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The Mosaic of Global Conflict Management

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A serious question for the current security environment is whether the world has the right institutional architecture for managing conflict. The experience of the last twenty years has made clear that the challenges to global security cannot be easily grouped into a few big baskets such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ethnic conflicts, chronic underdevelopment, and terrorism. There has been an expansion in the definition of security to include issues such as public health and environmental degradation, as well as more traditional national security concerns such as interstate rivalry and power transitions.¹ Moreover, there are new linkages between these different security concerns.

In reviewing current global institutional architecture and its capacities, it is important to understand and assess the role of regions and regional groups or institutions in conflict management. This assessment, however, is more easily suggested than done. There are many challenges, most obvious among them being that regions are not like countries. Most states have established borders, identifiable populations, and a political structure that not only governs but also provides national security, at least to the extent possible. Regions have no such uniform definitions. There is rarely complete agreement on membership, geographical outline, or included and excluded populations. With the exception of the European Union, there are few common governance structures. And regional security is more often threatened by conflict from within that region than from an external menace. Even if a common definition of a region existed, the world's regions

are not modeled on some central template. They differ as to power structure, political-governmental cultures, types of security challenges, styles of negotiation, intergovernmental norms, and perceptions of what “security” actually means and the principal challenges to it. Assessing security challenges between and among global regions is complex, because there may be not only different security challenges but also different perceptions of the same security challenges.

At the same time, there has been a growing recognition that local, regional, and global security are closely linked. The conflicts in Bosnia, the Congo, and Afghanistan prove that community violence can flare up to engulf large territories, spread across borders, and engage the international community. Of particular importance in dealing with these conflict patterns are the evolving relationships between global and regional actors and organizations. The relative salience of global versus regional initiative, capability, and legitimacy is central to understanding basic trends and tensions in international security. A balance sheet of demand and supply in security capacity in various regions would clearly be useful as would an effort to review the implications of the global-regional interface. That is the goal of this book: to explore how different regions define challenges to their security, how each region addresses these challenges, and how regional security capacity links to global peace and security.

Changing Security Threats and Conflict Management Requirements

Traditional Views of Security

Over the past forty years, the world has seen significant changes in official and popular views of security threats and conflict management needs. When he wrote *Politics among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau defined security in national terms: as the expectation that through its “monopoly of organized violence,” the state would protect the citizen and the institutions of the state.² In the succeeding years, expert circles generally framed security challenges as arising from the competitive power struggles between states, epitomized by the Cold War military and political confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Generally speaking, the traditional view of security sees threats as emanating from outside the state. Within this traditional frame of reference, the most effective national strategy is to maximize the power of the state and build up its defenses and military capabilities in order to deter would-be aggressors. Balancing or “bandwagoning” strategies may also be in order to maintain the balance of power and stability of the international system.³

During the Cold War, there was little official interest in or priority given to conflict management—that is, the use of nonmilitary means such as mediation, “good offices,” or preemptive diplomatic engagement to promote negotiated alternatives to violence and political upheaval.⁴ Although nuclear deterrence was underpinned by diplomacy and the credible threat to use force, conflict management was generally viewed in unidimensional terms. The dominant powers in a bipolar international system sought to manage their conflicts in order to avoid a loss of face or strategic setbacks and to prevent their conflicts from escalating out of control. However, they had little interest in using the tools of negotiation, mediation, and preventive statecraft more broadly to promote institution building, good governance, development, and the rule of law in countries and regions that were politically unstable or threatened by other sources of strife.

The East-West conflict found expression in proxy wars—initially in Greece, then in Korea, Vietnam, southern Africa, Central America, Afghanistan, and other places—but, with the exception of Korea and Vietnam, these wars were generally limited in scale and scope. As the inconclusive result of periodic strife between Israel and its Arab neighbors demonstrated, managing these conflicts generally meant keeping the lid on and preventing escalation—in the view of many, a job that was performed best by powerful states. While lip service was paid to the role of international organizations, such as the United Nations, in resolving conflicts, it was clear that the ability to freeze or manage conflicts lay with the powerful states, not with international or regional organizations. The United Nation’s conflict management potential was confined to those cases where there was some measure of East-West tolerance or consensus, and its actions consisted mainly of good offices, electoral support in decolonization processes, and traditional peacekeeping operations in consensual settings such as Cyprus, Israel-Egypt (Sinai Desert), or Israel-Syria (Golan Heights).

During these Cold War years, more interest in conflict management was shown by scholars, religious and secular activists, and others outside government who sought to popularize a very different discourse about national security. This discourse focused on the threat of nuclear annihilation either as a direct attack or as a consequence of a nuclear winter. Proponents believed that conflict management consisted of pushing their own governments toward arms control and then eventually nuclear disarmament, thereby reducing stockpiles and removing the weapons from national armories. Such activity by civil society actors gained some traction in a few Western countries; however, there was virtually none within the Soviet bloc.⁵ Toward the end of the Cold War, civil society pressure played an increasing role in affecting popular attitudes in the West, but successes

in U.S.-Soviet arms control and disarmament negotiations came as a result of official diplomatic efforts, which stabilized the nuclear balance and brought forth greater transparency and predictability in U.S.-Soviet relations, especially during the final two decades of the Cold War.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, the world's attention shifted from tracking superpower rivalry, counting nuclear warheads, and arguing over "Star Wars" (as President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative was called in the press) to witnessing the outbreak of civil war on nearly every continent—wars that habitually spilled over state boundaries to contaminate entire neighborhoods. Perceptions of security changed as a consequence of the upsurge in sectarian violence and a similar upsurge in attention to conflict management in the broadest sense, as distinguished from the goal of advancing the national security of the state against direct, external threats.

Global security was redefined in local and regional terms and the tasks undertaken to provide security widened to protecting civilians from massacre by their own governments and shoring up weak states threatened by struggles among factional militias. In a very real sense, security increasingly came to be viewed as divisible, which is to say that there was no shared sense that these civil or regional conflicts affected the core values and interests of the wider community of nations. The United States struggled with the increasing diversity of threat perceptions at the regional level in its own efforts to project power and influence. In some regions, such as the Middle East or Central America, it tried (not always successfully) to shape the regional security agenda by imposing itself and intervening directly in the decision-making processes of regional states. This has sometimes resulted in a single-lens approach that overwhelmed and distorted regional issues by simplifying their causes and dynamics—for example, by targeting illicit economies or terrorism and ignoring a host of other factors, such as historic grievances or ideological and religious differences.

Traditional Westphalian conceptions of state sovereignty have also been reshaped in the post-Cold War era. Through its case-by-case decisions and statements, the United Nations Security Council chipped away at arguments in favor of absolute sovereignty and expanded the perception of what is legitimate relating to preventive action undertaken by the United Nations. As early as 1991, actions mandated by the Security Council in Resolution 687 imposed a highly intrusive and complex regime of monitoring to prevent Iraq from producing weapons of mass destruction. Thereafter, council members tended to use the international peace and security threat that flows of refugees could pose to neighboring countries to authorize various kinds of preventive action. Such arguments were

advanced, notably, in the early stages of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor, and in the council's deliberations regarding the overflow of refugees into Guinea from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the 1990s there was a short interval of successful international peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions. The generally positive experiences in Mozambique, Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere seemed to argue for a strong role for outside third parties, often identified simply as the "international community," in helping to settle internal conflicts and as guarantors to settlements between states.⁶

Despite this increasing interventionism, responding to violent humanitarian catastrophes occurring in the territory of sovereign states continued to pose an ongoing challenge. As with situations of extreme human rights violations, many internal humanitarian abuses were met with condemnation and sanctions by the United Nations. Some instances led to Security Council authorizations of remedial force. Many, however, did not lead to the express authorization of more vigorous enforcement action. For example, the United Nations and members of the international community grappled with the ramifications of the failures of political will and/or execution in the cases of Somalia and Rwanda. After these failures, debates about security policy in major Western capitals and UN headquarters tended to focus increasingly on the proper extent and limits of third-party conflict management. These discussions of limits and extent included such pressing issues as when was international intervention (humanitarian or otherwise) justified, what were the limits to sovereignty, and who was authorized to decide when these lines can or should be crossed.

As a consequence, at times other actors took things into their own hands. In some cases, internal conflicts met with a more robust response through unilateral military intervention undertaken by states or regional organizations without prior express Security Council authorization. In some of these cases, the United Nations might engage after the fact, playing an important post-intervention legitimating role, for example, by the post facto authorization of intervention, as occurred in relation to interventions by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.

Expanded Views of Security

The past two decades made it clear that while an element of security is objective, for example, that an army is threatening your borders, another set of security issues is perceptual and identity-based or dependent on circumstances. These include, for example, threats to stasis, threats to a sitting

government and its political constituency, and threats to a society, community, or a way of life. The growing realization that peoples, societies, and even entire polities can be put at risk by “threats from below” has expanded the discussion of security to include majority-minority relations, language policy, and similar matters. The outbreak of civil wars in many parts of the world in recent decades sharpened the understanding of the human costs of war and led to the development of the concept of human security.⁷ Definitions of human security differ in detail and emphasis, but they converge on the main points: human security consists of physical safety, economic well-being, social inclusion, and the full exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.⁸

As useful as this concept is, it brought questions about the international community’s responsibility in recognizing and responding to violations of this human security.⁹ The responsibility to protect norm (R2P) was strengthened with the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of many of the principles outlined in *The Responsibility to Protect*,¹⁰ particularly the notion that the international community, in particular the United Nations, had a responsibility to act in the face of internal atrocities when states themselves proved unwilling or unable to protect their own populations. Unfortunately, despite some clear successes in strengthening this general disposition among states and facilitating state compliance to these norms, international and intrastate violence continued relatively unabated in many corners of the globe—Darfur, Somalia, the Congo, and elsewhere where the international community demonstrated a limited appetite to intervene. The reality was that politics all too often stood in the way of any kind of direct intervention after a conflict escalated beyond the point of no return, not least by the Security Council but also by other international and regional actors.¹¹

Another area of concern, especially among students of international development, involved the relationship between globalization (in its various meanings) and human insecurity.¹² On one side of this argument, enthusiasts of globalization argued that the breakdown of national barriers to trade and the spread of global markets were processes that helped to raise world incomes and contribute to the spread of wealth.¹³ Although there were clear winners and losers in the globalizing economy, the old divisions between the South and the advanced economies of the North were breaking down and making way for an increasingly complex architecture of economic power. There was more or less general agreement that the forces of economic globalization were transforming international politics and recasting relationships between states and peoples with important implications for human security: globalization was not only intensifying

trade and economic connections but also accelerating the pace of economic and social change. Further, it was not just goods and capital that were exchanged across borders, but ideas, information, and people.

On the other side, globalization's critics argued that although some countries in the South gained from globalization, many did not and income inequalities between the world's richest and poorest countries were widening. They suggested that trade and investment flows were intensifying between those countries that could compete in the global economy while leaving behind those that could not. As income gaps and deep-seated social and economic inequalities widened in many countries, so the argument ran, so did the prospects for violence and civil strife.¹⁴

The attacks on Washington and New York of September 11, 2001, and other attacks in Europe, South Asia, and other areas, changed prevailing views yet again. Third-party conflict management—a more or less discretionary feature of Western foreign policy in the 1990s—was set aside, at least temporarily, in order to focus on a direct threat to national security. But, no longer was the enemy a foreign country: it was loosely connected bands of militant jihadist ideologues whose mission was to hobble the United States and to drive it out of the Muslim world. In the United States and among its key allies there was a partial return to the concept of global security focused on counterterrorism and coping with failed (or failing) states, viewed by many as breeding grounds for terrorists, dealers in weapons and drugs, and other international miscreants.¹⁵ In the last few years, the immediacy of the September 11 attacks has receded and the challenges of reconstruction and security stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan have become unavoidably clear. Western officials tend to perceive “hybrid” threats flowing from a potentially toxic mixture of proliferating technologies, weak state institutions, local conflicts breeding in “ungoverned spaces,” criminal mafias, terrorist networks, and dangerous regimes prepared to offer them clandestine support.¹⁶ In sum, direct security threats and the indirect threats that flow from “conflict management” challenges have converged.

Differentiated Views of Security

Defining security challenges is not the sole province of official institutions and political and military leaders. Popular attitudes also matter. However, it is not easy to capture changing popular views about international security and conflict management, and even more difficult to assess these views by region. A series of recent polls by the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations of public opinion in different parts of the world attempt to do so. These polls underscore that there is widespread

public concern around the globe about the spread of nuclear weapons, religious and ethnic hatred, AIDS and other infectious diseases, pollution and environmental problems, and the growing gap between rich and poor.¹⁷ However, as many of these polls also revealed, publics in different countries assess and rate these dangers differently.¹⁸

For example, the November 2009 Council on Foreign Relations poll indicates that there are different attitudes toward the threat posed by terrorism in different parts of the world. In countries that have directly experienced terrorism, concern about terrorism was high: over 70 percent of respondents in Morocco, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Pakistan, India, and Turkey viewed terrorism as a very serious security concern. Similar concerns were found in Italy (73 percent), Spain (66 percent), France (54 percent), Peru (70 percent), and Japan (59 percent). Extrapolating from these country-based results, it seems that terrorism was seen as a primary threat in three regions—the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe. The U.S. respondents, however, seemed less concerned (with only 44 percent citing terrorism as “a very big problem”). Fourteen other countries—most of Africa, some of Eastern Europe, and China, as well as other Asian states, rated terrorism as a small problem or not a problem at all.¹⁹

Although views of al-Qaeda were largely negative worldwide, this was not the case in Egypt and Pakistan—both of which are key actors in the conflict with al-Qaeda. “In both of these countries, far more people have either mixed or positive feelings toward al-Qaeda (Egypt 20 percent positive, 40 percent mixed; Pakistan 19 percent positive, 22 percent mixed) than have negative feelings (Egypt 35 percent, Pakistan 19 percent). In addition, there are several other countries where negative views are less than a majority position: China (48 percent), India (44 percent), Indonesia (35 percent), Nigeria (42 percent), and the Philippines (42 percent).”²⁰

Attitudes toward the threat of nuclear proliferation also differed. In a poll of nine countries, majorities in six viewed nuclear proliferation as a critical threat—Mexico (75 percent), Israel (72 percent), and the United States (69 percent). In South Korea, only 50 percent considered proliferation “critical” (this somewhat surprisingly low percentage may be explained by the fact that 40 percent of the Korean respondents did consider proliferation “important,” indicating that 90 percent of the Korean respondents were in fact concerned about the issue). By contrast, 27 percent of the Chinese respondents considered the threat critical, 43 percent important, and 17 percent (the highest percentage of all polled countries) did not think that proliferation was important at all.²¹

A few years earlier the 2007 Pew Research Center polled informed publics in forty-seven countries on their ranking of what they viewed as global

Table 1.1 Countries Most and Least Concerned about Specific Global Dangers by Percentage of Population**Spread of nuclear weapons**

<i>Most concerned</i>	<i>Least concerned</i>
Japan 68	Ethiopia 12
Israel 66	Kenya 16
Lebanon 57	France 21
Turkey 57	South Africa 22

Religious and ethnic hatred

<i>Most concerned</i>	<i>Least concerned</i>
Lebanon 74	South Korea 14
Britain 67	Argentina 16
Kuwait 66	Ukraine 17
Palest. terr. 64	Uganda 19

AIDS and other infectious diseases

<i>Most concerned</i>	<i>Least concerned</i>
Tanzania 87	South Korea 7
South Africa 83	Germany 9
Kenya 82	Japan 11
Ethiopia 78	Sweden 14

Pollution and environmental problems

<i>Most concerned</i>	<i>Least concerned</i>
South Korea 77	Ethiopia 7
China 70	Lebanon 13
Japan 70	Senegal 13
Sweden 66	Ivory Coast 14

Growing gap between rich and poor

<i>Most concerned</i>	<i>Least concerned</i>
South Korea 68	Kuwait 21
Kenya 61	Venezuela 26
Indonesia 57	Japan 28
Chile 56	Mexico 28

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey, 31

dangers (see table 1.1). Categories are not overlapping with the Council on Foreign Relations poll, but both polls do tend to confirm that it is hard to understand regional perspectives through polling on a country-by-country basis.

It is clear from this chart that the definition of security is as diverse among individuals as it is among nations. However, while there are occasional similarities among countries in the same region (Japan, China, and South Korea are all concerned about environmental degradation, for instance), at other points regional neighbors show distinct disparities in their threat perception. Almost 70 percent of South Korean respondents

believe that the growing gap between rich and poor is a global threat, while less than 30 percent of Japanese do so.²² Understanding how regions view security remains elusive.

Another element in the growing diversity of security concerns lies in the different perspectives of the North and the South. In recent years, the idea that reciprocity among states is the bedrock of multilateralism and the workings of international institutions has come under challenge from critics who point out that international institutions are dominated by the interests of Western countries in multilateral decision making. Many developing countries feel profoundly disadvantaged by global multilateral political, financial, and trading arrangements. They also believe that the normative principles and political architecture of the United Nations (especially the Security Council) and the Bretton Woods system are biased toward the interests and values of the most powerful states in the international system. Many developing countries have long felt that they have been disempowered by international institutions and have not received commensurate benefits from their participation in postwar, global, and multilateral economic, financial, and trading arrangements. Many developing countries also believe that the North has traditionally been the normative and legal trendsetter in international institutions, with the South being on the “receiving end” of those norms and rules.²³

There are many ideas about what mechanisms and institutions should replace current systems of multilateral cooperation and governance.²⁴ The legitimacy and accountability deficits in multilateral institutions play out at two levels. At one level, many would like to see a better representation from the South in the major decision-making organs of the United Nations and global summitry via the G20 and the Bretton Woods system of institutions. These calls have intensified in the aftermath the 2008–9 international financial and credit crisis.²⁵ At another level, many would like to see a devolution of authority and responsibility for decision making to the regional or even subregional level by strengthening and empowering local actors to play a much greater role in managing their own economic and political affairs than they do now. Some would also like to see the creation of new institutions of global and regional governance that involve new kinds of partnerships between intergovernmental bodies and civil society that are centered on a commitment to advancing and promoting human security.²⁶ There are many different proposals out there to change the architecture and machinery of global governance. But, as Manuel Lafont Rapnouil observes, “The reform of the multilateral system today will be slow, gradual and probably disorderly. It is all the more important to have clear ideas and different possible horizons, and to anticipate the problems

that may develop with major restructuring.”²⁷ In other words, the prospects of a grand global concert of nations or organizations are slim in the short term.

Finally, the globe has had to deal with the fact that despite global, regional, and national efforts, violent conflict has not gone away. While the past decade saw a downward trend in the outbreak and lethality of warfare, this trend now appears to be reversing itself with wider implications for international security and conflict management.²⁸ This new upswing in the outbreak of armed conflict is coupled with the troubling persistence of conflicts in various parts of the world—for instance, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Sudan and its neighbors, Iraq, Iran, the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Horn of Africa, Kashmir-India-Pakistan, and North Korea. These intractable conflicts challenge the world’s capacity to hold in check potentially devastating civil and regional threats to peace.²⁹ While international organizations and powerful states deal with major economic dislocations and front-page news, these intractable conflicts sap resources and destabilize regions, acting as low-grade infections in the global body politic.

Our Starting Point

The changing perception of security threats has created a global debate about how to respond to these threats. The American response to 9/11 reflected a traditional approach: the United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a state which it associated with the terrorist attacks. The results have been mixed at best. A growing school of thought maintains that current security risks cannot be dealt with through use of force alone. This school emphasizes diplomatic approaches, the use of soft or “smart” power, indirect capacity-building activities to empower democratic or democratizing governments and their security forces, and developing leverage through multilateral initiatives—the traditional political tools of conflict management.³⁰

During the 1990s, the fabric of international security became stronger and more globalized. Yet long-standing conflicts continued to burn and a number of low-profile conflicts seemingly received little attention from the international security institutions and powerful states. This may help to explain why, contrary to the apparent trend toward globalization, there is a growing demand in many of the world’s regions for greater regional control or influence over how security challenges are defined and responses organized. In parallel with the growing demand, the supply of regional conflict management initiatives is also expanding. The reasons are not entirely clear. Regional actors may feel that they have a better understanding of the

conflicts in their neighborhoods, and therefore a better chance at helping parties craft a solution. Another factor may be the selective attention to regional security issues by global actors, which may reinforce demands for greater regional control, actively encouraging regional actors to define their own priorities, create their own facts, and design their own mechanisms and norms. Today's security threats are often buried deep inside regions, and the fabric of security looks increasingly like a patchwork quilt.

A Gap in the Literature

In all of this debate, there have been few efforts to illustrate on a region-by-region basis the supply/demand balance sheet for security challenges and conflict management capacity. Starting with the premise that in this new world regional organizations are coming to play an expanded role in dealing with security threats and managing conflicts in their regions, this book offers a comparative perspective on the threats to security and conflict management as seen by regional actors around the world. Through this means, this book also intends to add to the understanding of global conflict management capacity and the "balance" between regional/local security initiatives and global ones. The project starts with the premise that it is essential to understand the regional dimension and its implications for security, and to get fresh assessment of the links between regional and global security.

Interstate cooperation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is marked by a proliferation in the number of organizations and international regimes that adhere to both similar and different multilateral norms and principles. No two regions have the same security culture or regional security architecture, and there are important differences in the way threats to security are weighed. Some regions of the world—Europe, for example—have developed a crazy quilt of regional organizations. In other regions, states have quite consciously avoided formal multilateralism. The lack of formal, *de jure*, regional, multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region has both a normative and a domestic, political explanation.³¹ As the dominant regional nations, China and Japan in particular appear to have a mixed attitude toward formal institutions.³² Prevailing political norms at the national level have also been antithetical to liberal internationalism because of colonial legacies that favored "rule by law" instead of the "rule of law" and custodianship in state-society relations. In their international relations in the postwar period, many countries in the Asia-Pacific eschewed multilateral arrangements in favor of direct, bilateral economic and security ties with the United States (though this too may now be changing).³³

While there have been a number of studies, done by regional experts, that have focused on security and conflict management in specific regions, as well as a number of comparative studies written by individuals or scholars in the United States or Europe, this book will take the less-traveled approach of asking experts from a wide range of regions to engage in a comparative study across regions. Based on their analyses and the project's global scope, we present a fresh review of regional threats, perceived threats, and policies, as well as new perspectives on how institutions intend to counteract them. Only when we understand the security challenges and local capabilities to meet those challenges *as determined within the regions themselves* will we start to be able to assess who can do what in global conflict management.

This project builds on the argument that in order to understand global security, it is necessary to have a firm grasp on regional security matters. Over ten years ago, David Lake and Patrick Morgan argued that (1) regions had become more salient as components of international politics; (2) the post-Cold War period offered an opening for more cooperative regional orders; (3) in order to understand regions, the analyst must recognize that some generalizations can be drawn from looking across regions as long as it is done with care—they are neither “little international systems” nor so unique that comparisons cannot be drawn; and (4) in dealing with these regions, powerful states must recognize that regions are different and require foreign policies tailored to those differences.³⁴ Similarly, Barry Buzan and his colleagues Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde have asserted that security threats are increasingly regional rather than global, and that the identification of threats comes from within societies and states rather than from a global or out-of-region origin.³⁵

At a minimum, the regional security literature appears to agree that there are four dimensions for analyzing conflict sources from a regional perspective. Following Muhtiah Alagappa, these are: (1) international (the regional impact of global systemic conflicts such as during the Cold War or, today, the confrontations surrounding militant Islamic threats to the status quo); (2) extramural (directed at constraining and channeling the influence and power of major powers); (3) intramural (addressing inter-state tensions and challenges at the regional level); and (4) “domestic” (addressing the many internal security issues faced by states in a number of regions).³⁶ While contemporary study of regionalism is robust, as discussed in a recent survey by Robert Kelly, it is also replete with basic debates about the autonomy of regional initiative and action, the significance of regions as a valid level of analysis, the degree to which regions can be defined in narrowly geographic terms, the core ingredients of “regional security

complexes,” the relevance of European-derived regional models for other parts of the world, the degree to which regional security organizations are capable of addressing constructively the real security challenges faced by developing societies, and the desirability of participation in regional security affairs by Northern states.³⁷

Some analysts, to be sure, are highly critical of the notion of regionalized security, seeing it as weak or faulty because of the following concerns:

- From the point of view of the powerful Western states, regionalization is often ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. A sometimes unilateralist Washington has a habit of rejecting regionalization, except when the rise of regional strength coincides with its own interests. European countries are more positive about the potential of regional powers and intergovernmental bodies providing security to their neighborhood, but still step in when regional powers seem incapable of carrying out the task, as the French did in Côte d’Ivoire and British did in Sierra Leone in the last decade.
- Related to this set of attitudes is the assessment that only the states of the Atlantic community are wealthy and powerful enough to establish regional organizations up to the challenge of security management, and that all other regions do not have the wherewithal to manage their own conflicts.
- Supporters of global institutions, on the other hand, view regionalization as competition for the United Nations, sometimes leaching away precious resources and sometimes getting in the way of UN missions.
- Skeptics of the efficacy of regional response mechanisms point to the disparity in regional capabilities, noting that some regions are resource rich (in terms of both money and trained personnel) and that others are less well-off. This leads to a system in which some regions only get what they can provide for themselves, leading to a further fragmentation of global security standards and norms. And skeptics from within regions point out that regionalization raises the specter of regionally hegemonic behavior, creating a situation that would allow one country to dominate the region under the pretense of providing a more secure environment for its zone of influence.³⁸

We take a different approach, questioning the notion of whether in today’s world there is some centrally conceived plan or normative construct in which the dynamics of “liberal peace” are playing out in the regions.³⁹ We recognize the desire for greater levels of local ownership in security management in many regions. But we also recognize that this desire and capability to act on that desire vary from region to region. Whether the

regions' autonomy and scope to organize their own security affairs are dependent on decisions and policies taken by a handful of world powers or whether the regions are increasingly marching to their own drummers is a core question to be explored.⁴⁰ Our project will test both of these propositions: first, that some distant "hidden hand" is determining facts on the ground and conversely, that "no one is in charge."

The book grows out of our interest in strengthening links between the security and conflict management fields. Observers of on-the-ground field operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Israel-Palestine, Korea, and the Philippines report evidence of these links on a regular basis. Among organizations dedicated to helping societies reknit themselves after conflict, there is a strong agreement that providing security—and a sense of security—is a crucial step in the rebuilding process. In the academic literature, however, the links between security and conflict management seem much fainter, and tend to cluster in the literature around how wars end.⁴¹ One explanation for the paucity of contact between the security and conflict management fields is that they often focus on different levels of analysis and different vantage points. Security studies tend to focus on the global or international level, and address the security perspectives, policies, and needs of powerful actors. The consumer of security studies is more likely to be concerned with direct, physical threats and challenges. Conflict management literature, on the other hand, tends to focus on challenges and threats that arise because parties are in a conflict situation (for example, India and Pakistan or Israel and the Palestinians), and it looks closely at the local or case-specific level and at particular instruments of conflict response—for example, prevention, crisis response, mediation, peacekeeping, institution building, and post-conflict peacebuilding. Examining what is going on at the regional level in the delineation of security threats and conflict management capacity to address those threats may provide a fruitful means to uncover connections between the two fields.

There is a natural tension—both in terms of the analysis and the resulting prescriptions—between focusing on the regional manifestations of conflict phenomena and their global impacts and consequences. Such conflict-linked phenomena as arms transfers, technology proliferation, health pandemics, terrorist networks, criminal groups trading illicit goods, flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and mass violations of humanitarian law all illustrate the problem. Whether regional responses to conflict are at times more effective at conflict management than global—or externally directed—responses is a central question of the project. This question is far from theoretical—it addresses the very core of global and regional security concerns. Should the international community invest heavily in regional

organizations, or should it try to bolster the United Nations, allowing it to plan a central organizing and legitimating role in regional/global conflict management? More profoundly, are there any institutions, whether international or regional, that can address a region's security concerns?

In order to examine these issues, more must be known about the extent to which regions are decoupling from the global security mechanisms and norms due to such factors as the weakening of global capacity for direct, coercive action and sustained political-diplomatic-political initiatives; the weakening of global political will to act; and the weakening of global legitimacy to act (wherein those with the greatest capacity may lack legitimacy, and those with the greatest legitimacy may lack capacity). These factors that diminish the global capacity to act stand in stark relief to other trends, such as the strengthening—in some regions—of regional capacity for conflict management, and—in some regions—of regional desires and will to act.

Structure of this Volume

In this book, we have globalized the discussion, asking experts and authors from across the world to help us understand the regional approaches. Together they provide us with insight into

- security threats and global or regional instabilities that are likely to affect security—local, regional, and global—over the next five years;
- the manner in which existing regional/subregional institutions, political authorities, and civil society are responding to these challenges;
- the conflict management and security gaps and how should they be filled; and
- the implications for statecraft—U.S. foreign policy, the United Nations, and other actors/institutions in the international system who have “world order” interests—of the continually evolving mix between regional security challenges and regional conflict management capacity.

The discussion is framed by three stage-setting chapters. Gilles Andréani provides an authoritative analysis of the global security and conflict management environment in which the regional conflicts play out. Paul D. Williams and Jürgen Haacke guide us through the maze of regional organizations across the world, providing frameworks to allow for a deeper understanding of these institutions' comparative strengths and weaknesses. Nigel Quinney's chapter asks provocative questions about whether it is possible to identify a regional conflict management culture, in the same way that past analysts have identified regional security cultures.

The heart of the book is formed by the regional chapters. These chapters provide excellent windows into several regions, at times looking at different levels of security threats and conflict management capabilities within the same region. Thus, Kwesi Aning's chapter on the role of illicit economies—drugs and gangs—in Africa gives an in-depth view of a particular issue, while Crysantus Ayangafac and Jakkie Cilliers analyze broad security threats challenging African peace and security and assess the ability of pan-African institutions to deal with them. The chapter on Mexico and Central America by Raúl Benítez Manaut and Ricardo Córdova Macías and Hilton A. McDavid's piece on the Caribbean pick up the theme of the destabilizing effect of transnational crime, an observation confirmed by John W. Graham's more broad-ranging chapter on the Americas. All three chapters also point out the security and conflict management role that the United States plays in the regions to its south. Monica Herz, writing about South America, focuses on the evolution of a conflict management culture in a region seemingly intent on establishing homegrown institutions to manage potential conflict on the continent.

As expected, the three Middle East chapters by Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Bassma Kodmani, and Itamar Rabinovich reveal very different perspectives on the threat perceptions between Israel and its Arab neighbors, but they also show differences within the countries concerned, further complicating the regional picture. Alyson J. K. Bailes's chapter on Europe and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat's piece on the trans-Atlantic community (which covers both the European Union and NATO) explore a European security approach based on the skillful exercise of multipolar soft power, while Oksana Antonenko's review of Russia and Eurasia paints a very different picture of a complicated security dance between a hegemonic power and its less powerful and highly dependent neighbors. While the South Asia chapter by Meenakshi Gopinath explores another region that is heavily dominated by one country, it also makes clear that the regional security conversation in South Asia is proceeding on two nonintersecting tracks—a contentious traditional security track and a potentially more harmonious human security one. China looms large in the chapters on Southeast Asia by Richard A. Bitzinger and Barry Desker and on East Asia by Hitoshi Tanaka and Adam P. Liff, but these chapters also disclose a region that is defining its own approach to internal conflict management (an adaptation of the "ASEAN way") and a growing consciousness of its international role.

The effort to understand regional perspectives is especially pertinent at a time of preoccupation and reappraisals in the United States, Canada, Britain, and other global security providers as a result of the heavy costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and related instability in Lebanon,

the Palestinian territories, and Pakistan, and the global order based on key bodies such as the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions is challenged by old charters, outdated leadership roles, normative disharmony, and lumbering bureaucracies. At the same time, the global financial crisis that burst upon key capitals in 2008 quickly developed global economic implications and has raised basic questions about both global economic-financial-monetary governance and about the relationship between economic policy imperatives and the search for international security and stability. When it comes to arrangements for preventing conflicts and promoting peace, the world is not “flat,” as characterized by Thomas Friedman.⁴² Rather, it is characterized by every sort of landscape—rolling, flat, hilly, rocky, mountainous—some of them accessible and some still quite remote. The book will have served a useful purpose if it sheds greater light on the connections between different kinds of landscape—that is, the different levels of conflict management response to security threats, the regionally diverse definitions of security, and the reasons behind the divergent regional preferences for conflict management response. The succeeding chapters will examine this terrain, adding to our understanding of whether there is a global conflict management gap and whether regions—through their regional organizations or through a loose coalition of states and cultures—will help to close this gap.

Notes

1. Russel Howard, Reid Sawyer, and Natasha Bajema, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2008); Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 526–33.
3. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
4. The definition given by Beyond Intractability captures a common understanding of the term: “Conflict management involves the control, but not resolution, of a long-term or deep-rooted conflict. This is the approach taken when complete resolution seems to be impossible, yet something needs to be done. In cases of resolution-resistant or even intractable conflict, it is possible to manage the situation in ways that make it more constructive and less destructive. The goal of conflict management is to intervene in ways that make the ongoing conflict more beneficial and less damaging to all sides. For example, sending peacekeeping forces into a region enmeshed in strife may help calm the situation and limit casualties. However, peacekeeping missions will not resolve the conflict. In some cases, where non-negotiable human needs are at stake, management is the most feasible step.” See Brad Spangler, “Settlement, Resolution, Management, and Transformation: An Explanation of Terms,” Beyond Intractability, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/meaning_resolution/.

5. There were also some East-West bridge-building exercises, such as the Pugwash conferences, that sought to limit the nuclear arms race and the Dartmouth process, which aimed at U.S.-Soviet joint exploration of negotiated solutions to conflict.
6. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
7. Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8. Report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People* (New York: United Nations, 2003).
9. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
10. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001).
11. Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, *Preventing Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).
12. Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002); United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
13. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, eds., *Global Transformations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
14. As the World Bank reports, globalization is contributing to a rapid growth in average incomes across the globe. In the next twenty-five years, much of this growth will be concentrated in developing countries, but it will be accompanied by growing income inequality and potentially severe environmental pressures. And some regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa, are unlikely to be the beneficiaries of such growth. Growing income inequalities within countries will also contribute to civil unrest, especially in the world's poorest countries. See World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization* (Washington, DC, 2007).
15. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). Monty Marshall at the University of Maryland offers a similar conclusion. According to Marshall, "the most troubling regional sub-systems in the Globalization Era are the regions constituted by the sub-Saharan African countries and the pre-dominantly Muslim countries, which stretch from Morocco and Senegal in the west to Malaysia and Indonesia in the east. The Lorenz curves for these two regions are roughly equivalent; income inequality among African countries is only slightly greater than income inequality among Muslim countries." It is also apparent that "although the general magnitude of armed conflict in both regions has diminished substantially since the end of the Cold War, the overall decrease in warfare in Africa has fallen more slowly than the general global trend." Muslim countries, however, "are the sole region [sic] where there has been an increase in armed conflict in recent years, possibly levelling, or even reversing, the general downward [global] trend." Monty G. Marshall, "Caveats to the 'Pacification' of the Global System: Global Report on Governance, Conflict, and Systemic Development" (paper, International Studies Association 2007 Annual Meeting, Chicago, March 1, 2007).

16. Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 28–40.
17. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007).
18. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey*, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), "Public Opinion on Global Issues: A Web-Based Digest of Polling from Around the World," November 2009, www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/pop/index.html.
19. CFR, "Public Opinion on Global Issues," 41.
20. *Ibid.*
21. CFR, "Public Opinion on Global Issues," 46.
22. In addition, there is little consensus on who should deal with these wider problems. For instance, of the four countries most concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons (see table 1.1), Japan and Israel thought the United States should take the lead, while Lebanon felt that the United Nations should be the principal conflict management agency. A majority of respondents in Turkey, however, believed that Turkey itself should take the lead in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons.
23. Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and Jorn Tirman, eds., *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006); Ramesh Thakur, "Global Norms and International Humanitarian Law," *International Review of the Red Cross* no. 841 (March 31, 2001): 19–44, www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList182/8605528CB8A2EC1DC1256B66005FA42B.
24. Colin Bradford and Johannes Linn, "Reform of Global Governance: Priorities for Action," Policy Briefing no. 163, Brookings Institution, October 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10global%20governance/pb163.pdf>; Dries Lesage, "Globalisation, Multipolarity and the L20 as an Alternative to the G8," *Global Society* 20, no. 3 (2007): 343–61.
25. Joshua Partlow, "At Brazil Conference, G-20 Urges Swifter Action on Financial Crisis," *Washington Post*, November 10, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110902499.html.
26. Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe," *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007): 273; August Reinisch, "Securing the Accountability of International Organizations," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 7, no. 2 (April–June 2001): 131–50; Peter Willetts, "From 'Consultative Arrangements' to 'Partnership': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 6, no. 2, (April–June 2000): 191–212; Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds., *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceição, Ketell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. Mendoza, eds., *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
27. Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, "A European View on the Future of Multilateralism," *Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 182.
28. Andrew Mack, ed., *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Joseph J. Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfield, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict, 2010* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2010).

29. Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).
30. CSIS Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), <http://csis.org/programs/smart-power-initiative/smart-power-report>; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Smart Power* (forthcoming).
31. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575–607.
32. There are other tensions that thwart the development of stronger institutions in the region. The voluntary multilateralism and institutional weaknesses of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), for example, are due to "the on-going creative struggle between ambitious multilateralists and national sovereignty realists." In addition to the great power rivalries between China, Japan, and the United States, the broader regional framework for cooperation has been held hostage to the countries of Southeast Asia (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which preferred their own "incipient sub-regional architecture" that is centered on the "Asian way" of informal agreements and consensual decision making. Richard Feinberg, "Voluntary Multilateralism and Institutional Modification: The First Two Decades of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)," *Review of International Organizations* 3, no. 3 (2008): 239, 246.
33. Yoichi Funabashi, "Keeping Up With Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 110–25.
34. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
35. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–40.
36. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis," *Review of International Studies* 21 (1995): 359–87.
37. Robert E. Kelly, "Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism,'" *International Studies Review* 9 (2007): 197–229.
38. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., *The United Nations and Regional Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 31–46.
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40. Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Parag Khann, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony," *New York Times Magazine*, January 27, 2008.
41. Stephen John Stedman, Elizabeth M. Cousens, Donald Rothchild, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Roy E. Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
42. Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).