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INTRODUCTION

Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past

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The subject of this book is democracy and counterterrorism. Its purpose is to survey, and then to assess, the policies and practices democracies use to combat groups that use terrorism to achieve their goals. Our ultimate objectives are to identify the counterterrorism measures and policies that have proved most effective and to suggest which of them could most help the United States and its allies in dealing with al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated groups—what we call “the transnational jihadist network”—and other such groups that may emerge in the future and employ terrorism to achieve their goals.

Terrorism is both a tactic and a strategy. According to Bruce Hoffman, a longtime student of the subject, terrorism means at its core “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”¹ In today’s world, terrorism involves the deliberate and often random maiming and killing of noncombatants for political effect by subnational groups and nonstate actors. For the purposes of this volume, therefore, combating or countering terrorism means devising methods and policies to cause nonstate groups that employ this technique to stop using violence to achieve their political objectives. In this volume, we

concentrate on counterterrorism policies that a selected set of democratic governments have used against nonstate actors that have resorted to terrorism. Our focus is on which policies worked, which did not, and why.

To identify these policies, this volume addresses two fundamental questions: How have thirteen democratic states fought groups employing terrorism, and what lessons for counterterrorism campaigns might we derive from their collective experience? The case studies in this book deal with the first question; the conclusion, with the second question. The purpose of this introduction is to set the context for the case studies that follow.

WHY THIS STUDY?

The overwhelming majority of terrorism studies fall into one of two groups: separate monographs on the history and evolution of individual groups, or studies of terrorism in general. Such studies are useful for helping us understand the nature of specific groups that employ terrorism and the policies that particular governments have used to deal with terrorist threats. Comparative studies of counterterrorism, both cross-national and cross-temporal, are rare, however. As Martha Crenshaw, another longtime student of terrorism, remarked in 2002, scholars are “just beginning to sort through many issues regarding what lessons could be learned for U.S. policy from other cases.”² Consequently, there are few comparative studies that analyze counterterrorist campaigns conducted by democracies.

Among the best of the studies that do exist are *Western Responses to Terrorism* (Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten, eds.), *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberties in Six Countries* (David Charters, ed.), *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency* (Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw), *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan* (C. Christine Fair), and *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries* (Yonah Alexander, ed.).³

Each of these studies has its merits and deficiencies. The Schmid and Crelinsten volume contains seven case studies, but it is confined to Europe and includes the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria—states that have had little experience with terrorism to date. The Charters volume examines six cases (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Israel, and the United States), but the focus is on the nexus between security and civil

liberties—an important issue to be sure, but only part of what concerns us here. The Hoffman and Taw study is comparative, but because it includes both terrorism and counterinsurgency cases, it draws conclusions based on only three counterterrorism campaigns (Northern Ireland, Germany, and Italy). The Fair volume systematically analyzes urban terrorist campaigns in Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan and the respective government efforts to deal with them, and consequently it provides insights for counterterrorism, even though it is confined to three states. The Alexander volume covers a relatively large number of cases (the United States, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey, India, and Japan) and concentrates explicitly on democratic counterterrorism efforts, but the studies are not as systematic as the ones in this volume, nor are the lessons drawn from the cases and applied to America's campaign against today's global jihadist threat.

In sum, although valuable for their knowledge and insights, these studies do not exhaust the subject of democracy and counterterrorism. The purpose of this volume is to build upon these prior comparative studies and, in the process, add to the collective picture of how democratic states have combated, and should combat, terrorism.

CASE SELECTION

The case studies in this volume cover thirteen democratic states and sixteen major groups that have resorted to terrorism against these states. We employed four criteria to select our cases: the nature of the democratic government targeted, the duration of the government's counterterrorist campaign, the type of terrorist organization involved, and the degree to which the government's counterterrorist campaign succeeded or failed.

Nature of the Democratic Government. Our case studies include only democracies, but they encompass three types of democracies: fully democratic states, partially democratic states, and new or fragile democracies. (For analytical purposes, we group the second and third types into one category.) We have included these three types to increase the number of cases and their geographic range. We have avoided using authoritarian or totalitarian governments as "control states" for the simple reason that democratic states are more constrained in their ability to deploy military force domestically.

Authoritarian states eradicate insurgent terrorism from below by employing state terrorism. This practice is generally not an option for democracies, although two governments we studied did employ ruthless methods that fully mature democracies have not used.

Duration and Extent of the Counterterrorism Campaign. We have included some of the biggest and longest-lasting terrorist groups, in part because we are interested in applying lessons learned from these groups to al Qaeda and like groups. By terrorist group standards, al Qaeda is a very large, albeit loose, organization; consequently, assessing counterterrorist campaigns against large organizations is appropriate. Moreover, the campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliated groups is likely to be long, and there may be much to learn from campaigns of long duration. During such campaigns, both terrorist groups and governments have to adapt and change their techniques over time. Large and long-lived groups are likely to yield lessons especially suitable for dealing with al Qaeda.

Type of Terrorist Organization. We have included a range of terrorist groups: revolutionary, ethnonationalist, and religious or millenarian. Revolutionary groups aim to change the nature of the society in which they live, usually with the goal of redistributing resources from the rich to the poor. Ethnonationalist groups aim for separation in the form of a distinct state, for a high degree of local autonomy from the central government that rules over them, or to join another state. Religious or millenarian groups are those that either seek to establish theocratic states or hold to quasi-religious beliefs about a radical transformation of the entire world.

Success and Failure. Finally, our cases include successes and failures. We have included failures as well as successes to enhance our chances of separating what does not work from what does. Success means that attacks from the group employing terrorist tactics have ceased because the group has been destroyed as an effective force, or that the attacks have been reduced to a low level of frequency and destruction because the group has been significantly weakened and its appeal has been severely diminished or it has entered into a peace process. Failure means that the group remains potent and capable of mounting deadly attacks, or that the group continues to operate, mount attacks when it so chooses, and appeal to a larger sympathetic audience. We

do not code a simple cease-fire as a success if the group remains intact and is capable of resuming its terrorist campaign, although clearly a cease-fire can be a first step on the road to governmental success.

On the basis of these criteria, we selected a group of thirteen states to examine. Clearly, this group does not include every government that has faced a major terrorist threat in the past forty-five years, but it is representative of the types of counterterrorist campaigns that democratic and quasi-democratic governments have conducted during this period. For geographic spread, we have chosen cases from Europe (Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France); Latin America (Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia); the Middle East (Israel and Turkey); South Asia (India and Sri Lanka); East Asia (Japan); and Russia—almost a region unto itself. The cases include mature and fully democratic states—Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Israel, India, Japan, and Sri Lanka—and partial, new, or fragile ones (at the time they faced major terrorist challenges)—Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Russia, and Turkey.

Finally, our cases include the three types of groups resorting to terrorism. There are ethnonationalist groups: Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Hamas), Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Fatah), and Hizballah against Israel; Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) against Spain; the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the United Kingdom; the Sikhs—the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), the Babbar Khalsa (BK), the Khalistan Liberation Force (BLF), and the International Sikh Youth Federation—against India; the Kashmiri Jihadis—the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), and the Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM)—against India; the Chechen rebels against Russia; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) against Sri Lanka; and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) against Turkey. There are revolutionary groups: the Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades, or BR) against Italy; the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed National Liberation Forces, or FALN) against Venezuela; the Partido Comunista del Perú–Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path) against Peru; and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) against Colombia. Finally, there are religious or millenarian groups: the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) against France and Aum Shinrikyo against Japan.

Table 1-1 lists the states under consideration, the group or groups that have employed terrorist techniques against them, and the nature of the groups. (In table titles, we use the phrase *terrorist groups* as shorthand for groups employing terrorism.) Not all the groups under study fall neatly into one category. Hamas and Hizballah, for example, want to reclaim Israel for the Palestinian state, but both also have religious agendas. The Chechen rebels are largely Muslims fighting against a Russian Orthodox state, the various Kashmiri Jihadis are Muslims fighting against a largely Hindu India, and the Sikh rebellion against India had religious overtones. Nonetheless, we have classified these groups as ethnonationalist principally because they seek their own state and are fighting against another state or their own government to get it. Religion obviously plays a role in these situations, but we believe that the primary motivation of these groups is to acquire control over their own political fates. Similarly, the GIA, which we classify as a religious group, wanted to gain control over the Algerian government, but it does not represent a separate ethnic group within Algeria; the state it wanted to establish was an Islamist or theocratic one, and our concern with the GIA is the terrorist challenge it posed to the French government in the mid-1990s. Finally, although today the FARC is concerned with retaining the territory it controls in Colombia and the narcotics trade there, it began as a revolutionary group and still claims to be one. Thus, although seven of our groups do not fall quite so neatly into one category, there are valid reasons to put them in the categories we have.

These sixteen groups differ in a number of other dimensions that make them useful for thinking about how democracies can deal with the terrorist threats of today and tomorrow. For example, the IRA, ETA, Fatah, and the PKK are among the longest-lasting terrorist organizations. Hizballah nearly rivals al Qaeda in its international reach (it is reputed to have cells around the world) and has never been vanquished by Israel, the democratic state with probably the world's most sophisticated, experienced, and extensive counterterrorism apparatus. LTTE is one of the most successful and powerful terrorist organizations of the past thirty years. It even possesses its own navy, and although it did not pioneer suicide terrorism in the contemporary world, it has made extensive use of this technique to great effect. The FARC, Hizballah, PKK, Sikh, and Kashmiri Jihadi cases are useful to look at in part because of the scale of the threat they have posed and in part because they spill out beyond the borders of their respective states and have interna-

Table 1-1. The Government Targeted and Type of Terrorist Group

Government Targeted	Terrorist Group	Type of Group
Italy	Red Brigades	Revolutionary
United Kingdom	IRA	Ethnonationalist
Spain	ETA	Ethnonationalist
France	GIA	Religious
Venezuela	FALN	Revolutionary
Peru	Shining Path	Revolutionary
Colombia	FARC	Revolutionary
Israel	Hamas and Fatah; Hizballah	Ethnonationalist
Turkey	PKK	Ethnonationalist
Russia	Chechen rebels	Ethnonationalist
India	Sikhs; Kashmiri Jihadis	Ethnonationalist
Sri Lanka	Tamil Tigers	Ethnonationalist
Japan	Aum Shinrikyo	Millenarian

tional implications. Aum Shinrikyo had vast sums of money and considerable scientific expertise at its disposal and is the only known terrorist organization to have used weapons of mass destruction (sarin and anthrax) with even a modicum of success. The Red Brigades came closer to success—to bringing down the Italian government—than is commonly thought, and the Italian government’s campaign against them teaches much about how a democracy can effectively fight terrorism against a tough opponent. The French campaign against the GIA, which along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba (a Kashmiri Jihadi group) is closest in ideology and association with al Qaeda, teaches a lot about the effective marrying of judicial and intelligence systems. The campaign against the FALN was almost a textbook case of how an emerging democracy could successfully defeat a counterinsurgency group that also employed terrorist tactics. Finally, Russia has fought against groups that have received help from al Qaeda or the involvement of al Qaeda elements. In sum, although our cases do not include every group that has employed terrorist techniques against every democratic state in the past forty-five years, they do include the major ones, with the exception of current challenges such as al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.

Finally, when their tactics are taken into account, the groups we studied fall into two categories: those groups that relied solely or primarily on terror tactics, and those groups that resorted to both terror and guerrilla tactics.⁴ Both terror and guerrilla tactics are weapons used by a weaker party against a stronger one. Terrorism, let's recall, is the deliberate use of violence, more often than not against noncombatants, to induce political change through fear. Guerrilla warfare refers to tactics that an irregular army uses to fight a state's regular armed forces. Whereas terrorism relies on the fear induced by random violence and killing to produce desired political results, guerrilla tactics are designed to attack and wear down governmental forces while avoiding set-piece battles with the state's regular army units, since guerrilla groups are inferior in size to regular armies and poorly equipped compared to them. Hit-and-run tactics aim to grind down regular forces and bring about their eventual military defeat through attrition and loss of will, or to pose such huge costs to a military effort that a government will seek negotiations and compromise. There is admittedly a gray area between terrorism and guerrilla warfare because guerrilla forces can and do resort to terror tactics, especially against civilian governmental officials and police forces. Despite the considerable gray area, guerrilla forces are generally much larger than those of "terror-only" groups; they usually concentrate on attacking military forces as opposed to noncombatants (although they do kill non-combatants); and they often try to seize and hold territory rather than simply attack innocents randomly.⁵ Table 1-2 illustrates the breakdown of our groups by the tactics used.

In our cases, all seven groups that relied solely or primarily on terror tactics were fighting against wholly democratic states (see table 1-3). The only qualification to this statement concerns ETA, which was formed in Franco's authoritarian Spain, survived Spain's transition to democracy, and continued to operate in a fully democratic Spain. (For the GIA, we are concerned with its operations in France, not Algeria.) For the nine groups that employed both guerrilla and terror tactics, five—the FALN, the FARC, Shining Path, the Chechen rebels, and the PKK—operated against new, fragile, or partially democratic states. Of the remaining four groups, two—Hizballah and the Kashmiri Jihadis—established their base of operations within a fragile or partially democratic state. Hizballah operated from Lebanon against Israel and waged both a guerrilla war and a terrorist campaign to force Israel to end its occupation of Lebanon. The Kashmiri Jihadis

Table 1-2. Terrorist Groups and Guerrilla-Terror Tactics

Group Uses Both Guerrilla and Terror Tactics	Group Uses Primarily or Only Terror Tactics
FARC	GIA
Chechen rebels	Aum Shinrikyo
FALN	IRA
Hizballah	Red Brigades
Fatah	Sikhs
Shining Path	ETA
PKK	Hamas
Tamil Tigers	
Kashmiri Jihadis	

Table 1-3. Democratic States and Terrorist Groups

Nature of Democratic State Attacked	Ethno-nationalist Terrorist Groups	Revolutionary Terrorist Groups	Religious or Millenarian Terrorist Groups
Fully Democratic States	Hamas and Fatah (Israel) Hizballah (Israel) ETA (Spain) IRA (United Kingdom) Sikhs (India) Kashmiri Jihadis (India) Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)	Red Brigades (Italy)	Aum Shinrikyo (Japan) GIA (France)
New, Fragile, or Partially Democratic States	PKK (Turkey) Chechen rebels (Russia)	FALN (Venezuela) Shining Path (Peru) FARC (Colombia)	

resorted to both terror and guerrilla tactics against India, infiltrating from Pakistan and employing terror tactics against Indian civilians but also targeting Indian military units, often with the help of Pakistani military units that shelled Indian military forces across the border with large artillery pieces. The third group, Fatah, operated against Israel proper and against Israeli forces occupying Palestinian territory, using terror tactics within Israel and a combination of guerrilla and terror tactics within occupied Palestinian territory. The fourth group, the Tamil Tigers, was the only one of our sixteen that used both terrorism and an extremely effective insurgency war within a democratic state.

Why did groups that used primarily terror tactics operate in only mature democracies, and why did five of the eight guerrilla groups (the FARC, the Chechen rebels, the FALN, Shining Path, and the PKK) emerge within new, fragile, or partially democratic states? A definitive answer to each question is beyond the scope of this volume, but some speculation is in order, and the discussion concerns the nature of the democracy within which, or against which, the group was operating. In genuinely mature democratic states, a dissatisfied group usually can do well if it has a broad base of support, because it has an electoral option that enables it to put pressure on the government to respond to its interests. In general, therefore, we are not likely to see broad-based groups resorting to guerrilla tactics and insurgency warfare against governments within well-established and fully functioning democracies. LTTE is an exception to this generalization because it is a broad-based group that has used both guerrilla and terror tactics and operates within a functioning democracy. Fatah, Hizballah, and the Kashmiri Jihadis are anomalies because they operated against democratic states, but from bases outside those states. So, too, is the IRA, because the movement emerged not in mainland Britain but in the Protestant province of Northern Ireland, where British standards of democracy were not practiced. Similarly, revolutionary groups in well-established democracies with large middle classes are not likely to attract large numbers of people who want to overthrow the government but are more likely to operate as fringe groups. In well-established democracies, therefore, terror is normally the tactic of choice for ethnonationalist and revolutionary groups.

In contrast, in new, fragile, or partial democracies, where the rules of the game are not fully settled and well accepted and where the law and the courts may not be objective, dissatisfied groups—both ethnonationalist and

revolutionary—have less confidence that the government will fairly address their demands, and governments often have bad track records that support the dissatisfied groups' views. Consequently, such groups are able to attract large numbers of adherents willing to fight the central government, or to support those willing to do so, in order to overthrow the government, create their own sovereign territory, or claim a high degree of regional autonomy.

Finally, religious or millenarian groups are the wild card in this analysis, because religion can be a powerful motivator, as can cult worship, which the case of Aum Shinrikyo shows. The group had more than nine thousand members in Japan alone and, according to some observers (see the Parachini and Furakawa chapter), as many as thirty thousand members altogether. Moreover, the tactics these groups resort to are more difficult to predict, although in both our cases (the GIA and Aum Shinrikyo), terror was the tactic of choice.

OVERVIEW OF THE CASES

Table 1-4 provides some important statistics about the sixteen groups under study here. Columns one and two detail the groups employing terror tactics, their nature, and the governments targeted. Column three details the strength of the hard-core active members of each group—those who actually carry out the attacks or provide the wherewithal to make them happen—not the larger number of respective supporters and sympathizers. For example, the IRA had a core of active members only in the hundreds, but its active supporters numbered in the thousands, while its sympathizers—those willing to vote for its political wing—numbered in the tens of thousands. Similarly, Hizballah has always been quite choosy about who can join the hard-core active membership, but its supporters arguably number in the thousands or even tens of thousands. Column four provides the dates during which the group operated (or still operates). Not all groups that are counted as still active, however, operate with the degree of effectiveness and potency that they once showed (see below). Column five displays the number of people killed by the group, or by both the group and the government. When people killed by both the group and the government are listed, the figure generally includes noncombatants, group members, and government security forces.⁶

Table 1-4. Profile of Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	Government Targeted	Approximate Member Strength	Approximate Dates of Effective Operation	People Killed
Red Brigades (revolutionary)	Italy	800	1970–82	150 by the Red Brigades; 351 by all revolutionary leftists and fascist bands
IRA (ethnonationalist)	United Kingdom	Several hundred	1970–2005	3,365 on all sides
ETA (ethnonationalist)	Spain	Hundreds	1959–present	850 by ETA
GIA (religious/millenarian)	France	Thousands in the 1990s; 30–100 today	1992–2006	12 French citizens killed in France; 100 expatriates killed in Algeria; several thousand Algerians killed
FALN (revolutionary)	Venezuela	2,000–3,000	1963–67	6,000 on both sides
Shining Path (revolutionary)	Peru	7,500–10,000 in the 1980s; 400–600 today	1980–present	69,280 people—civilians and government forces—killed or disappeared
FARC (revolutionary)	Colombia	16,000–20,000	1964–present	41,000–60,000 on all sides

Table 1-4, continued

Hamas and Fatah (ethnonationalist)	Israel	500-plus Hamas; 1,000-plus Fatah	1987–present	1,322 killed on both sides in the first intifada (1987–93); 622 killed on both sides from 1993 to April 1999; 4,390 killed on both sides in the second intifada (September 29, 2000–January 31, 2005)
Hizballah (ethnonationalist)	Israel	5,000 in mid-1980s; hundreds–2,000 today	1982–present	More than 900 Israeli soldiers killed by Hizballah in Lebanon between 1978 and 2000; 1,237 Hizballah fighters killed between June 1982 and May 2000
PKK (ethnonationalist)	Turkey	10,000 in mid-1990s; 4,000–5,000 today	1984–99	30,000 on both sides
Chechen rebels (ethnonationalist)	Russia	2,000–3,000	1994–present	40,000–70,000 on both sides
Sikhs (ethnonationalist)	India	Hundreds–2,000	1980–93	19,359 civilians, police officers, and terrorists
Kashmiri Jihadis (ethnonationalist)	India	3,500–4,000	1989–present	35,000–65,000 killed on all sides
Tamil Tigers (ethnonationalist)	Sri Lanka	8,000–10,000	1976–present	60,000–65,000 killed on both sides
Aum Shinrikyo (religious/millennarian)	Japan	9,000 claimed in 1990s; 1,500–2,000 today	1987–present	12 killed in 1995 Tokyo subway attack

We must stress that reliable figures on group membership and numbers of people killed are difficult to come by. For obvious security reasons, the groups studied in this volume did not make their membership lists public, and member strength varied over time for each group. In table 1-4, we have provided our best estimates of peak member strength when the group was most active, and, where available, current membership figures. Figures on the numbers of people killed are especially hard to come by, particularly for conflicts that involved counterinsurgency operations. In such conflicts, both the groups and the governments involved had political incentives either to exaggerate or to minimize the numbers of deaths that occurred.

Finally, the figures on people killed mix apples and oranges to a degree because we have relied on several databases that are not consistent with one another. In four cases—the Red Brigades, ETA, the GIA, and Aum Shinrikyo—we provide data only for numbers of people killed by terrorists, because the differences between those numbers and the total numbers killed (including killing by the government) is very small. In the other cases, with the exception of Hizballah, we have figures for the total number of people killed by both the terrorist groups and the governmental forces arrayed against them, and this total generally includes terrorists, governmental forces, and civilians. The case of Hizballah appears to have the greatest difference between the number of people killed by terrorists and the total number killed by both terrorist and governmental forces. A large number of civilians were killed as a result of Israeli defense activities against Hizballah in southern Lebanon, but it is difficult to know exactly how many.⁷ For all these reasons, the data in columns three and five in particular should be treated as rough estimates rather than definitive and exact numbers. The appendix at the end of this volume details the sources for the figures provided in columns three and five.

Four important conclusions emerge from table 1-4. First, nearly all the groups operated for long periods, and all but six—the Red Brigades, the FALN, the Sikhs, the ETA, the IRA, and Aum Shinrikyo (which no longer engages in terrorism)—are still actively operating today, even though some—ETA, the PKK, and Shining Path—are doing so with severely reduced effectiveness. Counterinsurgency wars against guerrilla groups that also employ terrorism are generally drawn-out affairs because counterinsurgency efforts by nature take a long time. The government's quick dispatch of the FALN in Venezuela in the 1960s is the exception, not the rule, for

Table 1-5. Terrorist Groups by Member Strength

2,000 or Fewer	More Than 2,000
Red Brigades	FALN
IRA	PKK
ETA	Chechen rebels
GIA (in France)	Shining Path
Hamas and Fatah	FARC
Sikhs	Kashmiri Jihadis
	Hizballah
	Tamil Tigers
	Aum Shinrikyo

counterinsurgency campaigns. However, even small groups such as the Red Brigades, the IRA, or ETA, which employ only terror tactics, can bedevil governments for years. The obvious lesson here is that campaigns against groups that employ terrorism are not short-lived affairs. Usually, progress must be measured in decades, not years.

Second, there is a nearly perfect correlation between the size of the group, on the one hand, and the tactics employed, on the other. (Table 1-5 breaks out groups according to member strength.) The groups with smaller memberships (Fatah being the exception)—the Red Brigades, the IRA, ETA, the GIA, Hamas, and the Sikhs—primarily used terror tactics. The groups with larger memberships (more than two thousand members)—the FALN, the PKK, the Chechen rebels, Shining Path, the FARC, the Kashmiri Jihadis, Hizballah, and the Tamil Tigers—resorted to both terror and guerrilla tactics. The larger groups had more members because the insurgency wars they waged required larger forces than did terror-only tactics. Aum Shinrikyo is the other exception to this generalization: it had a very large membership but used only terror tactics.

Third, there is no correlation between groups with large memberships, on the one hand, and the nature of the democratic states they targeted, on the other. Five of the nine groups with large membership—the FALN, the FARC, Shining Path, the Chechen rebels, and the PKK—operated against new, fragile, or partial democracies. The remaining four groups with large memberships—Aum Shinrikyo, Hizballah, the Kashmiri Jihadis, and the Tamil Tigers—fought against more mature democracies. It appears that

both mature and not-so-mature democracies can suffer groups with large memberships that resort to a combination of terror and guerrilla tactics.

Finally, not surprisingly, the biggest death tolls (more than ten thousand) occurred in those states that battled large groups employing both guerrilla and terror tactics. Hizballah is an exception because it operated mainly outside Israel and mostly against the Israeli army in Lebanon, not against Israeli civilians in Israel (except for rocket attacks into Israel).⁸ The medium and low death tolls (fewer than ten thousand) occurred mostly in those states with groups that relied solely or primarily on terror tactics, with two exceptions—Hizballah and the FALN, both of which also resorted to guerrilla tactics. Table 1-6 breaks out the death toll into low, medium, and high categories.

Table 1-6. Terrorist Groups and the Death Toll

Low (Fewer Than 2,000)	Medium (2,000–10,000)	High (More Than 10,000)
ETA	IRA	PKK
Red Brigades	FALN	Chechen rebels
Aum Shinrikyo	Hamas and Fatah	Shining Path
GIA	Hizballah	Tamil Tigers
		FARC
		Kashmiri Jihadis
		Sikhs

COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND THE CASES

A state can use a range of counterterrorism policies, strategies, and instruments to combat groups resorting to terror. For purposes of this volume, we have grouped these measures into three categories: political measures, legislative and judicial measures, and security measures.

- **Political measures** include negotiations with groups (in which the government makes compromises and concessions) to bring about the end of resistance; socioeconomic and political reforms to win the “hearts and minds” of people from whom the terrorists draw both armed adherents and more general support; and international cooperation to cut off funds

to terrorists, extradite terrorists, police borders, and provide intelligence to the state under siege.

- **Legislative and judicial measures** include emergency and other special legislation to expand the government's power to arrest, detain, and incarcerate suspects and to gain intelligence about them in ways that involve infringements on citizens' privacy; use of the courts to empower the state and special magistrates and prosecutors to undertake broad investigative actions; legislation to disrupt the finances of groups employing terrorism; and amnesty and repentance measures designed to wean active armed members from such groups and to reintegrate them into society.
- **Security measures** include military deployments to protect the population and to seek out and destroy terrorist groups; intelligence operations, especially the use of counterterrorist units to penetrate terrorist networks and disrupt their logistics and support networks; new organizational machinery to coordinate the security instruments and disparate units of government dealing with terrorism; and preventive actions for defense, such as the hardening of facilities, control of access, and the like.

Not all of the thirteen governments studied in this volume employed every one of the above measures, and each government had its own particular way of utilizing the measures. Furthermore, the relative importance of the measures adopted differed across the cases, although good intelligence was critical to every case in which the government enjoyed success. In most cases, the government employed a large number of the measures, and in the conclusion we analyze the commonalities and the contrasts among the cases with respect to how governments used the above counterterrorism instruments.

In order that these comparisons could be drawn and lessons for counterterrorism extracted from them, the authors were asked to keep a set of questions in mind in writing about their cases. Every case study treats the questions in a different manner because the cases by necessity differ, but all the cases deal with the questions in one form or another. These are the questions the contributors were asked to keep in mind:

- What were (are) the nature, the modus operandi, and the aims of the group fighting the government, as well as the dynamics of the conflict?
- What were (are) the elements of the government's counterterrorist policy?

- Which policies used by the government worked, which did not work, and why?
- How adaptable was (is) the terrorist group to policies the government employed, and how adaptable was (is) the government in return?
- How did (has) the terrorist-counterterrorist struggle change(d) over time?
- What were the key factors enabling the government to prevail, if indeed it did prevail, and if it failed, what were the key factors for failure?
- Did (has) the government make (made) significant concessions to the terrorists' demands?
- Did the international environment contribute to the success or failure of the government's counterterrorist campaign, and if so, how?

The fourteen case-study chapters appear in the order in which they are listed in table 1-4, which is presented geographically. Each chapter begins with a brief overview of the facts of the case, followed by an in-depth analysis of the policies and techniques that the government in question employed against the groups it faced. Finally, each author draws lessons from his or her particular case and assesses which of the counterterrorist instruments seemed to prove most effective in combating the terrorist threat. We now turn to the case studies.

APPENDIX: SOURCES FOR TABLE I-4

Red Brigades

- Member strength: William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 77–103.
- People killed: Donatella della Porta and Maurizio Rossi, *Cifre crudeli: Bilancio dei terrorismi italiani* (Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo, 1984), 67–71.

IRA

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- People killed: Northern Ireland, Department of Finance and Personnel, “Deaths and Injuries as a Result of the Security Situation, 1969 to 2003–04,” *Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics 2003* (Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2004), 81.

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- Member strength: *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B.
- People killed: *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B.

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- People killed: “France Puts Muslim Militants on Trial for Bombings That Killed Eight,” *Independent*, November 25, 1997, 12; and *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B.

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- People killed: Peter Calvert, “Terrorism in Venezuela,” in *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, eds. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 455.

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- Member strength: David Scott Palmer, “The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru’s Shining Path,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 273–306; *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B; and *TMB: 2004–2005*, 374.
- People killed: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú, *Informe final*, vol. 1, *Primera parte: El proceso, los hechos, las víctimas* (Lima: Navarrete, 2003), 169.

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- Member strength: Eduardo Pizarro, *Kolumbien: Aktuelle Situation und Zukunftsperspektiven für ein Land im Konflikt*, Analysen und Berichte, no. 4 (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, November 2001), 29; and Heidrun Zinecker, *Kolumbien: Wie viel Demokratisierung braucht der Frieden*, Report 2/2002 (Frankfurt am Main: HSFK, 2002), 9.
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Hamas and Fatah

- Member strength: *TMB: 2004–2005*, 366–67.
- People killed: B’Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Statistics, “Israelis Killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem),” B’Tselem, Publications, “Olso: Before and After, the Status of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories” (May 1999); and B’Tselem, Statistics, “Intifada Fatalities,” www.btselem.org.

Hizballah

- Member strength: Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb ‘allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 53; and A. Nizar Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1997), <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a2.html>. Other experts report that Hizballah had five thousand fighters and five thousand more reservists by the end of the 1980s. See Carl Anthony Wege, “Hizbollah Organization,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17, no. 2 (April–June 1994): 155; *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B; and *TMB: 2003–2004*, 346.
- People killed: William Stewart, “How Many Must Die?” *Time*, February 17, 1997, 43; Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon: Fire and Embers* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), 105; Roula Khalaf, “A Guerilla with Charm: Sheikh

Hassan Nasrallah,” *Financial Times*, May 27, 2000, 15; and Clyde R. Mark and Alfred B. Prados, *Lebanon*, no. 1B89118 (Congressional Research Service, updated June 10, 2005).

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- Member strength: Ismet Imset, *PKK: Ayrilikci Siddetin 20 Yili (1973–1992)* (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1993), 188; *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B; and *TMB: 2004–2005*, 362.
- People killed: John B. Grant, “Turkey’s Counterinsurgency Campaign against the PKK: Lessons Learned from a Dirty War” (unpublished thesis, Faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College, June 2002), 1; and *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, 142.

Chechen rebels

- Member strength: *TMB: 2004–2005*, 364.
- People killed: *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 142; and “Group Claims 25,000 Russian Soldiers Have Died in Chechnya,” *Eurasian Daily Monitor* 1, no. 3 (May 5, 2004).

Sikhs

- Member strength: Data compiled by Paul Wallace from interviews; *Tribune*, March 31, 1989, 1; *Times of India*, April 10, 1988, 1; *India Today*, April 20, 1988, 35–36; and *Times of India*, March 17, 1989, 7.
- People killed: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Integration Council, Meeting December 31, 1991. Annexure-1, *Profile of Violence in Punjab*, 11; Office of the Director-General of Police, Punjab, as cited in K. P. S. Gill, “The Dangers Within: Internal Security Threats,” in *Future Imperiled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond*, ed. Bharat Karnad (New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 1994), 118, 120.

Kashmiri Jihadis

- Member strength: *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, 45.
- People killed: *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, 141; BBC News, “Soldiers Killed in Kashmir Attack,” March 28, 2005; Praveen Swami, “Quickstep or Kadam Taal? The Elusive Search for Peace in Jammu and Kashmir,”

Special Report no. 133 (United States Institute of Peace, March 2005), fig. 2, “Fatalities from Violence in Jammu and Kashmir, 1989–2004.”

Tamil Tigers

- Member strength: *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B.
- People killed: *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, 98, 119.

Aum Shinrikyo

- Member strength: *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B; and *TMB: 2004–2005*, 372.
- People killed: *PGT: 2003*, Appendix B.

NOTES

1. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43. See his discussion in chapter 1 for the different meanings and evolution of the term *terrorism*.

2. Martha Crenshaw at a Congressional Research Service seminar in 2002, quoted in Nina M. Serafino, *Comparative Terrorism: Possible Lessons for U.S. Policy from Foreign Experiences, Summary of the Major Points of a Seminar* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 24, 2002), 16.

3. See Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten, eds., *Western Responses to Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, 1993); David Charters, ed., *The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberties in Six Countries* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994); Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); C. Christine Fair, *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); and Yonah Alexander, ed., *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

4. It must be noted, however, that two of our groups, LTTE and the FARC, moved beyond guerrilla warfare to the use of main-force units or regular conventional warfare.

5. See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 41.

6. We thank the authors of the case studies for their help in providing us with these figures and for suggesting where to track down the ones they could not provide.

7. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that between 1978 and 2000, twenty-one hundred Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas lost their

lives, and twenty-one thousand Lebanese civilians died in clashes with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). A difficulty with the twenty-one-thousand figure is that it does not break out numbers of civilians killed by IDF and SLA operations against Hizballah and by the IDF in its general operations in Lebanon, especially in the first few years after the initial invasion and the subsequent attack on Beirut. See the appendix for the full citation for the CRS source.

8. We put Hizballah in the medium-death-toll category on the basis of our estimate that the bulk of the twenty-one thousand civilian deaths caused by IDF operations in Lebanon occurred in the early years of Israel's occupation of Lebanon, not in subsequent years during IDF operations against Hizballah in southern Lebanon.