described a grand design when he spoke in October 1996 of “an opportunity to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent” embracing all of Europe. As Goodby notes, the president has repeated a similar phrase on subsequent occasions. In a press conference on March 7, 1997, the president referred to his “vision” of “a united, democratic, and free Europe.” He explicitly stated that this “does not rule out even Russian membership in a common security alliance”—eventually, that is.<sup>3</sup>

It is indeed possible to interpret these statements, as Goodby does, as indicating that the president has set as a long-range goal of U.S. policy to try to bring about a stable peace within an enlarged Euroatlantic community. But in fact it is difficult to ascertain to what extent Clinton’s vision is as yet a well-considered, well-developed grand design. And it is equally difficult to tell to what extent policy planners within the government have privately articulated some semblance of a grand strategy for achieving this ambitious, difficult goal. Certainly it is fair to say that if the administration has such a long-range goal and strategy, it has made little effort thus far to explain it to Congress or to the public in order to achieve their understanding and support.

Any long-range foreign policy objective such as this one must pass two “tests”—the test of desirability and the test of feasibility. A grand design is desirable if it is considered to be consistent with American values and with basic national interests. Goodby makes a plausible case that a stable peace that includes Russia meets the test of desirability.

The more difficult test is that of feasibility. Is such a security system achievable? Do our policymakers have the motivation and incentives, the knowledge and resources, a good enough grand strategy, and the political and diplomatic skills needed to bring about a transition from conditional peace to stable peace? And, equally important, can our policymakers persuade not only themselves but also enough members of Congress and the public that such a long-range goal is feasible as well as desirable? The reader will find in chapter 8 a realistic discussion of the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving such a goal and of the formidable requirements for doing so. Therein also is a lucid case on behalf of its desirability and feasibility.

Working together with other states, the United States has undertaken a number of initiatives toward developing a new security system for Europe. This is a fluid process. Some steps have already been

undertaken—for example, the Partnership for Peace and the NATO–Russia Founding Act. Some additional steps have been determined but not yet ratified—notably, the enlargement of NATO. Discussions have started concerning the enlargement of the European Union to include some states that lie on the other side of the former Iron Curtain. There is also unfinished business, as Goodby reminds us, to develop what might be called a “constitution” for Europe and the Euroatlantic community that will embody appropriate norms, rules, and new or strengthened institutions.

Are these developments part of a coherent, if not yet fully developed and articulated long-range strategy for realizing Clinton’s vision? Are they the first, pragmatic “building blocks” designed to lay the basis for an all-embracing Euroatlantic community based on stable peace? Or are the various assurances being offered to Russia damage-limiting tactics—short-term improvisations designed to make NATO enlargement more palatable to the Russians? Alternatively, as Goodby hopes, are they or should they be parts of a transition strategy that aims at eventually bringing Russia into a common security system that achieves stable peace?

If, as seems likely, the administration has not yet undertaken the in-depth policy planning needed to implement its “vision,” Ambassador Goodby goes a long way toward filling the vacuum. These are not the musings of a starry-eyed idealist or an impractical dreamer. Quite the opposite: Goodby’s analysis is grounded in a serious assessment of the obstacles that stand in the way and what must be done to make a transition to stable peace at least possible. It will require a transformation of NATO so that it provides the basis for a common security system within the Euroatlantic community. As he would be the first to recognize, additional aspects of a grand strategy for achieving this goal need to be addressed; and additional questions regarding its feasibility will be raised and will need to be answered. But to recognize that more hard thought is needed to complete the assessment is not to fail to appreciate fully the value of the framework this book presents and the encouragement it provides to consider with utmost seriousness the concept of an inclusive Euroatlantic security community that would achieve stable peace.

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# Preface

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**W**riting is said to be a lonely occupation, but many people have shared in the creation of this book; the title page could rightfully be crowded with their names. Their ideas and advice and their critique of the manuscript truly have become a part of it. Their support encouraged me to persevere in a work in which I have been engaged off and on for over a dozen years. But in one important way, of course, this is not a collaborative effort: the author alone is responsible for the way the book has finally turned out.

I wrote and rewrote a substantial portion of the manuscript while I was the Arthur and Frank Payne Distinguished Lecturer for 1996–97 at the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. The purpose of the Payne Lectureship is “to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community today and increase support for informed international cooperation.” I tried to do just that in the public lectures I delivered at Stanford. This book, which includes ideas I broached in my lectures, panel discussions, and publications while at Stanford, will reach a wider audience and, I hope, will be a continuing fulfillment over many years to come of my deeply felt obligation to Stanford and to the descendants of Arthur and Frank Payne.

If this book is at all successful in linking the theoretical and the public policy worlds, no one will deserve more credit than Professor Alexander George, Stanford University, author of the foreword and my friend and mentor for many years. He was the inspiration behind the central themes I have sought to develop. More than anyone else, he encouraged me to merge my practitioner’s experience with my scholarly aspirations. I owe him a great debt of thanks.

The director of Stanford's Institute for International Affairs, Dr. Walter Falcon, and the deputy director, Dr. Nancy Okimoto, were constantly helpful to me during my year as Payne Lecturer. They were "force multipliers" in the sense that I utilized my time more effectively because of them. Dr. David Holloway and Dr. Michael May, codirectors of Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, did everything possible to make my year in their center an intellectual and a personal pleasure. Janet Weitz was faced with the daunting task of deciphering my early drafts of lectures and chapters of this book, and for her patience I will be forever grateful.

The genesis of the book goes back to 1985 when I became Research Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Still on leave then from the U.S. Foreign Service, I began to study the influences on American presidents as they made their decisions regarding the acquisition and the potential use of nuclear weapons. I came to realize that behind all the rhetoric there lay the simple recognition that, as Ronald Reagan later put it, a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. American presidents had wisely constructed a set of tacit rules that the Soviets had implicitly accepted too, despite Moscow's ideological rigidities at that time. The logic of this system of rules pointed to the nonuse of nuclear weapons. On this foundation rests much of the remainder of the book. My formative year in the world of academia meant a great deal to me, and Ambassador David Newsom, then director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown, opened that door for me. He also made it possible through a Pew Grant for me to extend my study of presidential decisionmaking by researching and writing case studies of decisions made by Roosevelt and Reagan. Two of my research assistants in those days were Robert Danin and Janette Hill. They also became my good friends, and still are. This book's publication owes a lot to their work and their continuing interest in the project.

The critical middle years of the book's creation took place at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., where I became a Distinguished Fellow in the fall of 1992. My plan was to study and write about rules of international behavior in the post-Cold War period, building on the work I already had done on nuclear rules of behavior in the early part of the Cold War. At the Institute I focused on the origins of the human rights norms sponsored by the U.S. government in the

late 1960s in the context of the preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I also studied the breakdown of norms and rules in Yugoslavia that had led to war in 1991 and looked into the problem of collective security in the post-Cold War era.

The origins of chapters 5 and 7 date back to this period. Chapter 5 appeared in an earlier version in the *Journal of International Negotiations* 1, no. 3 (1996), and in a still earlier version in *Regional Conflicts: The Challenge to U.S. Russian Cooperation*, edited by J. E. Goodby (SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1995). The United States Institute of Peace published an earlier version of chapter 7 in *Managing Global Chaos* (1996), edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall. My discussion of contemporary collective security in chapter 7 was published in an earlier version by the *Journal of International Affairs* 46, no. 2 (1993).

My tenure at the Institute was interrupted in 1993 by a one-year return to duty with the State Department as chief U.S. negotiator for the Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons. This experience gave me fresh insights into the role of norms and rules in international affairs since part of my official responsibilities involved negotiating for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine. I wrote about this experience on my return to the United States Institute of Peace in 1994.

I owe a great deal to the support given to me by the Institute's former president, Sam Lewis, and its current president, Dick Solomon. Sam Lewis made it possible for me to have a productive year of research and writing at the Institute. Dick Solomon endorsed the project and approved the book's publication by the Institute, giving me encouragement through every one of the final steps. Michael Lund, former director of the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program, and Sally Blair critiqued my efforts and offered me their ideas. Joe Klaitz the current director of the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program, was involved in the take-off and in the landing. I am especially grateful to him for his unfailing confidence in this project. Dan Snodderly, director of the Institute's publications program, has worked with me from my first days at the Institute, seeing it through from gleam in the eye to finished product.

I received magnificent support at the Institute from three wonderful research assistants, Dan O'Connor, Lou Klarevas, and Fred Williams,

each of them a Ph.D. candidate at The American University. The academic community can be proud to be represented by such fine young people. Of course, the quality of every book is the result of transactions between its author and its editor. I was very fortunate in working with Nigel Quinney, of the Institute of Peace. Nigel improved the quality of the manuscript significantly. Furthermore, he turned out to be the better diplomat of the two of us. If I felt at times like the bull in a *corrida de toros*, I realized it was for my own good.

The memory of the late Senator John Heinz is very special to me because I was the first winner of the Heinz Award in Public Policy for 1994. Teresa Heinz and the Heinz Family Foundation deserve great credit and the warmest thanks from all of us for what they are doing to encourage us to remember what we owe to others. Because of them and their ideals I pursued the theory and practice of peace for a longer time than I had ever expected, both in my writing and in my career as an American public servant.

Finally, of all the “it would have been impossible withouts,” the one that is most heartfelt is my tribute to my wife, Priscilla, who not only put up with this extended effort but also converted it from yellow pads to diskettes, improving the product all the while.

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