U.S. Institute of Peace Press

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$24.95 $20.00 (Paperback)
978-1-60127-040-5

USIP Press Books
July 2009
356 pp. , 6" x 9"

“This unique, joint memoir reveals a behind-the-scenes look at the U.S.-Soviet policymaking process at the end of the 20th Century. The authors provide a fascinating account of their roles in moving the issue of human rights up the foreign policy agenda.”
—Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

“In recounting the experience of the senior negotiators on one of the key issues that arose during the Cold War, the authors provide valuable insight into negotiations that have received relatively little attention as compared to those on arms control and geopolitical issues. Their comments are also very useful in combating some widespread misconceptions about the nature and achievements of Gorbachev’s perestroika.”
—Jack F. Matlock, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1987-1991

A diplomatic memoir unlike any other, this volume takes the reader behind the scenes on both sides of the Cold War as two men form an unlikely partnership to help transform Soviet-American relations.

When U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Schifter first met Soviet deputy foreign minister Anatoly Adamishin to discuss human rights, the Reagan administration was still skeptical of Gorbachev’s reformist credentials. But skepticism soon gave way not just to belief but to active support. Like their immediate superiors George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, Schifter and Adamishin became partners in the process of rapprochement. Together, they helped free political prisoners, spur Jewish emigration, support perestroika against its domestic enemies, and contribute to the mutual trust that allowed the Cold War to end swiftly and peacefully.

Each chapter consists of two parts, one by each author, that offer complementary perspectives on the same events. The result is a volume that reveals much about the policymaking process during a historic era and exemplifies the power of diplomatic negotiation. It also argues provocatively that once the Cold War had ended, U.S. assistance to the Soviet Union could have helped prevent Gorbachev’s fall from power, which ultimately damaged the democratic cause in Russia.