- Sort by
This landmark study offers a rich and detailed portrait of the negotiating practices of American officials. It assesses the multiple influences—cultural, institutional, historical, and political—that shape how American policymakers and diplomats approach negotiations with foreign counterparts and highlights behavioral patterns that transcend the actions of individual negotiators and administrations.
Informed by discussions and interviews with more than fifty seasoned foreign and American negotiators, Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney argue that four distinctive mind-sets have combined to shape U.S. negotiating practice: a businessperson’s pragmatic quest for concrete results, a lawyer’s attention to detail, a superpower’s inclination to dictate terms, and a moralizer’s sense of mission. The authors examine how Americans employ time, language, enticements, and pressure tactics at the negotiating table, and how they use (or neglect) the media, back channel communications, and hospitality outside the formal negotiating arena. They also explore the intense interagency rivalries and congressional second-guessing that limit U.S. negotiators’ freedom to maneuver.
A chapter by the eminent historian Robert Schulzinger charts the evolving relationship between U.S. presidents and their negotiators, and the volume presents a set of eight remarkably candid foreign perspectives on particular aspects of American negotiating behavior. These chapters are written by a distinguished cast of ambassadors and foreign ministers, some from countries allied to the United States, others from rivals or adversaries and all with illuminating stories to tell.
In the concluding chapter, Solomon and Quinney propose a variety of measures to enhance America’s negotiating capacities to deal with the new and emerging challenges to effective diplomacy in the 21st century.
Contributors: Gilles Andreani • Chan Heng Chee • David Hannay • Faruk Logoglu • Lalit Mansingh • Yuri Nazarkin • Robert Schulzinger • Koji Watanabe • John Wood
Since independence, Angola has witnessed twenty-plus years of civil war and a string of broken peace agreements. “It is not difficult to be a cynic about Angola,” notes Ambassador Paul Hare. Yet Hare and other dedicated diplomats have continued to persevere in their quest for a lasting solution to the Angolan conflict.
In this behind-the-scenes account of the negotiation and implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, Hare describes how representatives of the United Nations and “the Troika” (the United States, Russia, and Portugal) launched negotiations with the rebel forces of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, and the Dos Santos government to address their differences and plot a peaceful course for the country’s future. Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace offers a revealing picture of the interplay of personalities and policy agendas in this large, resource-rich country.
In this exceptionally well-written book, Hare follows the uneven process of implementation through to 1998, concluding with a look at the lessons of Angola for other conflicts, both in Africa and elsewhere.
A comprehensive, one-volume exploration of the peace and security field, this volume presents detailed investigations of four major approaches employed in the study of conflict and peacemaking.
Statecraft, or the art of conducting a state's affairs with other states, is as old as human civilization. So too is diplomacy, the form statecraft takes in time of peace.
In this comprehensive treatment, distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman describes the fundamental principles of the art of statecraft and the craft of diplomacy. The book draws on the author's years of experience as a practicing diplomat but also his extensive reading of the histories of ancient India, China, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and the Islamic world as well as modern Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Among numerous other subjects, the book addresses the role of intelligence, political actions, cultural influence, economic measures, and military power, as well as diplomatic strategy and tactics, negotiation, and the tasks and skills of diplomacy.
Taking an in-depth look at cases of the two Germanys, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt, Armstrong examines why initiatives by Brandt, Nixon/Carter and Mao, and Sadat and Begin succeeded where previous attempts at rapprochement had failed.
The book looks first at the available theory and then at rapprochemnet in practice. Were there, the author asks, similarities between the three cases in terms of the prevailing international circumstances, the strategies and tactics adopted in the pursuit of improved relations, and the formal negotiations that ushered in the new relationships? Armstrong concludes that some underlying principles did indeed govern the shift from mutual antagonism to mutual acceptance--principles that may apply equally in today's post-Cold War world.
Bridging the gap that separates the two cultures of academia and policymaking is the central purpose of this pathbreaking study. George examines six U.S. strategies toward Iraq in 1988-1991. He urges policymakers to make better use of scholarly knowledge and challenges scholars to develop the types of knowledge that can be employed effectively by policymakers.
A major work from a seminal figure in the field of conflict resolution, Building Peace is John Paul Lederach's definitive statement on peacebuilding. Marrying wisdom, insight, and passion, Lederach explains why we need to move beyond "traditional" diplomacy, which often emphasizes top-level leaders and short-term objectives, toward a holistic approach that stresses the multiplicity of peacemakers, long-term perspectives, and the need to create an infrastructure that empowers resources within a society and maximizes contributions from outside.
Sophisticated yet pragmatic, the volume explores the dynamics of contemporary conflict and presents an integrated framework for peacebuilding in which structure, process, resources, training, and evaluation are coordinated in an attempt to transform the conflict and effect reconciliation.
Building Peace is a substantive reworking and expansion of a work developed for the United Nations University in 1994. In addition, this volume includes a chapter by practitioner John Prendergast that applies Lederach's conceptual framework to ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
Ambassador Ould-Abdallah arrived in Burundi with a mandate from the United Nations to rescue the country's fledgling democracy and bring together political and ethnic rivals. His original mandate was for three months; he stayed two years. When he left, Burundi was by no means tranquil, but his efforts to foster political power sharing and to rein in extremism had done much to avert all-out civil war and to save Burundi from the genocidal fate of neighboring Rwanda.
In Burundi on the Brink, Ould-Abdallah pulls no punches as he describes the challenges he faced—not only from Burundians but also from members of the international community. He is equally revealing about how he sought to boost the limited leverage available to a UN special envoy by bold action, personal example, and close coordination with the local, diplomatic, and NGO communities.
The volume concludes with a stimulating, often unconventional analysis of what Burundi tells us about what does and what doesn't work in the practical realm of preventive diplomacy.
Japanese representatives bring to the negotiating table a distinctive mind-set and behavioral style, one that’s largely free of gamesmanship and histrionics but that’s nonetheless frequently exasperating.
This volume explores four recent U.S.–Japanese negotiations—two over trade, two over security-related issues—looking for patterns in Japan’s approach and behavior. In the first three cases, veteran Japanologist Michael Blaker finds the same fundamental style—coping. “Coping captures the go-with-the-flow essence of the Japanese bargaining approach”: cautious, methodical, low key, resistant, apprehensive, and above all defensive. In the fourth case, Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra recount how the United States and Japan fashioned a new security framework for their relationship in the 1990s. Vogel and Giarra show that close personal relationships, mutual trust, and a common purpose can foster flexible, fast, and fruitful negotiations.
Each case study explains the cultural as well as political, institutional, and personal factors and assesses their influence. A concluding chapter draws out common threads from the four studies, suggests how U.S. negotiators can maximize negotiating efficacy, and points the way toward a new and clearer understanding of Japanese bargaining behavior.
After two decades of hostile confrontation, China and the United States initiated negotiations in the early 1970s to normalize relations. Senior officials of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations had little experience dealing with the Chinese, but they soon learned that their counterparts from the People’s Republic were skilled negotiators.
This study of Chinese negotiating behavior explores the ways senior officials of the PRC—Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and others—managed these high-level political negotiations with their new American “old friends.” It follows the negotiating process step by step, and concludes with guidelines for dealing with Chinese officials.
Originally written for the RAND Corporation, this study was classified because it drew on the official negotiating record. It was subsequently declassified, and RAND published the study in 1995. For this edition, Solomon has added a new introduction, and Chas Freeman has written an interpretive essay describing the ways in which Chinese negotiating behavior has, and has not, changed since the original study. The bibiliography has been updated as well.