

NURTURING PEACE

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WHY PEACE SETTLEMENTS
SUCCEED OR FAIL

FEN OSLER HAMPSON



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FOREWORD

We have now seen enough of the post–Cold War era to begin systematically reviewing the conclusions and refining the lessons that can be drawn from numerous cases of contemporary conflict. Indeed, the effort is, if not already overdue, then extremely timely. In the first place, a significant degree of what might be called “strategic disorientation” continues to affect the thinking of political leaders, scholars, practitioners, pundits, and citizens. The search for new conceptual frameworks is still under way, and when it comes to describing the current transitional global system we are faced with many more questions than answers. In the second place—and paradoxically—this disorientation and uncertainty have not inhibited all sorts of people from making sweeping judgments about where we are headed, what works and does not work in post–Cold War conflict situations, and which conflict scenarios lend themselves to which forms of external action, if any. Characterized by an artificial aura of certainty, much of this discussion appears divorced from (and bereft of) in-depth analysis and comparison of specific cases.

In *Nurturing Peace*, Fen Osler Hampson remedies these deficiencies and brings impressive scholarly rigor to bear in a comparative study of five cases of negotiated settlement. This is a comprehensive attempt to identify, understand, and rank the factors that have made for success or failure

in Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, Namibia, and El Salvador. Seldom have students of conflict offered us such a rich, multifactoral analysis of the ingredients that shape the outcome of settlements. Serious students and practitioners alike will be gratified to encounter in these pages a nuanced and carefully developed account of the relevant global, regional, and domestic context of each case, as well as selective diplomatic histories to illustrate the path to settlement and beyond.

By zeroing in on the crucial but often neglected *implementation phase* of settlements, Hampson presents an overview not only of whether settlements were in fact carried out as planned, but also of the dynamics of implementation and the linkage between presettlement and postsettlement negotiation. In the process, Hampson charts fresh ground in extending the theory of third-party mediation into the postsettlement phase; he expands in provocative ways the powerful concept of conflict “ripeness,” while making clear the still important role of unique, case-specific factors. This book provides solid contextual grounding for the notion (and limitations) of ripeness, while also addressing other significant variables such as global and regional factors and the quality of the settlement package itself.

For practitioners, the merits of this accessible volume include its relative absence of obfuscatory academic scaffolding and its clear outline of what “implementors” need to do to avoid losing control of a situation to the opposing side or sides. One only hopes that the Western allies will read this book as they seek to translate into practice the accords reached at Dayton among the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.

As the title suggests, *Nurturing Peace* strongly reinforces the idea that settlements are not self-executing. Indeed, those that “work” are nurtured by a continuous element of sustained, third-party leadership, mediation, problem solving, and peace building. When those external actors who helped mediate a settlement remain engaged and continue to furnish diplomatic backing and political will, then a settlement has a chance of succeeding. This external element, Hampson argues, provides the cement to hold things together when it comes time to put a blueprint into action. It also provides the essential components of creativity, flexibility, pressure, and incentives to keep the parties themselves from running aground—just as outsiders often play a variety of such roles during the presettlement phase. Seen in this light, we should “nurture” peace settlements because their implementation is, in reality, but another phase of a continuous political process. After reviewing five distinct cases, we

learn in the concluding chapter not only how third parties play vital roles in peacemaking but also why those roles are so important.

There are no easy panaceas or silver bullets in *Nurturing Peace*. The outright successes of peacemaking—if this sample of cases is at all representative—are outnumbered by partial successes and failures. That should surprise no student of international politics; similar ratios apply to most diplomatic endeavors. But readers also will find here solid refutation of a number of widespread but dubious nostrums. For instance, Hampson demolishes the simplistic notion that these regional conflicts were ripened and settled as a direct result of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the ensuing cooperative phase in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Nurturing Peace provides a sober basis for hope about the post-Cold War global arena. It graphically demonstrates that fruitful foreign policy options do exist between the extremes of doing nothing and intervening with aggressive military force. But these options have their costs and requirements. Those who would write off UN peacekeeping and U.S. leadership within multilateral peacemaking efforts in complex, intrastate conflicts will find little comfort here. By the same token, those seeking quick fixes for the Afghanistans, Burundis, and Bosnias of our world by means of nonofficial, "track-two" initiatives or entirely noncoercive techniques of engaging armed combatants will also be disappointed. *Nurturing Peace* reminds us yet again why peacemaking requires persistence, toughness, and a steady hand on the steering wheel of foreign policy.

Chester A. Crocker
Georgetown University

PREFACE

I first became interested in the subject of this book after participating in several workshops for practitioners on the implementation of the Namibia peace accords. These workshops were sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security, which had the foresight and wisdom to recognize the need to explore how the international community can play a more effective role in assisting with the implementation of negotiated peace settlements. Regrettably, the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security no longer exists, having fallen victim to budget cuts and the shortsighted policies of the Mulroney government some years ago. But Canadians are indeed fortunate that the United States Institute of Peace continues to thrive and to support much-needed policy-oriented research on some of the most difficult international problems of our time. I am indebted to the United States Institute of Peace for supporting my own work through the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program. The Institute has provided an intellectually rich and enormously stimulating environment that has greatly enhanced my own understanding about the difficulties of nurturing peace. I also wish to thank the Cooperative Security Programme of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for its support of my early work on this project.

Over the years, many colleagues, students, and friends have helped nurture my interest in the question of why some peace settlements appear to “stick” whereas others “come undone” during the course of their implementation. Although only some of these people can be mentioned here, I am grateful to all of them for their contributions, whether in the form of shared insights, comments on draft chapters, or intellectual and moral support. All errors of omission and commission are, of course, mine.

Chester Crocker, Douglas Anglin, and Donald Rothchild read and commented on my work on the Angola-Namibia peace accords. Their insights have proven invaluable in helping me develop a keener and subtler appreciation of the intricacies of that settlement and the challenges of making peace in a “rough neighborhood.” I learned much about Cyprus from Brian Mandell, Ronald Fisher, Tozun Bahcheli, and Lou Klarevas. Alvaro de Soto and Patricia Weiss Fagen graciously provided detailed comments on early drafts of my chapter on El Salvador, for which I am most grateful. Richard Solomon, James Shear, and Barbara Shenstone provided constructive suggestions on successive drafts of the Cambodia chapter in this volume. Pamela Aall and Chester Crocker read the conclusion too many times to mention, providing helpful suggestions and commentary in the process. Several of the fellows in the Institute’s class of 1993–94 also shared their critical insights on various chapters. I wish to thank Shaul Bakash, Denis McLean, Norma Kriger, Saadia Touval, and Anne Thurston, in particular, for their comments and support. Joe Klaitis and Michael Lund provided a supportive and enriching research environment for the fellowship program, as did the members of their staff. Bill Zartman and Steve Stedman at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, were generous critics of early chapters of this work, and I have learned much from Zartman’s own ground-breaking work on the issue of “ripeness” in making peace.

My own work on this project was assisted by several very able graduate students at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. I learned a great deal from Alexandra Bugaliskis, a former graduate student and Canadian foreign ministry official, who had firsthand experience with the settlement in Namibia and wrote a very good research essay on this topic. Natalie Mychajlyszn and Jonathan Perkins provided superb research assistance and helped assemble materials during the early phases of this project. Lou Klarevas, a doctoral student

at American University, served ably as my research assistant at the Institute and helped bring the project to final completion. Nigel Quinney provided invaluable editorial guidance in turning the manuscript into a book, as did three anonymous reviewers for the Institute Press. My final word of thanks goes to Dan Snodderly and his staff in the Institute's Publications and Marketing Department, who have been supportive of this project from its early days.

