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Taking an in-depth look at cases of the two Germanys, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt, Armstrong examines why initiatives by Brandt, Nixon/Carter and Mao, and Sadat and Begin succeeded where previous attempts at rapprochement had failed.
The book looks first at the available theory and then at rapprochemnet in practice. Were there, the author asks, similarities between the three cases in terms of the prevailing international circumstances, the strategies and tactics adopted in the pursuit of improved relations, and the formal negotiations that ushered in the new relationships? Armstrong concludes that some underlying principles did indeed govern the shift from mutual antagonism to mutual acceptance--principles that may apply equally in today's post-Cold War world.
In practically all the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, a postconflict reconstruction gap of almost one year separates the end of military peacekeepers' mission of halting mass violence from the start of removing mines as well as rebuilding and repairing the host country's physical infrastructure: roads and bridges, public utilities, and buildings.
In this timely work, Colonel Garland Williams analyzes the postconflict reconstruction gap in three case studies—Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—and shows how military engineering brigades accompanying peacekeeping contingents can be put to use immediately after the conflict ends to restore vital infrastructure and social institutions. In the book's concluding chapter, Williams proposes changes in U.S. national security decision making to integrate military engineering brigades into postconflict reconstruction, thus making U.S. military officials less wary of “mission creep” and nation-building.
Can Russia and the United States really move beyond their bitter Cold War rivalry to a genuinely cooperative relationship?
Yes, argues distinguished diplomat James Goodby, but only if the United States, together with its European allies, promotes a new "logic of peace" to which NATO enlargement could contribute. During the nuclear standoff, a network of norms, rules, and structures kept the peace between the superpowers in Europe. Today, a new logic must be established, one that builds on mutual concerns to combat nuclear terrorism, reduce nuclear weaponry, and avoid the kind of bloodshed seen in the former Yugoslavia.
Drawing on the lessons of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Goodby analyzes the prospects for achieving a secure and democratic Euroatlantic community. He challenges policymakers and public alike to embrace a new vision of U.S.-Russian cooperation.
Even before it led opposition to the recent war on Iraq, France was considered the most difficult of the United States’ major European allies. Each side tends to irritate the other, not least at the negotiating table, where Americans complain of French pretensions and arrogance, and the French fulminate against U.S. hegemonisme and egoisme. But, whether they like it or not, the two nations are going to have to deal with one another for a long time to come.
Charles Cogan’s timely and insightful study can’t guarantee to make those encounters more fruitful, but it will help France’s negotiating counterparts understand how and why French officials behave as they do. With impressive objectivity and authority, Cogan first explores the cultural and historical factors that have shaped the French approach and then dissects its key elements. Mixing rationalism and nationalism, rhetoric and brio, self-importance and embattled vulnerability, French negotiators often seem more interested in asserting their country’s “universal” mission than in reaching agreement. Three recent case studies illustrate this distinctively French mélange.
Yet agreement is by no means always elusive. Cogan offers practical suggestions for making negotiations more cooperative and productive—although he also emphasizes the long-term damage inflicted by the crisis over Iraq.
Drawing on candid interviews with many of today’s leading players on the French, American, British, and German sides, this engaging volume will inform and stimulate both seasoned practitioners and academics as well as students of France and the negotiating process.
This book is the recipient of the Prix Ernest Lémonon from L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 2006
Drawing on interviews with dozens of European and American negotiators, How Germans Negotiate explores the roots of contemporary German negotiating behavior and identifies the stages through which negotiations typically pass. Using examples drawn from the past 50 years, Smyser illustrates Germany's abiding search for security, stability, and community. Germans are usually willing to make a mutually beneficial deal, but not before they've undertaken exhaustive research, presented a meticulous case, and satisfied their own demands for conceptual consistency.
A separate chapter focuses on business and economic negotiations, which can be very different from diplomatic encounters. Smyser investigates a variety of recent cases, including discussions on global monetary policy and the Daimler-Chrysler talks, and discovers a tension between a traditional "old" style and a more predatory "new" style. The conclusion lays out basic strategies and tactical pointers and explains how to avoid mistakes.
Recipient of "Outstanding Academic Book" Award—CHOICE, 1999
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, perhaps more than any other Cold War institution, embodied the West’s determination to deter potential Soviet aggression in Europe. But nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the Atlantic Alliance is engaged in cooperative security endeavors with former adversaries throughout Europe, including peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.
In this ambitious study, David Yost analyzes the major changes in the alliance and its new roles. While the Allies remain committed to collective defense, they have increasingly endowed NATO with new roles as an instrument of collective security. NATO Transformed provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of the current debate on the alliance’s enlargement and its new cooperative security institutions—including the Partnership for Peace and the special consultative forums with Russia and Ukraine—and the demands of crisis management and peacekeeping operations beyond NATO territory. Drawing on international political theory and the history of other alliances, Yost identifies crucial challenges for the cohesion and effectiveness of “the new NATO."
NATO has come under increasing fire for its structural constraints, shortcomings in burden sharing among its members, and disagreements about threat assessments and priorities. Despite these serious challenges, longtime NATO watcher David Yost argues that the Alliance is no Cold War dinosaur.
NATO’s Balancing Act evaluates the alliance’s performance of its three core tasks—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security—and reviews its members’ efforts to achieve the right balance among them. NATO has retained its original collective defense and positive political change missions, but it has also undertaken crisis management operations and addressed nontraditional threats, such as energy and cyber security, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This volume examines the evolving security environment and its implications for collective defense before turning to the Alliance’s crisis management efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and Libya. Yost also considers the possibility of NATO’s further enlargement, the complexities of its partnerships with other international organizations, and its shifting relationships with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Mediterranean and
Persian Gulf states, and the Asia-Pacific region.
Whether NATO can maintain cohesion and perform its tasks effectively is a question of fundamental importance for U.S. and international security. NATO’s Balancing Act calls for a constructive path forward, including balanced engagement with Russia, missions beyond Europe as necessary, and enhanced partnerships with international organizations and nations.
"The science of medicine was the first to discover that 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,'" Henryk Sokalski reminds us as he begins this study of a unique United Nations mission. "In the political realm, however, its full potential has yet to be realized." Sokalski, former head of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, provides the ultimate insider's look at the UN's attempt to establish a mission in this former Yugoslav republic before the imminent eruption of mass violence spilling over from neighboring Balkan states—Serbia and its overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo in particular.
An Ounce of Prevention—and the UNPREDEP mission itself—begins in early 1995 with a telephone call to Sokalski at his Warsaw home from UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, and it ends several years later in a disappointing Security Council veto of the mission's renewal. In between, Sokalski's study of this "novel experiment in UN peacekeeping" describes the mission's three "pillars" as well as contending theories on preventive diplomacy and early preventive action, contemporary Balkan history, and the daily bureaucratic and human challenges of reinventing civil society. All the while, Sokalski attempts to answer the question of whether the mission's renewed mandate could have prevented the country's recent destructive insurgency—and whether UNPREDEP's truncated success could serve as a model for future UN preventive deployments.
One of the most courageous journalists of our time, Kemal Kurspahic tells a riveting tale of how media malfeasance stirred up the ethnic hatreds that led to the bloody Balkan wars of the 1990s. Drawing on extensive interviews with journalists in the region, the author recounts how—after serving Yugoslavia's communist party for decades—key Balkan media readily shifted loyalties to nationalist ideologues, doing their warmongering for them.
But Prime Time Crime is also the story of independent journalists who risked their livelihoods and their lives in an effort to tell a more balanced story. And it is a disquieting account of how the international community, post-Dayton, undermined the goal of creating a civil society in Bosnia by leaving the nationalists in control of the media.
In a final section, the author offers recommendations for the international community in the Balkans and comprehensive lessons for media intervention in other countries undergoing transitions to democracy.