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How to secure the nuclear peace remains one of the most profound questions of the modern era. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War and with the arrival of a new administration in Washington, it is time to think through fundamental questions about the purposes of nuclear deterrence and the character of the U.S. strategic posture. While the existential threat to the United States has decreased, the rising threat of catastrophic terrorism, the possession and spread of nuclear weapons by other states, and a general worldwide nuclear renaissance continue to influence decisions about America’s strategic posture.
Recognizing the changing character of these threats, Congress formed a commission in 2008 to examine the United States’ long-term strategic posture and make recommendations. For more than eleven months this bipartisan commission of leading experts on national security, arms control, and nuclear technology met with Congressional leaders, military officers, high-level officials of several countries, arms control groups, and technical experts to assess the appropriate roles for nuclear weapons, nonproliferation programs, and missile defenses. This official edition contains a discussion of key questions and issues as well as the Commission’s findings and recommendations for tailoring U.S. strategic posture to new and emerging requirements as the world moves closer to a proliferation tipping point.
The Commission members include:
William J. Perry, Chairman
James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman
Whatever happened to multilateral peacekeeping? This is the central question Jean-Marc Coicaud explores in this penetrating scholarly examination of the period of “robust” UN-mandated peacekeeping missions in humanitarian crises. The most notable peace operations during this period were undertaken by the three leading NATO powers—the United States foremost among them—in the immediate post–Cold War era. Yet, as Coicaud explains, the international democratic solidarity that unified their multilateral action against a Soviet threat was stretched thin in the post–Cold War era, which manifested an entirely new set of threats to international security—such as ethnic cleansing and failed states. The three leading Western powers were ill-equipped to handle them effectively in terms of the fundamental political theory and applied political philosophy that generally informed their traditional foreign policies. The book concludes with guidelines for more effective realization of international interests among the Western powers and an afterword on the book’s lessons applied to Darfur.
A major work from a seminal figure in the field of conflict resolution, Building Peace is John Paul Lederach's definitive statement on peacebuilding. Marrying wisdom, insight, and passion, Lederach explains why we need to move beyond "traditional" diplomacy, which often emphasizes top-level leaders and short-term objectives, toward a holistic approach that stresses the multiplicity of peacemakers, long-term perspectives, and the need to create an infrastructure that empowers resources within a society and maximizes contributions from outside.
Sophisticated yet pragmatic, the volume explores the dynamics of contemporary conflict and presents an integrated framework for peacebuilding in which structure, process, resources, training, and evaluation are coordinated in an attempt to transform the conflict and effect reconciliation.
Building Peace is a substantive reworking and expansion of a work developed for the United Nations University in 1994. In addition, this volume includes a chapter by practitioner John Prendergast that applies Lederach's conceptual framework to ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
The concept of a “middle ground” between simple peace enforcement and traditional peacekeeping by lightly armed observers has been both ill defined and controversial. But the authors of this thoughtful yet challenging volume make a strong case for both the practicability and the desirability of such operations.
“Coercive inducement”—the term was suggested by Kofi Annan, when he was undersecretary general for peacekeeping—is a form of coercive diplomacy that relies more on the deployment and demonstration of military force than on the use of force per se. In the absence of such an option, the international community finds it hard to respond to a variety of crises, including ones that can spiral into genocide.
After first laying out general principles, the book explores four recent UN operations (in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti) in which coercive inducement was particularly relevant, and then presents operational guidelines for its use. Clear-sighted and pragmatic throughout, the authors conclude by suggesting when and to what extent the international community should commit itself to undertake coercive inducement.
This path-breaking volume fills a major gap in the literature on efforts to rebuild societies emerging from conflict. Drawing on firsthand experience in tackling organized and other destabilizing crime in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, it distills that practical, hard-won knowledge into lessons and guidance for policymakers and practitioners who must face similar challenges. No similar work exists anywhere.
"Serious crimes" include any and all criminal acts that threaten post-conflict security, hinder political and economic reconstruction, or undermine public trust in nascent criminal justice institutions. From money laundering to murder, drug trafficking to terrorism, these crimes flourish where governments are impotent or officials are themselves complicit in illegal activities. Their impact on post-conflict societies of all types can be profoundly damaging--but they can be dealt with.
More than forty seasoned practitioners--judges and generals, prosecutors and human rights activists, scholars and government officials from across the world--participated in the discussions that generated the broad guidelines and more specific prescriptions presented in this handbook. Each of its chapters covers a different area of activity--initial assessment, reform of the legal framework, institutional reform, investigation and prosecution of serious crimes, and foreign assistance--providing not only general guidance but also real-life examples to illustrate the importance of adapting to local circumstances.
Easy to read and easy to use, with checklists and sidebars supplementing the succinct text, Combating Serious Crimes will be greatly appreciated by governments, international and regional organizations, and foreign assistance providers throughout the world. The police, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and peacekeepers who address serious crimes on a day-to-day basis in post-conflict states will likewise find the book invaluable.
Three of the most successful peace processes of the 1990s—El Salvador, South Africa, and Guatemala—experienced worse violent crime after their wars concluded. Organized crime in Bosnia deepened after the 1995 Dayton peace agreement. These and other cases of post-conflict societies displaying serious and persistent problems of citizen insecurity and an absence of the rule of law underscore one of the central challenges of international security in the twenty-first century: How can external actors not only establish security in the immediate aftermath of war, but also create self-sustaining systems of justice and security?
In Constructing Justice and Security after War, the distinguished contributors—including scholars, criminal justice practitioners, and former senior officials of international missions—examine the experiences of countries that have recently undergone transitions from conflict with significant international involvement. The volume offers generalizations based on careful comparisons of justice and security reforms in some of the most prominent and successful cases of transitions from war of the 1990s drawn from Central America, Africa, the Balkans, and East Timor.
The contributors also offer answers to the question How can societies emerging from armed conflict create systems of justice and security that ensure basic rights, apply the law effectively and impartially, and enjoy popular support?
It has been described variously as everything from a global legislature to a self-important yet ineffectual debating society. And although the United Nations Security Council may have resembled the latter in many respects during the Cold War, when vetoes and disagreements among the permanent members often stymied the Council’s work, the end of the Cold War made it possible for the Council to begin exercising the full range of its legal authority under the UN Charter and to begin expanding that authority to meet the new challenges of the post–Cold War period.
In this book, Michael Matheson examines the Security Council’s new, expansive exercise of legal authority in this period and its devising of bold and innovative methods—coercive and noncoercive—to stop nascent wars and “threats to the peace,” including international terrorism. He also surveys the many roles assumed by the Council in postconflict environments, acting in a variety of ways to rebuild a war-torn country or territory and reintegrate it into the world community—from prosecuting war criminals, to providing compensation for war victims, to exercising governmental authority in postconflict territories such as Cambodia, Bosnia, and, recently, Kosovo and East Timor. The author also examines the more recent controversies over Iraq, in which disagreements among the permanent members have made decisive UN action difficult, and the investigations into fraud and abuse in various UN programs.
Combating terrorism is nothing new for democracies. Over the course of decades, a wide range of democratic states has encountered an array of terrorist groups—and, moreover, has often prevailed against them. As this timely and stimulating volume makes clear, the United States can learn much from fellow democracies to help it in its current war against al Qaeda and affiliated groups.
Democracy and Counterterrorism offers unparalleled breadth in its comparative study of the policies, strategies, and instruments employed in the fight against terrorism. The distinguished contributors—some scholars, some practitioners, and all renowned experts—examine no fewer than fourteen cases, featuring thirteen states and sixteen major terrorist groups. Each case study includes a brief overview, a detailed analysis of the policies and techniques that the government employed, and an assessment of which measures proved most effective and instructive.
The substantial conclusion draws together common threads from the individual cases and asks what lessons their collective experience can offer to the democracies now battling al Qaeda and the global jihadists. Among the answers sure to interest policymakers as well as academics is that the constraints within which democracies must fight terrorism are actually a source of strength; democratic governments that seek simply to obliterate terrorism by force usually succeed only in making their problems worse.
Can Russia and the United States really move beyond their bitter Cold War rivalry to a genuinely cooperative relationship?
Yes, argues distinguished diplomat James Goodby, but only if the United States, together with its European allies, promotes a new "logic of peace" to which NATO enlargement could contribute. During the nuclear standoff, a network of norms, rules, and structures kept the peace between the superpowers in Europe. Today, a new logic must be established, one that builds on mutual concerns to combat nuclear terrorism, reduce nuclear weaponry, and avoid the kind of bloodshed seen in the former Yugoslavia.
Drawing on the lessons of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Goodby analyzes the prospects for achieving a secure and democratic Euroatlantic community. He challenges policymakers and public alike to embrace a new vision of U.S.-Russian cooperation.
Addressing an increasingly important and greatly understudied phenomenon in international affairs, this groundbreaking volume analyzes the formation, actions, and efficacy of groups of states created to support UN peacemaking and peace operations. While these groups—Friends of the Secretary-General and related mechanisms—may represent just one small component of the United Nations’ increased involvement in conflict management, they have fast become a critical element in today’s system of global-security governance.
Bringing to the study a rare combination of both a scholarly eye and an insider’s perspective of the United Nations, Teresa Whitfield provides an overview of the types of groups and coalitions that have been actively engaged in issues of peace and security within the UN sphere and identifies five core factors for their success. She also offers case studies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Georgia, Western Sahara, and East Timor, illustrating in a comparative manner the utility and limitations of groups of Friends under widely different conditions. She ultimately arrives at conclusions and presents recommendations that will no doubt prove vital to policymakers when deciding whether to form a group of Friends or another more informal coalition. Indeed, the study provides compelling evidence for the impact—both positive and negative—that external political intervention can have on peace processes.
An original, important, and timely study, Friends Indeed? adds substantially to the literature on international conflict resolution and the role of international organizations in resolving crisis. Perhaps more significant, it greatly furthers understanding of how and in what circumstances the United Nations secretary-general and secretariat can work productively with groups of states in the resolution of conflict.