

**SOMALIA AND OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE**

SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

REFLECTIONS ON
PEACEMAKING
AND PEACEKEEPING

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Robert B. Oakley

Foreword by Chester A. Crocker



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Contents

| | |
|---|-------|
| Foreword by <i>Chester A. Crocker</i> | vii |
| Preface | xvii |
| Abbreviations | xxiii |
| 1. Origins of a Crisis | 3 |
| 2. UNOSOM I | 17 |
| 3. President Bush's Decision to Protect Humanitarian Operations | 35 |
| 4. Operation Restore Hope | 49 |
| 5. The Framework for Stabilization | 81 |
| 6. From UNITAF to UNOSOM II | 101 |
| 7. Challenge and Confrontation | 115 |
| 8. Reflections | 149 |
| Appendixes | |
| A. UN Security Council Resolution 794, December 3, 1992 | 177 |
| B. Seven Point Agreement, December 11, 1992 | 183 |
| C. General Agreement and Supplement Signed in Addis Ababa, January 8, 1993 | 185 |
| D. Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, March 27, 1993 | 191 |
| E. UN Security Council Resolution 814, March 26, 1993 | 199 |
| F. UN Security Council Resolution 837, June 6, 1993 | 207 |
| G. Radio Address by Mohamed Farah Aideed, March 10, 1994 | 211 |
| Select Bibliography | 215 |

Maps

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. Somalia | 2 |
| 2. UNITAF Deployment in Humanitarian Relief Sectors | 66 |

Foreword

The winding down of U.S. military engagement in Somalia came at a time of turmoil and confusion about the U.S. role in the post-Cold War security order. Commentators, policymakers, and scholars will look back on America's Somalia enterprise of 1992-94 as setting the tone of this transitional era. That is why this book is so important: It matters deeply what lessons we draw from Somalia precisely because each episode in this uncharted post-Cold War transition is often characterized as a huge, clearly worded road sign. But the lessons are subtler than they might first appear. To interpret them properly, it is necessary to set aside the one-liners and the op-eds long enough to listen to the story of diplomatic veterans whose careers span a range of regions, conflicts, and decades.

This book captures the essence of the Somalia experience of humanitarian intervention. Bob Oakley and John Hirsch outline the guiding assumptions behind the initial U.S.-led phase of intervention, the United Task Force (UNITAF), and compare these guidelines and resulting practices with those of the ensuing, UN-led phase of peacekeeping, the second UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. This discussion, presented with fairness and candor, will serve as a rich field for analysis by practitioners and scholars.

Some commentators look coldly at the U.S. engagement in Somalia as a costly failure of misguided internationalism. They see in it a form of media-driven, shortsighted "ad hockery" that placed our nation's most treasured assets in harm's way as an almost casual act of strategic charity. This perspective emphasizes the absence of full disclosure about how hard it can be to intervene constructively with military force in alien societies and to exit honorably with the mission accomplished. We are

reminded that Somalis, like some other people emerging from the European and Soviet empires, have long traditions of factional violence and little experience of civil order. Accordingly, we are urged to narrow our strategic focus and develop greater tolerance for the humanitarian tragedies that are certain to accompany the new world disorder. Passionate adherents of this isolationist view will go further, asserting that Somalia should inoculate us against further ventures of this sort, just as it has discouraged any inclination toward deeper U.S. military involvement in Rwanda and Bosnia.

Others want to draw different lessons, believing that our difficulties in exotic Somalia have inhibited us from doing what is necessary in Bosnia. According to this interpretation, U.S. political will to lead in shaping the post-Cold War system is being sapped by public perceptions of Somalia. This view sees Somalia as an unnecessary and somehow trivial engagement whose "failure" has discredited good ideas and placed "more important" interests, engagements, and (implicitly) peoples at risk. The lesson of Somalia, in this view, is to refrain from applying global norms and standards in U.S. policy and to disengage ourselves from the world's strategic slums and other difficult places.

Still others view the Somalia episode from a more hopeful angle as the beginning of an era in which the United States will chart a humanitarian course as one hallmark of leadership for a new age. After all, this would be perfectly consistent with the notion of American exceptionalism and the U.S. tradition of seeking to do good works in our foreign policy. The decision to intervene, unilaterally if necessary, and save Somali lives in a context where "national interests"—traditionally defined—were absent would be startling only if some other nation had done it. George Bush's judgment that U.S. forces could and should stop humanitarian disaster in Somalia was, from this perspective, the very essence of leadership. Nor was there anything partisan about that decision, as President-elect Bill Clinton's enthusiastic endorsement of it made clear. Once U.S. leaders acted, they suddenly had lots of company from friends and allies in conducting the enterprise and plenty of congressional and public support at home.

Where the Somalia exercise turned sour—according to the humanitarian purists—is when the United States and the United Nations became involved in Somali politics. We erred when we moved beyond the mandate of creating a secure environment for humanitarian operations to one of helping to put Somalia back on its feet as a country and trying to impose order on its armed factions. Uninvited, armed intervention in a

strife-torn country is fine, according to this doctrine, so long as it remains politically immaculate and does not entangle outsiders in the messy business of solving local political problems.

This book enables the reader to grasp the fallacies in all these interpretations. First, it makes it abundantly clear that external intervention in Somalia has not been a failure. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has been averted. Second, the Somali political landscape has been changed forever, creating the possibility for a workable political outcome designed by Somalis themselves. Media and other observers who focus narrowly on the apparent rejection of outside plans or initiatives by local parties would—as the authors remind us—be better advised to look a little deeper and stop the rush to judgment long enough to grasp what is happening. They might then recognize that outside intervention is exactly what has knocked a hideously costly, stalemated clan war off dead center and opened the field for new political initiatives worked out by Somalis themselves. Breaking up a lethal logjam is a classic function of the third party intervening in a conflict situation.

Third, this book sheds a clear light on why and how the initial humanitarian intervention gradually became something far more broadly, if somewhat naively, defined. Somalia was transformed in a matter of months from a famine-stricken backwater where heartless warlords and hopped-up teenage gangs reigned over helpless innocents into a sort of living laboratory for the new theories of UN peacekeeping then current in both the UN headquarters and the U.S. government. Perhaps, ironically, it was the impressive leadership, coherence, and dramatic success of the UNITAF phase (December 1992 to May 1993) which made it look too easy, thus encouraging the tendency toward “mission creep” that produced UNOSOM II’s vast “nationbuilding” mandate. But then the unthinking slide toward some modern version of trusteeship over an ex-colonial territory triggered a violent, nationalist backlash by a powerful Somali clan faction.

There can be little doubt about the high cost of discontinuities in the leadership of the United States–United Nations effort in Somalia. The smooth, carefully delineated and coordinated operating methods of Oakley and Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston (and their unusually close links to Washington) were interrupted first by the presidential transition in Washington (changing many of the policy people at the other end of the telephone), and again when the entire field leadership of the intervention was replaced before and during the handoff from UNITAF to UNOSOM II

and a less decisive and disciplined UN operation replaced an essentially U.S.-managed one. When one considers the full practical impact of these changes just a few months into the operation, is it any wonder that things turned sour? Why expect a seamless transition to UN-led peacekeeping to flow from a rancorous argument between Washington and UN headquarters about whether the transfer should even take place and whether the United States had completed the initial task? How could the transition have been seamless when the previous UNITAF management and many of the vitally important U.S. combat units had left before the new UNOSOM II management was even in place in Mogadishu?

Such jolting discontinuity of leadership, tradition, doctrine, personal chemistry, operating procedures, policy instincts, and bureaucratic systems was bound to disrupt the effectiveness and credibility of the external military presence. These factors, combined with the sweeping new mandate authorizing UNOSOM II, could only raise Somali doubts about the new UN objective. All that had been accomplished, politically and militarily, was placed at risk.

Arguably, Somalia does not offer us a fair test of the Bush strategy of humanitarian intervention. It certainly is not a fair test of the evolving concept of “peace enforcement” conducted according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter—a concept that UNOSOM II attempted to carry forward from UNITAF, which had used it so successfully for more limited purposes.

The Somalia “failure” is not a failure of either humanitarian intervention or muscular peacekeeping, but a failure to conduct them steadily and wisely. UNITAF had success during its too brief deployment. Opening up a secure environment for relief while keeping the warlords more or less sweet and somewhat off balance; maintaining and demonstrating military primacy without making a permanent adversary or national hero of any local actor; pushing the military factions towards a locally led political process while opening up that process to civilian elites, without advocating precise formulas; removing heavy weapons from areas of conflict while fostering the restoration of police and government functions—these are undertakings of the highest order of delicacy and complexity in a militarized and fragmented society such as Somalia’s. These UNITAF accomplishments in fact went far beyond the one-line goal of creating a “secure environment for humanitarian relief” discussed publicly by U.S. officials during the UNITAF phase. The goals required world-class leadership as well as a well-oiled military-civilian bureaucratic machine capable of acting quickly and coherently.

Does Somalia, then, tell us that the United Nations is just not up to managing “peace enforcement” operations in a dangerous environment where challenges to UN authority are likely? Should we oppose placing the United Nations in charge of ambitious mandates to supervise disarmament arrangements linked to political transitions and humanitarian relief and resettlement? These are two separate questions, and the answers do not fit on a bumper sticker. The United Nations has achieved some dramatic successes in dangerous, complex situations with wide-ranging mandates. Its performances in Cambodia and Namibia were highly effective, professional exercises that unquestionably enabled these fragmented, wartorn lands to get on their feet.

But the United Nations’ ability to handle a militarily challenging peace enforcement operation under Chapter VII provisions has not yet been demonstrated. Somalia tells us that change is needed in the modus operandi of the UN system itself: You cannot enforce peace when your own structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival bureaucratic fiefdoms that characteristically resist unified command and control in the field at both civilian and military levels. Basic change is needed on the issues of delegation to the field, unity of command in the field, professional military backstopping and oversight in New York, and many other matters. We knew these things already, and now we know them better. After Somalia—and with the experience of Bosnia (as well as Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola)—we are better prepared for discussion of how best to upgrade worldwide capabilities for handling the sorts of challenges we have faced in these places and will face again elsewhere.

Equally important, Somalia reminds us of the need for improvement in the way we—the UN’s leading member—conduct ourselves when we define missions, review and approve peacekeeping mandates, and approve UN force levels and budgets. This book points clearly to the conclusion that the United States and the United Nations overreached when they expanded the initial mandate—without making it possible to carry it out. The authors confirm that a debate over disarmament of the factions raged out of public view between UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and both the Bush and Clinton administrations. In the end, of course, the United States won the debate, refusing to take on this time-consuming task before handing off to UN command and UNOSOM II, whose members pleaded for UNITAF to stay on a few months longer. The authors conclude that there is little doubt UNITAF could have done much more to demilitarize and disarm Somalia (more or less voluntarily,

without our getting bogged down or incurring significant losses) if the United States had been prepared to keep the necessary forces in place longer and if the UN Security Council had directed the organization to plan and take over responsibility for this longer-term task.

Sensing the more open-ended time frame and resource implications of disarming the Somali factions, and realizing the possible negative fallout on the home front, both U.S. administrations strongly opposed it. Nothing was done to develop a comprehensive and systematic program of removal of heavy weapons, disarmament and demobilization. Clearly, much more could have been done to pave the way for the ambitious nationbuilding mandate contained in UNSC Resolution 814 if UNITAF had stayed on for a few more months in parallel with and under UNOSOM II. This ball, apparently, was simply dropped by the administration in Washington as well as by the secretary-general and the Security Council in New York. As a result, the United Nations received a bolder mandate than the one Bush had given UNITAF (as expanded on the ground by Oakley and Johnston), but it was given woefully inadequate means for carrying it out. These things should never have been permitted to happen. Either the mandate under Resolution 814 should have been drastically revised, or the means to implement it should have been mobilized.

In sum, the contrast between the peacekeeping operations documented here is dramatic. At the levels of strategy, mandate, military resources, tactical and strategic leadership, reporting channels and lines of authority, and of course ultimate responsibility, Somalia has experienced several distinct types of peacekeeping, as Hirsch and Oakley make clear: the minimalist and ineffective UNOSOM I; the skillfully managed, U.S.-led UNITAF; the overstretched, coercive nationbuilding phase of UNOSOM II; and the final scaled-back, more accommodative UNOSOM II. As a result, the Somali case will be a laboratory for years to come, from which vital lessons can be learned about how best to refine the instrument of peacekeeping that we will so obviously need in the years ahead.

I would underscore a handful of the most striking lessons that flow from the Oakley-Hirsch account:

- The need is obvious for the United States and other leading nations (within or outside the United Nations, as appropriate) to swing into action through preventive diplomacy before states fail and societies implode. Once the men with the guns seize the initiative as political actors, it becomes more complex to accommodate the interests of their

peculiar hierarchies in addition to those of the broader political system. And it becomes more costly for external peacemakers to apply their will.

- The linkage between UN peacekeeping mandates, whether under Chapter VI or VII provisions, and the resources made available by member states must be better understood by Security Council members when they approve such missions. There can be no excuse for approving grandiose missions that will expose UN peacekeepers to severe risk and the United Nations itself to ridicule and discredit. But at the same time, there is no excuse for underfunding and understaffing missions that—in our considered judgment—warrant our support. It is simply irresponsible (as well as dishonest) for American commentators to blast the United Nations for problems arising from ill-conceived or poorly drawn mandates. If we are angry at the sometimes disappointing fruits of Security Council resolutions, we must forcefully remind ourselves, our media, and our public opinion that the council is a mirror of the actions, inactions, fudges, and fantasies of the leading members, who can veto anything they do not like.
- The clear and continuing shortcomings in the United Nations' capacity to manage peacekeeping, and peace enforcement in particular, argue strongly for a sustained push for UN institutional reform, restraint and selectivity in undertaking enforcement missions, and creativity in supporting their management. For some time to come, the UN structure will be capable of success only with the support of big powers (or NATO). Historically, UN operations have prospered when they enjoyed the determined, focused backing of one or more major powers with the demonstrated will and capacity to support them. This was the case with the far-reaching but highly successful Congo operation of the 1960s. It was the case as well with intricate, multipurpose UN operations in Namibia and Cambodia in more recent times. Somalia during the UNITAF phase enjoyed such backing, but the successor UNOSOM II operation was orphaned by both Washington and New York.
- It is essential that both United States and United Nations authorities assign responsibility for the success of such operations to world-class people and then aggressively support them, while forcing operational reviews and fresh decisions if things turn sour. UNOSOM II got off to a poor start and was permitted to slide toward a humiliating crisis in October 1993 before being redefined under duress—the worst of out-

comes from the standpoint of United Nations (and United States) credibility worldwide.

- In the conduct of UN operations, it is essential to strive toward greater delegation of authority to a more coherent and streamlined structure of field leadership (unity of command) that avoids multiple reporting channels back to New York. UNOSOM II clearly suffered from the United Nations' byzantine bureaucratic structure, a problem compounded by compartmentalization within the U.S. military command.
- Peacekeeping initiatives should not be launched without some assurances of stability of leadership in the field, some hope for continuity of backstopping in Washington (and New York), and some clear hierarchy of accountability for the whole business in the appropriate capitals and in the UN Security Council. Continuity of leadership and seamless handoffs are the sine qua non of effectiveness in peace operations. Sudden changes in either resources made available (including key combat components) or the leadership relationships and reporting channels between the field and key capitals must be avoided.

At the strategic level, the Somalia story obliges us to consider another set of questions that can only be touched on here. What are the logical limits to United States and United Nations involvement in nationbuilding or restoring failed states? Can and should the United States insist on a carefully worded national interest standard for support of (and participation in) such operations? What obligation is there to respond when no such interest exists or to remain engaged with U.S. forces after headline humanitarian goals have been accomplished? Books will be written on these matters, but a close reading of the Oakley-Hirsch narrative suggests a few basic themes:

- The United Nations and its leading members, by overreaching as dramatically as they did with Resolution 814, created a reaction and a backlash. There is no enthusiasm in most parts of the world for a latter-day, UN-managed colonial era. The sweep of the Resolution 814 mandate and the manner of its implementation changed the Somali political climate from humiliated acceptance of an external helping hand to renewed polarization and the emergence of nationalist martyrs. At home, support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid total confusion about U.S. purposes. Was this a humanitarian relief mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, or a nationbuilding program? There is no enthusiasm in Western societies to become global police. It

will not be easy for Western leaders to rally their nations to go to war for the new world order.

- George Bush was right—politically, strategically, and ethically—to launch Operation Restore Hope, and Bill Clinton was right to support that decision. It is not useful, as we near the end of the 20th century, to limit our understanding of the national interest to such things as defense of the homeland, access to oil, security of lines of communication, or control of key industrial assets or natural resources. Categories of national interest that relate to global order (e.g., sanctity of borders) and to global standards (e.g., mass humanitarian catastrophe) must be recognized as we consider the U.S. (and UN) role in post-Cold War security.
- This does not mean a lurch to indiscriminate global interventionism. It suggests, however, that our security policy cannot redline the world's bad neighborhoods as off limits for humanitarian operations. Would we have stood by if losses as large as Somalia's in 1991–92 had been occurring in Greece, Ireland, Israel, or Poland? Operation Restore Hope was an act of human solidarity without regard to race, religion, or national origin. That is why Congress and the American people supported it. And that is why no one is especially proud of our performance in Rwanda, the first victim of the post-Somalia backlash. It is hard to argue that Americans should behave otherwise, and harder still to claim that we can sustain a global leadership role if we have one set of lines in the sand for good neighborhoods and another for the Somalias.
- The criteria for judgment on the use of force for humanitarian ends are not primarily regional or geographic. What, then, are they? It has somehow been claimed that we should not intervene (or encourage the United Nations to do so) in Somalia unless we are also prepared to do so in Sudan, Liberia, or Tajikistan. But this quest for consistency only confuses the picture. It cannot be U.S. policy to do nothing anywhere unless we can be effective everywhere. The real issue is whether humanitarian intervention is likely to be effective and whether it can be effective at an acceptable cost to those who intervene. It will be apparent that a wide range of factors must be examined, including logistics, terrain, the nature of opposing forces on the ground, the likelihood of armed opposition to the intervention, and whether the intervening party can maintain “strategic neutrality” between the local parties, as Oakley did in Somalia.

- But even this analysis provides only part of the answer. We need to know more about exits from humanitarian interventions. The act of intervening (assuming it is done effectively) has a decisive impact on the local balance—the balance between armed factions and innocent civilians as well as the balance between the factions themselves. Operation Restore Hope was no exception. It dramatically strengthened Somalia's vestigial civil society and challenged the warlords' political monopoly. By stopping the factional strife, it also froze in place the military situation, denying the initiative to the stronger factions and protecting, for a time, the weaker. In this way, a new state of affairs developed to replace the hideous one that prompted the intervention.
- Viewed in this light, we need to do better at identifying and analyzing what will replace this new state of affairs so that the previous one does not return. This point has inexorable logical implications. It means that we must answer not only the question of when and how to exit but also the question of how humanitarian operations will bridge into a political settlement strategy so that something can emerge to replace the temporary structure created by intervention. The Bush administration solved this one by pointing to a quick hand-off to the United Nations—begging the question of whether the United Nations would be up to the task, and leaving unaddressed the problem of the UN's exit strategy. It was left to Oakley's team to improvise (under a UN umbrella) the political settlement strategy that began to take shape in early 1993 but was dropped in May. After reading the Oakley-Hirsch account, it is hard to escape the conclusion that humanitarian intervention requires a linkage to political strategies of peacemaking and conflict resolution. The humanitarian purist cannot have it both ways: If there is an appeal for outside force, it must be accompanied by an outside strategy for leashing the dogs—while healing the wounds—of war.

Chester A. Crocker
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Preface

This book emerges from our shared experience in Somalia, first in the mid-1980s as ambassador and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, and later during Operation Restore Hope. It is also the result of our separate but related professional careers in the U.S. Foreign Service, where we have dealt with the complexities of peacekeeping and peacemaking in the Middle East and elsewhere long before the Somalia situation reached crisis proportions. Robert Oakley's experience in Vietnam and Lebanon, John Hirsch's tour in Israel, and our separate assignments at the U.S. mission to the United Nations and in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s provided firsthand contact with peoples caught up in ethnic, religious, and territorial conflict, as well as with several UN peacekeeping operations.

It was perhaps fortuitous that Oakley chaired two study groups at the United States Institute of Peace. The first, on the professionalization of peacekeeping, begun in spring 1992, attempted to go beyond the new theoretical arguments for a more assertive UN peacekeeping role to the practicalities of what was needed for success in the field. The second, later that year, involved a cross-section of Somalis resident in the United States in an attempt to define the multiple nature of the crisis and to suggest ways in which the international community could help to resolve it. Thus when President Bush and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell asked Oakley to go to Somalia as special envoy, he had a headstart on the issues we would face.

We decided to write this book one evening in January 1993, at the U.S. Liaison Office in the Conoco compound, a mile from United Task Force headquarters on the site of the gutted U.S. embassy in Mogadishu

and down the rutted street from the residence of faction leader Mohamed Farah Aideed. It struck us that we were living through a unique experience, which should be made available for public interest generally and especially for those interested in peacekeeping. Officially, Operation Restore Hope was a limited humanitarian intervention intended primarily to get relief supplies through to the famine triangle. However, Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, with encouragement from Washington and Central Command (CENTCOM), also saw the international presence as an unofficial umbrella under which Somalis could perhaps begin to sort out their political future after twenty-one years under Siad Barre's rule and two years of devastating civil war, drought, famine, and disease. Clearly UNITAF was a transition to the long-term, broader UN operation that was expected to follow.

Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF were unique on several counts. For the first time in history, the United States had sent a large military force to an area without strategic interest on a strictly humanitarian mission. For the second time, the U.S. military was deeply involved in relief and rehabilitation. Operation Provide Comfort, which helped the Kurds in northern Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, had been the first. It was a new venture in peacekeeping because the Security Council for the first time approved the dispatch of a UN-approved force without the request of the local government, even though on some previous occasions that government had been in exile. Moreover, the United States wanted a more traditional UN peacekeeping force to follow UNITAF and work on broader issues and was prepared to leave noncombatant U.S. troops under UN command in order to make the follow-on succeed. In a humanitarian context, an operation taking place under Chapter VII of the UN Charter also constituted a significant new departure. The UNITAF peacekeepers were allowed to use force if necessary to attain their objective of restoring security so that humanitarian operations could proceed. But Johnston and Oakley were determined to avoid any confrontations with the Somali factions so long as UNITAF's mission was not compromised, and to ensure that if force were used it would not lead to permanent hostilities.

However, as events unfolded in 1993 the original focus had to be revised. Thus we found ourselves writing at length about the second UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, the successor to UNITAF, even though we had not been present. This part of the narrative—particularly the June 5 killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers and the ensuing war between

the Somali National Alliance, UNOSOM II, and the U.S.—draws heavily on interviews with those who were there, as well as on interviews with knowledgeable individuals at UN headquarters, and the Departments of State and Defense, as well as on press and other public accounts. It was originally supposed to occupy only a single chapter. Again our plans for the book changed due to developments on the ground, the significance they subsequently took on, and Oakley's renewed participation.

When Oakley was called back into service as special envoy by President Clinton on October 6, after the confrontation in which eighteen Americans were killed and seventy-eight wounded, the entire international enterprise was on the line. Somalia's future, the role of the U.S. in other peacekeeping operations, and the capability of the UN to support future operations hung in the balance. Clinton's decision to keep U.S. forces in Somalia and reinforce support for UNOSOM II for a further five months gave renewed impetus to diplomacy and allowed the Somalis one last chance to start rebuilding their country with international support. It also slowed the negative trend in attitudes toward peacekeeping generally. So the third part of our narrative became an account of Oakley's renewed mission.

As direct participants, we do not claim the dispassionate impartiality of the scholar or historian. Much of this work is drawn from our own recollection of events; discussions and interviews with others who were present or involved in the same issues in Washington, New York, or foreign capitals; and numerous articles and conferences that sought to analyze these events. We have tried to avoid the polemics that surrounded various phases of the operation, to eschew assigning credit or blame, and certainly not to presume that we have, or have had, all the answers. The reader will not find juicy gossip or accusatory rhetoric, nor are confidential documents revealed, because none was used. We believe it is an honest account of what happened, and that it answers some questions about why.

Peacekeeping in Somalia was complex and difficult. Policy directions taken initially by the departing Bush administration were changed by the Clinton administration. The UN Security Council and the secretary-general, with full U.S. support, drastically expanded the mandate and began to establish what many observers, especially proud Somalis, saw as a *de facto* trusteeship. The transition in Washington coincided with a new, optimistic perception of the UN role and capabilities. This raised excessive expectations and placed impossible demands on the UN, especially in the peacekeeping area. Subsequent setbacks on the ground

inevitably led to a reassessment in Washington and in New York as to what peacekeeping entails, a reconsideration which has had resonance in Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Although the pendulum has stopped swinging away from peacekeeping, the experience will inevitably affect the international community's approach to other conflicts and crises that lie ahead.

The four successive peacekeeping operations—UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and two distinct phases of UNOSOM II—cannot simply be labeled successes or failures. Their respective strengths and weaknesses are part of the learning process for those at the United Nations who plan and conduct peacekeeping operations and for the member states that support and take part in them. Our concluding reflections are offered in the spirit of a constructive contribution to the continuing debate and assessment about when and how such efforts should be undertaken and how UN peacekeeping capabilities and effectiveness can be enhanced.

We wish to express our deep appreciation to the board and staff of the United States Institute of Peace, under whose auspices this book has been written. Thanks particularly to Richard Solomon and Charles Nelson, the Institute's president and vice president, to Sam Lewis, the Institute's previous president, and Chester Crocker, chairman of the Institute's board of directors. Thanks to David Smock, Ken Jensen, Tim Sisk, Jackie Schwartz, Maryann Heimgartner, and Barbara Cullicott for professional, secretarial, and administrative assistance. Priscilla M. Jensen did an outstanding job in helping with research, editing the text, putting it through multiple revisions, and keeping the two of us reasonably coordinated and of good cheer as the manuscript evolved. Jennifer Mason, an Institute summer intern, provided useful research. The Institute's publications department, with special help from Dan Snodderly, prepared the final stages of the manuscript.

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Retired general Aboucar Liban provided useful perspective on Somali political developments. All the commenters made many valuable suggestions, corrected errors of fact, and filled in gaps on events preceding the deployment of Operation Restore Hope as well as on Operation Provide Relief and UNOSOM I.

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The authors alone take full responsibility for the text. The views reflected are theirs and do not reflect positions of the Department of State or the United States Institute of Peace.

Abbreviations

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| CENTCOM | United States Central Command |
| HRS | Humanitarian Relief Sector |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NIF | National Islamic Front |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OFDA | Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID |
| OIC | Organization of the Islamic Conference |
| SACB | Somali Aid Coordinating Body |
| SDA | Somali Democratic Alliance |
| SDM | Somali Democratic Movement |
| SNA | Somali National Alliance |
| SNDU | Somali National Democratic Union |
| SNF | Somali National Front |
| SNM | Somali National Movement |
| SNU | Somali National Union |
| SPM | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| SSDF | Somali Salvation Democratic Front |
| SSNM | Southern Somali National Movement |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNITAF | United Task Force |
| UNOSOM I | First United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNOSOM II | Second United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USC | United Somali Congress |
| USF | United Somali Front |
| USLO | United States Liaison Office |
| USP | United Somali Party |
| WFP | World Food Program |

